The Blue Line or the Bottom Line of Police Services in Canada?  
Arresting runaway growth in costs

CHRISTIAN LEUPRECHT
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Executive Summary

Despite rapidly rising costs, Canadians are not getting all the police they pay for.

Canada’s police are pricing themselves out of business; police budgets have increased at a rate double that of GDP over the last decade, while calls from the public for service have remained stable. Police associations have been happy to stoke public fears about safety, but the correlation between numbers of officers, crime rates, and response times has long been shown to be spurious. In fact, a great deal of work now done by highly trained, well-paid, and experienced uniformed officers is only tangentially related to law enforcement and could be done as well or better and more cheaply by someone else, freeing police to do their core job.

Consider the fact that almost 40 percent of the Toronto Police Service’s workforce made Ontario’s 2012 “Sunshine List” of employees making more than $100,000, including six parking enforcement officers and a cadet in training.

Consider also that much of uniformed officers’ time is spent waiting to give testimony in court, transcribing interviews, teaching CPR, transporting prisoners, or a hundred other duties that take them off the street. In some jurisdictions outside Canada, civilian investigators even handle burglaries, leaving full officers to take on more demanding cases. We can learn from such examples.

Canada needs a new debate about how we provide police services. That debate would focus on three main areas.

First is the changing nature of policing, public expectations of police, and myriad inefficiencies related to the role of police in Canada’s justice system. These powerful cost drivers go well beyond the salaries and benefits police enjoy but do not get the same attention.

Second is the economies of scale to be harnessed from overhead. This report points out many areas where savings can be generated beyond what agencies themselves have already identified. They include:

- having forces share or contract dispatch, tactical teams, forensics, and investigations;
- common provincial standards and processes for hiring, communication, and procurement; and
- using technology, including record management systems to gather evidence and share it with the court and defence, and using lapel cameras, licence plate readers, and more, to make the job easier.

Third, even if we reduce overhead and find economies of scale the benefits are limited, since almost 90 percent of police budgets go to pay salaries. Police work is complex, difficult, and demanding and should be well compensated. The real question is why police who are making upwards of $100,000 a year are performing so many tasks that are not really core policing duties and that other jurisdictions are delivering as or more effectively, efficiently, and productively through alternative service delivery in the form of both civilianization and outsourcing. Examples include:

- administrative functions, such as finance and human resources;
- burglary investigations, lifting fingerprints, and collecting DNA evidence;
• prisoner transport and court security;
• transcription of interviews;
• professional development and training; and
• background checks.

Finally, general recommendations in this study to curtail the overall growth of police service costs include:
• re-directing calls and call volume to allow police to spend more time on problem-focused and community-oriented policing;
• rewarding achievement rather than seniority;
• cross-training police, fire, and Emergency Medical Services;
• reforming the leadership and institutional culture (or brace for a crisis);
• spending less time reactively “fighting crime” and more time on proactive intervention, mitigation, and prevention;
• having police colleges spend more time on developing critical thinking and analytical skills so as to counter a paramilitary institutional culture; and
• shifting from command-and-control principles to more participative and dispersed leadership and management.

In the end, the responsibility lies with legislators to provide legislative frameworks that constrain cost escalation on the one hand, and provide greater latitude in service delivery on the other. The balance struck by reform and legislative renewal in Quebec is instructive in this regard.

Order is integral to freedom, but liberal democracy is ultimately premised on limited state intervention, especially when it comes to the long arm of the law. Yet, the scope of policing has expanded by orders of magnitude in recent decades because governments and the public have either intentionally or inadvertently placed under police authority an ever-expanding array of activities, many of which are really social or medical measures, not law enforcement.

Canadian society would be better served by debating “what kind” of police service rather than “how much”.
Sommaire

Malgré la hausse des coûts des services de police, les Canadiens n’en ont pas pour leur argent.

Les coûts des services de police sont devenus prohibitifs, ce qui a fait augmenter les dépenses prévues à ce titre à un rythme équivalent à deux fois celui du PIB au cours de la décennie écoulée, et ce, malgré un volume d’appels stable. Les associations de policiers ont contribué à renforcer les inquiétudes du public en matière de sécurité, mais la relation entre les effectifs, les taux de criminalité et les temps de réponse a été infirmée depuis longtemps. En fait, ces agents en uniforme hautement qualifiés, bien rémunérés et expérimentés s’acquittent maintenant de tâches qui ne sont qu indirectement liées à l’application des lois et qui pourraient donc être déléguées à un personnel au moins aussi performant, à moindre coût, ce qui permettrait d’orienter leurs efforts sur l’essentiel de leurs fonctions.

Considérez le fait que près de 40 pour cent de l’effectif policier de Toronto se retrouvait en 2012 sur la « Sunshine List » des employés de l’Ontario qui gagnent plus de 100 000 dollars par an, parmi lesquels on comptait six agents de police préposés au stationnement et un cadet en formation.

Considérez également le fait que la plupart de ces agents en uniforme passent le plus clair de leur temps à attendre pour témoigner en court, à transcrire leurs entretiens, à enseigner les techniques de réanimation cardio-pulmonaire (RCP), à transporter des prisonniers et à accomplir des centaines d’autres tâches hors des rues. Diverses autorités à l’extérieur du pays déléguent à des enquêteurs civils même les cas de cambriolage, ce qui laisse aux policiers de plein droit toute la marge nécessaire pour se concentrer sur les cas difficiles. Ce sont des exemples à suivre.

Au Canada, nous avons besoin d’un nouveau débat sur la façon de fournir les services de police, un débat qui aurait trois volets. Tout d’abord, il faut se demander si la nature changeante de la fonction policière, si les attentes du public à cet égard et si la myriade d’inefficacités observées découlent de la place même des services policiers au sein du système de justice au Canada. Ces facteurs déterminants vont bien au-delà des salaires et des avantages sociaux, mais sont souvent ignorés.

Deuxièmement, il est nécessaire d’examiner s’il y a des économies d’échelle à réaliser. Nous mettons en évidence dans cette étude de nombreuses possibilités d’économies, en plus de celles qui ont déjà été repérées par les organismes concernés :

- la mise en commun ou l’impartition des services de répartiteurs, des équipes tactiques et des services de médecine légale et d’enquête;
- l’uniformisation des normes et des processus provinciaux visant l’embauche, les communications et l’approvisionnement;
- le recours aux nouvelles technologies pour faciliter le travail – y compris l’emploi des systèmes de gestion des dossiers pour consigner les preuves et les rendre accessibles aux tribunaux et à la défense – aux caméras corporelles, aux lecteurs de plaques, etc.

Troisièmement, même la réduction des frais généraux et la réalisation d’économies d’échelle ne donneront, somme toute, que des résultats limités, puisque les salaires comptent pour près de 90 % des budgets des services de police. Le travail des policiers est complexe, difficile et exigeant et, par conséquent, doit être bien rémunéré. Ce qu’il faut remettre en cause est le fait qu’une rémunération supérieure à 100 000 dollars par an soit accordée à des policiers qui s’acquittent d’un grand nombre de tâches qui ne sont pas essentielles à leur rôle, alors même que diverses autorités ont établi qu’elles pouvaient être effectuées de façon au moins aussi efficace, efficiente et productive grâce aux
recours à des services de remplacement exécutés par des organismes civils ou externes. Ces tâches comprennent les suivantes : 
- les fonctions administratives, par exemple, les finances et les ressources humaines; 
- les enquêtes de cambriolage; 
- la collecte des empreintes digitales et des preuves d’ADN; 
- le transport de prisonniers et la sécurité des tribunaux; 
- la transcription des entrevues; 
- la formation et le perfectionnement professionnels; 
- les vérifications d’antécédents.

Finalement, afin de restreindre la croissance globale des coûts rattachés aux services de police, on recommande pour l’essentiel dans cette étude les actions suivantes : 
- rediriger les appels et le volume d’appels afin que les policiers consacrent plus de temps aux problèmes de sécurité dans la collectivité; 
- récompenser les réalisations plutôt que l’ancienneté; 
- offrir une formation transdisciplinaire aux policiers, aux pompiers et au personnel des services médicaux d’urgence; 
- réformer le leadership et la culture institutionnelle (pour se préparer au déclenchement de crises); 
- consacrer moins de temps à lutter rétroactivement contre le crime, mais avoir une action proactive en mesure d’intervention, d’atténuation et de prévention; 
- encourager les institutions de formation policière à consacrer plus de temps au développement de l’esprit critique et des aptitudes analytiques afin d’opposer une solution de rechange à l’institution d’une culture paramilitaire; 
- et passer d’une orientation reposant sur des principes de commandement et de contrôle à ceux de leadership et de gestion participatifs et élargis.

En dernière analyse, la responsabilité échoit aux législateurs de fournir le cadre législatif qui peut endiguer la hausse des coûts d’une part et accorder une plus grande latitude dans la prestation de services d’autre part. Il est révélateur de noter, à cet égard, le juste équilibre atteint par le Québec au terme d’une réforme et d’un renouveau législatif.

Le respect de l’ordre est partie intégrante de la liberté, mais, ultimement, toute démocratie libérale repose sur une intervention limitée de l’État, en particulier devant la puissance des lois. Pourtant, la portée de la fonction policière a explosé au cours des dernières décennies, et ce, parce que les gouvernements et le public ont demandé ou ont obtenu de façon bien involontaire que les corps policiers interviennent de façon sans cesse croissante dans de multiples situations, en réalité liées à des troubles sociaux et médicaux plutôt qu’à l’application des lois.

La société canadienne serait mieux servie par un débat qui s’intéresserait davantage à la « nature » des services policiers plutôt qu’à leur « quantité ».
Introduction

Security is a public good. We all benefit (although not necessarily equally), and we all suffer in its absence, especially in a liberal democracy where the exercise of freedom is predicated on individual and collective security. In a liberal democracy where the preservation of freedom is premised on limited state intervention, how much security to provide and how much to spend on it is bound to be controversial.

According to municipal, provincial, and federal surveys, Canadians’ satisfaction with policing consistently ranks very high. Canadians like the quality of policing; their concern is cost. The Police Services Act of Ontario (1990), Quebec’s Police Act (2000), and the RCMP Act (1985) detail the primary functions of police. If the cost of policing is to become more sustainable through gains in efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity without compromising quality, then we have to debate the activities (such as patrols and investigations) by means of which these functions are delivered.

Any discussion must ponder the appropriate extent of policing rather than default to securitarizing an ever-expanding array of social and health dysfunctions that afflict modern societies. An informed discussion must also prioritize responsibilities that are genuinely core to policing over those deemed discretionary, consider how to deliver in alternative ways those responsibilities that emerge from this debate as discretionary, and make efforts to manage demand and expectations. The essence of the argument is to shift from increasing the numbers of uniforms to increasing how police complement the community through a more visible presence as a result of civilianized and/or outsourced non-core duties.

This study diagnoses key cost drivers, and contrasts the perspectives of taxpayers and politicians with that of police. It then reviews a series of strategic cost-reduction measures and examines which of these hold the greatest promise in forging an affordable, sustainable, efficient, and effective policing strategy. The third section surveys operational and tactical measures that are readily implementable in the short and medium terms and makes some overall recommendations.
The Rising Cost of Policing

Security is expensive. In 2012, Canadians spent $12 billion, or nearly 1 percent of GDP, just on policing. The problem is that police agencies are pricing themselves out of business. The Parliamentary Budget Office (2012, 18) estimates that the proportional cost of security grew from 54 percent to 57 percent of criminal justice expenditures in Canada between 2002 and 2012. Over the same period, however, provincial expenditures on security grew by about 10 percent, from 0.475 percent of GDP to 0.53 percent (PBO 2012, 19). In real terms, (2002 dollars) provincial security expenditures rose from $5.6 billion to $7.9 billion, an increase of 41 percent (or $2.3 billion), representing an average annual growth of 3.5 percent – and almost double the average annual growth in Canada’s GDP over the same period.

If a picture is worth a thousand words, figure 1 tells a compelling story of per capita police expenditures across Canada since 1989:

**Figure 1: Per capita police expenditures in Canada, 1989–2009**

![Graph showing per capita police expenditures in Canada, 1989–2009](image)

**Note:** The Consumer Price Index is used to calculate constant dollars over a base year of 2000 (2002=100)

**Source:** Statistics Canada, Catalogue no. 85-255-X.

The cost of policing rose substantially in the time period shown. Note the flattening of the curve during the budget-balancing exercises of the early 1990s followed by a precipitous rise since the late 1990s (see also ESSC 2011, 6). It follows that the politics of the costs of policing are just as important as the economics: the curve flattened because of a political consensus throughout the country to curtail salary expenditures in the public sector to reduce budget deficits.

A new factor today, however, is the unprecedented rise in salary expenditures of about 50 percent since the late 1990s; that is, over merely 10 years (ESSC 2011, 9). Between 2005 and 2010, for
instance, the total annual cost including benefits, payroll taxes, and so on for a sworn member with Peel Region Police Services increased from $96,300 to $113,761. In Durham, the equivalent cost increased from $159,865 in 2008 to $182,108 in 2011 (Durham Regional Police Service 2013). Total cost per sworn member for municipalities that contract with the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) for policing services (including cost-recovery for dispatch and equipment) rose by 18 percent from $122,200 in 2007 to $144,000 in 2011 (Auditor General 2012, 248).

As the Drummond Report prepared for the Government of Ontario makes clear, such escalations are unsustainable when real GDP growth is negative (note the relentless rise in compensation in the public-sector during the 2008 recession) or when real GDP growth is projected to hover around 1 percent for the foreseeable future (Commission for the Reform of Ontario’s Public Services 2012). Saint John, Belleville, Brockville, and Innisfil are a sample of municipalities that are seriously considering contract policing as a way to curtail costs. The extent to which economies of scale are to be harnessed is evidenced by the 31 (smaller) Ontario municipalities (listed in the appendix) that have contracted with the OPP since 1998 – with only 52 municipal and regional police services now remaining in Ontario. In New Brunswick, Moncton contracted for municipal policing with the RCMP in 1999. St. George recently voted to terminate its contract, and Moncton’s experience suggests that contract policing may not necessarily be cheaper than a municipal police service (see also Bish 2004; Bish, McDavid, and Clemens 1998). In other words, the issue of contract policing is as controversial as it is charged. Realistically, however, the cost (infrastructure costs, start-up costs, training, and hiring) of reverting to an autonomous police forces is prohibitive; and few Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), OPP, or Sûreté du Québec (SQ) members will be looking to join a municipal force intent on controlling salary creep.

A broad consensus is emerging among all levels of government that police risk pricing themselves out of business. The federal government held a summit on the issue on January 15–16, 2013, and the RCMP has established the Costs of Policing Working Group as well as the National Police Service Renewal and Sustainability Initiative. The working group is meant to engage with the broader law enforcement and criminal justice communities to define specific needs, establish priorities, and initiate a discussion on the economics of policing among other things. Ontario’s Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services held a summit on the Future of Policing on March 6–7, 2012, and subsequently brought stakeholders together in the Future of Policing Advisory Committee. In that province, review and rationalization to achieve greater efficiency, effectiveness, and client service dates back to the Expert Panel on Municipal Police Services Budgets formed in March 1992 (McKenna and Evans 1994), and even has antecedents in the establishment of the Ontario Police Commission in 1962 (McDougall 1969). The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities and the Eastern Ontario Warden’s Caucus (Wood 2013) have repeatedly pushed the issue.

But the options are limited: you can share, shift, and shrink cost or you can increase productivity. In other words, reduce supply and/or manage demand. Economies of scale can be found in centralized dispatch, training, forensics, emergency response, tactical teams, centralized stores, supply, fleet management, traffic services, business planning, IT services, and priority access to provincially held specialist services (such as polygraphy).

Yet, incremental changes and making the same set of services more cost-effective is unlikely to make policing any more affordable or sustainable. Human resources constitute up to 90 percent of the
$5.39 billion that municipalities spend annually on policing. By way of example, based on the 2011 cost recovery model, the OPP (2012, 5, 17) estimates that 85 percent of OPP-administered municipal policing costs relate to salaries and benefits (90 percent for uniform salaries, 10 percent for support staff) while 15 percent goes towards direct operating expenses.

Municipalities pay for over half of policing costs in Canada, yet they provide nearly two-thirds of the total workforce; consequently, the rising costs of policing affect them disproportionately. Municipalities that contract for policing with the OPP, for instance, saw their costs rise by 29 percent between 2007 and 2011 (Auditor General 2012, 233). Similarly, the Auditor General of Canada (2011) decries the extent to which the rising cost of national policing compromises the RCMP’s capacity to address its federal policing responsibilities. The percentage of municipal budgets that policing represents has remained fairly stable, yet real growth in salaries consistently exceeds inflation and is about twice the growth in salaries in the rest of the public sector (ESSC 2011, 6–7; PAO 2012). As a result, in many municipalities, the number and salaries of police and firefighters exceed those of other municipal employees (Ontario Ministry of Finance 2012).

1. Cost Drivers

From the perspective of politicians and taxpayers

Reining in escalating costs of first responders is proving exceedingly difficult (ESSC 2011). Police unions are adept at mobilizing political and public support (Ross 2012, especially ch. 4), ensuring that wages and benefits remain competitive, that budget-driven lay-offs are avoided, and that legislated and legal standards mean police equipment and facilities cannot be reduced (Robertson 2012, 354). Their campaigns are successful because policing is widely perceived as a dangerous profession that warrants appropriate remuneration. Yet, policing and firefighting are relatively safe occupations (Barton 2014). They do not make the list of most dangerous professions, and compensation for those professions does not seem to correlate with risk. Waste collectors, certain hydro workers, and pilots, for example, all face greater risk of workplace hazards than police. Ergo, in policing as in other professions, pay does not correlate with risk. Police exploit public ignorance at the bargaining table: in fact, 80 percent of police work serves to maintain order, not enforce law (Wilson 1978).

Most taxpayers work in the private sector. When the economy does well, their salaries go up while those in the public sector lag because it is less responsive to market forces. Yet, when the economy fares poorly, there is a social expectation of faster downward salary correction than is possible in the public sector since collective agreements make it again less responsive to economic stressors than the private sector. Unions are loath to relinquish pay and benefits – often extracted in return for salary concessions during difficult economic times – and justify their remuneration by the notion that they perform a popular, valuable, and sometimes dangerous service.

Governments do not exercise the same control over public servants as the private sector does over its employees. Adjustments and downsizing do take place, but tend to be more moderate and spread over a longer time. And changes in salary are harder to negotiate, especially clawbacks. Therefore, successful change requires a longer view beyond the next election, which runs counter to the strategic interests of politicians who need to be responsive to short-term political imperatives.
Reducing the workforce and consolidating police operations is politically difficult because of the perceived impact on personal and community safety. “Due to the unique nature of policing etc.,” Community Safety and Correctional Services was exempt from the proposed 5 percent reduction targets for full-time equivalent (FTE) positions for the Ontario Public Service announced in the 2009 budget. Attempts to restrict growth in police or firefighting budgets – let alone cut – are met with populist tactics to galvanize support through fear-mongering about crime (PAO 2011).

However, efforts by politicians in government to force first responders into the same constrained salary growth that they have been trying to impose on the rest of the public service have been mixed. On the one hand, the federal government’s Treasury Board Secretariat withheld a salary increase for the RCMP, which is without a union despite being the country’s largest police force, and thus not as well positioned to react collectively as it could be. On the other hand, the austerity-pleading Ford administration in Toronto raided the city’s reserve fund to pay for a hefty raise for police – with the result that almost 40 percent of the Toronto Police Service’s 5,400 sworn and 2,500 civilian workforce (that is, 3,181 employees) were on the Government of Ontario’s 2012 “Sunshine List” of employees making more than $100,000 a year. The effect of salary increases is palpable: the sprawling list adds 1,200 names every year, and includes six parking enforcement officers and even a cadet-in-training (Blair 2012). (That runs counter to the logic in force elsewhere, such as London’s Metropolitan Police Service in the UK, where cadets have to put in a few years on quasi-probation performing simpler functions, such as directing traffic, at considerably lower pay before they become a full-fledged sworn member.) And, in return for “complying” with the expectation of a salary freeze for 2012 and 2013, the Ontario Provincial Police Association negotiated an offsetting “matching entitlement” of 8.55 percent for 2014 with the Government of Ontario. The “matching entitlement” amounted to a calculated risk that the government would not renege on its commitment.

Hardest hit are the many rural counties where taxpayers bear the brunt of tax hikes that often exceed the rate of inflation since these counties have little or no industrial tax base. They also end up bearing the costs of policing cottages and seasonal properties on an annual basis despite lower Calls For Service (CFS) during winter. Large cities can grow their tax revenue by virtue of economic and population growth, increased valuation of properties that generate more property tax, and densification of urban planning. Smaller and medium municipalities are more limited in their options, in part because their growth is constrained by large tracts of Crown and other land that is not fully taxable. In 11 counties of rural Eastern Ontario, for instance, 90 percent of the region’s assessment is residential, and expected to rise to 91.5 percent by 2020, while non-residential assessment is projected to drop from 14.2 percent in 2002 to 8.5 percent in 2020 (Wood 2003, 27). Moreover, since 2000, the overall operating expenditures in those counties have grown faster than the population, largely as a result of multiple non-demand factors, including police services (Wood 2003, 7). The cost of “protection services” in these counties has increased 86 percent since 2000, and 20 percent in 2007–2011 alone, and is projected to rise another 45 percent by 2020 (Wood 2003, 15). That exceeds the real growth in local assessment. The effects are particularly acute for the working poor who own their own home and those on fixed incomes, such as seniors. Both groups are over-represented in rural areas (Pong 2007; Statistics Canada 2008).

The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) (2008) decries the exorbitant growth in salaries, benefits, and pensions that is largely a result of benchmarking. A clause in the OPP’s collective agreement reads: “an across the board wage increase […] equal to the percentage increase required to raise the salary rate of a first class constable to the highest first class constable base rate in Ontario in effect on that date.” Almost every unionized police force in the country either has a similar clause
in its collective agreement or operates on precedent, which has a similar effect. This is a leapfrog method of increasing salaries: every time a police force in Canada gets an increase in salary, it raises all the boats in port.

By way of example, the OPP’s 8.55 percent benchmark was not set by one of Ontario’s “big 12” police forces, but by the town of Orangeville, population 27,975, where, as of 2014, the top grid for a first-class constable will be $97,000 as opposed to $94,702 for the OPP, $90,623 in Toronto, and $90,215 in London (Tremblay 2013). In the nearby town of Brockton, matching that salary means an increase in property taxes of over 3 percent. Those metrics now set the benchmark for contract negotiations for municipalities across the country. What is more, in return for not being unionized, RCMP pay scales are mandated to range among those of the top three police forces in the country, but governments routinely ignore this. RCMP salaries rank about 34th in Canada (the rank position changes as other police services settle on new collective agreements), giving a city police constable in Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, a higher salary than an equivalent RCMP member.

The Government of Ontario has traditionally kept compensation for the OPP among the top five police forces in Ontario. Nonetheless, the OPP has slipped as low as 12th and 20th nationally since 2013: $66.45/hour in 2011, as compared to $65.72 for the RCMP, $57.84 for the SQ, $70.90 for the Toronto Police Service, and $70.52 in Vancouver (Auditor General 2012, 243). In Ontario, at $294 per capita, policing costs are well above the national average of $268. However, the cost of living and the nature of policing differ between urban and rural areas; consequently, figures are not readily comparable across provinces and municipalities. In 2011, the per capita cost of policing was $226 in York Region but $336 in Toronto (Durham Regional Police Service 2013).

Moreover, the federal government costs out salary as a “total compensation package” that includes benefits, pensions, and the like, whereas the RCMP members’ association does not. Therefore, benefits are not included in the aforementioned figures, and amount to an extra 25–27 percent, and almost 50 percent once fleet, equipment, vehicles, and support such as dispatch are included. Police associations hone in on increasing benefits and pensions, especially when politicians are looking to compensate for their inability to raise salaries. For example, the OPP’s pension plan is self-funded. In the last round of negotiations the Ontario Provincial Police Association (OPPA) focused on pensions instead of improvements in salary, and negotiated a stealth rise in pension payouts by reducing the calculation from 60 months to an average of 36 months of highest earnings. In the next round of negotiations, the aforementioned “matching entitlement” will allow the OPP to leapfrog to make up for the salary foregone last time.

At the turn of the millennium, police officers were leaving larger forces for smaller ones. Since police forces subsidize recruitment and training, smaller forces have an incentive to attract experienced members, and larger ones have an incentive to retain them. However, since retention is not an issue in the current labour market (as exemplified by the OPP’s recent imposition of restrictions that effectively close down recruitment) what they receive should be deemed an “experience” bonus, rather than a retention bonus, that can reach as high as 9 percent of salary for up to $7500.

Sick days are a similarly costly legacy issue. Many municipal forces allow employees to bank sick leave (and, in some cases, pay it out at retirement). Similarly widespread is generous leave with pay. Overtime is often determined arbitrarily or is the result of poor planning. Such measures are partially responsible for the premium municipalities pay to maintain their own police force. Larger forces seem to be more progressive on these issues. In the OPP sick days can neither be banked nor paid out and the federal government, among other reforms, recently legislated an end to unlimited sick days in the RCMP.
Another example is recent changes to the Public Service Labour Relations Act (2003) which include changing factors that arbitrators need to take into account, including ability to pay. In Ontario, the AMO has focused on an arbitration system in which a municipality’s ability to pay is not currently a factor. One of the advantages of Canada’s federal system is the ability to compare provincial solutions. Manitoba’s arbitration system, for instance, appears to work better: even public servants who can strike, such as teachers, have not done so in decades. However, Ontario’s politicians are highly averse to tampering with the arbitration system for fear of backlash from unions, a political liability in a province where about 1 million voters are provincial public employees.

From the perspective of police

Since 2007, the OPP’s call volume has remained stable at about 716,000 a year (Auditor General 2012, 232). At the same time, heightened expectations of police, the growing complexity of policing, the relative dangers of the job, and shift and duty requirements call for an exceptional level of dedication and commitment. As well, the need for policing to remain an attractive profession is raising costs. The compound effect of these developments is causing more police to spend less time on the road.

The level of transparency that society expects from police forces (from all public services for that matter) has been growing. This is an active expectation, not a passive one: Individuals are no longer waiting for government to come forward with information; they expect information and accountability on ever tighter timelines. Police forces must constantly account for their actions or risk being judged in the court of public opinion, rather than await the results of a lengthy inquest. However, popular opinion of how things should be done often does not match legal, fiscal, and/or operational realities.

On the one hand, when a court, inquest, or law imposes a higher degree of care on some aspect of policing, the future cost of conducting that same task rises, because it takes more hours to meet that new degree of care. On the other hand, the cost of tasks, such as investigations, need to come down, if the amount of time that sworn members actually spend in the community stopping cars, doing ride checks, and driving back roads and alleyways is to go up. Demand-side factors that are escalating the costs of policing include:

- expanded demand for services (Gascon and Foglesong 2010, 5–6): The main purpose of police used to be to keep political and economic elites in power and assert their interests (by subduing restless masses) and safeguard their (and subsequently the public’s) property and well-being. Today, we expect police to deal with everything from mental-health cases to liquor violations by rowdy teenagers.

- greater legal and procedural complexity and the expansion of civil liability (Robertson 2012, 355–357). Thirty years ago, a domestic dispute took about half an hour of police time. Now, a domestic dispute takes longer to process than a criminal charge 30 years ago. Even when no charges are laid, two cars usually respond and one officer is taken out of operation for the remainder of the shift, because one of the two parties usually spends the night in jail. In rural areas that means the lone officer on duty is now encumbered. Then there is all the paperwork that entails and the follow-up to ensure the safety of the spouse. As well, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has made criminal prosecution
more process-focused, as law enforcement has to prove that evidence was obtained in a constitutionally admissible manner.

- growing transparency and accountability requirements. Expectations have increased on the due diligence and paperwork to be completed by police on everything from reports to how evidence is gathered, handled, stored, and presented in court, to the member’s time to attend court or another judicial mechanism, such as alternative dispute resolution or judicial pre-trials – often on overtime.

- “downloading” of services. Police must deal with the fallout of provincial and municipal governments looking to balance their budgets by reducing social services, incarcerations, and the number of people in institutional care.

- growing public expectations. The public expects high policing levels in the wake of 9-11 to raise visibility, meet response times, and provide community policing in schools and among “at-risk” groups.²

- environmental factors. These include unscheduled overtime during natural or anthropogenic disasters.

- changing nature of policing. Police need more appropriate skillsets and legislation to cope with the changing nature of harm (such as guns and gangs, identity theft, and cyber crime) and the increasing complexity of policing (in operations, administration, governance, and criminal investigations) that consume vast police resources (Gascon and Foglesong 2010, 5).

- mounting bureaucracy. Proliferating rules, regulations, procedures, and the associated training to execute them.

- overtime. Aggregate salaries do not show the extent of overtime, which is largely non-discretionary (OPP 2012, 40), for instance, to do patrol or other duty at public events or construction sites where costs are borne by the contractor, not the taxpayer.

In 2012, before the 8.55 percent matching entitlement in 2014, starting salary for a first-class constable (who has more experience than a detachment officer whose salary is 15–33 percent lower) with the OPP, for instance, was $83,483 and topped out at $90,997. To make over $100,000, that constable would have to perform additional duties (OPP 212, 22). The overall rate that the OPP paid for overtime for municipal policing was 6.3 percent, but ranged from 0.8–15.3 percent – in other words, not enough to push a first class constable over $100,000 (OPP 2012, 39).

Today, it is virtually impossible to be hired with the OPP, the SQ, and most municipal police forces without having completed at least some post-secondary education; a college degree at a minimum, but often a BA. This is a substantial change from recruitment qualifications a couple of decades ago, and speaks to the rapidly changing nature and rising expectations of the profession. The RCMP remains the notable exception: “minimum qualification” (a euphemism for high-school diploma and no criminal record) prevails for hiring and for most promotions. And a select “old guard” in all police forces continues to regard higher education as a liability. To require a mere high school diploma of people who draft court briefs, the writing requirements of which exceed those of many graduate school courses, is an anachronism. The changing profile of recruits suggests a gradual shift in institutional culture – a shift that risks being cancelled out by the gradual assimilation of new recruits into “old school” thinking if the shift is not accompanied by genuine changes in command, culture, and leadership within the organization.
2. Mitigation Strategies

Increase revenue

In a number of US municipalities, especially in New England, a municipal levy that is separate from property taxes funds police and fire services. While this does not restrict costs by itself, it does make transparent the amount each taxpayer contributes. That, in turn, makes these levies subject to public debate that is the hallmark of democratic legitimation.

Similarly, Canadian municipalities could be given the option of raising additional revenue by imposing a municipal sales tax. Its rate would be constrained by the option for shoppers to “exit” to another municipality without a sales tax to make their purchases; so, this solution would only generate limited additional revenue.

Municipalities could also approach their respective provinces about increasing their grant for policing services. In Ontario, for instance, that grant is encompassed in a transfer each municipality receives in the form of the Ontario Municipal Partnership Fund (OMPF). Alternatively, they could ask the province to increase the “heads and beds” transfer that they receive to cover provincial properties such as hospitals, schools, colleges, and universities that do not pay property taxes. However, in fiscally austere times, it may prove difficult to wring higher transfers out of empty provincial coffers. Ontario has frozen that transfer since 1987.

Reduce costs: Economies of scale

Redundancies and inefficiencies are the reason why per capita cost for municipally funded policing services are 35–60 percent higher than the same services contracted to the OPP (OPP 2012, 19; Auditor General 2012, 246). Initiating (as Ontario has done) a common standard for procuring and maintaining clothing, fleet, and equipment, initially at the provincial level but subsequently at the national level, would generate some savings. The OPP is benefiting from significant synergies through a team whose sole task is to write Part 6 warrants (electronic surveillance). But it is only a half-measure insofar as the task is being done by a team composed of highly paid uniformed members instead of specialized paralegals at a fraction of the cost.

The OPP handles the province’s entire call volume through five Provincial Communications Centres: London, North Bay, Orillia, Smiths Falls, and Thunder Bay. After deciding that local knowledge and geographic familiarity were indispensable to providing effective policing services, the OPP opted against consolidating the service into a single call centre. As a result, the OPP has built redundancy into its system: if one call centre goes down or is overwhelmed, four others are still operational. But while the OPP can handle all of Eastern Ontario with one dispatch and communications centre, Kingston, Brockville, Belleville, Gananoque, and Smiths Falls all run their own municipal dispatch and communications centres. The pattern and duplication are repeated throughout the country: These municipalities could save money by pooling such resources, while maintaining their own police forces. With the benefit of Google maps and geographic information systems, the OPP’s dispatchers have been trained and are (pretty) effective in local and geographic knowledge for all of Eastern Ontario. Since urban areas are mapped more accurately than rural ones, if procedures among municipal forces and the OPP were standardized and systems for routing calls centralized, OPP dispatchers would probably prove equally proficient at picking up additional duties covering some local municipalities that currently cling to their own services. This is already common practice in the United States. The reason is economic: patrolling is subject to diseconomies of scale, but dispatch and other overhead to economies of scale; so, the most efficient policing is actually carried
out by small departments that get their overhead services from larger organizations (Parks 1985). In the event of a large-scale emergency, contracting of overhead has the added advantage of speeding up coordination and deployment of assets.

Quebec is Canada’s only constitutional jurisdiction to have legislated stratified municipal policing: the smaller the municipality, the fewer the functions municipal police are permitted to perform (the SQ provides the rest). Municipalities with a population below 50,000 must contract for policing with the SQ. There are four tiers for municipalities with fewer than 1 million people and one for those above. Only the SQ is permitted to do tier-six policing (Quebec Police Act 2000, section III, articles 70 and 72, and Annex G). As a result of some forces being eliminated and others consolidated into regional ones, over the last decade the number of municipal forces in Quebec shrunk from about 130 to 33 today (not counting First Nations Police). However, elsewhere amalgamation has actually been shown to be associated with higher cost, fewer officers, lower levels of service, no change in crime rates, higher workload for officers, and lower satisfaction among citizens (McDavid 2002). But Quebec’s logic is not necessarily driven by economies of scale. Concerns about criminal investigations bungled by inexperienced municipal police, for instance, had the Government of Ontario temporarily suspend municipal police authority in Barrie and Kenora to conduct major criminal investigations (with Kenora subsequently contracting with the OPP for municipal policing).

Provide synergies: Cross-training

The antagonism between fire services and emergency medical services (EMS) in the City of Toronto is legendary. As fire safety has improved, the two services have been competing for more minor calls that a two-person EMS crew can handle just as well as a $350,000 fire truck and its sizeable crew. Only 14 percent of callouts for the fire department are for fires. Policies determining which vehicle(s) get called out and when are set at the local level, and thus differ among municipalities. The situation is complicated by the fact that police and fire departments tend to be municipal services whereas in more rural areas, EMS is often run by the county, adding a multilevel government dimension to collaboration between the organizations.

In rural Canada, each service has a different employer, which is often a different level of government: the RCMP, OPP, or SQ provide policing services; a fire department may be municipal and/or volunteer; and EMS is managed by the county. However, smaller and medium-sized municipalities may benefit from a more coordinated approach, as exemplified by the Saint John suburbs of Rothesay and Quispamsis that have joint commissions for policing and fire protection which use the RCMP and, to a lesser extent, the Saint John city police for overhead services (Bish 2004, 11). In Ontario and Quebec, all police (except the RCMP) undergo the same provincial training and attend the same provincial academy. Fire and EMS are already trained to a common provincial standard. To overcome resistance, these two provinces could simply provide an incentive for municipalities to cross-train new hires.

The City of Sunnyvale, California, solved these problems by cross-training all police, fire, and EMS personnel (CBS Local 2013). Public safety officers attend the 22-week Police Academy, the 14-week Fire Academy, and the 6-week Emergency Medical Technician (Basic Academy) (City of Sunnyvale 2012). Such flexibility allows the city to optimize the way it schedules and deploys personnel. The city harnesses economies of scale: cross-training all first responders means they can respond effectively to just about any call and know how to cooperate with their counterparts from other emergency services.
Shift costs: Alternative service delivery

One way to distinguish core policing responsibilities is to separate out those that are genuinely dangerous and need to be carried out by trained, professional sworn members. The level of accountability expected for these tasks is high. But the bulk of police duties are not dangerous; yet, in Canada, many of the least dangerous tasks are carried out by “elite” plainclothes police investigators who benefit from a 4–5 percent premium in salary and retention pay. Yet, civilians have a proven track-record of performing many of the same tasks equally well at lower cost.

In a liberal democracy such as Canada, alternative service delivery (ASD) has good philosophical justifications. As the duties of police expand, and sworn members perform a greater array of duties, these duties have now become “securitarized.” Such “securitarization creep” runs counter to the fundamental principles of individual freedom and limited state intervention. The power of the state – especially that of law enforcement – should be limited to a strictly defined set of duties by trained personnel that cannot be performed equally well by other means. Yet, many of the duties that police perform can be performed as effectively and efficiently by non-sworn members, special constables, community safety officers, or private security companies. Protocols and policies would determine the best means of responding to any call or need. Such triaging of calls may prove more palatable to members of the public who are concerned about a lower level of service, if a policy such as the one at the OPP would allow for a sworn member to be dispatched regardless of the nature of the call if the caller specifically requests one.

Across US police forces, only about 5 percent of calls required the responding member “to use some type of force to insure the safety of the public or the officer” (Pittsburgh Bureau of Police 2007). So, there is no obvious answer as to why uniformed members must perform some of the remaining 95 percent of duties or why they might perform them better (Buerger 2007). Similar patterns seem to prevail in Canada (Auditor General of Ontario 2012).

In fact, civilians have been performing a growing number police functions since the early nineties (Heininger and Urbanek 1983; Crank 1989). In 2010, the ratio of police-to-civilian employees in Canada was 2.5:1, compared to 4.6:1 in 1962. In the United Kingdom, the ratio went from 2.3:1 in 2000 to 1.4:1 by 2009, and civilian employees now outnumber sworn members in some British police services (Adetunji 2010; Statistics Canada 2010). Some Quebec municipalities now hire civilian security guards to complement police presence.

Of course, this is hardly novel: by-law enforcement officers at the municipal and provincial levels just about everywhere in the country tend to be trained civilians. Communications personnel and dispatchers are civilians (and, even as full-timers, make about 75 percent of a sworn member’s salary). There is also a trend towards complaints against police being investigated by independent civilians (Goldsmith 1991). The Commission for Public Complaints Against the RCMP and its provincial counterparts are examples of this trend, as are Ontario’s Special Investigations Unit (SIU), Alberta’s Serious Incident Response Team (ASIRT), and British Columbia’s Internal Investigations Office (IIO) (Mouallem 2013).

“Civilianization” has its challenges, both functionally and in terms of institutional culture (Kostelac 2008). Yet the problematic aspects can be mitigated by:

- improving private security services through licensing and bonding of agents and agencies;
- reducing problems associated with public monopolization of policing through improved accountability systems and accreditation;
- improving procedures for screening, training, and managing civilian specialists;
• making more effective use of civil remedies for harms in the public and private sectors; and

• finding ways to clarify roles and improve coordination among the public, private, and civilian components of policing (Forst 2000).

In England and Wales, the Police Reform Act (2002) allows local police to designate “any person employed by the police authority” to be a police community support officer and dispatch them to safe and suspect-less crime scenes as an investigating officer, a detention officer, and/or an escort officer. In Scotland, the rough equivalent of the latter are called police custody and security officers. Since their introduction, the British Crime Survey shows that confidence in police has risen from 67 percent in 2006 to 80 percent in 2012. Salary savings are in the range of 30–40 percent compared to that of a sworn member. That reduces overtime because two people can be hired for a job that had been done by one. In Canada, the savings are 60–80 percent of the cost of a constable. In other words, the cost savings are significant – but they are also associated with improvements in service.

In terms of the division of labour, it makes perfect sense: have civilian personnel who are specialized in a specific task carry out that task to the best of their ability. These community safety officers also tend to be more representative of society at large, especially women and visible minorities, than police forces. The benefits are laid out in a report commissioned for the Vancouver Police Department (Griffiths et al. 2006).

Since 2009, a team of civilian investigators 3 in Mesa, Arizona has been handling about 30 percent of all calls, including 50 percent of all calls for vehicle and residential burglary (provided they are no longer in progress), vehicle and copper theft, unsecured buildings, accidents, traffic hazards, and loose dogs (Gascon and Foglesong 2010, 3–4, 13). They also respond to “suspicious activity” (9 percent of calls) and “subjects disturbing” (15 percent). By and large, these do not require a sworn member to attend. Having a sworn member attend false alarms amounts to subsidizing cheap security and poor risk management. Some municipalities bill for false alarms, to offset this moral hazard. Another roughly 17 percent of calls are answered by a civilian and a sworn officer (false alarms account for 11 percent and 6 percent for juveniles disturbing the peace).

Civilian investigators are less apt to be called away by an urgent call from the dispatcher, can spend more time at the crime scene, and specialize in a smaller number of tasks, including calming victims. Once a burglary is over, the on-site threat has dissipated so there is no real need for a sworn member to attend. In Mesa, civilian investigators have substantially reduced the length of time it takes to respond to non-emergency calls. They write 10 percent of initial reports, lift about 22 percent of fingerprints, and collect DNA evidence. As for public trust, surveys report exceptionally high satisfaction with the service they perform. In the United Kingdom, civilians now carry out some criminal interrogations, including those for murder and rape. They have the power to direct traffic, confiscate alcohol, and seize drugs. But they do not have powers of arrest.

There is ample room for ASD in the form of community safety officers to deal with burglaries; special constables for routine court security and prisoner escort, court liaison, community outreach, media relations, and more. After all, civilian volunteer first responders already do just about everything highly paid first responders do. 4 The OPP, for instance, has 103 officers tasked with “community-service duties” and another 110 performing court duties, both of which are tasks that the OPP has flagged for prospective civilianization (Auditor General 2012, 241). Recruiting, criminal background checks (for which there is ever-growing demand), court case management, training, and ceremonial duties all lend themselves to ASD.
However, there are limits. The UK has awarded a contract to a private security corporation, G4S, for traffic enforcement. That, however, is an anomaly. More police die in traffic services than elsewhere, and each stop could be potentially life-threatening, which does not make traffic enforcement a good candidate for privatization or civilianization. In other words, there are clear limits on the purview of civilian investigators.

There is also ample room for ASD at the organizational level. Civilians could run recruiting systems and perform much of the instruction delivered at police academies. Background checks could be centralized and outsourced instead of being performed by police services at rates that do not even recover cost. The public sector ends up subsidizing a service that is already performed by several RCMP-accredited companies with a national presence, including L-1 Identity Solutions, ClearNeed Information Systems Inc., Canadian Corps of Commissionaires, Excellium, and the National Pardon Centre. Moreover, smaller municipal forces could control costs by subcontracting with larger forces for everything from call centres and dispatch to a tactical team to maintain standards and legal requirements.

**Shift and reduce costs: Streamline the justice/police nexus**

Courts and Crown are provincial or federal agencies, whereas police tend to be municipal or municipally contracted. Outsourcing court costs to police amounts to an indirect municipal subsidy of the judicial process. The relationship among courts, crown attorneys and police warrants a detailed study to see what internal court costs are actually being outsourced to police, from the Crown’s office to the police, from defence to police, from society to police.5

**Court duty**

Spending less time in court would free up uniformed members for other duties. Police have to appear repeatedly for court dates that are subsequently adjourned on procedural grounds, such as allegedly missing documentation or failure to have requested a translator. But if the sworn member misses just one appearance, the case may be dismissed! In many smaller jurisdictions, prosecution and defence are both complicit in delaying proceedings. These jurisdictions often either do not have a full-time Crown attorney or the Crown is overloaded so cases are contracted to agents of the Crown. Like defence lawyers, however, agents bill by the hour, so neither side has an interest in settling. This drives up costs needlessly, and causes a disproportionate number of cases to be dismissed due to the excessive delay in coming to trial.

Attending each court date takes that officer out of circulation for the entire shift (see below as to why), or the appearance is taken as overtime if it falls outside shift hours. Police officers work shifts and weekends, but court is held during business hours on weekdays, so there is a good chance that it falls on off time. Although scheduling could mitigate this, court time puts a significant burden on the allocation of policing resources in the community. Court appearances are set by date, not time; consequently, an officer may pass an entire day in court only to testify at the end of the day or be postponed to another day.

The remedy is straightforward: there should only be one punctual hearing for which both defence and prosecution have to arrive fully prepared, having made all necessary submissions and requests ahead of time. If either side is unprepared or, for instance, has neglected to request a translator even though they knew one was required, the trial will proceed, regardless. No more adjourned proceedings on procedural grounds.
Records management

There is little uniformity in record management systems (RMS). Forces tend to run their own system that can only handle small text files such as case notes. The OPP does not participate in the RCMP’s Police Information Portal (which allows access to general case information); the OPP runs its own Niche RMS system instead, known as the Ontario Police Information Technology Cooperative (OPTIC), which it shares with 43 municipal police services. To overcome intelligence-sharing information gaps, the OPP runs a province-wide intelligence management system, but most municipal forces do not make systematic use of it. However, none of these RMS’s are powerful enough to upload evidence on a large scale, such as large files of electronic voice intercepts, videos, and/or photos. That makes inter-jurisdictional investigations that are already complex needlessly more so. The separate systems greatly hamper the ability to share information among police services. By and large, evidence for trials today is shared the way it was 100 years ago: reams of paper are transported to the court and catalogued. Instead, police should be able to share documentation with the court and defence electronically.

At the same time, the federal government could be instituting a national system for case files and evidence. Even on a cost-recovery basis, this would still be cheaper than each force running its own system. Police services across the country would be able to upload case notes, evidence, pictures, reports, and associated documentation. The system would be secure and have different levels of access to ensure that only appropriate personnel could view case files and documentation. Another federal country, Belgium, has implemented such a system.

This system would have an ancillary benefit. Currently, Crown prosecutors only see the evidence once charges have been laid and cases are moved to the prosecution. Given the large number of cases that the Crown drops before they ever make it to court for a variety of reasons, the current approach is highly inefficient. This is especially true in view of the costs involved in police time (arrests, paperwork, and more) required to file the charge. As well, since there is no process to provide feedback to the officers when they make mistakes on the paperwork and/or the way they collect evidence, they often repeat the mistakes throughout their career. Only in rare cases does the Crown provide input on a complicated warrant or other types of judicial orders. File-sharing systems would allow the Crown to accompany that file from the outset. The Crown could offer feedback on the quality and comprehensiveness of the evidence from a legal perspective, and on the sort of evidence and supporting material that are still missing and needed to maximize the chances of securing a conviction.

Administrative overhead

Courts require police to produce a Crown brief. But courts have neither the funds nor the interest in paying for these, so they expect police to produce them as a volunteer service. In the case of a speeding offence, that might take 15 minutes; in the case of a more major offence, it could take hours, days, or even weeks. If a sworn member has 10 court appearances in a day, s/he could spend over four hours just preparing the necessary briefs. Much of that task could be performed at a fraction of the cost by having someone transcribe the notes. Physicians, for example, often dictate into an electronic device with word-recognition software. The same technology promises to realize substantial savings in support of policing.

Similarly, it is best practice to video-record interviews. Yet these are rarely viewed in court. Instead, the Crown usually asks for a synopsis. But because police have no funds for transcription, it is the sworn member who ends up transcribing the interview. Failure to do so could get the case dismissed for lack of disclosure, or could get the sworn member reported to the professional standards council for neglect of duty. Should the Crown not pay if the Crown wants a transcript?
In another example, the prosecution could save a lot of time in traffic court if it had access to drivers’ backgrounds; it currently has to ask police for that information, and when it does, it usually asks for a full court brief. Again, local police foot the bill, to the point where most police services have a full-time court liaison officer just to liaise between the justice system and police. A further cost-cutting measure would be first appearance/early resolution courts for plea bargains in traffic court, where the presence of sworn members would not be required.

**Administrative efficiencies**

Courts currently issue paper notices to sworn members to appear, with little awareness or sensitivity to that member’s schedule. The wishes of the court and the defence take priority over the member’s schedule, often causing members to switch shifts to attend court and leave that particular shift short-handed. A simple Enterprise calendar solution that makes the member’s shift schedule available to the court and allows court notices to appear electronically would save a lot of money for both the court and police.

In the United Kingdom, minor offence notices are now sent by text message. This has proven beneficial in two ways: it saves an estimated $47 million a year in bailiff interventions, and the collection rate of fines from offenders is higher. E-ticketing, where the officer writes the ticket on a laptop, prints a copy, serves the driver, and then wirelessly files the ticket with the court is taking root in some Canadian jurisdictions: administrative savings are considerable.

Currently, the police service in question assumes a sworn member’s overtime to appear in court. Their assuming the costs poses a moral hazard: if the court – or the defence, in case of a conviction – had to absorb the member’s overtime, it would have more of an incentive to take the member’s shift schedule into account when scheduling appearances.

The Crown picks the witness(es) it wants to testify. But police draft the subpoena, get it sworn to by a justice of the peace, send it to the local police service, and then track down the witness for service. Crowns are federal or provincial. Any time a municipal police service is involved, the provincial and federal governments are downloading a cost to municipalities.

### 3. Other Efficiencies

**Technology**

Technological alternatives to human labour in law enforcement are proliferating: billboard warnings; (body/lapel) cameras (now being trialled by the Toronto Police Service); plate readers for speed enforcement that process hundreds of vehicles in a fraction of the time it would take a normal patrol vehicle to process a couple; gunshot detection sensors; and collision-reporting centres that eliminate the need to dispatch a patrol unit. In a Rialto, California pilot project, 60 percent of interlocutors were more cooperative when sworn members were known to be wearing cameras, and complaints against police (which consume considerable resources) fell by 90 percent (Farrer and Ariel 2013).

Hotlines, such as 211 and 311 numbers, help to manage public demand for service by channelling calls towards more appropriate municipal, provincial, and federal services. Provincial call protocols for low-priority calls could be standardized and enhanced: for example, dispatching protocols that require the dispatch centre to call back and confirm the need for police response, and problem-solving by phone for calls unrelated to crime or traffic.
However, technology also risks generating additional work for police. Gone are the days of a simple synopsis, copies of written statements, and a list of charges. Crown briefs are thick like tomes, serious criminal cases are now delivered by stacks of banker’s boxes or by terabyte hard drives, all with little or no administrative support for the investigating sworn member(s).

Technology can also amount to a form of downloading instead of greater efficiency. Police in Ontario now have direct access to the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) drivers’ licence, collision and registration histories, even mug shots.

However, the MTO used to add roadside suspensions, such as for stunt driving. Dispatchers could call an MTO hotline, add the suspension, and the sworn member could serve it on the spot. Now, the sworn member has to generate the suspension at the office and populate the MTO database in real time with the suspension. In other words, the benefits as well as the administration of this IT tool were downloaded to police, with police now essentially acting as agents of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.

Concomitantly, the MTO is no longer providing official suspension notices in a timely fashion. The result is months of backlog and lost cases for suspended drivers. While police can file the report making the suspension, courts still only accept official MTO documents, signed by the agency, as evidence at trials. This is just one example of how technology and procedure are increasingly misaligned and have negated any efficiencies gained through digitization.

If technology is to create efficiencies, not more administration, it must be deployed properly and its impact on the entire justice and security ecosystem assessed. It is incorrect to assume that technology in and of itself will generate efficiencies.

**Bureaucracy**

The RCMP has a Specialized Policing Branch that oversees critical services, such as the Canadian Firearms Program, the Canadian Police College, the Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada, the Chief Information Officer Sector, Forensic Science and Identification Services, and Technical Operations. But do we really need uniformed members running and administering these programs?

The educational component of any college should be run by professionals in education, yet a survey of the Ontario Police Academy’s course calendar shows that virtually all instructional courses are operations-oriented and taught by police. It stands to reason that first aid would be better taught by the St. John’s Ambulance or another organization with such expertise, with police limiting their instruction to tactical caveats, such as precautions when administering first aid. As well courses on ethics, Canadian values, civics and society, and leadership are absent. Recruits would be well served with a lecture on the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* delivered by a professor, Crown attorney, or defence lawyer. Since 2004, the Canadian Police Knowledge Network has been making some inroads into efficiencies through on-line and blended learning to replace certain classroom courses, especially for recertification. Such initiatives spread the same number of officers over a greater area and/or reduce costs of training. And why are ceremonial appearances, such as “red surge duty” in the RCMP, being performed by sworn members on salary when any number of retired members would do just as good a job in return for being paid mileage and per diems?

In civilian organizations, tasks such as human resources, corporate management, and comptrollership are a specialized function. In many police organizations, by contrast, they are run and administered by police officers. This phenomenon and the reluctance to cede these positions to civilians have less
The Blue Line or the Bottom Line of Police Services in Canada?

To do with the professional delivery of services than with rational strategic behaviour to advance personal opportunity. These positions are often viewed as temporary, a chance for a promotion, to work straight days and regular hours, gain necessary corporate knowledge for further promotion, or to employ uniformed members unable to perform other duties.

Police are prone to performing sub-optimally at these functions, as evidenced in the report by the Task Force on Governance and Cultural Change in the RCMP (2007):

We learned about basic human management systems that haven’t worked for years: mandatory unpaid overtime; discipline and grievance systems that don’t work; a promotion system with little or no credibility; a sometimes embarrassing record of account to the people they serve …

Owing to the operationally driven nature of their work and the conservative nature of policing, police are unlikely to change the way they manage themselves of their own accord (Maguire 1997; Maguire et al. 1997; Reiner 2000; Robertson 2012, 359–360). Change requires direction and oversight from the political and civilian authorities to which police report. Civilianizing tasks such as human resources and corporate management, as Quebec has been doing, is not just a matter of cost, efficiency, and making policing more effective; it is also a matter of ensuring that the organizational structure, command, and culture reflects that of a police service rather than a paramilitary force.

Professionalization and Accreditation

Provinces and the RCMP have training academies, commonly known as police colleges. But no level of government in this country has a College of Police as exists in the United Kingdom, with the purpose of professionalization similar to professions such as physicians, teachers, and nurses. The College allows the profession to codify a consensus on everything from standards to ethics, and hold its members to account. That has the effect of smoothing out cultural differences among forces and holding middle management accountable for the government’s policies, such as how HR managers handle harassment complaints. Rather than looking to police to investigate themselves, or to public complaints commissions or special investigations units, the College determines reprimand or punishment. As with other professions, the process of the College is independent of any criminal prosecution or civil litigation.

A pan-Canadian College of Police is unlikely to materialize. For starters, Quebec would opt out and establish its own, both to protect and assert its constitutional right over the administration of policing and justice as well as its jurisdiction over education. However, there are other ways to foster debate on the core responsibilities and duties of policing. The Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) sets standards for conduct, professionalism, accountability, and transparency. Accreditation is voluntary. Nonetheless, eight countries now participate but there are only four accredited municipal police services in Canada (and no provincial or federal police agencies). Accreditation has led to demonstrably better policing outcomes in 18 US states. Accreditation can serve as a proxy for a College of Police and achieve best practices and comparable outcomes without the collective action and bureaucratic problems of establishing a national or even provincial College of Police. Accreditation also enhances interoperability by virtue of helping to standardize operating procedures.
Sharing of Research Data

When municipal governments try to close a police or fire station, unions and public-interest groups promptly resort to demagoguery and hyperbole that increased response times and put lives at risk. Even though the number of police officers per 100,000 has oscillated from 203.7 in 1981 to 181.6 in 1998 and 203.2 in 2010, crime has largely been on the wane throughout this period (Statistics Canada 2011, CANSIM Tables 252-0002 and 252-0052.). That corroborates findings from a meta-analysis of 27 studies showing that the correlation between police workforce and crime rates is indeterminate (Eck and Maguire 2000, 210–214, especially Table 7.1). From the standard of evidence-based crime policy, however, the meta-analysis showed conclusively that simply adding more police does not reduce crime. Since crime is far more complex than stepping up deterrent and enforcement, that conclusion makes good sense.

In fact, the ineffectiveness of the “standard model” of policing (random patrol, rapid response, investigations, and follow up) relative to the “focused model” or “problem-based model” is well documented (Skogan 2004, especially ch. 6). Waterloo, Ontario is divided geographically to ensure consistent response times relative to calls for service. Yet, faster response time has not produced more arrests (Spelman and Dale 1984), which would be expected since, at most, 30 percent of calls involved criminal activity. Of those, 75 percent are for crimes where the offender is long gone by the time police arrive. Even among the minority of calls related to crime, therefore, response time is largely immaterial. Faster response times might be consequential in 3 percent of cases at best. By and large, however, fast response times do not improve the chances of stopping a crime in progress or arresting the offender (National Academy of Sciences 2004). The OPP then seems to have it right. By virtue of the size of the province, the OPP does not use a response standard to measure quality. Nonetheless, OPP data show that a sworn member is available to be dispatched to 92 percent of priority calls (and when no member is available, one is either pulled in from a different jurisdiction or a lower-priority call).

Response times are just one example of the way the dearth in data thwarts rational, informed debate. Yet, neither governments nor unions are genuinely interested in an evidence-based policy discussion on the subject, because the effectiveness of police is notoriously hard to measure (Robertson 2012, 354). However, one of the greatest problems in fostering genuine innovation in the cost of policing is the lack of public data on impact and performance. This problem is pervasive throughout Canada’s security sector, which explains why there is relatively little scholarly research in the field (Robertson 2012, 360–361) and why this paper contains little systematic data analysis. Such research is scarce because the police subculture operates on secrecy, and loathes observation by outsiders (Chan 1996).

So, the first step in optimizing the costs of policing and maximizing value for money is to bring together data already being collected by government, share those effectively within and among agencies and levels of government, and make them more widely accessible to researchers and the public in useable formats. Mandating data transparency would go a long way to diagnosing inefficiencies and ascertaining the costs and benefits of civilianization, privatization, alternative service delivery, technology, and organizational efficiencies.
Federalism and Multilevel Governance

In recent years federal and provincial government departments have undergone strategic reviews of core responsibilities to prioritize funding allocations. Yet, police have largely been spared such reflexivity. In 2000, 2004, and 2007 and again in 2012 the Auditor General of Canada chastised the RCMP for … providing national police services to other levels of government and law enforcement organizations without clarifying which services should be provided; how they should be funded; and how provincial, territorial, and municipal partners should be engaged within the national police services framework. In the absence of formal agreements, the accountability of the RCMP and other partners for the delivery of these services has not been clearly established, nor has how they are to be sustained over the long term. (OAG 2012)

The Federation of Canadian Municipalities (2008) estimates that local taxpayers are subsidizing federal police enforcement by more than $500 million annually by virtue of the fact that municipal police spend 10–30 percent of their time enforcing federal laws. This percentage is likely to increase due to issues such as the local consequences of international organized crime and terrorism and the cost associated with increased local demand and vigilance to counter politically motivated violent extremism. In the aftermath of 9-11, police received additional funding – by some estimates, expenditures on security doubled while real costs rose by 60 percent (Macdonald 2011) – but it all focused on high policing: investigation, intelligence, and so forth. It did not result in a greater public police presence. The wake of 9-11 saw the creation of a plethora of “integrated” high policing programs: integrated border enforcement teams (IBET), integrated national security teams (INSET), integrated market enforcement teams (IMET), and integrated proceeds of crime (IPOC). The participation of local police agencies was accepted as a no-cost proposition for the federal government, which assumed that municipalities would be only too happy to contribute to the collective effort. These integrated programs tend to be popular among sworn members, especially in smaller agencies that can now “play with the big boys.” However, forces must draw from their visible police to fill spots in desirable investigative positions.

Municipalities prioritize low policing for their communities: uniformed sworn members on the street. For small forces faced with having a uniform on the street or giving a “freebie” to a federal or provincial program, the likely choice is to opt out of the program and return to street policing. If the federal government wants police forces to engage in high policing, intelligence gathering, and so on, it must co-fund seconded positions or police chiefs on tight budgets are likely to cut back their contribution to integrated units. Growing fiscal constraints among local forces have made this trend more prevalent, the most glaring example being the Toronto Police Service’s refusal to participate in the OPP’s integrated Guns and Gangs unit. At the same time, the federal government has withdrawn its contribution to any
new RCMP municipal policing contracts (although it continues to share the cost of provincial policing on a basis of 30 percent). The RCMP does still cover its component of integrated enforcement at the provincial level, such as project CONCEPT for border patrols in Quebec, but its participation has been on the wane. At the same time, the RCMP is cannibalizing federal policing to meets its national policing priorities, while municipalities are subsidizing federal policing.

General Recommendations

• **Place much higher emphasis on quality over quantity.** Numbers and arrests are ready metrics to measure, but metrics are heavy on the reactive side of policing. The philosophy of Community-Oriented Policing (COP), by contrast, is about proactive posture, and its effectiveness in comparison to the “standard model” well documented (Skogan 2004; Fridell and Wycoff 2004; Wilson and Petersilia 2011). Instead of debating “how much?” policing, we should be debating “what kind?” (Moore 2003). Similarly, the debate needs to shift from “inputs” to “outcomes”: reducing fear and preventing crime are measurable (Hoover 1996; Moore et al. 2002; Maguire and Wells 2009).

• **Look beyond reductionist cost-benefit analyses** and work backwards to identify the options and optimal means to achieve those outcomes agreed upon.

• **Re-direct calls and call volume to allow police to spend more time on problem-focused policing**: that is, the type of policing that leads to better, sustainable outcomes (O’Connor Shelly and Grant 1998; Weisburd, Morris, and Ready 2008). Police respond to a lot of non-essential calls for service. The solution is a shift in culture and policing strategies, and the need to re-educate the public.

• **Reward superior achievement** (and improve or root out underperformance). Governments need to shift from a seniority-driven human-resource model to one that rewards merit among individual sworn members.

• **Implement cross-training programs between services.** Cross-training has been catching on quickly with governments. It makes for a more flexible labour force, and counteracts inter-service rivalries. It also shifts the focus away from calls for service and response time to harnessing cross-service synergies to improve community safety.

• **Brace for a leadership crisis in policing.** Promotion from within results in philosophical inbreeding. Instead, government needs to foster cultural, institutional, and programmatic change through accountability. We should start by designing job-evaluation instruments that are tailored to the functions and tasks of each police job, and ensure that personnel are assigned to functional tasks and territorial commands according to a clear rationale connected with public safety (a point already made in a report to the Solicitor General a quarter-century ago; Bayley 1991).
• **Flatten organizational structures.** This is in line with 21st century management theory, and is also a way of de-militarizing the DNA of many older police forces. The RCMP, for example, does not need 13 ranks, nor does the OPP need 12, when the SQ makes do with 7 (in part because it has civilianized many non-core policing functions, such as finance and human resources). While select military concepts and methods may be relevant to policing, the paramilitary approach to police leadership has been resoundingly debunked as resting on false assumptions about military structure, leadership, and doctrine (Cowper 2000). That these hierarchical structures conflict with effective communication and decision-making is amply documented; and is the reason these structures are stubbornly difficult – but not impossible – to reform (Maguire 2003). Instead of hierarchy, we need to shift the emphasis to reform that promotes quality outcomes.

• **Shift the emphasis of police work away from law enforcement towards “peace officer.”** Some of the time and energy spent on crime-fighting strategies would be better spent on revamping the role of front-line officers by soliciting input from the community and police. Instead of emphasizing physical strength, police academies should develop critical thinking and judgment skills among recruits. Popular and media culture shoulder considerable responsibility for constructing the prevailing “tough cop” image that is diametrically opposed to the “peace officer” expectations that most citizens have of their police. Moreover, it is far more resource-effective to have a smart officer use his/her brain to resolve an issue than to default to requesting backup – especially in much of rural Canada where backup may be hours away.

• **Raise the bar through accreditation by CALEA or provincial benchmarking.** Less than 7 percent of police forces in the US are accredited by CALEA, and even fewer in Canada.

• **Shift away from command-and-control principles** and focus instead on participative and dispersed leadership as well as participative management (which will, in turn, flatten the organizational hierarchy; Moore and Stephens 1991).
Conclusion

Costs need to be shrunk, shared, and shifted. Police services need to look at alternative service delivery, beware of mission creep, and hold the line on salaries so that overall increases do not exceed cost-of-living adjustments. Communities that contract for policing need to overcome collective-action problems and collaborate to muster sufficient clout to bring about necessary legislative changes and pilot projects.

Federal and provincial governments have frozen operating budgets for ministries; police services boards should insist that their police forces do likewise for their budgets. Governments will have a difficult time forcing change, but can instead set the constraints under which police will operate and the conditions likely to lead to cultural, institutional, programmatic, leadership, and management change.

Once the discussion shifts from inputs to outcomes, and what quality of outcome a community is looking to achieve, an informed democratic discussion of core policing duties versus support services that contracted civilians could deliver can follow. It is up to taxpayers and their representatives to shift from an increase in numbers of police to an improvement in how the police complement the community so that a more visible police presence would be achieved by outsourcing non-core duties.

Further efficiencies can be gained through technology (voice-to-text programs, video logs), alternative service delivery (special constables as court officers/community services officers, civilian recruiting systems) and centralization (dispatch, stores, supply, fleet management, traffic services). Such savings may make an important contribution to changing institutional culture. Greater efficiencies stand to be gained from an array of possible improvements to the nexus between justice and policing.

However, only a paradigm shift that maximizes value for money by re-prioritizing core functions over discretionary ones – with a strict focus on making core functions more efficient and effective – is likely to produce a sustainable model. Policing needs to become more effective, more responsive, and more "professional" through certification and standardization. Demand has to be managed, as does the creeping trend towards "securitarization" and its deleterious effects on civic life in a liberal democracy. This will require the police sector to change how it does business, which is likely to prove futile without reforming the entire policing ecosystem from recruiting, training, and education through leadership, management, and accountability.

In Canada and the US, security and policing are prima facie local matters. With 10 provinces and 50 states, Canada and the US benefit from 60 constitutional constituent laboratories of experimentation, and almost 20,000 local, provincial/state, and federal agencies with policing functions. We have a pretty good idea of what works and what does not, what is needed and what is not. Reform can be a positive-sum for everybody. If police price themselves out of business, they run the risk of civil authorities compromising their institutional autonomy and, consequently, their standing as a profession to implement reform.

If police cherish their institutional autonomy, they, the membership, and the unions would do well to embrace reform and engage in a discussion about quality and outcome with the communities they serve and who pay their keep. That discussion they can win. The discussion about quantity and input they cannot.
About the Author

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Christian Leuprecht is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Economics at the Royal Military College of Canada, and cross-appointed to the Department of Political Studies and the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University where he is also a fellow of the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations and the Queen’s Centre for International and Defence Policy. Christian Leuprecht’s award-winning publications have appeared in English, German, French, and Spanish, and include a dozen books as well as over 80 scholarly articles and book chapters. He is a frequent commentator in national and international media.

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## Appendix:
### Ontario municipalities with OPP contracts for municipal policing since 1998

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Endnotes

1 The federal government and the provinces have concomitant jurisdiction over the administration of justice within their areas of jurisdiction. The federal government is responsible for border security, federal enforcement, national security, drugs, and organized crime (although that is an area of concurrent jurisdiction). The RCMP’s responsibilities in Quebec differ from those in Ontario. Provincial and municipal police enforce the Criminal Code of Canada and provincial statutes. Ontario and Quebec have their own provincial police forces; however, in the rest of Canada, the RCMP discharges provincial, territorial and Aboriginal policing under contract, which explains the RCMP’s federal and national (or “contract”) policing mandates. In addition, about 200 municipalities contract policing services to the RCMP.

2 For a distinction between high and low levels of policing, see Brodeur (1983).

3 The result of hiring freezes and budget cuts in the aftermath of a 44.7 percent escalation in cost and personnel between 2003/4 and 2007/8.

4 On the east side of the river in Kingston, Ontario, all first responders at all three fire stations are volunteers except the training officer. They are entrusted with all accidents within their area of jurisdiction on the 401, including vehicle extractions – and are technically also the fire brigade of jurisdiction for the Canadian Forces Base Kingston and the Royal Military College of Canada, including its slow-poke nuclear reactor.

5 For starting points on a discussion of the many inefficiencies in the criminal justice system, see Newark, 2013.

6 However, a couple of provincial and federal agencies with enforcement powers are accredited members. See http://www.calea.org/content/calea-client-database.
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SENATOR HUGH SEGAL, NOVEMBER 25, 2013

Very much enjoyed your presentation this morning. It was first-rate and an excellent way of presenting the options which Canada faces during this period of “choice”... Best regards and keep up the good work.

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