Do We Really Want to go to the Congo?

In the last two weeks there have been rumbles in the Ottawa jungles that the Harper government might be interested in sending troops to take part in the United Nations mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The Chief of the Defence Staff was said to be telling the troops that Canada’s next overseas mission was in Africa. The departing Chief of the Land Staff, General Andrew Leslie, was tipped to be the commander of the UN’s Congo force. There was even a hot rumour that the Governor General was to visit Kinshasa, the capital, and the media began writing informed stories on all the possibilities.

Certainly the Congo is a disaster, a huge country the size of Europe (2.35 million sq. kms) with a corrupt government ruling its population of some 70 million, genocidal tribal slaughters, rapacious mining companies scooping up everything they can, and neighbouring nations trying to bite off chunks of territory and population for their own purposes. The United Nations first went into the Congo in 1960, with Canadian signallers providing its communications, and UN forces fought a war against separatist elements. It has been there again for more than a decade with a 22,500-man force, the largest UN force ever, mainly provided from African nations.

MONUC, as the UN force is dubbed in French, is underfunded, under-supplied, and has been neither competent militarily nor effective in halting the violence that is estimated to have killed more than five million Congolese since 1999. Moreover its mandate, as so often is the case with UN missions, is fuzzy, its political support in New York doubtful. Many also consider the UN troops in-country to be part of the problem, and there have been charges of corruption and rape levied against them. And even though MONUC has supported the Kinshasa government as it tries to impose its control, President Joseph Kabila has demanded that the UN leave the Congo by mid-2011.

Should Canada involve itself – or not – in this horrifying mess? First, there seems no doubt that the Canadian public continues to believe that Canada is uniquely gifted in peacekeeping. Lester Pearson’s Nobel Peace Prize, the 60-year-long record of service in UN missions, and the popular sense that doing good is what the Canadian Forces should be doing make UN service hugely popular. And with the Canadian Forces now pulling out of Afghanistan, an unpopular commitment (even though UN-authorized) because it involves killing and being killed and supporting the United States, what better way to re-establish the national bonafides than by taking over a UN peacekeeping force? An Ipsos-Reid poll in September last year found popular support for the CF to become a force that does only peacekeeping. The New Democratic Party, the Bloc Quebecois, large elements of the Liberal Party, and the peace movement speak as one on this: government funding has made the Canadian Forces capable again, so why not use the CF for peace in a nation that is bleeding to death?

But hold on a moment. There’s no doubt that the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a basket case, a perfect example of a failed state ruled for the benefit of a corrupt leadership and the corporations that loot it. But before we jump in, we need to remember a few things, the first being that the government of the DRC wants the UN forces out. UN willingness to finance MONUC is shaky at best, and there is no guarantee that the countries that pay the bill might not accede to Kabila’s demands and support getting out.

Then there are the peculiarly Canadian factors. The members of the Canadian Forces are white, and that’s never a plus in the Congo. They are a Western force that needs roads and mobility to operate effectively, requires a high standard of logistical support, and has small numbers at its disposal. The Congo is huge, and in the eastern regions where much of the killing goes on, there is no infrastructure. One Canadian officer who knows the country well says it can take five days to drive 100 kilometres in Orientale province in the rainy season.

What this means is that if the CF is to go into the DRC, it will need fleets of helicopters, potable water, and a secure supply line. Where are those to come from? Moreover, there are local armies aplenty operating all across the Congo, some well-supplied from neighbouring regimes, and all knowing the terrain better than white guys from Come by Chance or Moosonee. They will fight to protect their access to the spoils. In other words, any troops we dispatch will likely be involved in combat (MONUC has had 156 peacekeepers killed since its creation) and will need to be equipped with a full suite of weapons and air mobility. Despite a decade of service in Afghanistan, we still lack sufficient helicopters, and the Canadian Forces won’t have them available soon.

So peacekeeping, yes. But only if there is a firm UN mandate, full UN support, and a role that the Canadian Forces can play. And unfortunately that’s not in the Congo.

J.L. Granatstein, a member of the Research Advisory Board of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and a Senior Research Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, writes this monthly column for CDFAI.