CANADA AND THE FIRST NATIONS
Cooperation or Conflict?

DOUGLAS L. BLAND
MAY 2013
### Board of Directors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAIR</td>
<td>Rob Wildeboer</td>
<td>Executive Chairman, Martinrea International Inc., Vaughan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICE CHAIR</td>
<td>Jacquelyn Thayer Scott</td>
<td>Past President and Professor, Cape Breton University, Sydney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANAGING DIRECTOR</td>
<td>Brian Lee Crowley</td>
<td>Former Clifford Clark Visiting Economist at Finance Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECRETARY</td>
<td>Lincoln Caylor</td>
<td>Partner, Bennett Jones LLP, Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TREASURER</td>
<td>Martin MacKinnon</td>
<td>CFO, Black Bull Resources Inc., Halifax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTORS</td>
<td>John Beck</td>
<td>Chairman and CEO, Aecon Construction Ltd., Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erin Chutter</td>
<td>President and CEO, Puget Ventures Inc., Vancouver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Navjeet (Bob) Dhillon</td>
<td>President and CEO, Mainstreet Equity Corp., Calgary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Keith Gillam</td>
<td>President and CEO, Envirogreen Materials Corp., Scottsdale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wayne Gudbranson</td>
<td>CEO, Branham Group Inc., Ottawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stanley Hartt</td>
<td>Chairman, Macquarie Capital Markets Canada, Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter John Nicholson</td>
<td>Former President, Canadian Council of Academies, Ottawa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Advisory Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purdy Crawford</td>
<td>Former CEO, Imasco, Counsel at Osler Hoskins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Dinning</td>
<td>Former Treasurer of Alberta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Drummond</td>
<td>Economics Advisor to the TD Bank, Matthews Fellow in Global Policy and Distinguished Visiting Scholar at the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Flemming</td>
<td>International lawyer, writer and policy advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Fulford</td>
<td>Former editor of <em>Saturday Night</em> magazine, columnist with the <em>National Post</em>, Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvin Helin</td>
<td>Aboriginal author and entrepreneur, Vancouver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon. Jim Peterson</td>
<td>Former federal cabinet minister, Partner at Fasken Martineau, Toronto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maurice B. Tobin</td>
<td>The Tobin Foundation, Washington DC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Research Advisory Board

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title/Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Janet Ajzenstat</td>
<td>Professor Emeritus of Politics, McMaster University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Ferguson</td>
<td>Professor, health care economics, University of Guelph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Granatstein</td>
<td>Historian and former head of the Canadian War Museum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick James</td>
<td>Professor, University of Southern California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rainer Knopff</td>
<td>Professor of Politics, University of Calgary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Martin</td>
<td>George Morris Centre, University of Guelph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Sands</td>
<td>Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington DC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Watson</td>
<td>Associate Professor of Economics, McGill University</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For more information visit: www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca
This year, 2013, is the 250th anniversary of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 (pictured on the cover). The Royal Proclamation is widely regarded as having been one of the cardinal steps in the relationship between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals in British North America – what eventually became Canada.

A quarter of a millennium later it is our judgment that that relationship has often not been carried out in the hopeful and respectful spirit envisaged by the Royal Proclamation. The result has been that the status of many Aboriginal people in Canada remains a stain on the national conscience. But it is also the case that we face a new set of circumstances in Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations. Indigenous peoples in Canada have, as a result of decades of political, legal, and constitutional activism, acquired unprecedented power and authority. Nowhere is this truer than in the area of natural resources.

This emerging authority coincides with the rise of the demand for Canadian natural resources, a demand driven by the increasing integration of the developing world with the global economy, including the massive urbanisation of many developing countries. Their demand for natural resources to fuel their rise is creating unprecedented economic opportunities for countries like Canada that enjoy a significant natural resource endowment.

The Aboriginal Canada and the Natural Resource Economy project (of which this paper is a part) seeks to attract the attention of policy makers, Aboriginal Canadians, community leaders, opinion leaders, and others to some of the policy challenges that must be overcome if Canadians, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal alike, are to realise the full value of the potential of the natural resource economy. This project originated in a meeting called by then CEO of the Assembly of First Nations, Richard Jock, with the Macdonald-Laurier Institute. Mr. Jock threw out a challenge to MLI to help the Aboriginal community, as well as other Canadians, to think through how to make the natural resource economy work in the interests of all. We welcome and acknowledge the tremendous support that has been forthcoming from the AFN, other Aboriginal organisations and leaders, charitable foundations, natural resource companies, and others in support of this project.
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Executive Summary</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social fractionalization</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The warrior cohort</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic and resources factors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security factor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy options</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sommaire</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>La fragmentation sociale</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>La cohorte guerrière</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Les facteurs économique et ressources</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Le facteur sécurité</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Les options politiques</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>First Nations: Our Distant Partners</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 1 – The Feasibility Hypothesis</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Feasibility Hypothesis</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Determinants</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 2 – The First Determinant: the Fractionalized Nation</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life in the Distant Community: 2012</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lives of Crime and Punishment</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 3 –The Second Determinant: the Warrior Cohort</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doorway to Feasibility</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 4 – The Third/Fourth Determinants: the Economy in Action</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 2012 Canadian Pacific railway strike</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Nightmare Imagined</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collier’s Theory Meets Reality</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Weak Links: Critical Infrastructure Systems and Vague Policies</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Vulnerable Infrastructure Bottlenecks</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 5 – The Third/Fourth Determinants: the Natural Resources/Security Paradox</strong></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation General</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rail Transportation</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Transportation</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marine Transportation</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Energy Transportation Systems</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hydroelectric Infrastructure</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 6 – The Fifth Determinant: the Security Guarantee</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Law Meant to Protect the State from the People?</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Security Guarantee 2012: Manitoba as an Example</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 7 – The Five Determinants and the Possibilities for Change</strong></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Fractionalized Nation</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Warrior Cohort</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Economic and Resources Determinants</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Security Determinant</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Chapter 8 – The New Reality: Recognition of Aboriginal Autonomy</strong></td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diminishing the Feasibility Factor: Federal Policy Options</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enhancing the Feasibility Factor: Aboriginal Options</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Sovereignty Association Dilemma</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closing Thoughts</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Endnotes</strong></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>About the Author</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>References</strong></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

The author of this document has worked independently and is solely responsible for the views presented here. The opinions are not necessarily those of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, its directors or supporters.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For all the meetings, plans and requests by prime ministers and native chiefs, conditions within some First Nations communities languish. While a growing number are improving, others suffer from severe deprivation. The poorer communities often seethe with frustration.

Expectations raised by legal victories and government announcements seem to lead nowhere, or fall away. As the frustrations of unfulfilled expectations rise, anger in the communities festers, especially among young people.

The outcome? An idea that most Canadians would have seen as preposterous a year ago, but which is now very real: the possibility of a disruptive confrontation between Canada’s Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities.

This paper examines that possibility in the context of five determinants central to an accepted ‘feasibility hypothesis’ developed by an Oxford researcher:

• Social fractionalization
• The ‘warrior cohort’
• Economic and resources factors
• The security determinant, and
• Topography

The hypothesis suggests that feasibility, not root causes, provides the foundation for challenging civil authority. Do these factors support the likelihood of a First Nations insurgency in Canada today? If so, will it occur?

In mid-2012, these questions would have been seen as largely speculative unless one lived close to where Aboriginal protests had taken place. By January 2013, they had taken on entirely different meaning and immediacy.

Social fractionalization

Social fractionalization significantly increases the risk of social conflict. The phenomenon provides motives for an insurgency.

The fractionalization along Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal fault-lines is obvious.

Social life on many reserves is defined by poverty and its consequences. For many Aboriginal people in Canada, but especially for First Nations women and children, life on-reserve is dreary, dark and dangerous.

Over-crowded conditions and poorly constructed and maintained housing are the norm on reserves. Illicit drug use is widespread on many reserves; personal insecurity is a constant.

Left untended as they are today, these social cleavages present a growing danger to citizens in both communities and to Canada.

The warrior cohort

The young warrior cohort is here to stay. By 2017, about 42 percent of the First Nations population on the Prairies will be under the age of 30, over twice the 20 percent in the non-Aboriginal community.

Many young Aboriginal people are disadvantaged by circumstance, government policies, band mismanagement, negative leader models or parental choices. They tend to be poorly educated and unskilled.

To reduce the feasibility of an uprising in the First Nations, Canada needs educational and employment policies that immediately transform future First Nations cohorts aged 15 to 24 into productive, self-reliant people.
The challenge for Canadian and Aboriginal leaders is to rescue today’s Aboriginal youth from the negative social effects of Canadian realities and the shortcomings of Indigenous governments. At the same time, they must prevent conditions from disenfranchising future generations of First Nations youth. There is no either/or choice in this situation.

**Economic and resources factors**

Unfortunately for Canada, the matrix of the economy, national resources and transportation is irreversibly vulnerable. It presents targets that cannot be fully protected. As Canada’s economic health becomes more dependent on moving natural resources over long, difficult transportation routes, effective Aboriginal disturbances become more feasible.

And because they are feasible, it follows that strategic, co-ordinated First Nations actions against Canada’s economy will occur.

The reality for Canadians and their governments is that in a prolonged dispute, Canada’s transportation infrastructure would inevitably be targeted.

Nor is it necessary to disrupt an entire vital transportation system. A strong, enduring protest at a few critical bottlenecks would suffice.

**Security factor**

The minimal capabilities of Canada’s security forces are well understood in Aboriginal communities. Native leaders also understand the reluctance in governments, in the Canadian Forces and police organizations (as demonstrated at Caledonia) to intervene in Aboriginal demonstrations, even when there are urgent and lawful reasons for doing so.

This reinforces the feasibility factor, and makes more certain future challenges to civil authority at times and places of Aboriginal leaders’ choosing.

Finding the right balance between legitimate protest and armed confrontation may be difficult, but it must be found. An indispensable part the solution will be policing regimes that assure peaceful Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people of their rights and freedoms under the law.

**Policy options**

There are various policy options open to both sides. The federal government, in cooperation with provincial and territorial governments as warranted, might open talks with First Nations people to discuss a new constitutional framework to govern First Nations/Canada relations.

This framework might include measures aimed at diminishing national fragmentation and disarming the warrior cohort as part of a broad national economic and social program.

The options available to Aboriginal peoples are extensive, and were powerfully presented to Canadians during the 2012-2013 protests. The fact that Canada’s natural wealth flows unfairly from Aboriginal lands and peoples to non-Aboriginal Canadians is a long-standing, justifiable grievance.

Therefore, it is morally and ethically just that Indigenous peoples act in their own interests and in the interests of their future generations to correct this unfairness. It is also appropriate that First Nations leaders use, or suggest that they will use, whatever peaceful means and advantages they have to achieve this outcome.

Without reasonable shifts in both communities in the near future, a great deal might change for the worse for both First Nations people and for Canadians.
Même les innombrables réunions, projets et les demandes réitérées des premiers ministres et des chefs autochtones, les conditions de vie demeurent déplorables dans certaines collectivités des Premières nations. Un nombre croissant d’entre elles voient leur situation s’améliorer, mais d’autres souffrent toujours de graves privations. À l’intérieur des communautés les plus démunies, la frustration grandit.

Les espoirs suscités par les victoires juridiques et les annonces des gouvernements ne mènent nulle part ou s’évanouissent. La frustration qui résulte des attentes contrariées fait couver la colère dans les communautés, en particulier chez les jeunes.

Le résultat? Une notion que la plupart des Canadiens auraient écartée pour son apparente absurdité il y a un an est maintenant bien réelle : la possibilité d’un conflit majeur entre les collectivités autochtones et non autochtones du Canada.

Le présent article examine la possibilité de conflit en fonction de cinq déterminants à la base d’une « hypothèse de faisabilité » qui fait consensus et qui a été développée par un chercheur de l’université d’Oxford:

• La fragmentation sociale
• La « cohorte guerrière »
• Les facteurs économie et ressources
• La sécurité,
• La topographie

L’hypothèse suppose que la faisabilité d’un conflit, et non ses motivations profondes, constitue le fondement d’une contestation de l’autorité civile. Il faut se demander si ces facteurs viennent accroître le risque d’une insurrection des Premières nations au Canada aujourd’hui. Dans l’affirmative, une insurrection se produira-t-elle?

Au milieu de l’année 2012, la plupart d’entre nous auraient considéré ces questions très hypothétiques à moins de vivre tout près des lieux où des protestations autochtones s’étaient déroulées. Mais en janvier 2013, ces questions avaient acquis une toute autre dimension et revêtaient désormais un caractère d’imminence.

La fragmentation sociale

La fragmentation sociale augmente considérablement le risque de conflits sociaux. Ce phénomène peut engendrer des griefs pouvant mener à une insurrection.

Le clivage entre les collectivités autochtones et non autochtones est déjà évident. La vie sociale dans de nombreuses réserves est marquée par la pauvreté et ses conséquences. Pour de nombreux autochtones au Canada, mais surtout pour les femmes et les enfants des Premières nations, la vie dans les réserves est mornne, précaire et dangereuse.

Des logements mal construits, mal entretenus et surpeuplés sont la norme dans les réserves. Dans un grand nombre de réserves, la consommation de drogues illicites est largement répandue, tandis que la sécurité personnelle est une préoccupation constante.

Si rien n’est fait pour les faire disparaître, ces clivages sociaux présentent un danger croissant pour les citoyens des deux communautés et pour tout le pays.

La cohorte guerrière

La cohorte de jeunes guerriers va continuer de croître. Ainsi, en 2017, les moins de 30 ans représen-teront environ 42 pour cent de la population des Premières nations dans les Prairies, soit deux fois le taux de 20 pour cent enregistré pour la communauté non autochtone.

De nombreux jeunes Autochtones sont défavorisés par les circonstances, les politiques gouvernementales, la mauvaise gestion des bandes, les modèles négatifs de leaders ou certains choix parentaux. Ils ont tendance à être peu instruits et insuffisamment qualifiés pour occuper un emploi.
Afin de réduire la possibilité d’un soulèvement des Premières nations, le Canada doit mettre en œuvre des politiques d’éducation et d’emploi pouvant transformer rapidement les cohortes du groupe d’âge de 15 à 24 ans de manière à les rendre productives et autonomes.

Le défi pour les dirigeants canadiens et autochtones consiste à protéger dès maintenant les jeunes Autochtones des retombées sociales négatives attribuables à la réalité canadienne et à l’impuissance des gouvernements autochtones. Ce faisant, les dirigeants doivent cependant veiller à éviter de priver de leurs droits de gouvernance les futures jeunes générations des Premières nations. Il n’y a donc qu’une seule solution à envisager.

Les facteurs économie et ressources
Malheureusement pour le Canada, son économie, ses ressources nationales et ses systèmes de transport se sont développés de telle sorte que leur vulnérabilité a atteint un point de non-retour. Les points névralgiques de l’économie du Canada ne peuvent pas tous être protégés. Celle-ci repose de façon croissante sur le transport des ressources naturelles sur des parcours dont la longueur et les obstacles sont à même de donner prise aux perturbations par les Autochtones.

C’est bien parce que ces perturbations sont réalisables, que les Premières nations mèneront des actions stratégiques et coordonnées contre l’économie canadienne.

La réalité à laquelle font face tous les Canadiens et leurs gouvernements, c’est qu’advenant un conflit prolongé, l’infrastructure de transport du Canada serait inévitablement ciblée.

Nul besoin de perturber un système de transport vital en entier, il suffit de paralyser certains goulots d’étranglement, pendant une période prolongée

Le facteur sécurité
Les communautés autochtones sont bien au fait des capacités minimales des forces de sécurité du Canada. Leurs dirigeants connaissent également la réticence des gouvernements, des Forces canadiennes et des services policiers (comme l’a montré l’affrontement autochtone à Caledonia) à intervenir lors des manifestations autochtones, même lorsqu’il peut être impératif et légitime de le faire.

Cet état de fait renforce le facteur de faisabilité et rend beaucoup plus probable la contestation des autorités civiles à des moments et aux endroits que choisiront les dirigeants autochtones.

Il est difficile de trouver un juste équilibre entre protestation légitime et affrontement armé, mais il faudra y parvenir. La solution devra obligatoirement passer par des régimes de maintien de l’ordre assurant la protection garantie par les lois des droits et libertés des peuples pacifiques, autochtones et non autochtones.

Les options politiques
Diverses options politiques s’offrent aux deux parties. Le gouvernement fédéral, en collaborant au besoin avec les gouvernements provinciaux et territoriaux, pourrait entamer des négociations avec les Premières nations pour discuter d’un nouveau cadre constitutionnel destiné à gouverner les relations entre les Premières nations et le Canada.

Ce cadre pourrait inclure des mesures visant à diminuer la fragmentation au pays et désarmer la cohorte guerrière dans le cadre d’un vaste programme économique et social.

Les solutions à la disposition des peuples autochtones sont très variées et ont été largement démontrées aux Canadiens au cours des manifestations de 2012-2013. Le fait que les peuples autochtones du Canada soient dépouillés des richesses naturelles se trouvant dans leurs territoires au profit des non-Autochtones du Canada constitue une injustice de longue date et un grief tout à fait légitime.

Par conséquent, il est moralement et éthiquement juste que les peuples autochtones agissent dans leur propre intérêt et dans l’intérêt des générations qui suivront afin de corriger cette injustice. Il est également tout à fait raisonnable que les dirigeants des Premières nations utilisent ou se proposent d’utiliser tous les moyens pacifiques et avantages à leur disposition pour atteindre leur but.

Si les positions des deux communautés ne changent pas dans un proche avenir, il faut s’attendre au pire tant pour les peuples des Premières nations que pour les Canadiens.
FIRST NATIONS:
OUR DISTANT PARTNERS

The social legacy of Canada’s Aboriginal policies and of Aboriginal people’s social choices
presents to Canadians – Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal alike – a looming, self-reinforcing
danger. The thousands of disadvantaged Indigenous people of the past are being reinforced by
the frustrated and marginalized children of the present who will, in turn, become the ever-larger lost
generation of tomorrow. That the Idle No More movement of 2012-2013 has been driven primarily
by the mobilization of Aboriginal youth, many articulate and creative, others angry and disconnected,
is a perfect illustration of the cumulative effect of Canada’s inability to ensure full Indigenous
participation in its wealth and quality of life.

The challenge for Canadian and the Aboriginal communities’ formal and informal leaders is to rescue
today’s Aboriginal youth from the negative social effects of Canadian realities and the shortcomings
of Indigenous governments and, at the same time, prevent conditions from disenfranchising future
generations of First Nations youth. There is no either/or choice in this situation.

The First Nations struggled with the arrival of newcomers since the time of
first contact. While the general pattern of Indigenous-newcomer interaction,
defined largely by the fur trade, was collaborative, conflicts did occur. From
the time that the Inuit resistance to Martin Frobisher on Baffin Island to the
Beothuk clashes with English fishermen in 1612 (Friesen, 1997, pp.47-53)
and the Métis-led rebellions in western Canada between 1869 and 1885,
Indigenous peoples have demonstrated their frustration with uninvited
intrusions into their territories. Since the early 1990s, however, events have
challenged the long-term pattern of limited conflict, raising the prospect of
more serious tensions in First Nations -Canadian affairs.

In July 1990 at Oka, Quebec, a municipal dispute over an Aboriginal land
claim escalated into a dispute about sovereignty that led to a prolonged stand-off, the murder of a police officer, and the deployment of Canadian
Forces combat units in a substantial Aid of the Civil Powers
operation near the village. (Swain, 2010) Through a series of improvised three-party
negotiations, these events eventually and unexpectedly changed a domestic
law enforcement situation into a transformed Canadian-Indigenous reality
having the characteristics of an international confrontation. (Brock, 2010)

After Oka, other disturbances over Indigenous rights occurred across the country, from armed stand-offs in the interior of British Columbia to battles over Aboriginal fishing rights in the Maritimes. The language and temperature of the Indigenous protests showed new signs of increasing anger and frustration. The more violent confrontations over land rights at Caledonia in 2006 led again to
governments backing away from flagrant threats from – this time – armed native protesters. Asked
why he did not enforce the law, then Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Policy, Julian Fantino replied:

Caledonia is not an isolated, stand-alone issue. Caledonia is connected with all these other
First Nations issues not only across the province, but country-wide. Everyone’s watching
what goes on in Caledonia and one misstep in Caledonia will result in a flare-up right
across the country of conflict and confrontation. (Blatchford, 2010, p.200)

More threats followed. In 2010, for instance, governments’ plans to apply the Harmonized Sales Tax
on reserves in Ontario prompted native leaders there to threaten “to shut down the country if we
have to” unless the plans were rescinded. In face of these threats (and, some say, of the approaching

Since the early
1990s, events have
challenged the
long-term pattern
of limited conflict,
raising the
prospect of more
serious tensions
in First Nations
-Canadian affairs.
Toronto G8/G20 meetings), “federal and provincial officials [engaged native leaders in] a frantic round of negotiations.” Within a few days, the governments re-instated the extant on-reserve tax exemption. (The Globe and Mail, 16 June 2010)

In some opinion, these and other examples of the “sensitive treatment” of native protests, including some that verged on violations of the law, produced a two-tiered justice system in Canada. Whether such a system is actually the new Canada/First Nations reality, the possibility that such events have “led to an unsettling disquiet in Aboriginal-Canadian state relations” is worrying. (Brock, 2010, p.45) The escalation of Indigenous rhetoric in January 2012, driven by Idle No More assemblies and Chief Theresa Spence’s prolonged protest in Ottawa, led to numerous statements from Aboriginal groups that they could and would bring the Canadian economy to its knees through blockades and roadblocks.

A fundamental restructuring of the Aboriginal-government relationship is now central to the demands of First Nations organizations, and it has been presented as the only way out of the current political impasse. Assembly of First Nations (AFN) National Chief, Shawn Atleo, told a large gathering of corporate leaders in Toronto on 23 April 2012, that the First Nations’ goal is to “…live the promise of the ancestors …and fulfill the potential of treaty, a real partnership, and the greatest that this country has yet to achieve.” (AFN, Toronto, 23 April 2012)

Yet for all the meetings, plans, and requests by prime ministers and AFN chiefs, conditions within the First Nations community continue to languish.

A major component of this partnership (and a flash point for governments) is the First Nations’ demand for much greater control over their lives and, specifically, the resources extracted from their traditional lands. The era of passive acceptance within the Aboriginal community of the exploitation of these resources is ending. Atleo reminded the audience that “almost every resource development activity currently operating or planned is occurring within 200 kilometres of a First Nations community and right in the middle of our traditional territories.” (Ibid) And for emphasis, according to quotations published in the National Post, Atleo warned the audience that Canadians faced “an Aboriginal tsunami” that could only be avoided if they (Canadians) “smashed the status quo.” (National Post, 24 April 2012.) Atleo’s warnings proved prescient, as events of early 2013 demonstrated.

The National Chief of the AFN speaks “as the national representative organization of the First Nations in Canada.” (Website of the AFN, “About the AFN”) Nevertheless, Chief Atleo, as other national chiefs before him, generally sets the agenda for AFN-government relations and is for many Canadians the face and the voice of the First Nations community.

In reality, local First Nations leadership regimes headed by elected (under the Indian Act) or traditionally appointed chiefs reinforce the idea that Aboriginal people are independent partners in the Canadian confederacy. The chiefs provide strong, accountable administrative order in most – though by no means all – First Nations. (The Frontier Centre for Public Policy, 12 April 2012)

Regional First Nations assemblies in the provinces and territories have also developed important nation-to-nation relationships with premiers and local industries. For Example, the Manitoba Keewatinowi Okimakanak (representing 30 First Nations and 65,000 “First Nations citizens”) completed independent negotiations with private industry to support its youth education initiatives in June 2012. (Media release: MKO, 12 June 2012) Other First Nations projects are being developed elsewhere in Canada under the guidance of regional First Nations councils and independent of the federal Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC).

AFN national chiefs have sat at meetings concerned with the Canadian constitution, been invited to speak on the floor of the House of Commons and joined federal/provincial conferences. National chiefs are often invited to address meetings of influential leaders of Canada’s business community and are the media’s first point of contact when a major Aboriginal issue hits the headlines. In January
2012, Chief Atleo, for instance, chaired with Prime Minister Harper a grand meeting of chiefs and federal cabinet ministers to discuss Aboriginal affairs and federal policies.

Yet for all the meetings, plans, and requests by prime ministers and AFN chiefs, conditions within the First Nations community continue to languish. While a growing number of Aboriginal communities are improving, others suffer from severe socio-economic deprivation. Frustration is often present in the poorer communities. Expectations raised by legal victories and government announcements seem to lead nowhere or fall away. As the frustrations of unfulfilled expectations rises, anger in the communities – especially among young people – festers and grows.

Former National Chief of the AFN (1997-2009), Phil Fontaine, then at the pinnacle of his influence as he drove the federal government to apologize for the residential schools tragedy, declared “We have a right to be frustrated, concerned, angry – anger that’s building and building.” (CTV News, 15 May 2007) Other chiefs, such as often provocative and then Chief Terry Nelson, (Roseau First Nation) more ominously echoed Fontaine’s warning. “There’s only two ways to deal with the white man. Either you pick up the gun or you stand between him and his money.” (Ibid)

On 07 December 2011, First Nations chiefs gathered at a special AFN session in Ottawa. Several of them brought their anger and offered aggressive proposals to their colleagues. Some Manitoba chiefs called for “action” against existing [oil] pipelines. Others declared “It is time to be really aggressive towards the government.” Grand Chief Stan Louttit denounced Harper’s government. “We are saying no to these governments who want to come to us and put us aside just like we were animals, just like nothing ... people are dying while this is going on.” (APTN, 07 December 2011)

Following that meeting and a full year before her high profile 2013 protest in Ottawa, Chief Theresa Spence of the impoverished Attawapiskat First Nation in northern Ontario, stood on Parliament Hill in a gathering of the chiefs, and warned Canada. “This is only the beginning, only the beginning. This is a warning to the government that we are going to be more aggressive; that we are going to act together.” (Ibid)

Only the prime minister’s sudden agreement later that day to meet with all the chiefs (rather than his earlier insistence on meeting only with a small delegation of chiefs) and the forceful intervention of Chief Atleo prevented the gathering from denouncing even more strongly their deep dissatisfaction with Aboriginal-Canadian state relations. Several Manitoba chiefs did, however, assemble on Parliament Hill again to denounce the meetings, the prime minister and Aboriginal affairs in Canada in general. (APTN, 12 December 2011)

The internal disputes in the AFN and the assertive behaviour of a number of Manitoba chiefs continued after the Ottawa meetings. In Winnipeg in June 2012, the tone and mood was still pessimistic and aggressive. On announcing his candidacy for National Chief of the AFN, Terry Nelson urged the chiefs to use the resources on their lands as the means of empowering their communities. When, he declared, the world understands that the First Nations “and not the immigrants are the real owners of all the natural resources wealth in Canada [then we] will begin to have an independent First Nations foreign policy that is not tied to Canada.” (Terrance Nelson, Toronto, 17 July 2012)

Other leaders have echoed Nelson’s powerful rhetoric. Their common expressions are anger and frustration boiling up from a deep sense of betrayal and unfairness. Not all the anger is expressed by individuals most Canadians dismiss as “radicals.” It would be difficult to find a less radical Canadian Aboriginal leader than Justice Murray Sinclair, Chair of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Yet even he recognizes the dangers facing Canada’s two communities. “One day soon instead of violence
being directed at themselves by other Aboriginal people, the violence [in the First Nations community] will be directed at the general society.” (Winnipeg Free Press, 11 November 2011.) Beyond the anger, however, one can hear and see a potent combination of growing confidence, assertiveness and deep despair that the native community must finally capitalize on to direct the destiny of its people for the first time since the arrival of newcomers.

Today, some Canadians might assume that because the Parliamentary apology for the residential schools set that issue to rest and because more attention and money is being directed to some Aboriginal communities, Canada’s relationship with the First Nations will be calmer. But then few Canadians or their national leaders sit with First Nations people and listen to their descriptions of the frustration and anger roiling in their communities. They do not hear the determination among leaders to take charge, by whatever means, of their communities’ futures. Neither do they understand how vulnerable Canada’s economy is to internal disruptions. (See for example, National Post, 17 January 2013; National Post, 21 January 2013)

Destructive national insurgencies are let loose by such misapprehensions and failure to listen and to hear. Idle No More brought all these forces to the country’s attention in new and dramatic ways. The prospect of wide-ranging Aboriginal uprisings is suddenly more than real although, until January 2013 at least, protests have been overwhelmingly peaceful events, focussed on combining political statements with cultural events.

In Aboriginal settlements, another image of the future has emerged. If Canadians were alert, they would have sensed, before December 2012, the gathering of Indigenous power – a form of unity not seen before – fuelled by the realization that, as Canada’s natural resources industries move farther into “Indian country,” the nation’s economy will become increasingly vulnerable. Now, with Idle No More, few Canadians can ignore the depth and reach of Aboriginal passion, frustration and determination.

This essay addresses one possible outcome of the current controversies; an idea that most Canadians would have seen as preposterous a year ago but that is now very real. The possibility of a catastrophic confrontation between Canada’s settler and Aboriginal communities, spurred not by yesterday’s grievances but by the central features and consequences of our national policies, have the potential to make such an uprising feasible if not, one hopes, inevitable.

CHAPTER 1

THE FEASIBILITY HYPOTHESIS

“… where a rebellion is feasible it will occur without any special inducements in terms of motivation.” COLLIER, 2009, P 23

Introduction

Why insurrections – “violent uprisings against an authority or government” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2012) – occur is a question of immediate interest and concern to governments worldwide. The question has interested academics in many countries well before the Arab Spring of 2011, especially as civil wars, rebellions and political chaos developed in many states and regions of the world following the end of the Cold War.
In the late 1990s, scholars advanced numerous theories as to why insurrections occur and why they continue, in some instances for decades. Since 2000, these theories have been tested and examined in great detail by political, international and economic commentators. Their work has done more than produce an impressive library of learned papers and reports for governments, the United Nations, and international organizations; it has also shaped a general consensus on the causes and effects of insurrections in our times.

In 1991, as the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact crumbled, many government leaders worried that the international stability associated with the Cold War, such as it had been, would also fail. Scholars and others turned their attention from Cold War issues to ways to predict why and where insurgencies would break out in Europe and other states, particularly in Africa.

A prevailing assumption was that insurrections would erupt, with armed forces if necessary, to redress the political, economic and social circumstances of once-disadvantaged ethnic, national and regional factions. Indeed, in the early 1990s, there was reason to worry as sectarian wars erupted in the former Yugoslavia, and turmoil engulfed much of Africa. Even today, many regional conflicts resemble a type of “Clash of Civilizations” Samuel Huntington foresaw in 1993, focussed on religious-cultural conflict and occurring along what he called the “fault lines” between civilizations. (Huntington, 1996.)

Although appealing in some respects, grievances as motives (and thus the base explanation for the civil war paradigm) proved inadequate to explain the onset of civil wars and regional violence. Resource wars, occurring mainly in Africa, were seen primarily as strategic means to reach political ends. The logic seemed obvious: insurgents who captured a nation’s resources would thereby deprive the existing government of its primary tax base and its means to create and maintain government services and police and military capabilities. Thus, as the government’s capabilities withered, the insurgents’ wealth and capabilities would increase. Sooner or later, the government would be overthrown. In many cases, the declared aim of such rebellions was to effect a fairer distribution of national wealth. Just as often, the insurgent leaders’ motives were uninhibited greed – the transfer (by violent means if necessary) of national wealth and power from ruling factions to themselves.

Eventually, early in this century, some economists began to challenge the ethnic, resources, grievance and greed theories as causes for civil wars and insurgencies. James Fearond, for example, argued that “the factors that explain which countries [are at] risk of civil war are not their ethnic or religious characteristics but rather the conditions that favor insurgency.” (Fearond, 2003, p.1) Instead, and among other factors, he marks poverty, weak states (especially ineffective governance), political instability, rough terrain and large populations.

In 1998 and continuing through several research projects to 2009, Oxford economist, Paul Collier, and his colleagues began to note that the usual root causes or greed-and-grievance discourse aimed at predicting rebellion and civil violence was “hopelessly contaminated by advocacy.”(Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohnner, 2009, p.1) These theories, they argued, were confounded by the rhetoric of special interests and by charismatic leaders who “style [their] rebellion as a protest movement driven to the extreme of violence by the extremity of the conditions which ‘our’ people face.” (Collier, April 2006, p.2) When, however, Collier and his team measured objectively hundreds of cases in widely diverse circumstances and the usual grievances therein, they found “they provide little or no explanatory power in predicting rebellions.” (Ibid, p.22)

Research into the economic characteristics of civil conflicts, by contrast, provides explanatory power and pathways to policy remedies. In a particular example of this approach, Susan E. Rice and her colleagues concluded in 1996 that nations with high poverty levels – “[an] enduring robustness of low income per capita,” – experience a high risk of internal conflict. The value of their research lies not in this observation but in the usefulness of its conclusion to policy: “polices that increase per capita income in the poorest countries will reduce their conflict risk.” (Rice, Graff, and Lewis, 2006, p.13)
Observations from economic research illustrate the utility of the economic approach to the study of the causes and cures of civil wars. This analysis has identified factors that favor insurgencies and provided arguably practical policy suggestions aimed at avoiding and/or resolving dangerous civil conflicts.

**The Feasibility Hypothesis**

Collier and his colleagues constructed their work on the assumption that the study of civil conflict was “particularly well-suited to statistical analysis.” (Collier, Hoeffler, Rohnert, 2009, p.1) They followed the lead of the University of Michigan, *Correlates of War* researchers who had amassed a comprehensive global dataset on civil wars and added new research material to it. This approach to the study of civil conflict “abstracts [the research] from any particular conflict and subjects the researcher to the discipline of statistical method.” (Ibid, p.1) Most importantly, it also allows researchers to consider causes of civil conflict within a standard model across a wide range of social and political variables beyond mere greed and grievances, and across scores of national examples in particular circumstances.

The theory does not entirely discount motivation as having an influence on civil societies and political agendas. Rather, this comprehensive and complex research project led the team to postulate that “instead of the circumstances which generate a rebellion being distinctive in terms of motivation, they might be distinctive in the sheer financial and military feasibility of rebellion.” (Ibid, p.2, emphasis added). They argue that motivation is essentially and practically indeterminate and offer the feasibility hypothesis instead.

Factors that are important for the financial and military feasibility of rebellion but are unimportant to motivation decisively increase the risk of civil war. “The feasibility hypothesis leaves the motivation of the rebel group unspecified, its initial agenda being determined by the preferences of the social entrepreneur [Mao and Castro] leading whichever organization is the first to occupy the niche.” (Ibid, p.3)

The key assertion is that feasibility, and not root causes, provides the incentive to challenge civil authority. As we shall see, it follows that the prevention and/or suppression of insurgencies and rebellions requires a determined effort directed not at so-called root causes, but at the factors that make such uprisings feasible.

**The Determinants**

Accordingly to this research, feasibility is contingent on five major related determinants.

1. “Social fractionalization,” the division of a society by ethnic and religious cleavages, significantly increases risk. In its modelling, Collier’s team doubled the fractionalization in its model nation from 18 percent to 36 percent, raising the risk of conflict from 4.6 percent to 6.67 percent. (Ibid, p. 15) Social cleavages may incite armed or unarmed efforts by the minority to change its social/political circumstances. On the other hand, such demands for change might intensify the majority’s resistance, including violent resistance, to any change at all.

2. The proportion of males aged 15-19 in the population is significant. “Doubling the proportion of the population in this category increases the risk of conflict from 4.6 to 19.7%.” (Ibid, p.16)

3. The state’s topography (mountainous or flat) produces a potentially large effect.

4. The proportion of primary commodity exports (i.e., natural resources) in GDP. This factor is particularly sensitive when it coincides with the third factor. In Collier’s model, “the risk of dependence
upon primary commodity exports [and thus of conflict] is at its peak when exports constitute 25% of GDP.” (Ibid p.13) Two measures intensify the primary resources/GDP risk factor. First, risk increases exponentially as the distance between the sources of natural resource and economic goods and their foreign or domestic markets increases. Second, risk increases yet again where transportation systems are long and cross mountainous terrain and where alternative routes are limited or unavailable. These circumstances make defence complex and expensive (i.e., in the number of security forces required) while making offence relatively easy and inexpensive. In such circumstances, vulnerability increases for one side and feasibility increases for the other.

5. Increased certainty of a credible security guarantee makes the risk of civil war more dangerous for insurgents and thus less feasible. In Collier’s research, African states where a guarantee (such as in the form of protection from a credible nation or an international organization, i.e. the United Nations) existed “faced a risk of 2.6%” compared with “a civil war risk of 8.2%” in states without such a guarantee. (Ibid, p.15)

These determinants, not mere political motives or the machinations of political leaders, make states more or less vulnerable. Vulnerability makes insurgencies more or less feasible. As Collier concludes “where a rebellion is feasible it will occur.” (Ibid, p.2)

The theory’s value lies in its political/policy utility: if insurgencies are to be avoided, then one or all of the determinants must be redressed in ways that reduce the state’s vulnerability to insurgency. The policy therapy is disarmingly simple: “if the incidences of civil war are to be reduced … [they] will need to be made more difficult [to instigate].” (Ibid, p.9)

This essay examines the feasibility of a First Nations uprising in Canada in the context of the five determinants central to the feasibility hypothesis. The central questions for Canadian and First Nations leaders are these: do the determinants in Canada today support the suggestion that a First Nations insurgency is feasible? If it is feasible, will it occur? In the middle of 2012, these questions would have been seen as largely speculative unless one lived close to where Aboriginal protests had taken place. By January 2013, the questions had taken on entirely different meaning and immediacy.

CHAPTER 2

THE FIRST DETERMINANT: THE FRACTIONALIZED NATION

Life in the Distant Community: 2012

For many Aboriginal people in Canada, but especially for First Nations women and children, life on-reserve is dreary, dark and dangerous. The statistics tell the a cruel tale. What Canadians should be particularly worried about is the accumulation of disabling social consequences that, year by year, separate the mainstream experiences they live from those of many Indigenous societies. If conditions were different and the country completely heartless, Canada could just wait for time to fade the aging Indigenous population and the associated socio-economic blight slowly out from the national fabric. That is not the Canadian reality.
About 615 First Nations in Canada, situated as “bands,” live on some 2,720 reserves across the country. Each Nation is self-defined and more or less governed in traditional ways but subject to the Indian Act nonetheless. AANDC officials oversee in various degrees the administration of these reserves.

Approximately 700,000 individuals identify as First Nations people out of a total Canadian Aboriginal demography of 1,172,790 people that includes Métis and Inuit.¹ (The Daniels decision by the Federal Court in January 2013 raised the possibility that the Metis could become Indians for the purposes of government policy; an appeal of that decision is likely.) The Aboriginal population grew by 45 percent between 1996 and 2006 compared to 8 percent in the non-Aboriginal community over the same period. By 2017, about 42 percent of the First Nations population in the prairies will be under 30 years of age (YOA) compared to less than 20 percent in the non-Aboriginal community in Canada. (StatsCan, 91-552-x, 07 December 2011)

The distribution of First Nations people on- and off-reserve – 40 percent and 55 percent, respectively – is actually difficult to confirm. People move on and off reserves at pleasure. Some people live nearby on private land or as transients moving to work or living off-reserve. Researchers and government officials tend to accept the above split for most general work.

Social life on many reserves is defined by poverty and its consequences. More than 28 percent of on-reserve adults in 2006 were unemployed compared with 16 percent off-reserve. The off-reserve rate, in turn, was nearly twice the non-Aboriginal rate.

Over-crowded, poorly constructed and maintained housing is the on-reserve norm. According to Statistics Canada (2006), 11 percent of on-reserve families live in “crowded homes” defined as ten or more people living in a small dwelling. More than 40 percent of the houses on a typical reserve require major repairs, such as new roofs, doors, windows, and installation and repairs to water and sewage facilities, the means to heat buildings, and the removal of mold and other contaminates. The Statistic Canada data are dated, but as the media frenzy of 2011-2012 regarding Attawapiskat revealed, there is no reason to believe housing conditions and needs have changed on many reserves. (StatsCan, 97-558-x 1e2006001)

Illicit drug use is also widespread on many reserves. Media reports in 2012, for instance, confirm that the situation is so severe that some reserves have made declarations of emergency to draw attention their situations and request aid for their people. “In 2009, the Nashnawbe Aski Nation … representing 49 First Nations in northern Ontario declared an emergency over its entire territory.” (Postmedia News, 23 February 2012) Leaders in the Cat Lake First Nation in the same region declared an emergency in January 2012, saying it suspects that “400 of its 600 residents were hooked on Oxys [Oxycontin pain medicine].” (CBC News, 16 April 2012) Community drug epidemics bring with them violent attacks on individuals, robbery, and spousal and child abuse. (Winnipeg Free Press, 16 April 2012)

A variety of healthcare determinants, from the rates of diabetes to teenage suicides, infant mortality, and HIV, reveals similarly distressing statistics. “Across Canada, Aboriginal people account for 8 percent of HIV infections” out of a national demographic representing about 4 percent of the population. In Saskatchewan, “the HIV rate … is more than double the national average” and “77 percent of new cases of HIV are Aboriginal people.” (Op cit. Postmedia News, 23 February 2012)

The disaster migrates from the present lost generation to the future lost generation. Saskatchewan’s chief medical officers emphasized that the issue in that province is “intergenerational and it’s almost a family thing. And that’s the real worry, because it means that the family themselves don’t have hope and that they’ve given up on life.” (Ibid)
Lives of Crime and Punishment

Violent behaviour and its consequences are remarkable features of Aboriginal life in general. Personal insecurity is a constant factor on First Nations reserves and for the large number of homeless natives, particularly women, in Canadian cities. The statistics confirm this dangerous reality.

- Violent crimes rates: Aboriginal, 319/1,000 compared to 1/1,000 in the non-Aboriginal population;
- Homicide: 8.8/100,000 compared to 1.3/100,000;
- Spousal abuse: 21 percent compared to 6 percent.
- These and other Aboriginal-on-Aboriginal crimes are visited mainly on young people: 461/1,000 for the 15-34 YOA cohort and 192/1,000 for those over 34 YOA.

Overwhelmingly in Canada, the non-Aboriginal community enforces the Criminal Code on the Aboriginal community. Incarceration rates are as remarkable as they are constant. For example, in 2007-2009 “Aboriginal adults accounted for 22% of admissions to sentenced custody, while representing 3% of the Canadian populations.” (StatsCan, 85-002-x, Volume 29, No. 3, July 2009. p.5) In the same period, 17 percent of all male inmates in provincial/territorial custody were Aboriginals. More than 18 percent of female inmates were Aboriginals. (The Globe and Mail, 27 September 2012) The federal system kept pace with provincial counts. During the same period approximately 18 percent of all male prisoners and 25 percent to 30 percent of all female prisoners were Aboriginal. (Ibid, p.9; See also Winnipeg Free Press, 03 March 2011)

A disproportionate number of youth entering the correctional system in Canada are Aboriginal. A 2010-2011 study reported that Aboriginal female youth comprised 34% of all female youth in the correctional system, while Aboriginal male youth made up 24% of all male youth in the correctional system. By contrast, about 6% of both male and female youth in the general population are Aboriginal. (StatsCan. SC 85-002-x 2012: updated October 2012)

The greater tragedy for these young people is that whenever they are mixed in with the older prison population they are soon recruited by Aboriginal gang member in prison. As police officials understand, “If you’re not a member of a gang when you go to jail you will be when you come out. Many prisoners simply cannot survive jail life without the protection of a gang.” (Yahoo News, March 15, 2010.) On release from prison most of these young people migrate into criminal gangs and other harmful (to themselves and society) anti-social situations. (MLI. Wilner, October 2010; Confidential interviews Winnipeg 2009-2010; and “the Nelson Files.”)

These consequences have their own debilitating economic and social effects on individuals and First Nations communities as well as on the wider Canadians society. The disproportionate number of incarcerated Aboriginal people symbolizes the accumulated social penalties that flow from Aboriginal poverty, poor education, failed families and communities, and from closely related drug use and criminal activities on- and off-reserve. (CPAC, 12 October 2012)

In Manitoba, Aboriginals represent 15 percent of the provincial population but 71 percent of the all prisoners. In Saskatchewan, the ratio is 79 percent out of 15 percent of the provincial population. And in Alberta, the ratio is an astonishing 80 percent out of 11 percent of the people. In a recent report (2010), the federal Correctional Investigator noted that “[I]n the Prairies [Aboriginal people] comprise … a staggering 60 percent of offenders.” As well, “Aboriginal women are even more over-represented than men in the criminal justice system, representing 30 percent of women in federal prisons.” This report attributes these statistics to “systemic discrimination and attitudes based on
racial and cultural prejudice, as well as economic and social deprivation, substance abuse and a cycle of violence across generations.” The Investigator concludes:

Correctional Service’s own statistics regarding outcomes for offenders confirm that, despite years of task force reports, internal reviews, national strategies, partnership agreements, and action plans, there has been no significant progress in improving the overall situation of Aboriginal offenders during the last 20 years.” (Correctional Investigator Canada, 02 February 2010, pp.1-2. Also Winnipeg Free Press, 17 March 2011.)

Even if one assumed that the policing, legal and corrections systems are fair – and many Aboriginal peoples assert otherwise – clearly, something ethical, social and legal is amiss.

Time, however, provides no quick solution to this deformity in our society. First Nations communities are not aging, and they are not about to disappear. Rather, the opposite is the reality. The First Nations community is young and growing rapidly – at more than twice the norm in the non-Aboriginal Canadian community (StatsCan 91-552-x. 07 December 2011). As the First Nations community grows, social difficulties expand exponentially. The easy resolution of these problems – if there ever were readily available policy options and if these could ever be defined as easy – vanishes over an ever-receding horizon.

In the terms of the feasibility hypothesis, Canada/First Nations communities are “fractionalized” by “ethnic domination” and linguistic, social, and, to some extent, religious fissures that the feasibility hypothesis “concludes significantly increases risk.” (Collier et al, 2009, p. 14. Also, Collier, 2006; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Indigenous people are native to the geopolitical landscape known as Canada and thus are set aside from newcomers by culture, history, language and traditions. This uniqueness is recognized in the constitutional, legal, political and other conceptual frameworks that define Canada. As well, First Nations are socially and economically fractionalized from most other people in Canada as is evident in the statistics presented in this essay.

In two respects, this fracture is the result of collective and historical social choices and not, at least conceptually, necessarily conditions imposed on the minority by the majority.

First, the physical separation of thousands of First Nations people to life on and near reserves by their own choice disconnects residents from most public and private benefits available to Canada’s larger urban population, including urban First Nations people. While conceptually true, the nature of Canada’s Indian policy and the administration of Aboriginal affairs over the past 100 years makes it clear that the hand of government and, therefore, the dominant society is actually an important part of the problem.

Some non-Aboriginal people and communities in the far north or in other isolated parts of Canada suffer the somewhat comparable effects. These populations and especially the younger members in them, however, are mobile and readily move to where the jobs, opportunities and social support mechanisms are available. First Nations people, including younger members, are for several reasons – including the inflexibility of the Indian Act – less eager to move away from their traditional lands, although a sizable outmigration has occurred.

Second, the fractionalization of this truly distinct society is reinforced in everyday conversations and in the statements, declarations and policy choices made by many native leaders. In their view, the very survival of the First Nations as a culture requires the reinforcement of the distinctness and the independence of the people from Canadian society and institutions. An essential component of retaining this distinction is evident in resistance within the community to any legal or social moves
by governments to abolish reserves. Aboriginal leaders also resist any reforms aimed at “moving away from the Indian Act,” which most chiefs believe protects their treaty rights. (See, for example, Chief George Stanley, Postmedia News, 23 January 2012.) Chief Atleo is even more emphatic: “We categorically reject unilateral moves and government tinkering to address singular issues. The [effort to unilaterally amend the] Indian Act marks one of the many direct attacks on our nations including efforts to silence our languages, eliminate our culture and dispossess us of our lands.” (National Post, 29 October 2012)

The First Nations leaders in Canada have been explicitly campaigning for the recognition of their nations as separate political partners in a fractured Canada. Their argument is that Canadian federal and provincial governments confiscated native land, broke treaties, stole native resources and shackled the native people to the racist Indian Act.

The underlying intent of these types of claims is expressed in a variety of ways, from personal choices to opt in or out of the dominant society to community strategies for economic development in partnership with companies and governments. In other instances, the Aboriginal goal is to re-assert native sovereignty over the areas in question and then to collect returns from the land as decided by the First Nations themselves.

This drive for or restoration of native sovereignty may someday, somehow, provide a conceptual fix for First Nations and Canadian relations. As a strategy, however, it is confounded by inherent contradictions between the ideal of future First Nations sovereignty and the community’s present economic and political dependency on Canada. It is complicated further by the continuing ability of Aboriginal people to win major legal decisions, all based on Canadian and British law, that demonstrate that Indigenous communities can be empowered inside Canada rather than through separation. To the degree that the sovereignist or separatist models hold sway at a local or regional level, however, they will inevitably exaggerate the internal competition – the fractionalization – of Canada.

The fractionalization along Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal fault-lines is obvious. Social fractionalization significantly increases the risk of social conflict. The phenomenon provides motives for an uprising. Moreover, it reinforces the feasibility of an insurgency by dividing Canada’s population into readily identifiable camps, each with established territorial boundaries – in Canada, “Indian country” is not just a Hollywood term – whose residents often hold negative and hostile opinions of the other. Left untended as they are today, these social cleavages present a growing danger to citizens in both communities and to Canada as a sovereign nation. Fractionalization need not occur at the macro-level or between all Indigenous peoples and the rest of the country to spark a confrontation. As the Oka and Caledonia conflicts reveal, embedded regional fractures can be as dangerously destructive of national unity as a nation-wide uprising. (Ottawa Citizen, January 25, 2013)
CHAPTER 3

THE SECOND DETERMINANT: THE WARRIOR COHORT

As history and the daily news illustrate, wars, rebellions and major criminal activities rely almost exclusively on males in the 15-29 YOA range. The greater the availability of young men as recruits (willing or not), the more feasible the opportunity and the lower the costs of launching an uprising. These correlations play out in wars between nations and in the ugliness of armies composed of “child soldiers” (Dallaire, 2010).

When they checked the “robustness” of their vast data files, the Collier research team confirmed a statistical “extreme selectivity” to the size of the young male cohort in states relative to the risk of conflict. The team assumed, moreover, that this selectivity occurs because “some young men have both an absolute advantage and a taste for violence.” (Collier et al, 2009, p.16)

The First Nations demography aligns well with this problematic population. The median age in this community is 25 YOA compared to 43 YOA in Canada’s non-Aboriginal population. Approximately 20 percent (2006) or 157,000 people – male and female – fall into the First Nations 15-24 YOA range. Moving the statistics for males into the broader 15-34 YOA (warrior cohort) range produces several thousand more potential recruits for any active endeavour. Removing the male prejudice in describing young warriors (or “young thugs” in the criminal context) adds tens of thousands of young women to the combative force. (StatsCan, 91-552-x, 07 December 2011 and StatsCan 97-588-XIE, 09 September 2012)

Offsetting this phenomenon is the fact that young Aboriginal women are more likely to complete high school and/or college/university and thus develop more stable lives than men or women who do not. Gender differences in educational success and other socially positive attributes are, moreover, important contributing factors to the unease and unhappiness among young Aboriginal males in 2013.

With appropriate incentives and charismatic leaders, young people may be tempted to join some type of rebellious or criminal militant organization. In the heated speeches of January 2013, several First Nations leaders declared that the Warriors were ready for action. The incarceration rates described above illustrate this tendency. The central question and curiosity given the living conditions of most young people in this cohort is not: why would they join such organizations but why would they not? What have they got to lose by doing so?

These young people, especially those living on-reserve, are particularly disadvantaged by unfortunate circumstances, government policies, band mismanagement, negative leader models and parental choices from the day they are born. They tend to be poorly educated and unskilled for the needs of the modern economy. Some are young fathers or abandoned child-mothers. As teenagers, many become addicted to drugs and alcohol and become “known to the police.” They are more likely than young non-Aboriginal Canadians to die young from disease, addictions or foul play.

In all jurisdictions under analysis, the Census Day [2006] incarceration rate for Aboriginal adults 20-34 YOA who were unemployed and without at least a high school diploma was higher than the rate for Aboriginal adults who were employed and had at least a high school diploma. For instance, the...

Fewer than 24 percent of the 15-24 YOA First Nations cohort complete high school compared with the 84 percent who do so in the non-Aboriginal community.
rate in Alberta was 46.1 per 1000 compared with 2.4 per 1000. (Op cit. StatsCan, 85-002-x. 09 July 2009, p.13).

Fewer than 24 percent of the 15-24 YOA First Nations cohort complete high school compared with the 84 percent who do so in the non-Aboriginal community. Failure to complete high school is not simply the result of failing grades, but a reflection of the fact that many First Nations youth simply decide not to attend high school, even if one were available nearby. Many explanations are offered to explain this behaviour, but most focus on the notion that many young people simply see little value in an education – an understandable response given the despair in many reserves.

The lack of education and somewhat indifferent approach of many toward paid work inevitably place large numbers of First Nations people outside the Canadian labour market. Nationally, 28 percent of the Aboriginal population was unemployed in 2006. A sizeable percentage of the younger generations is practically and permanently excluded from the national work force by the time those individuals are 20 YOA. Indeed, an appalling 40 percent of the 15-24 YOA group today is unemployed and likely unemployable.

The economic and living conditions on most reserves can be depressing and, in time, may reinforce individual failures. Employment opportunities are slim. In Ontario – home to 21 percent of Canada’s First Nations people – unemployment for both genders was 14 percent and their labour participation rate was a mere 63 percent. (First Nations in Ontario, 05 September 2010).

The income gap between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals is wide in almost every circumstance. Nationwide, income for employed Aboriginal males in 2006 was 30 percent lower than the median income for the rest of Canadians, although Aboriginal males earn about $5,000 more than Aboriginal women. First Nations residents who work off-reserve earn 34 percent less than non-Aboriginals. Non-Aboriginals working on urban reserves earn 34 percent more than the First Nations people they work beside. On rural reserves, non-Aboriginals make 88 percent more than First Nations workers. (Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 08 April 2010, p.3. Also StatsCan, 21 June 2010)

The only exception to these general circumstances – and it is an important one – is that education, especially a university degree, changes these earning statistics positively and substantially. The fact is, however, that university achievement in the First Nations community is poor, largely because high school completion rates remain so very low.

The feasibility hypothesis acknowledges the power of grievances as motive, but recognizes their limit as determinants and predictors of insurgencies.

Doorway to Feasibility

Some might argue that this social situation explains an outburst of anger and resentment on the part of First Nations male youth, especially those living on-reserve. Others might ask: if the conditions of young Aboriginals provide a motive that ought to ignite an uprising, why has the uprising not occurred? A quick and credible answer is that it has and is occurring – as a quick head count of the Warrior Cohort inside our penal colonies will demonstrate. In any case, this dismissive question cannot be left to answer itself: no rebellion, no problem.

The situation of young males on and off reserve may not have promoted a classic insurgency today. According to Collier’s hypothesis, however, it has set the stage for one. This large, young, unemployed, and most likely alienated First Nations cohort that perhaps has a taste for violence and excitement makes feasible the establishment of large criminal gangs. Criminal organizations are a threat to peace, order and good government in Canada. Incarceration statistics support this observation.

A life of poverty and few prospects for the good life enjoyed by the ‘immigrants’ and not available to poorly educated young Aboriginals tempts many young First Nations youths into lives of crime,
most of it within the Aboriginal community. If this and future cohorts were aroused by older leaders who focus on historical grievances – stolen lands, treaties betrayed and the horrors of the residential schools – young people might be tempted to forego criminal activities and to launch armed challenges against the civil authority to “take back the land” as they did at Oka and Caledonia.

The feasibility hypothesis acknowledges the power of grievances as motive, but recognizes their limit as determinants and predictors of insurgencies. Grievances, however, could provide a pretext for a rebellion advanced in the community’s interests but aimed in fact at promoting some faction’s very individualistic ends. In today’s circumstances in Canada, the arrival of a truly charismatic, unifying First Nations leader who seized legitimate grievances and used them as the cause to launch a rebellion that was in fact a rebellion to challenge Canada’s sovereignty might be of cardinal importance and of particular danger to Canada. More ominous for the nation would be such a leader who also carried a pointed message: “Canada is vulnerable. Winning a rebellion is entirely feasible. We can smash the status quo.” Statements close to this call that echoed across Ottawa in January 2013.

Certainly, some leaders, like Terry Nelson, unsuccessful candidate for the office of national chief of the AFN in 2012, have plans. A self-described “knowledgeable radical,” Nelson campaigned against Canada’s assertion that non-Aboriginal Canadians justly own the country’s resources. He advocates that “[t]he First Nations in Canada will not simply stand by the wayside as our resource wealth is sold off by the immigrants. The immigrants’ ‘free ride’ on our National Resources is over if I am elected chief.” (Nelson statement, 17 July 2012, p.1)

Nelson explained that his plan aimed to convince his people that they can, through “peaceful but very strategic coordinated … action,” retake control of the nation’s resources and thus turn themselves from serving the needs of “the immigrants” to serving the needs of the First Nations. (Nelson file, 17 July 2012, “What is the Plan! (sic)” and author’s interviews with First Nations leaders, Winnipeg, June 2012)

Terry Nelson’s campaign for independence and self-reliance will not disappear, as his bold attempt in October 2013 to enlist the government of Iran in his cause demonstrates. Critics who deride Nelson as a nuisance without support in the community ought to measure his influence carefully before they dismiss him entirely. According to some evidence, the Government of Canada has not dismissed him at all. At present, Nelson is most important as a representative of a value system and political approach that could ignite protests across the country.

Nelson’s is not a lone voice in the wilderness. He did, after all, win several hundred votes in the AFN leadership contest. Other chiefs and leaders are as angry as Nelson and as determined to overturn the status quo. Shawn Brant, the serial Mohawk blockader of railways and Highway 401 in Ontario, for instance, described well the link between Canada’s economy and its transportation infrastructure and the advantage it gives to First Nations:

“We've shown that, unified, we are capable of not just disruption, not just protest, but a willingness to use the economy as a tool in the arsenal to the fight. The government ran its infrastructure through our land ... now it serves as an incredibly powerful tool of influence that allows us now as a society to engage the government in a dialogue, a relationship based on us having the power.” (Aljazeera.net, 26 June 2010, pp.1-4. Also APTN, 18 February 2012)
CHAPTER 4

THE THIRD/FOURTH DETERMINANTS: THE ECONOMY IN ACTION

“Simply put … the strike can’t go on. We need to get the trains running again.”
LISA RAITT, MINISTER OF LABOUR, (VANCOUVER SUN, 28 MAY 2012)

The 2012 Canadian Pacific railway strike

In spring 2012, after weeks of negotiations broke down, the Teamsters Union called a strike against Canadian Pacific Railway (CP). The federal government followed the situation carefully and, within a week, intervened to end the strike. Labour union supporters rallied as expected, demanding that the government give negotiators time to solve the dispute. A Liberal Party member of Parliament accused the government of “shafting … the CP workers” and castigated Cabinet for “not believing in the importance of free collective bargaining.” (Vancouver Sun, May 29, 2012)

The government argued that this was no ordinary strike. Many scholars and business leaders agreed – as did, one can imagine, the hundreds of thousands of non-Teamsters Union members across Canada whose incomes depend on Canada’s railway system. “In the past only a handful of commodities were transported by trains [but] today everything is moving in containers that are often sent at least partway by rail. As a result, the effects of the strike are ‘much more widespread than would have been the case in the past across the economy.’” (CBC News, 28 May 2012)

Coal, grain, potash, nickel and lumber producers understand that they are captives to the efficiencies of the national rail system. Grain farmers use an estimated 1,800 rail cars a week to move their produce from the farm gate to markets. The automobile industry depends on rail to deliver parts and systems to its factories and finished vehicles to customers. The industry’s just-in-time manufacturing process faced “$1.5 million an hour in lost revenue” every day the strike continued. (thestar.com, 28 May 2012) The “forest products industry – ‘representing 2% of Canada’s GDP’ – is one of Canada’s largest users of freight rail services.” Forestry industry officials estimated that the strike cost the industry $22 million daily, placing severe stress on the mills, producers and “230,000 direct jobs” down the supply line. (Statement: Forest Product Association of Canada, 28 May 2012) Secondary industries and businesses that depend indirectly on this critical infrastructure were as alarmed as primary producers

Port Metro Vancouver, the main western gateway for Canadian exports to the Pacific region, quickly supported the government’s back-to-work legislation. Port officials explained that “up to $100 million worth of goods arrive in Vancouver per day – about 50 percent of the goods [because of the strike] … are being delayed or diverted via other transportation options.” Port Vice President, Peter Xotta, explained to the media that as the strike pressure increases, “Vancouver is starting to lose business to other west coast ports.” When customers lose confidence in the reliability of Canadian transportation systems, they begin to look elsewhere. For Vancouver, that meant its important rival, Seattle, Washington. (Op cit. Vancouver Sun, 28 May 2012)

Federal Minister of Labour, Lisa Raitt “estimated that the CP stoppage would cost Canada more than $540 million per week.” (thestar.com, 23 May 2012) Even if the strike had ended abruptly, the costs were predicted to continue until CP workers were able to bring the railway back to full capacity and clear the cargo backlog. In the meantime, producers waited, ships sat idle in harbours, mills closed, businesses laid off workers, and foreign customers looked for products elsewhere.
For many Canadians, the situation was perplexing. Few citizens could imagine that all this confusion and huge cost had been caused by a pension benefit disagreement, leading to a five days strike that was eventually resolved by a simple vote in the House of Commons.

A Nightmare Imagined

Today, let Canadians imagine another situation when, sometime in the near future, the challengers are not members of a legitimate union with a simple contractual demand. Instead, they are unified Aboriginal leaders who frame their dispute with Canada as a matter of life or death for their culture. They, too, have closed down Canada’s railways, not with strikes but with blockades along any of the thousands of kilometres of track that run through their territories. Then let Canadians imagine the time it would take to resolve a snarl of complex social, cultural, territorial, economic and legal issues with perhaps hundreds of First Nations at cost of $540 million per week.

“One thing that police and the army know is that indigenous people don’t have any real supply of guns. The supply of guns is controlled but what the authorities don’t understand is that every one of the 633 (sic) reservations in Canada has old cars. In Winnipeg thousands of cars were being stolen every month. Our indigenous youth, who make up to 95% of the inmates in jail, are actually in criminal “training schools” learning how to steal cars. If ever there was a military showdown between Indigenous people and the Canadian army, the first target would be the railway lines and burning cars would be on every railway line in Canada.

A covert operation involving burning cars on every railway line would almost be impossible to stop despite all the Canadian military and police being alerted to the potential. (Nelson file, “How dangerous is the situation in Canada?” March 2012, pp.1-2)

A burning car on a railway track is not simply a blockade, it is also a very efficient and economical weapon. A car with a full fuel tank would burn at a temperature high enough to warp the track and require extensive repairs. An attack on isolated tracks in sparsely settled countryside, for example, north of Lake Superior or west of Thunder Bay to the Manitoba border, would require the deployment by rail of special repair equipment. Once deployed, other attacks on the same line might trap that equipment in the wilderness. There is little doubt that one or two effective attacks, especially ones that derailed trains, would close CP and CN traffic simply because sensible train crews would refuse to travel on insecure railways surrounded by hostile forces.

Nelson’s message for non-Aboriginal Canadians is that if they find this imagined national crisis incredible, they need to know that some First Nations leaders do not.

Collier’s Theory Meets Reality

Canada’s economic well-being in 2012 is at risk because it is dependent on the export of natural resources and merchandise, especially to the United States.

Collier’s Theory Meets Reality

Canada’s economic well-being in 2012 is at risk because it is dependent on the export of natural resources and merchandise, especially to the United States. The risks of this dependency, however, do not fall neatly into Collier’s model.

Civil war/internal conflict studies (focussed mainly on under-developed states) link dependence on the export of primary commodities as a risk factor for two principal reasons: first, richness in natural resources can ignite internal resource wars; and, second, governments rich in funds generated by resources sales and export duties have little need for domestic tax returns and, therefore, little incentive to respond to citizens’ grievances. By Collier’s definition, “the risk of dependence on primary exports is at its peak when exports constitute around 25 percent of [a state’s] GDP. (Collier, 2009, p.13)
Although there is a simmering who-owns-Canada’s-natural-resources contest between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people, it does not yet define the internal national security risk facing Canada’s economy. The tax shifting/government incentive pattern is an unlikely risk by any measure. Rather, when analysts apply Collier’s model to Canada, they must take into account risks attributed to classic export dependence and to factors related to Canada’s internal/export economic model. In other words, they must acknowledge that the risk to Canada’s economy may arise from the dependence of national industries, for instance, in central and eastern Canada, on long supply chains running from the far west and the far north.

The internal/external export dependence risk to Canada’s economy today and into the foreseeable future arises from the inseparable, direct dependence of this trade on Canada’s critical infrastructure that transports goods to markets in Canada, the United States and overseas. This dependence on infrastructure is aggravated by the reality that many of these systems run for thousands of kilometres through some of the most difficult terrain in North America.\(^2\) As the 2012 CP strike demonstrated, any prolonged disruption of the supply chains and the flow of goods to domestic or foreign markets immediately creates a nationwide economic crisis that is very difficult to redress.

In the Netherlands, for example, where the distances between the sources of natural resources and economic goods and their markets (foreign or domestic) are relatively short, routes are geographically uncomplicated and transportation redundancies are in place, transportation security is relatively simple. Effective attacks on such a system would be difficult – less feasible – to execute with effect. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, where transportation systems are long, cross difficult terrain, and redundancy is limited or not available, defence is complex and offence is relatively easy or more feasible. This difficulty is almost impossible for intervening forces to overcome when insurgents are “resident” and at least tolerated by the local inhabitants.

In a situation where all or most of these negative transportation factors are present the cost for insurgents of interventions on transportation systems are small, but they are significant for the defender. In other words, the attacker would be free to attack and cause great harm to the weak system at almost any time and at any point he might choose. The defender would be obliged to disperse his forces to guard the entire system continually, adding to his overall strategic weakness.

In any internal conflict in Canada, the nation’s resource economy – the flow of taxes from the sale of resources – would become the ultimate but indirect target of the attack. Canada’s national critical infrastructure, its exposed rail, road, air and marine transportation systems as well as hydroelectric and pipeline systems, are the valuable targets of opportunity. It is this vulnerability that makes an attack on the Canada’s resource economy feasible as Shawn Brant, Terry Nelson, and others have plainly illustrated. *(Postmedia News, 4 January 2011)*

**The Weak Links: Critical Infrastructure Systems and Vague Policies**

“To say that Canada has its act together with respect to critical infrastructure threat, protection, and response capacity would be a stretch and somewhat misleading.” (Graham, 2012, p.23)

Canada’s public safety policies provide no definition for the term “critical infrastructure.” Rather, in government policy statements, critical infrastructure refers to:
processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of government. Critical infrastructure can be stand-alone or interconnected and interdependent within and across provinces, territories and national borders. Disruptions of critical infrastructure could result in catastrophic loss of life, adverse economic effects and significant harm to public confidence. (Public Safety Canada, 08 February 2012)

This wide and loose statement provides no guidance to officials or security authorities on how to grade the value of any process or system against another or how to allocate scarce security resources among many possible critical infrastructure targets or insecurities. Apparently, at Public Safety Canada, everything is equally and always critical, meaning that everything is equally valuable and always insecure.

Federal policies imply that the critical infrastructure systems of hardware – railways, hydroelectric poles and towers, road bridges and so on – define the nation’s critical infrastructure. It is this hardware that must be defended. This simple notion explicitly detaches these systems from their essential purpose – that of delivering to Canadians services essential to their well-being. (See MLI, Jason Clemens and Brian Lee Crowley, December 2011)

Yet even from this point of view, “Nearly a decade after the 9/11 attacks, Canada still hasn’t developed a reliable strategy for protecting such critical energy infrastructure as refineries, power plants and offshore petroleum platforms, according to a new study commissioned by the [Department of National Defence].” (Postmedia News, 04 January 2011) Since Canada’s entire critical infrastructure policies and procedures consist of no more than “… a combination of muddling through and ad hoc problem solving,” Canadians should not expect a coherent national strategy to be delivered to Parliament anytime soon. (Graham, 2011, p.10)

It is ironic – or do Canadians simply assume that the nation is innately secure? – that the government has identified the vulnerability of Canada’s critical infrastructure in unclassified documents and free-to-all websites and, in the process, advertised the vulnerability of its economy to friend and foe alike. Little wonder that Shawn Brant can brag that “… now we have the power.”

The fundamental basis for a critical infrastructure policy needs to be reconceptualised. That is, policies ought to be founded on the concept that the criticality of these systems is derived not from the value of their physical structures but from the value of the cargo they carry and deliver to Canadians. The relationship is easy to illustrate. (Op cit. Clemens and Crowley, pp.15-17)

For instance, as the value (measured perhaps by demand) for a cargo carried by a transportation system declines, the real value of the system’s hardware also declines and vice versa. At some point, the falling value of a transported cargo would not sustain the cost of maintaining the so-called critical infrastructure that transports it. Understanding this relationship is fundamental to any discussion about safeguarding services essential to Canada’s economy and social welfare from external and/or internal security threats.

It is the relative value of a cargo and not the mere existence of roads, railways and power-lines that may attract hostile forces to target these systems. The relative value of a cargo and the relative difficulty of its defence (or from the opposite perspective, the ease with which it can be attacked) defines a cargo’s vulnerability.³

With limited means to defend continually Canada’s vast transportation and related infrastructures, assessments of the relative value and relative vulnerability of the cargoes carried by each system
should determine the value of each element of critical infrastructure and thus define the deployment of scarce resources to protect them. During the 2012 CP Rail strike, Catherine Cobden, President of the Forest Products Association of Canada, declared: “A prolonged [transportation] dispute would have disastrous economic consequences for Canada’s economy and its reputation as a reliable supplier [to export markets].” (Op cit. FPAC statement, 28 May 2012)

The reality for Canadians and their governments is that in a prolonged dispute with the Indigenous peoples, their leaders would inevitably target Canada’s national transportation infrastructure. Not only would such actions have disastrous economic consequences for Canada and for the relationship between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians, but Canada’s unavoidable responses to them by the police and/or the armed forces could have disastrous repercussions on national unity and international relations.

If Canadian politicians, military officers, police chiefs, federal intelligence and Public Safety officials find this economy/vulnerability paradigm fanciful, Canadians hope they understand that many formal and informal Aboriginal leaders do not.

The Vulnerable Infrastructure Bottlenecks

It is not necessary to disrupt or dislocate any of the vital transportation systems entirely to produce significant negative effects on Canada’s economy, security and social welfare. A strong, enduring protest at a few critical points would create a crisis for governments across the nation.

Observant individuals can easily identify many such critical bottlenecks across Canada. They share several common characteristics:
- they are of immediate and significant value to businesses and governments;
- they concentrate valued resources or essential economic functions;
- they are located at the intersection of related transportation systems, thus allowing protesters to use their scarce resources efficiently;
- most are far from major national security resources and forces, thus complicating the deployment and maintenance of these forces;
- most are close to First Nations communities that would likely be neutral if not active supporters of insurgents and would provide safe-havens and logistical support to main participants;
- all are high profile assets the disruption of which would attract (for governments) troublesome national and international political and media attention; and
- all are vulnerable (i.e., value multiplied by the ease of disruption).

These feasibility enhancement sites include:

**British Columbia:** mountain and coastal road and rail systems; road and rail approaches to Pacific Ocean ports; crude oil and natural gas transmission pipelines, especially pumping stations, compressor stations and refineries; and all the transmission and distribution facilities of BC Hydro.

**Alberta:** crude oil and natural gas transmission pipelines, especially pumping stations, compressor stations and refineries; and coal-carrying railway systems.

**Saskatchewan:** crude oil and natural gas transmission pipelines, especially, pumping stations, compressor stations; railway transportation systems for natural resources; and Trans-Canada Highway intersections crossing the province.
Manitoba: The most vulnerable west-east transportation hub in Canada. Any disruption of the concentrated road and railways intersections at Winnipeg would have enormous, negative economic consequences across Canada. There are no easy or cost-effective ways around this transportation hub.

Elsewhere in the province the most important assets are the Manitoba Hydroelectric system from Nelson River generating facilities and the transmission lines running south and the hydroelectric distribution lines in the Winnipeg area.

Winnipeg has a unique vulnerability. The city’s draws its entire fresh water supply from Shoal Lake in Ontario through a 156 kilometre concrete pipeline into reservoirs near the city. Shoal Lake is surrounded by land claimed by the Iskatewizaagegan First Nation. Chief Mandamin has threatened to close the system unless Manitoba pays the First Nations an annual water supply fee of $124 million. The dispute continues. (CTV Winnipeg, 07 September 2011. Also Winnipeg’s Shoal Lake Aqueduct, George Siamandas, 05 April 2012; and Kenora Daily News. 05 September 2011)

Ontario: the west-east road and railway transportation convergence in the Thunder Bay area; the access roads and railways into the Thunder Bay port; the junction of the Highway 17 and Highway 11 Trans-Canada Highway systems over Lake Superior at Nipigon; the international bridge at Sault Ste. Marie; the road bridge over the Petawawa River on Highway 17 at Petawawa; the road and railway bridges over the Rideau Canal system on Highway 401 and Highway 2 near Kingston; the 400-series highways in and around Toronto; the roads into the Windsor/Ambassador Bridge border crossing; and the Welland Canal operating facilities.

Quebec: the Hydro Québec transmission lines from the James Bay generating facilities; the Hydro Québec distribution system in lower Quebec; the bridges near Montreal and Quebec City; the east-west-bound highways north and south of the St. Lawrence River; and the highway approaches to the United States.

Atlantic Provinces: roads and railways to Quebec and the United States; road and railway approaches to Halifax harbour; and the hydroelectric transmission and distribution lines from Quebec.

The Territorial North: major roads to Whitehorse and Yellowknife; airports; hydroelectric stations; pipelines; winter roads to mining camps.

CHAPTER 5

THE THIRD/FOURTH DETERMINANTS: THE NATURAL RESOURCES/SECURITY PARADOX

Canada’s economic security derived from its abundant natural resources makes Canada intrinsically insecure.

Canada is rich in natural resources. The efficient exploitation of huge quantities of raw materials brings immense prosperity and economic security to the nation and to Canadians generally. The efficient exploitation of these resources is contingent on the reliable transportation of raw and processed materials over long distances through difficult terrain and along highly vulnerable infrastructure systems to Canadian manufacturers and export markets.
No matter its natural riches, if Canada is to escape the consequences of a First Nations insurgency, then – according to the feasibility hypothesis – Canadians must, among other things, make its critical transportation infrastructure less vulnerable or deal with First Nations’ leaders from a point of relative strategic weakness.

**Transportation General**

In 2010, the minister of Transport summarized the central importance of transportation capabilities in Canada:

> One way or another, transportation is a part of all social and economic activities [in Canada]. Transportation provides market access to natural resources, agricultural products, and manufactured goods in the same way that it provides support to service industries. It also overcomes the challenges posed by topography and geography – linking communities and reducing the effects of distance that separates people from each other. These essential roles reflect transportation’s intertwined and interdependent relationships with the economic engines and social fabric of our society.” (“Transportation in Canada 2010,” 08 June 2011 p.4)

The minister’s report for 2011 underscored again the critical importance of the transportation sector to Canada’s economic security. (“Transportation in Canada 2011,” 13 July 2011)

All four transportation infrastructure systems – road, rail, air and marine – are crucial to the maintenance and sustainment of Canada’s economy. Each system is composed of specific structures – bridges, tunnels, airports, waterways and various communication and controlling systems, among other essential components – that are vulnerable to interference.

“The transportation industry remains a significant force in the Canadian economy representing (in 2010) 4.7% of Canada’s GDP” (StatsCan, 11-402-x, March 2012, p.1) The contribution of the transportation industry (including warehousing) is not limited to the movement of goods and resources alone. These systems make considerable economic contributions to Canada’s GDP by facilitating the movement of resources – minerals, forest products, grains and finished products – from production sites to markets in Canada and the United States and to/from coastal ports. The value and the contributions to GDP of these industries would vanish without the transportation capabilities that move these products.

The transportation sector is also a major national employer, employing in 2010, more than 670,650 individuals in all its various operations across Canada. Moreover, “all levels of government combined collected $16.5 billion in permits, fees, fuel taxes and other revenues from transport users in 2009-2010.” During the same period, “direct federal subsidies, grants, and contributions [to transportation infrastructure and other support] rose to $2.6 billion.” (“Transportation in Canada 2010,” p.7)

Road and rail transportation are especially important to Canada’s vital Canada-United States export/import economy. Trucking, for instance, “accounted for 58 percent of the value of trade with the United States in 2010 followed by rail at 17 percent … and air and marine at 5 percent each.” (Ibid, p.5) Not surprisingly, Canada’s manufacturing hub, Ontario, accounts for more than 30 percent of national transportation activity, followed by Quebec at 19 percent, and British Columbia at 15 percent. (Ibid, p.6)

A key vulnerability in this export/import network is the concentration of its critical transportation lifelines in a relatively close area funnelled through six congested gateways mostly in eastern Canada.
For example, 75 percent (by value) of Canada-United States trade is carried by trucks through six border crossings: Windsor/Ambassador Bridge, Fort Erie/Niagara Falls, and Sarnia, Ontario. The remainder passes through Lacolle, Quebec; Emerson, Manitoba; and the Pacific Highway in British Columbia. In 2010, “an estimated 10.5 million two-way truck movements [crossed] these border points.” (Ibid, p.5)

More than 800,000 long- and short-haul trucks use Canada’s extensive 1,045,000 kilometre national road transportation system. In 2010, this truck fleet, “the largest component of transportation GDP,” contributed $17.1 billion to the Canadian economy. The importance of the National Highway System is underscored by the fact that, in 2009-2010, governments invested more than $4.6 billion in its maintenance and improvement. (Ibid, p.16)

Obviously, any prolonged interference along these routes would greatly disrupt Canada/United States trade. Thus, for any group wanting to harm Canada’s economy, these high-value, easily disabled routes present tempting soft targets.

**Rail Transportation**

Rail carriers in Canada operate approximately 68,000 kilometres of track. The vast majority (84.6 percent) of these “owned and leased” lines are controlled by Canadian National Railways and Canadian Pacific Railways. As well, the entire national railway infrastructure includes 36 short-line and regional railways or 22 percent of the nation’s total kilometres of track. (StatsCan, “Rail in Canada”, 52-216-X, 2011.)

In 2010, all railways freight workloads “… totalled 239.2 billion RTM [Revenue-Ton-Mile]” and produced a revenue of $9.6 billion. (Railways Association of Canada, 2011 “Rail Trends,” p.2) Although these revenues are significant, the true value of Canada’s railway freight systems lies in its role as the indispensable economic enabler, linking national producers to domestic and foreign buyers. The statistics for 2009 present a typical annual profile.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top Ten Commodities</th>
<th>Tonnage (2009)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>34,508,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed loads or unidentified freight</td>
<td>22,224,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>22,124,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron ores and concentrates</td>
<td>21,954,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colza seed (canola)</td>
<td>8,354,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other basic chemicals</td>
<td>8,131,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood pulp</td>
<td>7,640,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>7,189,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potash</td>
<td>6,839,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other cereal grains</td>
<td>5,849,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>140,182,952</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(StatsCan. Ibid, 52-216-x, Table 12)

Much of this traffic flows from Canada into the United States, but a large percent of it also moves east and west on two main lines over Lake Superior and through the Winnipeg bottleneck. Every route, including those in the Montreal-Windsor corridor, is vulnerable to blockade and intentional damage. The isolated northern Ontario-Kenora-Winnipeg routes are particularly vulnerable and pass through the homelands of several large First Nations communities.
Air Transportation

Air transportation infrastructure is an important element in Canada’s overall transportation infrastructure. In 2009-2010, the government spent $1.2 billion on the construction, maintenance and operation of air transportation. In 2010, Canada’s major airlines carried more than 45 million passengers. In the same period, air cargo “reached nearly one million tonnes valued at $100 billion. (Transport Canada 2010: An Overview, “Air Transport,” p.20)

Canada’s airline infrastructure is composed of airfields, airports, air navigation networks, dedicated communications facilities and enormous maintenance, aircraft handling and ground transportation assets. Its derived value is measured in the direct revenue it produces for airlines and governments, and also in the multiplying value it (and other transportation assets) provides to Canada’s industries, businesses and distant communities.

This infrastructure and the value it provides are vulnerable to disruptions caused by nature, accidents and criminal agents. Malicious disruptions of air traffic, such as interference with communications systems and passenger- and freight-handling processes are nuisances but rarely disable the entire system. Active interference with flights or moving aircraft on runways and taxiways is very dangerous, and would result in swift action by the police and security personnel stationed at all airports. Even small, non-violent protests that attempt to gain access to an active airfield would almost immediately be declared in violation of the Canada’s Emergencies Act, which would result in a vigorous police response. Protestors have many softer infrastructure targets they could engage more easily and with greater effect. Therefore, air transport infrastructure will likely remain a low threat in Canada.

Marine Transportation

Canadian marine transportation carried 355 million tonnes via domestic, trans-border and international traffic in 2009. Canada’s 17 port authorities handled more that 50 percent of this traffic, and generated $390 million in operating revenue that year. The St. Lawrence Seaway handled some 35 million tonnes of cargo, and produced $55.2 million in revenues, also in 2009. Almost $46 million were spent on the Seaway system that year for “asset renewal.” (Transport Canada, 2010)

Canadian and United States Great Lakes-Seaway ports handled 322.1 million tonnes of cargo in 2010. The main value of the marine infrastructure to Canada, especially for the St. Lawrence Seaway, is its utility as an alternative or supporting transportation system for road and rail operations on the west-east transportation corridor.

In 2010, the Thunder Bay Port Authority managed 368 ships and 6,862,467 tonnes of cargo. The main cargoes were grain (5,219,784 tonnes), coal (1,062,891 tonnes) and potash (313,952 tonnes). Thunder Bay’s marine activities produced 1,808 jobs in Ontario, of which 881 were directly generated by cargo and vessel activities. The $60.6 million of regional purchases made by businesses supplying the port authority supported more than 500 indirect jobs. Moreover, the firms directly dependent on the cargo handled by the Port of Thunder Bay terminal generated $369.1 million in business revenue. (Thunder Bay Port Authority, 02 November 2011)

Although it would be difficult to interfere directly and effectively with terminal operations in Thunder Bay or elsewhere in the St. Lawrence Seaway system, disruptions to road and rail transportations systems leading to the ports would effectively close these vital, weather-sensitive, seasonal operations. Any prolonged stoppage of operations at Thunder Bay would produce serious disruptions along the entire Seaway system and to economic activities throughout north-western Ontario and across the prairie heartlands. (The Economic Impacts of the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Seaway System, 18 October 2011, p.9)
Energy Transportation Systems

It would be difficult to live in Canada, let alone develop a major industrial economy in its territory, if Canada were not a major producer of energy resources. The exploitation of these resources for national and international markets, however, depends on a vast, multifaceted energy transportation network running throughout Canada from west to east and from north to south.

In some places, these networks have been (and will be) constructed across, over and under some of the most difficult terrain in North America. Every system is more or less vulnerable to interference from nature, technical failures and hostile organizations in locations that are very difficult to access or survey.

Canada’s sources of energy vary significantly. In 2009, fossil fuels (crude oil, natural gas and coal) accounted for 82.7 percent of national energy production; hydroelectricity, wood, and tides, wind and solar sources for 11.4 percent; and nuclear facilities for 5.9 percent. In the same period, the energy sector (production industries, electricity transformation and transportation) accounted for 6.7 percent of Canada’s GDP at $80.2 billion. Capital investment in the energy-related sector represented 20.1 percent of all capital investment in Canada in 2009. In all its aspects, the energy sector employed more than 300,000 Canadian workers and accounted for 21.6 percent of the nation’s merchandise export trade.

Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines

By some estimates, Canada is the world’s third-largest producer and exporter of natural gas. Its crude oil reserves are “second only to [those in] Saudi Arabia.” Although these riches are significant drivers of Canadian industry and social well-being, the big business is in energy exports. According to Natural Resources Canada, 97 percent of the nation’s energy production, including about two-thirds of its crude oil, is exported, mainly to the United States. (Natural Resources Canada, “PipeLine Infrastructure,” 2009) An enormous 700,000 kilometre network of pipelines as well as railways, trucks and ships move crude oil and natural gas from wellheads mostly in western Canada to refineries and onward to markets in Canada, the United States and Mexico.

Unlike electric energy transmission lines, crude oil and natural gas pipeline are relatively secure from harm once they are properly placed in the ground. Each pipeline, however, requires pump and compressor stations to push product through it. These above-ground stations are susceptible to damage and interference. Other supporting parts to the crude oil and natural gas system might also be vulnerable to interference and accidental damage, including crude oil refineries, natural gas processing plants and storage facilities for both products. (Cutting Edge News, 10 November 2008; Reuters, 08 October 2008; CBC News, 19 November 2011)

The federal government acknowledged the vulnerability of the nation’s pipeline infrastructure in 2012 after a series of non-Aboriginal attacks on western pipelines, when it established a special RCMP-led “counter-terrorist unit … to help protect the energy industry from attacks by extremists.” According to RCMP Assistant Commissioner, Gilles Michaud, the Alberta-based unit, similar to others already functioning in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia, is a response to “an increasing threat to the [energy industry’s] infrastructure.” (National Post, Tuesday, 07 June 2012, FP.1)

These and other such events and their consequences for the trucking industry clearly illustrate the notion that the criticality of critical infrastructure resides in the value of the products they carry, not merely in the structures themselves.
Hydroelectric Infrastructure

Canadian hydroelectric facilities generated 60.4 percent of the total electric power used in Canada in 2009. There are four principal hydroelectric systems of waterways, generating plants, and transmissions lines – Hydro Québec, Hydro One (Ontario), Manitoba Hydro and BC Hydro. Each system makes substantial direct contributions to provincial and national economies by supplying energy to manufacturing, transportation, residential, commercial and agricultural sectors of the economy. Hydroelectric energy is also an important export commodity earning $2.4 billion in revenue through exports to the United States in 2009.

Transmission and distribution lines are critical infrastructure in each system. As the Great Ice Storm of 1998 in eastern Ontario and west Quebec made dramatically obvious, these lines are fragile and exposed to many natural and technical threats. In circumstances where damage is widespread, recovery is difficult, expensive and slow.

Safeguarding these transmission systems even from simple natural events is complicated by the great distances between generating facilities and consumers, which are often separated by rugged terrain. Hydro Québec maintains 145,542 kilometres of transmission and distribution lines. (Hydro Québec, 2010); Ontario Hydro, 152,451 kilometres (Hydro One, “Quick Facts,” 04 January 2012; Manitoba Hydro, 86,700 kilometres (Manitoba Hydro, 2012); and BC Hydro 73,000 kilometres (“BC Hydro50,” 2012).

All of these provinces are building or planning to build new transmission systems to serve increasing demands from private and public users. The derived value of the energy carried by these systems, their fragility and vulnerability to easily executed interference and the near impossibility of protecting them from harm makes them obvious targets for any group intent on harming Canada’s economy. Most of these planned systems, like the Manitoba Hydro project planned to run east of Lake Winnipeg, travel through lands owned, claimed and/or occupied by First Nations.

CHAPTER 6

THE FIFTH DETERMINANT: THE SECURITY GUARANTEE

Collier’s team introduced the “security guarantee” – a concept they had not considered in their earlier studies – into their 2009 analysis. The factor suggests that risks of conflict are minimized where a legitimate government is under the assured protection of a credible protectorate. The duration of any rebellion, should one occur, is also reduced. The team’s comparative models situated the de facto French guarantee in former French colonies in Africa (1965-1998) against the withdrawal of this assurance in 1998 and against the British decision to withdraw completely its security from its former African colonies soon after they were granted independence in the early 1960s.
The researchers concluded that when the French guarantee was in place, “French colonies had a risk of civil war that was a third of that which would otherwise have been predicted.” They attributed this result to several factors: the sound traditions of administration established by France during the colonial years; the relatively peaceful legacy in these societies established during that period; and especially to the presence of French military bases in the former colonies ready to intervene in case of trouble. The opposite effect unfolded in the abandoned British colonies almost immediately after British forces departed, as it did also in Côte d’Ivoire in 1998 “when the French government decided to allow the [coup] to stand despite being in a position to reverse it.” (Collier, 2009, p.15)

Collier’s research in this area is much too narrow and tentative to be transferred unconditionally to Canada/First Nations situation. Nevertheless, given the history of First Nations/Canadian civil conflicts and threat of more, it is reasonable that the maintenance of a credible (in the minds of First Nations leaders) security guarantee near major First Nations communities is critically important to maintaining stability in those communities and in the provinces. As well, governments today should understand from specific evidence derived from Canadian incidents that where a credible security guarantee at the scene of a confrontation is not available, that confrontation will almost surely escalate.

Finally, experience tells us (at Oka in 1990, for example) that when the media present disruptive events widely and dramatically, outside agitators will be drawn into the melee. The leadership of the protest will become disordered, and negotiations will become chaotic. In such situations, the availability of competently managed security forces is key to controlling immediate events and establishing circumstances in which negotiations can proceed.

In the case of Oka, combat units of the Canadian Forces were deployed at the request of the Quebec government to take command of the situation. The balanced, restrained conduct of the soldiers, and especially their commander’s unequivocal message to the protesters that he would re-establish order with deadly force if necessary, convinced the warriors to yield. More or less peaceful negotiations resumed almost immediately afterwards. (Winegard, 2008; Swain, 2010; and Brock, 2012)

At Ipperwash, Ontario, in September 1995 a similar peaceful protest erupted into confused violence between the poorly commanded Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and irritated First Nations demonstrators. The aggressive stance of the police, apparently encouraged by provincial politicians, significantly complicated events and harmed efforts to settle the immediate crisis peacefully. (Ontario, 31 May 2007) In the confusion, one Aboriginal person, Dudley George, was killed by the police. Formerly peaceful relations between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals broke down and ignited spontaneous, hostile demonstrations elsewhere in the province.

After Ipperwash and before the provincial inquiry was completed in 2007, the OPP developed the Framework for Police Preparedness for Aboriginal Critical Incidents. (2005). “The framework emphasizes avoiding critical incidents by building [beforehand] trust with the First Nations.” (Brock, 2010, p.31) Officers were trained as interveners in local disputes in the hope that they could defuse incidents before they exploded. They were also sent out to develop routine contacts with First Nations leaders. These efforts proved to be a major factor in stabilizing the confrontation at Caledonia and in other minor police/native disturbances in Ontario. (Brock, pp.31-32)

The Caledonia confrontation began in 2005 and, in some respects, is still active in 2013. Although many of the incidents there and responses to them by Aboriginals, non-Aboriginals and the police were similar to those at Oka and Ipperwash, by 2005, the OPP had learned a great deal from these protests and applied this experience at Caledonia. Nevertheless, some local citizens complained that police attempts to build trust with the First Nations in the midst of the occupation at Caledonia or at barricades on public highways and railways in the community compromised the rights and the
security of non-Aboriginals. Subsequently, skirmishes broke out between the non-Aboriginal residents and the police. (Blatchford, 2010, pp.124-127)

These police-in-the-middle conflicts demonstrate the dilemmas facing security forces. When they make compromises to one group in an attempt to maintain order, they risk enraging the other group thus making the situation worse. Commissioner of the OPP, Julian Fantino, at Caledonia for example, explained that he acted on the premise that a misstep on the part of his officers against the native protestors would have led to “[a native] flare-up right across the country.” Therefore, to deter this greater threat as he saw it Fantino took no direct action against the native activists. (Op cit. Blatchford, 2010, p.200)

The police at Caledonia had few options other than peacekeeping tactics to defuse the situation; that is, unless Canadians were prepared for the possibility that more aggressive measures might have led to wider disruptive, violent confrontations. The police at the scene and their political masters were not prepared to take such a chance.

Finding the right balance between legitimate protest and armed confrontation may be difficult, but find it we must. An important – indispensable – aspect of the solution will be the continuing development of policing regimes (with military support in the background) that credibly assure peaceful Canadians and peaceful Aboriginal people that a security guarantee is in place to underwrite their rights and freedoms under the law. (Media Co-op, 7 June 2011)

On the other hand, should the peacekeeping security guarantee fail, Canadians and Aboriginal people must be confident that the government has the appropriate forces to enforce stability and lawful order when and if necessary. These measures allow for legitimate protests and provide deterrents to unlawful acts. Without such assurances, insurgency becomes more feasible, and its destructive occurrence is the more likely outcome.

A Law Meant to Protect the State from the People?

Canada’s federal security guarantee is defined by The Emergencies Act: “an Act to authorize the taking of special temporary measures to ensure safety and security during national emergencies and to amend other Acts in consequence thereof.” (Canada: The Emergencies Act, 1985) The Act gives the federal government the authority “… to deal with emergencies on any property, territory or area in respect of which the Parliament of Canada has jurisdiction.” (EA, Section 2.2). It also gives the government the right to restrict travel, control public utilities and services (EA, Section 19.1 a & c) and to impose fines or prison sentences on citizens contravening its provisions (EA, section 19.1e).

The Act defines a national emergency as:

an urgent and critical situation of a temporary nature that:

(a) seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians and is of such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal with it, or

(b) seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada and that cannot be effectively dealt with under any other law of Canada. (EA, Section 3)

The government also has at hand The National Defence Act and its provisions for providing military forces “in aid of the civil power” to control “a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent, or deal with” (Queen’s Regulations and Orders, Chap.23. 275, R.S.C. 1985). The Act and regulations permit, under specific circumstances and conditions, “the
calling out of the Canadian Forces” by provincial attorneys general or their equivalent. Units called out (at the discretion of the chief of the defence staff) may act as constables but they would perform their duties in accordance with the Act and under the command of Canadian Forces officers.

Several underlying assumptions condition requests to call out the Canadian Forces in aid of the civil power:

- the civil authorities and their police (federal, provincial or otherwise) are unable to maintain peace and public order with their usual methods and equipment;
- the situation may require the use of military tactics and weapons;
- military force, including deadly force, will be employed continually and with as much severity as is necessary to restore good order and respect for the law.

The deployment of the Canadian Forces on operations directed at Canadian citizens, therefore, is complex and can result in death and injury to citizens and soldiers.

Political decisions to use the provisions of The Emergencies Act or The National Defence Act are types of last-chance decisions. They should never be used as part of a bluff. However, political leaders need to understand that the use of the state’s power might not be decisive, especially in the short-term. Indeed, such acts might impair negotiations and peacemaking in the short and long term. In the worst outcome, and particularly in the context of dealing with Aboriginal protesters, the use of armed force by governments in a particular situation in one part of Canada might inflame Aboriginal communities in many other parts of the country. Early in the Oka crisis, officials and military officers were highly sensitive to this threat, and took unusual steps to pre-empt nationwide supporting escalation in other communities. (Swain, 2010, pp.100-101)

The lessons from the last 25 years of Canadian-First Nations relations are threefold. First, attempts to use the full force of the law to impose a settlement of a protest/rebellion against a particular law may be a poor approach to resolving a civil dispute. Second, armed security operations by governments against their citizens seldom bring about reason, reconciliation, peace, order and good governance in the long term. Third, politicians who are eager to use the Canadian Forces to suppress internal law and order conflicts are surprised to discover that military commanders are not as blasé as they are in using soldiers against citizens.

The development of a credible security guarantee is a key element in any strategy aimed at negating the feasibility of an insurgency in Canada. Canadians and First Nations people must be convinced – before any confrontation begins – that the government, supported by its security establishment, will prevail. Aggressive Aboriginal leaders should assume that Canada’s security forces will always establish order “the hard way or the harder way,” to paraphrase Shawn Atleo.

**The Security Guarantee 2012: Manitoba as an Example**

Measuring the full size of Canada’s federal, provincial and municipal police establishments and their effectiveness in the context of a First Nations national security rebellion is beyond the scope of this essay. By examining a portion of Canada’s preparedness, however, it is possible to develop an appreciation of just how far Canada is generally from providing citizens and Aboriginal people with a credible security guarantee in anticipation or in the event of an “apprehended First Nations insurrection.”

As noted above, Manitoba is particularly critical to Canada’s interprovincial transportation network and also particularly vulnerable. The province is offered here as a proxy for the vulnerability of the country as a whole.
Manitoba is a vast, sparsely populated territory, home to 63 First Nations, including 20 of the largest bands in Canada. The total First Nations numbers some 141,000 people, of whom approximately 84,000 under-30 YOA fit well into the warrior cadre. (ANAC: Manitoba, 05 August 2012) Winnipeg is Canada’s transnational transportation hub; the centre of a concentration of road, rail and pipeline critical infrastructure systems. Any operational interference of this centre, even for only a few days, would greatly damage Canada’s economy and potentially throw the country into political chaos.

Even if a mere ten percent (14,000) of Manitoba’s First Nations people joined an aggressive protest, they would overwhelm the 52 small RCMP detachments scattered across the province. The Winnipeg City police force is not trained or equipped to reinforce the RCMP outside the city and is unlikely to be released by city politicians for such duties in a civil emergency. The general conclusion, therefore, is that there is no immediately available (defined as operationally deployable within 24 hours of the declaration of a civil emergency) security forces to prevent a significant disruption of economic activities in Manitoba or to contain such an event once it was launched. The Canadian Forces certainly have some locally stationed capacity in Manitoba that might “aid the powers,” but this force is not large and the technical and legal procedures necessary to call out the Canadian Forces would limit its immediate availability.

Thus, Manitoba cannot provide a credible security guarantee in the event of even a modest, more or less peaceful and prolonged First Nations protest. Certainly, no force could counter a coordinated, armed disruption of the Manitoba transportation hub without mobilizing outside resources. As one specialist familiar with the situation observed, “The reality is that the security of Manitoba now and in the future is whatever the First Nations allow it to be.” (Confidential interview, June, Winnipeg, 2012)

In the event of a public order emergency in Manitoba, RCMP and military forces from other jurisdictions could be deployed to reinforce police units in Manitoba. Depending on the situation, this tactic might suffice. The logistical complexity of doing so would be daunting, especially over a long period. A more serious factor might negate the idea entirely.

Moving sufficient forces to Manitoba, for instance, to remove blockades on the road and rail system into the province, would deplete the security guarantee in the areas from which these forces were drawn. Assuming that aggressive action against First Nations in Manitoba would escalate the crisis and ignite hostile action elsewhere, politicians outside Manitoba would at least hesitate before volunteering their police forces for duties far from home.

Unfortunately, from a national perspective, Manitoba’s non-security guarantee is not unique to the keystone province. In Canada in 2013, the security guarantee is the barometer of the insurgency feasibility factor; as the guarantee drifts lower, the feasibility of a confrontation climbs higher.
CHAPTER 7
THE FIVE DETERMINANTS AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR CHANGE

“An implication of the feasibility hypothesis is that if the incidence of civil war is to be reduced, which seems appropriate given its appalling consequences, it will need to be made more difficult.”
(COLLIER, 2009, P.24)

The Fractionalized Nation

There is a growing understanding within the First Nations community that it does have, as Shawn Brant declared in 2010, “an incredibly powerful tool of influence” based on its treaty rights and sovereignty and occupation of lands vital to Canada’s economy. (Op cit. Brant, 2010)

Missing is a coordinated action plan to give effect to this realization at a regional or national level.

Nevertheless, any opportunity for Canada to resolve “the fractionalization determinant” may have already slipped away, as the influence of the First Nations community and the power of the idea of native autonomy and sovereignty grow. The federal government may no longer be in a position to lead and control an initiative to more fully integrate the First Nations into the Canadian mosaic because prominent native leaders believe they have the legal and moral right to operate independently of the national government.

Shawn Atleo’s central notion, as he made plain in his address in Toronto in April 2012, is that Canada and the First Nations are partners. As of January 2013, there is no record of any Canadian politician contesting this idea. Rather, prime ministers’ statements and policy initiatives – Paul Martin at Kelowna and Stephen Harper in the resident schools apology, for example – reinforce the notion that First Nations people (and the Métis and Inuit by inference) are distinct societies within Canada. There is, however, no consensus about the meaning of such a partnership and no shared understanding of the consequences of this concept, except among a few radical Aboriginal leaders who define it as separation. (Chief Theresa Spencer’s CBC News, 23 January 2013; Nelson Files, February 2113)

This uncertain situation could deteriorate rapidly if the First Nations built a coordinated and effective political federation from the geographically and politically scattered chiefs and bands.

This uncertain situation could deteriorate rapidly if the First Nations built a coordinated and effective political federation from the geographically and politically scattered chiefs and bands. In such a case, Canadians governments may well find themselves as but one entity in a constitutionally fractured society of a federal government, ten provinces, three territories and one unified First Nations assembly.

Is there time and opportunity to act? No-one knows. The events of winter 2012-2013 suggest that the window is much shorter than previously thought. Canadians know or ought to know that our fractionalized nation will not heal itself spontaneously. The fractures can only grow wider and more evident as First Nations’ leaders begin to understand the true strength of their situation and non-aboriginal Canadians react against it.
The Warrior Cohort

The young warrior cohort is here to stay. And it is growing. To reduce the feasibility of an uprising in the First Nations, Canada needs educational and employment policies that immediately transform the next and all future First Nations cohorts of 15-24 YOA into productive, self-reliant people. These policies should be introduced not because it is the right thing to do but because research demonstrates that young people with a high school diploma and a job are very much less likely to become criminal or political security risks. Without the prospect of sustained jobs, few will attend school. Without effective schooling, few will find jobs. This reform must be administered as a unified education and jobs policy. One approach without the assurance of the other will not do.

According to some Aboriginal leaders, the impasse is that Canadian education is just another trick to assimilate young people into the dominant culture. It runs counter to the partnership concept because assimilation will eventually eliminate the numerically and economically inferior partner. Many thoughtful Canadians might concede the point but also see ways to combine traditional and modern curricula to benefit both cultures.

Even if this education-and-jobs mission were carried forward rapidly, the authorities would also need to solve the problems presented by the existing dysfunctional cohorts of poorly educated, barely employable members of the Indigenous communities living on- and off-reserve. Unfortunately, the literature presents few workable ways of reaching backwards and eliminating this distressing social situation.

If Canadian leaders on both sides (or all four sides if we include the three Aboriginal communities) do not find comprehensive strategies to redress the circumstances of the nearly 350,000 Aboriginal youth, then thousands will continue to drift into irretrievable poverty, weak relationships, drug addition, sickness, criminal associations, prisons and early deaths. As Justice Sinclair warned in November 2011, the problem may have already passed the tipping-point beyond which there is no credible policy that would rectify this profile of Aboriginal youth (Winnipeg Free Press, 11 November 2011).

Even a program to greatly increase the number of Aboriginal youth who attend university or advanced technical training off-reserve raises a worrying paradox. Once they are qualified and have experienced the advantages of life off-reserve, these people tend not to return to their homes. This trend would not surprise non-Aboriginal families whose educated children elect to live in large modern communities rather than on the family farm or in small fishing villages. The dilemma for First Nations leaders is that, as these potential leaders and role models forsake their communities, they leave behind a proportionally larger group of poorly educated, disadvantaged youth. The educational advancement of the few actually increases the disadvantages of the many, potentially to the detriment of the whole community.

The Economic and Resources Determinants

Canada’s economy is substantially dependant on the export of primary commodities; and the export of these commodities is absolutely dependent on Canada’s transportation networks. These networks all pass through long, nearly impossible-to-defend terrain occupied by First Nations. They are, therefore, inescapably vulnerable to disruptions and sabotage.

No practical alternative system could adequately replace these transportation networks. Anyone who has considered the importance of Canada’s critical infrastructure to the nation’s welfare understands this fact of national life. First Nations leaders certainly do, and they have used it to their advantage in discussions with governments, for instance, in the First Nations 2010 HST/GST disagreements with
the Ontario government and during the preparations for the 2010 Olympic Winter Games in British Columbia. The federal government is worried about the vulnerability of national infrastructure as well, and displayed its concern by setting up the counter-terrorist unit referred to above. (*National Post*, 07 June 2012)

Making an insurgency less likely by making it less feasible is a logical, indeed, urgent national security objective. Unfortunately for Canada, the interwoven economic/national resources/transportation matrix is irreversibly vulnerable as it presents targets that cannot be fully protected. No politician, military officer or academic has any credible suggestion as to how to mitigate this vulnerability, let alone address it in full. As Canada’s economic health becomes ever more dependent on moving natural resources over long, difficult transportation routes, effective Aboriginal disturbances become more feasible. And because they are feasible, it follows that strategic, coordinated First Nations actions against Canada’s economy will occur.

Some suggest hopefully that First Nations/resource industry partnerships “could be the key to progress in ending the plight of First Nations people in Canada.” (*Ottawa Citizen*, 19 July 2012) Both sides have much to gain through collaboration. However, significant uncertainties might derail these possibilities. Chief among them are defining who owns the resources in question and how the revenues will be shared.

Some Canadians take for granted the assertion that Canada owns the nation’s land and, therefore, the nation’s resources. From this perspective, the Canada/First Nations contest over resources is to insure that resource industries negotiate fairly with First Nations when they profit from mining and other activities on First Nations reserves. On the other hand, some First Nations leaders declare that they own all the resources on all the land in Canada and especially so where land claims have not been settled. Other less radical leaders claim only the resources on their land covered by treaty. In both cases, First Nations people are more stridently declaring their rights to profit from Canada’s rich resource industries.

These First Nations claims have led to successful mutually beneficial arrangements between First Nations and some industries. Canadians might well praise the new cooperative atmosphere. Much of it, however, may be due to Supreme Court decisions favourable to Indigenous peoples, more assertive Aboriginal leaders, and implicit acknowledgement of the resource industries’ vulnerability. At a deeper level, the fundamental issue is not about encouraging fair cooperation in the resource sector but about discovering who is sovereign in Canada.

The Security Determinant

In the early spring 2012, the Canadian government announced major cuts to most branches of the public service, including sharp reductions to the national defence budget and the RCMP. How these reductions will play out in allocating funds to military personnel and police forces is not yet clear. What is apparent, however, is that these military and national police capabilities are unlikely to expand in the near future.

At best, the national security guarantee will be no better in the near future than it is now; based more on history and behavioural patterns than a realistic threat assessment. In other words, it will be a very thin guarantee indeed. To make this weakness less critical and reduce the feasibility of Indigenous disturbances would require a considerable increase in security forces, particularly in locally employed police officers. While the federal government could create a rapidly deployable mobile force, it would soon become obvious that it was aimed at Aboriginal communities. That suspicion might provoke an
angry Indigenous response, creating the very situation that the security reinforcement was meant to deter. In any case, such a force could not sustain operations across the nation for very long.

The minimal capabilities of Canada's central security forces are well understood in Aboriginal communities. Leaders there also understand the reluctance in governments, in the senior ranks of the Canadian Forces and police organizations (as demonstrated at Caledonia) to intervene in Aboriginal demonstrations even when there are urgent and lawful reasons for doing so. These facts and the assumptions that flow from them also reinforce the feasibility factor, and make more certain future challenges to the civil authority at times and places of Aboriginal leaders' choosing.

CHAPTER 8

THE NEW REALITY: RECOGNITION OF ABORIGINAL AUTONOMY

"The path forward for positive change, is based on the implementation of inherent and treaty rights and the affirmation of our government-to-government, nation-to-nation relationship. The path forward must mean an end to unilateral decisions by governments. The path forward is fully respecting First Nations’ rights and supporting First Nations’ approaches."

(ATLEO, 04 OCTOBER 2012. EMPHASIS ADDED)

The prevailing concept in the decades-long, federal government-directed negotiation process with First Nations is grievance-centred reconciliation: that is, a process from the federal government’s point of view aimed at eliminating First Nations’ grievances as motives for civil disturbances and leading, inevitably, to a changed First Nations status in Canada and a lasting peace.

Over the years, First Nations people have demanded that Canada acknowledge their communities’ justified complaints – dissatisfactions or grievances based on (inter alia) violations of treaty rights and acts of Parliament, genocidal abuse, unresolved lands claims, unfair treatment and exploitation of natural resources. The Canadian governments’ usual responses have been to contest these complaints in court, enter into prolonged negotiations, pay compensation, show signs of contrition or reject them as unjustified.

Most non-Aboriginal Canadians assume that the First Nations community, singularly or collectively, seeks simple redress of grievances and complaints, and that Canadian politicians and their negotiators are motivated by their desire to close long-standing disputes in ways that would allow Canada to settle finally its relationship with First Nations and move on.

At times, First Nations’ complaints and grievances led to sporadic hostilities and armed conflict with Canada. In almost every case, the communities and their leaders gained little from these actions. At other times, they suffered greatly. Nevertheless, until recently, the popular assumption on both sides has been that the fair settlement of grievances would end years of legal confrontations and periodic violence. With no grievances, there would be no confrontations. This assumption is changing or has already changed.
The Canadian vision – such as one exists – is of a final national settlement that would see, perhaps somewhat “beyond the Indian Act” (Flanagan, Alcantara, and Le Dressay, 2010), all Indigenous people assume a new legal status as Canadian citizens within a sovereign Canada. On the Indigenous side, the vision – and there is an emerging if not quite universal one – sees Indigenous peoples become or remain one of several treaty-based or land-based sovereign entities within Canada. It is a model somewhat reminiscent of the rhetoric of Quebec separatists, where sovereignty association calls for political independence and an ongoing economic relationship with Canada. A First Nations model might encompass an ongoing, but modified, political relationship and a much stronger, fairer economic engagement with Canadians and Canada.

Somewhere along this road, perhaps as late as the Caledonia dispute, the dynamics of the internal/international, Aboriginal/Canada relationship changed significantly. At the heart of this transformation is the unilateral, Indigenous redefinition of grievances across a much broader and deeper horizon – a type of pre-first contact revisionist narrative. In this circumstance, every post-first contract settlement or historic reality is open to challenge or entirely invalidated by present day Aboriginal leaders.

When the National Chief of the AFN speaks of “smashing the status quo” and of “partnership,” he is not talking about a new relationship built on extant concepts and prejudices. Shawn Atleo, who is a moderate and conciliatory voice among a very divergent Aboriginal leadership, is asserting Aboriginal sovereignty: “To fully transform the current relationship, we first need to move beyond the federal structures that have been established to exclusively foster dependence and manage ongoing First Nations poverty.” (Atleo, National Post, 29 October 2012)

Most informed Canadians might consider absurd the construction of a substantial Indigenous autonomy as the foundation for future First Nations/Canada relationships. That is, of course, until they examine without prejudice whether Atloe’s notion of “government-to-government” relations is based on firm ground. Then, Canadians might ask whether the country unwittingly created conditions that make a First Nations challenge to Canada’s sovereignty – a “smashing of the status quo” – feasible or even inevitable. (See Bland, Ottawa Citizen, 26 January 2013; Spence, CBC.ca/News, 23 January 2013; and an opposing view, “Letters,” Ottawa Citizen, 28 January 2013)

The social/demographic and territorial circumstances of the First Nations and Canada’s economic vulnerabilities make a challenge to Canadian sovereignty not only feasible but almost inevitable. (APTN National News, 10 January 2013) The grievance-reconciliation conceptual framework does not provide a predictable or sure path to reconciliation. It does not, for instance, explain or define which grievances and in what order of priority are the most urgent. Consequently, the process does not provide any predictable or credible map to reconciliation. Indeed, as circumstances and economic and political awareness in the First Nations community change, old grievances evolve and new ones appear.

Maintaining Canada’s present approach to Aboriginal policy focussed on redressing grievances is not simply wrongheaded, it is irrelevant. Conversely, there is no indication that Indigenous autonomy would end legal challenges, political battles and demands for greater financial support from the Government of Canada. Indeed, Canada’s decision to sign the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, initially described as a symbolic act by Indigenous leaders, added demands to the already-lengthy Canadian Aboriginal list.
If Canada is to maintain control of its sovereignty, then the feasibility of a First Nations challenge, armed or unarmed, will need to be reduced. How might the federal government accomplish this? And how might First Nations leaders take advantage of their situation and enhance the feasibility of challenging Canadian sovereignty, collectively or in economically significant regions in Canada, if they decide to do so?

**Diminishing the Feasibility Factor: Federal Policy Options**

The federal government, in cooperation (as warranted) with provincial and territorial governments, might open a conversation with First Nations people to discuss a new constitutional framework to govern First Nations/Canada relations. This framework might include measures aimed at diminishing national fragmentation and disarming the warrior cohort as part of a broad national economic and social program. Such a comprehensive, national, multi-purpose program might include in outline:

- **Massive (à la the post-war U.S. Marshall Plan for European reconstruction) educational, medical, community infrastructure and governance programs for on-reserve people to bring conditions in First Nations communities into line with (or at least substantially closer to) the non-Aboriginal norms in Canada. In return, the First Nations might collectively agree to surrender absolute sovereignty under terms negotiated between the federal a unified Aboriginal congress. This agreement would formally acknowledge some form of sovereignty, if not Indigenous autonomy and authority in Canada. The treaties and Section 35 of the *Constitution of Canada* allow consideration of these possibilities.**

- **Programs that encompass comprehensive, integrated systems approaches to First Nations needs beyond, for instance, addressing Indigenous housing problems through sponsored First Nations’ housing construction and maintenance trades training initiatives help to create a degree of self-sufficient capabilities in First Nations’ communities;**

- **A negotiated and fair redistribution of revenues derived from Canada’s natural wealth under a regime that brings First Nations, federal, provincial leaders to the table as partners or interested parties;**

- **A program implemented immediately and with all reasonable means to ensure that every Aboriginal youth has a genuine opportunity to earn at least a high school diploma as the first step to securing a job; (See for policy example: FCPP, March 07, 2012)**

- **A program aimed at reinventing the conceptual framework for federal/provincial policies dealing with the incarceration of Aboriginal people. Special emphasis in such reforms should be placed on separating young Aboriginal prisoners from older Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal prisoners as part of a program to disconnect youthful offenders from criminal recruitment and to encourage targeted social rehabilitation.**

- **Build across Canada on an individual and/or family basis a comprehensive First Nations resettlement program (to include healthcare, secure and safe housing, education/employment programs for all ages) to facilitate and support the voluntary migration of First Nations people from reserves to villages, towns, and cities or high employment areas off-reserve;**

- **Establish a well-funded First Nations leadership institution devoted to developing practical leadership skills for young First Nations leaders.**

- **Build, in cooperation with First Nations leaders, a credible (in the eyes of First Nations people) a democratic and accountable First Nations governance establishment based on Canadian constitutional and legal norms and First Nations’ traditions.**

The federal government might also act immediately to reinforce the security guarantee in and near First Nations communities by:
• Developing means to increase significantly resources to safeguard Canada’s truly critical transportation infrastructure in vulnerable locations;

• Reinforcing the federal security guarantee to First Nations people in vulnerable regions and reserves and in cities with a high proportion of First Nations people;

• Reforming the present Public Safety Canada program “First Nations Policing” (Public Safety Canada, 2 February 2012) by transferring the entire program to the RCMP and building in cooperation with First Nations leaders and communities a highly effective First Nations police establishment; and

• Dealing with the extensive use of illegal drugs in and around reserves, perhaps by expanding federal, provincial, and First Nations’ enforcement capabilities.

**Enhancing the Feasibility Factor: Aboriginal Options**

The options available to Indigenous peoples are extensive, and have been powerfully presented to Canadians during the 2012-2013 protests. The fact that Canada’s natural wealth flows unfairly from Indigenous lands and peoples to non-Aboriginal Canadians is a long-standing, justifiable grievance. Therefore, it is morally and ethically just that Indigenous peoples act in their own interests and in the interests of their future generations to correct this unfairness. It is also appropriate that First Nations leaders use or suggest that they will use whatever peaceful means and advantages they have to achieve this outcome. To this end, First Nations leaders might:

• **Act together** and insist that the federal government respect the First Nations rights as defined in the *Constitution of Canada* (and specifically Section 35). It is their right and in the collective interests for the First Nations to maintain and enhance peacefully their autonomy and the power provided to them in treaties, Canadian laws and policies.

• **Demonstrate Canada’s economic resource vulnerability.** The reality that Canadian governments have generally ignored the social situation of the Aboriginal people, and constructed a fractured and unfairly administered Canada is no fault of the First Nations. That Canadian governments and entrepreneurs have developed vulnerable infrastructure systems the disruption of which would threaten the nation’s economy and private riches is no fault of the Indigenous people. That Canadian governments have neglected the nation’s defence and internal security forces is no fault of the First Nations. However, First Nations leaders have only themselves to blame for not developing a coherent, unified strategy aimed at taking advantage of the serendipitous yet powerful situation Canadian neglect has presented to them.

• **Assume responsibility for the behaviour and welfare of Aboriginal people.** The plague of drugs, the menace of criminals and gangs on- and off-reserve, the neglect of children, and other social blights disfigures many Indigenous communities. In the eyes of many Canadians, these circumstances and situations make Indigenous governments and leaders appear weak and incompetent. The national reaction to Chief Theresa Spence in January 2013 and the revelations about financial difficulties in her community are a case in point. (See, for example, *Yahoo News*, 03 January 2013; and QMI Agency, 07 January 2013) These realities undermine the credibility –
to the point of crude jokes – in the broader Canadian community that a First Nations insurgency is feasible. A strong, healthy, responsible, self-disciplined set of Indigenous communities would gain considerably more attention and respect from Canadians than they do today. Only the people themselves can effect this change.

- **Unify the political power of the First Nations community.** To achieve their policy demands and to exploit the political power inherent in their implicit (and potential) dominance of Canada’s transportation networks, First Nations people must first overhaul their fractured political system. Surely, there must be some way to honour the historic independence of individual First Nations while at the same time allowing the collective community for the common good to unite behind a democratically elected leader. Surely, there must be some way for the First Nations leaders to use peacefully the power that successive Canadian governments have unwittingly dropped into their hands. Surely there must be a way past the First Nations history of ‘grief and grievance’ on the road towards a mature, unified government of all the people.

**The Sovereignty Association Dilemma**

Sovereignty association has a unique political history for most Canadians. It means – depending on one’s point of view – the sly manipulation of the *Constitution of Canada* by Quebec separatists aimed at producing two distinct sovereignties more or less within one nation. However, because a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) is deemed too radical and dangerous an option for most Quebecers, political efforts to achieve sovereignty association required that the government of Quebec produce a sovereign entity *before* a political separation occurred.

This conundrum led to a long, agonizing, still continuing debate inside and outside Quebec aimed at proving – or not – that the province was/is a distinct polity and, therefore, *de facto* sovereign. The difficulty, then and now, is that the fundamental premise of this argument (that Quebec is before the fact sovereign) is a contested political opinion, not a historical or legal fact. Thus, for Canada to agree to any terms of a possible “sovereignty association” without the established fact of Quebec’s sovereignty was and is nonsensical. (A UDI presents, of course, an entirely different proposition.)

The case for Aboriginal people in Canada is fundamentally different. Aboriginal autonomy/sovereignty is a fact today as it has been for centuries after first contact. Moreover, it is a fact agreed upon by the high courts in Canada and acknowledged in Canada’s constitution. Indigenous people enjoy distinct rights defined in treaties and Canadian law. In this context, Aboriginal sovereignty association has an agreed-upon definition now, in terms of various treaties and the *Indian Act*, and in the future as defined by the degree to which Canada and individual or collective First Nations decide to be associated.

Canadians’ acceptance of this rationale is equivocal at best. They understand and support the concept of compensation for harm done, as in the case of the residential schools. Notwithstanding the Nunavut and Nunavik settlements – both far out of sight and mind in mainstream Canada – Canadians are very much less likely to accept policies that would divide Canada into many nearby, separate political entities and transfer enormous real and potential wealth to the First Nations in return, perhaps, for very little.
As long as it is convenient, Canadians can believe that the national security questions raised in this essay are merely an arcane, ceaseless contest between government officials, a bunch of greedy lawyers, and opportunistic First Nations chiefs – members together of the so-called “Aboriginal industry.” To do so, however, neglects at their peril the insistent declaration of sovereignty by many native leaders – including the moderate AFN National Chief, Shawn Atleo. Such an attitude neglects also the evident undercurrent of hostility many resident in the general non-Aboriginal population hold towards native leaders who aggressively promote their doctrine of national sovereignty.

Harry Swain, a former (1987-1992) deputy minister of AANDC (known as INAC at the time) was a champion for meaningful changes in the laws and regulations governing the way Canadians treat Canada’s native people. Yet, in his opinion, the First Nations pursuit of sovereignty in any meaningful form is a dangerous strategy. “At the root of the issue is the persistent claim by [First Nations] that they are sovereign states. It is hard to see anything but capitulation or bloodshed if the issue is forced.” (Swain, 2010, p.202)

**Closing Thoughts**

While the five determinants identified herein suggest that a First Nations challenge to Canada’s sovereignty is feasible, the problematic First Nations political structure of bands, reserves, nations and various concepts of chiefs, councils and representatives suggests otherwise. To most Canadians, Canada is safe because the First Nations communities could never competently manage such a daring, risky, and complicated enterprise.

In the First Nations community the sovereignty of each nation is paramount. Yet the idea is a dead-hand when an assembly of more than 600 chiefs each representing but a few hundred people, many living on distant and isolated reserves, attempts to force any issue concerning important national matters with a prime minister of Canada who has no obvious reason to negotiate with them at all. As experience demonstrates, in any competition with a Canadian prime minister of a united government supported by extensive bureaucratic, legal, financial, and security resources First Nations leaders will take home to their communities no more than defeat, disappointment, division, and anger.

On the other hand, a prime minister of Canada confronting an elected leader of some 700,000 unified First Nations people would face a very different situation. If this leader also arrived at the negotiations with the *feasibility hypothesis* and a powerful reminder of Canada’s economic vulnerabilities at the ready, then much more fairness might result.

In the coming year as the appreciation of the power of the feasibility factor grows and matures in the First Nations community, frustration and resentment will grow apace in the non-Aboriginal community, as public reaction to the generally peaceful Idle No More demonstrations attests. Without reconciliation, very little of importance in the First Nations’ communities will improve. Without reasonable changes in both communities in the near future, a great deal might change for the worse for the First Nations people and for Canadians.
ENDNOTES

1 Aboriginal people are not required to respond to requests for personal information from Statistics Canada (a privilege now enjoyed by all Canadians), therefore the accuracy of the data is problematic.

2 Fearon and Laitin, 2003, and Collier et al, 2009, p.6 in which he identifies “mountainous terrain” as a proxy for terrain that restricts travel and provides cover for insurgents. (Ibid, p.6)

3 Vulnerable: “… exposed to the possibility of being attacked …” Oxford English Dictionary 2012.

4 These 2009 figures are expected to increase in 2011-2012 as world economies rebound from lower performances in 2008-2009.

5 Transmission lines carry high voltage current to transformer stations. Distribution lines carry energy from these stations to consumers.

6 Canadians unfamiliar with the history or present circumstances should beware of ideas and policies that treat or seem to treat the three Aboriginal cultures as one. There is a long history of antipathy among them that is evident today.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DR. DOUGLAS L. BLAND,
Professor Emeritus,
Queen’s University, Kingston

Dr. Bland retired from the Canadian Armed Forces in 1990 as a Lieutenant Colonel after more than 30 years of service. He held command appointments in Canada and Europe and senior operational staff positions also in Europe and at the Canadian National Defence Headquarters. In his final years of service, Dr. Bland was Senior Staff Officer for Curriculum Development at the National Defence College of Canada.

From 1996 to 2011 Dr. Bland held the Chair of Defence Studies at Queen’s University where he conducted research and taught in the fields of defence policy making and management at national and international levels, the organization and functioning of defence ministries, civil-military relations, and insurgency operations. He has published books, articles, and reports and lectured in these fields in Canada, the United States, Europe, South Africa, and Latin America.


Douglas Bland began in 2006 a series of research studies concerned with Canada’s internal security situation. He is the author of the political novel, *Uprising*, (Dundurn Press, 2009) that describes a future First Nations’ insurgency against Canada. These studies continue.
REFERENCES


Dallaire, Roméo. 2010. They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children. Random House.


Nelson, Terry. Email, notes, and other correspondence provided by Nelson to author.


Critically Acclaimed, Award-Winning Institute

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute fills a gap in Canada’s democratic infrastructure by focusing our work on the full range of issues that fall under Ottawa’s jurisdiction.

- “One of the Top 5 New Think Tanks in the World” for 2011 as rated by the University of Pennsylvania.
- Cited by five present and former Canadian Prime Ministers, as well as by David Cameron, the British Prime Minister.
- Executive Director & Founder Brian Lee Crowley named one of 100 most influential people in Ottawa in 2012.
- The Wall Street Journal, The Economist, The Globe and Mail, The National Post and many other leading national and international publications have quoted the Institute’s work.

Ideas Change the World

Independent and non-partisan, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute is increasingly recognized as the thought leader on national issues in Canada, prodding governments, opinion leaders and the general public to accept nothing but the very best public policy solutions for the challenges Canada faces.

Where You’ve Seen Us

Former Speaker of the House of Commons Peter Milliken, former Prime Minister Joe Clark, former Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, and MLI Managing Director Brian Lee Crowley.
What Do We Do?

When you change how people think, you change what they want and how they act. That is why thought leadership is essential in every field. At MLI, we strip away the complexity that makes policy issues unintelligible and present them in a way that leads to action, to better quality policy decisions, to more effective government, and to a more focused pursuit of the national interest of all Canadians. MLI is the only non-partisan, independent national public policy think tank based in Ottawa that focuses on the full range of issues that fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government.

What Is in a Name?

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute exists not merely to burnish the splendid legacy of two towering figures in Canadian history – Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier – but to renew that legacy. A Tory and a Grit, an English speaker and a French speaker - these two men represent the very best of Canada’s fine political tradition. As prime minister, each championed the values that led to Canada assuming her place as one of the world’s leading democracies. We will continue to vigorously uphold these values, the cornerstones of our nation.

Working for a Better Canada

Good policy doesn’t just happen; it requires good ideas, hard work, and being in the right place at the right time. In other words, it requires MLI. We pride ourselves on independence, and accept no funding from the government for our research. If you value our work and if you believe in the possibility of a better Canada, consider making a tax-deductible donation. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is a registered charity.

Our Issues

The Institute undertakes an impressive programme of thought leadership on public policy. Some of the issues we have tackled recently include:

- The impact of banning oil tankers on the West Coast;
- Making Canada a food superpower in a hungry world;
- Aboriginal people and the management of our natural resources;
- Population ageing and public finances;
- The vulnerability of Canada’s critical infrastructure;
- Ottawa’s regulation of foreign investment; and
- How to fix Canadian health care.

For more information visit: www.MacdonaldLaurier.ca
What people are saying about the Macdonald-Laurier Institute

I commend Brian Crowley and the team at MLI for your laudable work as one of the leading policy think tanks in our nation’s capital. The Institute has distinguished itself as a thoughtful, empirically-based and non-partisan contributor to our national public discourse.

PRIME MINISTER STEPHEN HARPER

As the author Brian Lee Crowley has set out, there is a strong argument that the 21st Century could well be the Canadian Century.

BRITISH PRIME MINISTER DAVID CAMERON

In the global think tank world, MLI has emerged quite suddenly as the “disruptive” innovator, achieving a well-deserved profile in mere months that most of the established players in the field can only envy. In a medium where timely, relevant, and provocative commentary defines value, MLI has already set the bar for think tanks in Canada.

PETER NICHOLSON, FORMER SENIOR POLICY ADVISOR TO PRIME MINISTER PAUL MARTIN

The reports and studies coming out of MLI are making a difference and the Institute is quickly emerging as a premier Canadian think tank.

JOCK FINLAYSON, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF POLICY, BUSINESS COUNCIL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Very much enjoyed your presentation this morning. It was first-rate and an excellent way of presenting the options which Canada faces during this period of “choice”... Best regards and keep up the good work.

PRESTON MANNING, PRESIDENT AND CEO, MANNING CENTRE FOR BUILDING DEMOCRACY