How NATO Must Adapt in a Changing World

Canada should be courageous in pressing the Alliance to strengthen NATO’s collective defence in the face of a revanchist Russia

Shuvaloy Majumdar and Marcus Kolga

Inside the gilded halls of the Constantine Palace near St. Petersburg, on Tuesday, August 9, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan met with his “dear friend” Russian President Vladimir Putin to reconcile hostile Russian-Turkish relations which had soured after Turkish F-16s, defending Turkish airspace, shot down a Russian Sukhoi SU-24 bomber last November. The incident marked a low point between the two nations after Putin, who supports the Assad regime, accused Turkey of targeting the Syrian dictatorship instead of taking on the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Following this month’s coup attempt against Erdogan and attack on parliament in the NATO partner’s capital, Erdogan continues his consolidation of control over Turkish institutions. He has conducted the widespread detention of alleged potential conspirators, while moving towards normalizing Turkey’s relationship with Israel, realigning its approach in Syria, and re-establishing its relationship with Russia. For this NATO partner, the complex relationships at play underline just how different the world is today from when NATO was founded nearly 70 years ago. Yet NATO, formed in the aftermath of the Second World War and in response to aggressive Soviet imperialism, is as relevant today as in 1949.
NATO SINCE THE COLD WAR

As the Berlin Wall crumbled, the determined resolve to defend capitalism and freedom that overcame Communist tyranny began to lose focus. Bureaucracy, moral equivalence, and complacency became central features for a “multilateralist” ideology in Western governments, and the oxygen of freedom that gave life to post-war institutions became polluted by apathy.

Organizations formed during the Cold War in the name of collective security, the advancement of market democracies, and containment of the spread of Communism suddenly lost their mandates and scrambled to find meaning for their existence. For NATO, this meant a period of wandering in the desert, until Article 5 compelled action in Afghanistan in 2001, and again action was needed in response to the direct threat that the Russian invasion of Ukraine represents to the post-war order.

NATO’s principle of collective security was a rejection of the notion of spheres of influence, and an effort to shape an order based on the irreducible sovereignty of free countries. In 1956, a report prepared by NATO’s Committee of Three (the foreign ministers of Norway, Canada, and Italy) clearly reiterated that NATO was created by its member states for “purely defensive and constructive purposes.” The committee, which included Canada’s Lester B. Pearson, declared that “with this political commitment for collective defence as the cornerstone of the foreign and defence policies of its members, NATO has a solid basis for existence.”

Forty years later, after the Soviet collapse, both NATO and Russia committed themselves to “creating in
Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence" in a 1997 statement signed jointly by NATO and Russia. Known as The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, the memorandum calls on signatories to respect the “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security.”

Conventional warfare became less viable during the Cold War, and states turned to proxy wars and sponsoring terrorism as a means to advance their interests, inflaming the forces that sought to destabilize the international order. Today, globalization and technology are presenting a fundamental challenge to that order. Western nations are facing escalating threats posed by cyber warfare, and an array of hybrid and asymmetric conflicts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the advent of ISIS in the Middle East.

These threats are redefining the terrain upon which battles are waged, including their combatants. In order to successfully transition from NATO’s initial Cold War posture to meet the challenges of a post-9-11 security environment, NATO must adapt aggressively, or risk suffering an existential crisis similar to that facing the European Union following the British vote to leave the EU. The leaders of NATO states, including Canada, must recognize that the disintegration of the European Union and NATO have been the primary foreign policy objectives of Putin’s neo-imperialist Russia. The collective defence that Pearson and his colleagues urged in 1956 is still vital today.
As these serious new challenges emerge, NATO members must not forget that their future security rests on the Alliance’s integrity and the principle of collective defence. A staunch response to active foreign attempts to erode confidence in NATO among its members is critical to the survival of the transatlantic alliance.

THE BACKDROP OF THE 2016 WARSAW SUMMIT

Atlanticists have been confronted by some brutal realities lately. Most recently, there was Brexit, in which the British public repudiated bureaucrats in Brussels for encroaching beyond the economic deal that was to be the beating heart of the European Union. Most worrisome has been the emergence of a revanchist Russia under Putin, which already in 2007 began testing the resolve of Euro-Atlantic institutions in Georgia, Moldova, and Estonia, and found them wanting. Then came the invasion of Ukraine, the illegal annexation of Crimea and the deployment of thousands of troops, heavy weapons, and other materiel in the Ukrainian Donbass. And finally, the influx of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees brings the greatest humanitarian catastrophe of our times into Europe. Millions of refugees still reside in Turkey, and could yet migrate into Europe, significantly affecting the debate and outcomes of key European elections.

At the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016, experts gathered in the aftermath of the Brexit vote to assess NATO’s role in this new world. While European resolve appeared weak in the face of the rejection by the UK, the Warsaw Summit established that the transatlantic security architecture would continue. At the onset of the Ukrainian crisis, NATO states sought to rebuild their security infrastructure along the vulnerable eastern flank. Since the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO states have developed an approach that goes further, moving from merely reassuring NATO’s eastern partners towards establishing an actual deterrence against Russia’s ongoing threat.

Russia continues to aspire to restoring Soviet “greatness” by presenting a sustained and comprehensive challenge to NATO and the international order NATO represents. What is clear is that Russian actions are intrinsically linked to one another: what it does in Ukraine is not distinct from its support for the brutal Assad regime in Syria, its aggressive escalation in the Baltic and Black seas, its role in brokering the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, Putin’s invalidation of the right for Kazakhstan to exist, its vast Arctic military buildup, or its arrogant and reckless air policy, seemingly desiring to provoke a global incident.

Responding to Western sanctions in Russia over Ukraine in 2014, Putin explicitly sought revenge by establishing closer relations with the West’s rivals, including Iran, Venezuela, North Korea, China, and others. What commenced only two years ago with an oil-for-food program at the behest of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has now evolved into a sophisticated military alliance with Iran to ensure the continuity of Syria’s Bashar al Assad, including the expropriation of Crimean gas to support Assad’s brutal war against his own people.

As Russia’s corrosive policy became more ambitious globally, the Canadian government rightly commenced disciplined protocols for any engagement with Russia, closing gaps that the Kremlin could exploit. The Trudeau government has since relaxed this extensive effort to preserve Canada’s national security, while Ottawa seeks a dialogue with the Kremlin. But the architect of President Obama’s failed “reset” policy with Putin’s Russia, Ambassador Michael McFaul, recently told the Globe and Mail that Russia only respects strength. Canada’s reluctance to adopt further sanctions against the Putin regime in fear of disrupting the Trudeau government’s re-engagement policy with the Kremlin is in McFaul’s view “a sign of weakness, not a sign of strength.” McFaul further characterized Minister Dion’s claim that Canada earned an invitation to join the International Syria Support Group in Vienna last May by not imposing sanctions over the death of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, as “weird logic”.

Canada’s leadership must be courageous in pressing the Alliance to strengthen NATO’s commitment to collective defence in the face of this ongoing assault, tailored to contemporary threats, and entrenching the Alliance’s founding values of capitalism and freedom.
RUSSIA’S ENERGY INTIMIDATION DIPLOMACY

During the Cold War, the Soviet economy was a world unto itself where energy was among the only products or resources for which a foreign market existed. Since the end of the Second World War, Russian leaders have recognized Russian gas as a critical economic asset and an important political weapon. Preserving European reliance on Russian energy has always been a core national security interest for the Kremlin. For example, in 2008, Russia cut oil supplies to the Czech Republic after an agreement was signed to allow US ballistic missile radar tracking technology to be installed on Czech territory. Ukraine has been repeatedly targeted by Russia’s “gas diplomacy” whenever leaders in that country have considered cooperation with the EU and the West, as have most other Eastern European states.

At the onset of the Cold War, the 1955 Baghdad Pact was formed between the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan to block off potential Soviet hegemony over Middle Eastern energy supplies to Europe and NATO member states. Today, Russian efforts aim to supersede Turkish-Arab pipelines, and expand Russia’s energy supply to Europe from both the north and south. Russia seeks to expand its Nord Stream pipeline infrastructure through the Baltic region, to leverage its supply through Ukraine, and to assure that its Turkish Stream pipeline through the Black Sea presents another corridor for its natural gas. At their August 9 summit, Putin and Erdogan announced that this Turkish Stream pipeline would get built, reinforcing Russia’s economic and political strategies through energy intimidation diplomacy.

Even traditionally neutral Sweden, whose eastern coastline the proposed Nord Stream 2 pipeline skirts, has been unnerved by the Kremlin’s dangerous military activity in the region, including repeated violations of Swedish airspace and undersea incursions by Russian submarines. In 2015 Russian military commanders organized a mock invasion of the Swedish island of Gotland, which Nord Stream is using to construct the new Russian pipeline.

Canada’s active participation in developing NATO’s strategy for energy security is self-evident. With its vast energy resources, Canada must play an important role in unlocking European reliance on Russian gas, by offering a reliable, alternative supply of liquefied natural gas and by promoting new energy technologies in Europe.

THE RE-EMERGENCE OF NATO’S ARCTIC FLANK

In May 2015, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, founder of The Congress of Russian Communities, whose constitution calls for the armed reconstitution of the Soviet Union, landed on the Norwegian island of Svalbard despite his being included on Oslo’s sanctions list. Rogozin’s trip, which followed the annexation of Crimea, coincided with a string of announcements about the completion of new, large-scale Russian infrastructure in the Arctic.

“Russia has begun to understand its place, its borders, and its interests,” exhorted Putin’s deputy prime minister in charge of Russia’s military industry. Referencing the Russian annexation of Crimea, Rogozin astoundingly linked Russian conquest in Ukraine to the Arctic: “We saw something historic take place last year. Russia’s territorial integrity was restored. This year, we are casting our glance elsewhere. We are taking a closer look at the development of the Arctic. The two things are the same.”

Rogozin reiterated Russia’s position again in July 2016, just before Canadian Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion, who champions Arctic diplomacy with Putin, met with his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.

Russian aggression in Northern Europe has provoked non-NATO states Sweden and Finland to seek closer cooperation with NATO to counter dangerously irresponsible Russian air and naval activity in the Baltic Sea and Arctic. The Kremlin’s provocateurs are testing the world’s resolve in the North, on one hand building up a robust naval capacity and massive Arctic bases, such as the Kotelny base in Siberia, against a fabricated threat that does not exist, while also participating nonchalantly in Arctic diplomacy.
When the Arctic Council was established in 1996 with the Ottawa Declaration, it was in part in the context of a larger effort laden with good intentions to integrate Russia into the world’s rules-based system. In many ways, it has been a success. Arctic nations have created a system that speaks to how the North can be developed for its Indigenous peoples and how economic growth and sustainability can be fostered. It has also established the principle of leaving to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) how Arctic delimitation issues and seabed claims should be adjudicated. However, the Kremlin’s military investment and escalating rhetoric stand far apart from how Russian emissaries cooperate in the Arctic, or elsewhere. In the Arctic, the gap between the Kremlin’s deeds and words is widening at an alarming rate, and the situation’s gravity cannot be underestimated.

In addition to its announced contribution of troops to Latvia and jets to Baltic Air Policing, Canada should seize the opportunity to lead at NATO in developing an updated collective defence approach for the Arctic. Such a strategy should include support for UNCLOS as the process to resolve Arctic border disputes, and the Arctic Council as a forum for Arctic nations to ensure that the region’s economic development is centred upon the people who live there. The potential for a Canadian-led Arctic security strategy would establish a clear military deterrence capability against Russia’s vast buildup of maritime and air strength in the Arctic.

Canada must also invest more towards its own Arctic defence capability, including acquiring aircraft that are interoperable with NATO partners. Russia’s Northern Fleet, which accounts for two-thirds of the entire Russian navy, has greatly increased its operations in the North Atlantic with submarine activity approaching Cold War levels over the past two years. To meet these security challenges in a re-emerging Arctic theatre, Canada must focus on developing its own submarine and ice-breaking capacity, and replacing its aging fleet of CF-18s.

**BOLSTERING NATO’S EASTERN FLANK**

Russia’s provocative recent escalation of fighting in the Ukrainian Donbass is a fundamental betrayal of the Minsk Agreements that were to pacify the ongoing war in Ukraine. As Ukraine’s 25th anniversary of independence from Russia approaches on August 24, Ukrainian forces are going into high alert while Russian forces build up in Crimea and along the Eastern front. Putin’s threatening rhetoric is seen by astute observers as a basis to instigate conflict to remind Kyiv of the deep resentments Moscow holds towards Ukrainian sovereignty, and to intentionally sober Ukrainian enthusiasm for independence. For Putin, bludgeoning Ukraine also bolsters his domestic propaganda in advance of Russian parliamentary elections in mid-September.

Announcements by NATO’s 38 members from the Warsaw Summit in July were encouraging, including Canada’s participation as a framework partner to bolster Baltic defence. NATO’s decision from the 2014 Wales Summit, to create a NATO rapid reaction force to respond to Article 5 situations (recognizing that an attack on one member is “an attack against them all”) is fully apace. This initiative is intended to shrink the time with which NATO forces could respond to an invasion, and create multinational forces that would comprise that response. Yet, apace does not mean that the transformation has been fully realized. Some NATO leaders too readily concede Russia’s illegal occupation of Crimea as the new normal, even while Ukrainian soldiers fight heroically to defend Europe’s integrity.

Deeply troubling statements by the Kremlin’s military planners threatening the possibility of regional nuclear conflicts have been accompanied by massive escalations of Russian military infrastructure on Russia’s western borders, including the deployment of Iskander offensive tactical missile systems.

Since 2008, Kremlin officials and state-run media have continuously justified the expansion of Russia’s offensive capabilities in the Baltic region by conjuring up myths around NATO’s limited deployments in the region, including the small, but effective, NATO air policing mission based in Lithuania.
Russia’s invasion of Crimea and its ongoing offensive in Eastern Ukraine have prompted regional analysts to no longer ask “if” Putin will fulfil his commitment to reconstructing the Soviet imperium by attacking the Baltics, but “when” he will do so. If Putin could so readily betray the Budapest Memorandum, which provided for the dismantling of the third-largest nuclear stockpile in the world in exchange for Ukrainian sovereignty, then what good are Russia’s commitments to the sovereignty of Baltic states?

Bolstering NATO’s collective deterrence against Russia’s aggression in Eastern Europe is critical to transatlantic security, which includes Canada. In order to maintain peace and stability in the region, Canada’s ambassador to NATO should be asked to take a leadership role in advocating for key priorities as part of the next iteration of NATO’s Eastern presence. This includes going much further towards repelling Russia’s encroachment into Ukraine.

Ukrainian forces trained by Canadian, American, and British officers, are preventing Russian forces from overrunning that country and entering Europe. At the Warsaw Summit in July, it was reported that some 200 Russian tanks, 500 artillery systems, and 42,000 military personnel, of which some 6,500 are uniformed Russian troops, are deployed in Ukraine. According to NATO officials, an estimated 300,000 Russian troops are deployed in Russia’s Western Military District which borders Ukraine, Poland, and the Baltic States. The Russian Defence Ministry has announced that three additional divisions will be deployed in the coming weeks. NATO officials also confirm that at least 40,000 Russian troops are currently deployed in Crimea. The Ukrainians require meaningful levels of support to ensure NATO’s deterrence is felt by the Kremlin’s provocateurs.

Perhaps the most important support that NATO could offer Ukraine, beyond current efforts to train Ukrainian forces and strengthen their command and control, is for NATO to fearlessly embrace its own Open Door Policy. Canada can lead the effort within NATO to welcome widespread Ukrainian aspirations towards a European future, documented in the International Republican Institute’s July Ukraine Poll sponsored by the government of Canada, and not capitulate to Russian aggression. NATO should not be timid about initiating the process for Ukraine to join the Alliance, and Canada’s ambassador to NATO should be instructed to make every effort towards realizing this strategic longer-term goal.

As part of his strategy to disrupt, split and eventually dismember NATO, Vladimir Putin has made it Russia’s foreign policy priority to stop any other nations that were once within the former Soviet sphere from benefiting from NATO’s collective defence. By invading and illegally occupying parts of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, Putin has created very intentional complications for the accession of either of those countries into NATO anytime in the near future.

Despite these significant roadblocks, the presence of Russian troops in Crimea and Donbass in Ukraine, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, do not preclude NATO from accepting either state as a member. As noted above, when Russian and NATO leaders signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997, they agreed that both must respect all states’ “inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders and peoples’ right of self-determination.” While Kremlin propagandists have long attempted to misrepresent the Founding Act as a document that prohibits NATO expansion, it clearly states the opposite.

Like any other nation, Ukraine and Georgia have the right to choose how they protect their borders in order to secure their own sovereignty. If these countries are indeed accepted into NATO, it is unlikely that they will do so with those parts of their counties that have been violently hacked away by Putin’s armies. Doing so would present NATO with significant risks, including the possible retroactive application of Article 5. Yet the right to self-determination of all states in this region, as well as overall peace and stability, hinge on NATO’s commitment to its own principles.
Canada has the opportunity to lead within NATO and navigate the Alliance towards realistic and successful Membership Action Plans for Ukraine and Georgia without recognizing Russia’s illegal annexations of Crimea, Abkhazia or South Ossetia. While many real hurdles remain, Canada can start a process by which Ukraine and Georgia could eventually be admitted to the Alliance.

THE LONGEST WAR

NATO has concluded its only and longest ground campaign in Afghanistan, and the country is 18 months into its transformation decade. Despite the negligence of the international community – brought on by political fatigue – the country’s population has maintained a majority consensus towards a reform-and-development program.

Multiparty coalition governments are challenging, at best, for experienced democracies. While the Afghan National Unity Government has not collapsed in the two years it has existed, recent reports demonstrate its fragility, with stresses between the president and the chief executive officer spilling into the public domain.

Despite fierce advances by the Taliban, Afghan security forces have held their own and are beginning to take the fight to the enemy. While gradual progress is being made towards developing an anti-corruption regime, election law updates continue to work their way through the Afghan political process.

The biggest impediment to Afghan momentum remains its own neighbour, Pakistan. Pakistan organizes, funds, and deploys terrorists, and permits them safe haven. It has yet to cease its policy of using terror as an instrument of statecraft. From sheltering Osama bin Laden to most recently, Mullah Akhtar Mansour, there are those within the Pakistani military who actively support terror. They should be listed by Canada as sponsors of terrorism, and advanced by Canada for being listed under UN terrorism regulations.

Canada’s renewal of training support for the Afghan military announced at Warsaw should be encouraged. It accompanies a notable shift from Washington in giving the renewed mandate for US forces a wider remit to confront terrorist elements and support the efforts of the broader Afghan military. During Canada’s brave deployment in Kandahar, at the heart of the Afghan insurgency, Canadian soldiers were killed by Pakistani-supported terrorism in Afghanistan. It is high time for Canada to push for NATO to reconsider its partner status for Pakistan. Canada should also demonstrate leadership by asserting a position that focuses on bringing the real actors behind Afghan instability to an accord, the sponsors of terror in Afghanistan, rather than be distracted by the pantomime of the current peace and reconciliation process that negotiates with Pakistan in the abstract.

CYBER WARFARE AND INTELLIGENCE

With the advent of new technologies on the battlefield, NATO forces should expect that the Russian military has developed the capability to subvert electricity grids, weapons systems software, and tactical communications equipment, and to pose other cyber threats through Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) technologies.

Russian state-sponsored hacking through various methods and groups has become a weekly occurrence, and has even threatened to affect the current presidential election in the US with Russia’s unprecedented alleged role in hacking, infiltrating, and exploiting American political parties and presidential campaigns. The Kremlin’s hacking of activist accounts and sophisticated electronic trolling of social media and news websites by its agents has caused serious confusion among Western policy makers and the media, and led to manufactured disagreements. Canada should support expanding intelligence and counter-propaganda resources to actively address the Kremlin’s destabilizing efforts.

Canada has itself been the target of at least 25 state-sponsored APT malware attacks in recent years and CSIS warns that the impact of future attacks “could be severe and affect any and all areas of critical infrastructure,
including those which affect water supply, energy and utilities, manufacturing, Internet communications technology or even gravely affect institutions such as schools and hospitals.”

The threat of cyber warfare against Canada and NATO will increase exponentially as belligerent state-sponsored and independent cyber terrorists further advance their technologies and deploy them against Western nations. Canada has the expertise and resources to help take measures that will both defend Canadian and NATO digital infrastructure, and establish counter-measures to neutralize hostile cyber attackers.

NATO took the first steps at Warsaw towards developing its cyber threat capacity. NATO must move beyond these nascent discussions towards addressing the full spectrum of cyber threats to the Alliance. One source of inspiration that Canada could leverage is the new Israeli office at NATO’s headquarters. The Israel Defense Forces are among the very few who have recently formed a dedicated cyber defence command, a first and best-in-case example of what NATO must accomplish. Another source of inspiration comes from one of the earliest targets of Russian cyber warfare, Estonia, which has vast experience and well-developed counter-measures that Canadian cyber security and intelligence experts can learn from. The Estonian Defense League recently created a volunteer civilian cyber defence unit as part of its active defence to counter cyber attacks against the small Baltic state.

Exposed to Iranian cyber threats, Russia’s world-class electronic and cyber capacity, and those of ISIS, NATO must move beyond debating baseline definitions of cyber threats and towards establishing a fully operational Allied cyber defence command.

Implications on the Canadian approach to cyber warfare are significant. Former Canadian National Security Advisor and CSIS Director Richard Fadden recently suggested that Canada may need to possess cyber warfare capacity. Whether this capacity is used offensively or defensively is a tactical discussion; tanks play both offensive and defensive roles. Canadian leaders should move beyond the notion of whether we require the capacity, and ensure that our capacity meaningfully contributes to reduce threats that Canada and its allies face.

At Warsaw, NATO also took initial steps to coordinate intelligence sharing among its members. Across the Alliance, member states have wide-ranging capacities to collect, analyze, and share their intelligence. Unlike the Five Eyes intelligence alliance of which Canada is a part, (with Australia, New Zealand, the UK and US) NATO member states have varying degrees of confidence with each other, and are inhibited by the fact that intelligence is collected and reported on in different languages.

If transatlantic security is to be able to assess and respond to real threats, NATO needs to establish a baseline for timely and relevant intelligence sharing. Threats range from Russia’s infiltration to exploit the European economy and its propaganda efforts to alter domestic public opinion of member states, to the threat manifest in near-daily terror attacks in European states, and by massive migration emanating from the Middle East’s conflicts.

Further Canadian efforts should also include expanding on Canadian investments announced at Wales in three NATO Baltic Centres of Excellence on Cyber Security, Energy Security, and Strategic Communications. These centres merge state-of-the-art facilities for the Alliance’s strategic and tactical planning, generating meaningful responses to Russia’s omnipresent cyber threats, energy intimidation, and propaganda. In Warsaw, there was a missed opportunity to expand dramatically on these initiatives.

THE SOUTHERN FLANK: ISIS, LIBYA, TERRORISM, AND MIGRATION

Europe’s migration crisis and the humanitarian catastrophe flowing from the Middle East may have been avoided with a more robust response at the onset of the Syrian civil war. At the time, Canada was the only NATO partner that joined the US-led Coalition Against ISIS by committing substantial efforts in surveillance,
fighter jets, special forces training personnel, and humanitarian support. Today, this conflict is not contained to the region as the Middle East’s issues become Europe’s issues, and European states play a greater role in the Coalition.

The containment of Syria’s civil war has failed, and as the reach of ISIS-affiliated terrorism extends across Europe, it poses even greater risks to Canada. No long-term stability can be expected if Assad remains in power, nor can stability be realized if post-civil war power in the country is consolidated in the military.

In this, Canadian leaders face significant pressures. Russia’s interventions in Syria have largely strengthened Assad’s war against his own people, and, under the guise of combating terror, have diminished moderate US-trained elements inside the country. In response to a downed Russian helicopter in early August, Assad’s forces continue to demonstrate their contempt for disbanding their chemical weapons stockpiles and unleashed this horror on the civilian population from where ISIS launched its attack. In obvious and defiant ways, Assad still continues to hold and use his chemical weapons stockpiles.

The Russian deployment of its S-400 missile defence system poses a real risk to the Coalition’s efforts in Syria’s airspace. Their diplomatic effort to divide NATO by applying pressure on Turkey had some success, until recent ISIS attacks on Istanbul’s Ataturk International Airport. NATO is being tested even further by the Turkish rapprochement with Moscow, its ensuing crackdown following the failed coup attempt against Erdogan’s government, and the AK Party’s own Islamist identity politics in the Muslim world. In a recent visit by Turkish parliamentarians to Ottawa, many decried how Brussels and NATO partners seemed quietly saddened by the coup’s failure to oust Erdogan at the expense of Turkish democracy.

While NATO struggles to establish consensus in addressing Syria, it is prepositioning resources to train any legitimate partner that emerges in Libya to confront ISIS forces that have been gaining a foothold in Libya’s eastern region.

For Canada, pursuing our national security interests through all tools at our disposal remains essential. While that means working through NATO, it also requires Canada to work through the Coalition Against ISIS, and with ongoing humanitarian and development responses to which the previous government supplied nearly $1 billion. Canada should also adopt a strong and clear commitment to confront radical Islam and extremism, through sustained political leadership that adapts to the ongoing crisis as it evolves. The Trudeau government seemed to have full-throated support for NATO’s commitment at Warsaw to deploy surveillance craft over the skies of Syria in the fight against ISIS, although this came after having withdrawn Canada’s CF-18s from the conflict.

MEANINGFUL ENGAGEMENT VERSUS THE 2% RULE

NATO requires that all member states spend a minimum of 2 percent of GDP on defence. Currently, only a few member states meet this criterion, among them the US, Estonia, UK, and Poland. Canada spends just half of the prescribed amount.

This has not gone unnoticed. US President Barack Obama’s address in Canada’s House of Commons proclaimed that “NATO needs more Canada,” while the Republican nominee for president has cast aspersions over the American commitment to enforcing Article 5 should member states fail to “pay their fair share.”

It is true that NATO members must invest more and invest strategically in building interoperable military forces capable of taking on the world’s worst actors. But military spending isn’t the only measure of a nation’s commitment to collective security.

It should be understood that NATO possesses no materiel; it coordinates its members’ assets on a voluntary basis. Some volunteer more readily than others. While German troops patrolled relatively stable Mazar-e-
Sharif in the Afghan north, Canada took on the heart of the Afghan insurgency in Kandahar. Greek investments in its defence have little to do with assuring interoperability with NATO’s security architecture.

While some NATO members that are closer to the vaunted 2 percent mark sat on the sidelines of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and complained about sanctions against Russia, Canada contributed aircraft to NATO’s Baltic Air Policing, deployed training troops in Ukraine, and became an important contributor to NATO efforts in cyber security, energy security, strategic communications, and strengthening Ukraine’s own command and control capacity.

Before piety is claimed over spending levels alone, there must be an additional category that ranks the actual value of what NATO members are contributing to the Alliance – including contributions of blood and courage in the face of grave and global threats.

While there is little doubt that the larger defence establishment salivates at the prospect of spending commitments devoid of a clear focus, the world’s problems will not be resolved just by throwing the bank at them; they require the application of force with surgical precision, and the perils of that action must also be shared equally by all parts of the Alliance.

CONCLUSION

If NATO’s next steps are to position the Alliance to meet the challenges of the modern era, it must modernize and centre itself on the very values of market economies, democracy, and freedom that founded it. And it must be seen to be demonstrably worthwhile by the people of the countries who participate in this historic Alliance.

As discussed above, Canada has an opportunity to take a leadership role in NATO by heeding the following recommendations:

• Canada should seize the opportunity to lead at NATO in developing an updated collective defence approach for the Arctic. Such a strategy should include support for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the process to resolve Arctic border disputes, and the Arctic Council as a forum for Arctic nations to ensure that the region’s economic development is centred upon the people who live there. A Canadian-led Arctic security strategy would establish a clear military deterrence capability against Russia’s vast buildup of maritime and air strength in the Arctic. Canada must also focus on developing its own submarine and ice-breaking capacity, and replacing its aging fleet of CF-18s by acquiring aircraft that are interoperable with NATO partners.

• Canada can lead the effort within NATO to welcome widespread Ukrainian aspirations towards a European future, and work toward realistic Membership Action Plans for Ukraine and Georgia without recognizing Russia’s illegal annexations of Crimea, Abkhazia or South Ossetia. While many serious hurdles remain, Canada can start a process by which Ukraine and Georgia could eventually be admitted to the Alliance in the longer-term.

• Canada should further expand on its investments, announced at Wales, in three NATO Baltic Centres of Excellence on Cyber Security, Energy Security, and Strategic Communications. These centres merge state-of-the-art facilities for the Alliance’s strategic and tactical planning, generating meaningful responses to Russia’s omnipresent cyber threats, energy intimidation, and propaganda.

• NATO must move beyond nascent discussions in Warsaw towards addressing the full spectrum of cyber threats to the Alliance. One source of inspiration is the new Israeli office at NATO’s headquarters. The Israel Defense Forces are among the very few who have recently formed a dedicated cyber defence
command, a first and best-in-case example of what NATO must accomplish. Canada should also move toward developing its own cyber warfare technology.

- At Warsaw, NATO took initial steps to coordinate intelligence sharing among its members which it must build on. Across the Alliance, member states have wide-ranging capacities to collect, analyze, and share their intelligence. If transatlantic security is to be able to assess and respond to real threats, NATO needs to establish a baseline for timely and relevant intelligence sharing.

- During Canada’s brave deployment in Kandahar, at the heart of the Afghan insurgency, Canadian soldiers were killed by Pakistani-supported terrorism in Afghanistan. It is high time for Canada to push for NATO to reconsider its partner status for Pakistan and list individuals who sponsor terrorism in the Pakistan intelligence and defence communities.

- In the Middle East, for Canada, pursuing our national security interests through all tools at our disposal remains essential. While that means working through NATO, it also requires Canada to work through the Coalition Against ISIS, and with ongoing humanitarian and development responses.

NATO has an important role in securing and preserving the world order, but as the threats arrayed against Western nations evolve and grow, the Alliance must evolve with it. The Warsaw Summit and Canada’s contribution to taking NATO’s next steps were a positive start. More courageous leadership from this country will be needed in the near future.
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When you change how people think, you change what they want and how they act. That is why thought leadership is essential in every field. At MLI, we strip away the complexity that makes policy issues unintelligible and present them in a way that leads to action, to better quality policy decisions, to more effective government, and to a more focused pursuit of the national interest of all Canadians. MLI is the only non-partisan, independent national public policy think tank based in Ottawa that focuses on the full range of issues that fall under the jurisdiction of the federal government.

What Is in a Name?

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute exists not merely to burnish the splendid legacy of two towering figures in Canadian history – Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir Wilfrid Laurier – but to renew that legacy. A Tory and a Grit, an English speaker and a French speaker – these two men represent the very best of Canada’s fine political tradition. As prime minister, each championed the values that led to Canada assuming her place as one of the world’s leading democracies. We will continue to vigorously uphold these values, the cornerstones of our nation.

Our Issues

The Institute undertakes an impressive programme of thought leadership on public policy. Some of the issues we have tackled recently include:

- Getting the most out of our petroleum resources;
- Ensuring students have the skills employers need;
- Aboriginal people and the management of our natural resources;
- Controlling government debt at all levels;
- The vulnerability of Canada’s critical infrastructure;
- Ottawa’s regulation of foreign investment; and
- How to fix Canadian health care.

Working for a Better Canada

Good policy doesn’t just happen; it requires good ideas, hard work, and being in the right place at the right time. In other words, it requires MLI. We pride ourselves on independence, and accept no funding from the government for our research. If you value our work and if you believe in the possibility of a better Canada, consider making a tax-deductible donation. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is a registered charity.

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What people are saying about the Macdonald-Laurier Institute

In five short years, the institute has established itself as a steady source of high-quality research and thoughtful policy analysis here in our nation’s capital. Inspired by Canada’s deep-rooted intellectual tradition of ordered liberty – as exemplified by Macdonald and Laurier – the institute is making unique contributions to federal public policy and discourse. Please accept my best wishes for a memorable anniversary celebration and continued success.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE STEPHEN HARPER

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is an important source of fact and opinion for so many, including me. Everything they tackle is accomplished in great depth and furthers the public policy debate in Canada. Happy Anniversary, this is but the beginning.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PAUL MARTIN

In its mere five years of existence, the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, under the erudite Brian Lee Crowley’s vibrant leadership, has, through its various publications and public events, forged a reputation for brilliance and originality in areas of vital concern to Canadians: from all aspects of the economy to health care reform, aboriginal affairs, justice, and national security.

BARBARA KAY, NATIONAL POST COLUMNIST

Intelligent and informed debate contributes to a stronger, healthier and more competitive Canadian society. In five short years the Macdonald-Laurier Institute has emerged as a significant and respected voice in the shaping of public policy. On a wide range of issues important to our country’s future, Brian Lee Crowley and his team are making a difference.

JOHN MANLEY, CEO COUNCIL