What Do Muslim Canadians Want?
The Clash of Interpretations and Opinion Research
By Christian Leuprecht and Conrad Winn

Including Commentaries by Daniel Pipes, Alex Wilner, and Salim Mansur
The Macdonald-Laurier Institute

“True North in Canadian Public Policy”

Board of Directors
Chair: Rob Wildeboer, Chairman, Martinrea International Inc., Toronto
Managing Director: Brian Lee Crowley, former Clifford Clark Visiting Economist at Finance Canada
Secretary: Lincoln Caylor, Partner, Bennett Jones, Toronto
Treasurer: Martin MacKinnon, CFO, Black Bull Resources Inc., Halifax
Directors: John Beck, Chairman and CEO, Aecon Construction Ltd., Toronto; Erin Chutter, President and CEO, Puget Ventures Inc., Vancouver; Navjeet (Bob) Dhillon, CEO, Mainstreet Equity Corp., Calgary; Keith Gillam, former CEO of VanBot Construction Ltd., Toronto; Wayne Gudbranson, CEO, Branham Group, Ottawa; Stanley Hartt, Chair, Macquarie Capital Markets Canada; Les Kom, BMO Nesbitt Burns, Ottawa; Rick Peterson, President, Peterson Capital, Vancouver; Peter John Nicholson, former President, Canadian Council of Academies, Ottawa; Jacquelyn Thayer Scott, past President & Professor, Cape Breton University, Sydney.

Advisory Council
Purdy Crawford, former CEO, Imasco, now Counsel at Osler Hoskins; Jim Dinning, former Treasurer of Alberta; Don Drummond, Economics Advisor to the TD Bank, Matthews Fellow in Global Policy and Distinguished Visiting Scholar at the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University; Brian Flemming, international lawyer, writer and policy advisor; Robert Fulford, former editor of Saturday Night magazine, columnist with the National Post, Toronto; Calvin Helin, Aboriginal author and entrepreneur, Vancouver; Hon. Jim Peterson, former federal cabinet minister, now a partner at Fasken Martineau, Toronto; Maurice B. Tobin, the Tobin Foundation, Washington DC.

Research Advisory Board
Janet Ajzenstat, Professor Emeritus of Politics, McMaster University; Brian Ferguson, Professor, health care economics, University of Guelph; Jack Granatstein, historian and former head of the Canadian War Museum; Patrick James, Professor, University of Southern California; Rainer Knopff, Professor of Politics, University of Calgary; Larry Martin, George Morris Centre, University of Guelph; Chris Sands, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington DC; William Watson, Associate Professor of Economics, McGill University.

THE MACDONALD-LAURIER INSTITUTE EXISTS TO:

• Initiate and conduct research identifying current and emerging economic and public policy issues facing Canadians, including, but not limited to, research into defence and security, foreign policy, immigration, economic and fiscal policy, Canada-US relations, regulatory, regional development, social policy and Aboriginal affairs;

• Investigate and analyse the full range of options for public and private sector responses to the issues identified and to act as a catalyst for informed debate on those options;

• Communicate the conclusions of its research to a national audience in a clear, non-partisan way;

• Sponsor or organize conferences, meetings, seminars, lectures, training programs and publications using all media of communication (including, without restriction, the electronic media), for the purposes of achieving these objects;

• Provide research services on public policy issues, or other facilities, for institutions, corporations, agencies and individuals, including departments and agencies of Canadian governments at the federal, provincial, regional and municipal levels, on such terms as may be mutually agreed, provided that the research is in furtherance of these objects.
# Table of Contents

## Section I

2 Executive Summary - What do Muslim Canadians Want  
4 Sommaire - Que veulent les Canadiens musulmans?  
6 Introduction  
6 Newcomers and Pluralist Democracy  
6 Methodology  
7 Framework for Understanding the Questions and Answers  
10 Asking Islamic Canadians What They Think  
Findings from the Survey  
10 Feelings about Canada  
11 Sharia Law and Islamic Government  
12 Support for Terrorism  
14 The United States and Israel  
15 Focus Groups  
15 Introducing Regional Perspectives  
16 Canada Tops in Comparative Perspective  
18 Terrorism  
18 The United States and Israel  
20 Jobs - the Highest Real Concern  
21 Themes that Failed to Emerge  
22 More Paradoxes than Platitudes  
22 Conclusion  

## Section II

24 Commentary: Canada’s Muslims, Not of One Mind  
27 Commentary: Deadly Attitudes  
33 Commentary: A Response  

The authors of this document have worked independently and are solely responsible for the views presented here. The opinions are not necessarily those of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, its Directors or Supporters.
Executive Summary
What do Muslim Canadians Want

Canada has been welcoming newcomers at an extraordinary rate by world standards and a record-setting one by our own. Many arrive from societies that are burdened by a history of sectarian violence or that lack the habits of pluralist acceptance, tolerance, and self-restraint that are at the heart of Canadians' identity as a liberal-democracy. Given the potentially deleterious consequences for liberal-democratic values, we wondered: To what extent do the values and opinions of newcomers differ, if at all, from those of Canadians as a whole?

There has been a dearth of empirically-based research on the attitudes to democracy of newcomers to Canada in general and Muslims in particular. Since Islam is, according to Statistics Canada, the country’s fastest-growing religion and Muslims the fastest-growing non-Christian communities, it made sense to put to the test the heightened scrutiny to which this particularly subgroup has been subject. While no community, Muslims included, is homogeneous, this study is intended to contribute to an understanding of Canadian Muslims’ attitudes to the pluralist-democratic values that matter deeply to Canadians.

Approach to Study

This study is based on quantitative data from a telephone survey in Ottawa and qualitative data from focus groups held across the country. Insofar as ethnic-community surveys are concerned, the survey involved a relatively large, representative sample of 455 Muslims along with a small sample of Christians from Arab countries for comparative purposes.

The study also includes insights and information gained from eleven focus groups, which were composed of two types—cross-sectional groups that were representative of Muslim Canadians in general, supplemented by focus groups that were exclusively among Uyghurs (Chinese Muslims) for comparative purposes. The cross-sectional focus groups were carried out among representative samples of Muslim residents of Calgary, Ottawa, and Gatineau. Three Uyghur groups were held in Calgary, Mississauga, and Montreal.

The telephone survey was conducted in Ottawa rather than nationally to allow a ready comparison with Christian Arabs.

Framework for Understanding Muslims in Canada

Much has been written about the relationship and differences between Muslim culture and western values. For the purpose of this report, the cacophony of views spanning Muslim integration is conceptualized in the form of three broad explanatory perspectives:

i) Confrontational – If Islamic countries are thought to be in conflict with their non-Islamic neighbours in the spirit of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, we might expect a somewhat homogeneous pattern of alienation from Canada among Muslims who live here.

ii) Assimilationist - One might expect Canadian Muslims to embrace Canada and its democratic values, with any fear to the contrary rooted in Islamophobic attitudes among Canadians. The assimilation perspective holds that Canadian Muslims generally embrace Canada and its democratic values.

iii) Divided Community - One would expect Canadian Muslims to hold diverse views on terrorism, foreign policy, and Sharia law, along with other elements of an Islamist agenda. The divided-community perspective, in the spirit of Daniel Pipes, takes the view that the Canadian Islamic community likely holds diverse views on all the potential elements of an Islamist agenda.
Results and Conclusions

The polling data suggest that Canadian Muslims fit best the paradigm of a divided community with heterogeneous opinions as expressed by Daniel Pipes of the Middle East Forum. Survey respondents were asked specifically about the merits of a return of the Caliphate or the introduction of Sharia law. Their varied responses lend support to the paradigm of a diverse and divided Islamic community. Had they overwhelmingly opposed the establishment of a Caliphate or been strongly opposed to Sharia law, the portrait of an assimilationist Muslim community would have made sense. But Canadian Muslims are not strongly opposed to a Caliphate or even moderately opposed to at least some role for Sharia law.

Respondents in the survey and participants in the focus groups are of two minds about terrorists, providing further evidence in support of a community divided. On the one hand, they seem largely opposed to Al Qaeda. The level of decided support for Al Qaeda (scores of 5-7 on the 7 point scale) seems lower than the support observed in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, support for the Muslim Brotherhood is stronger than one might have expected, and not limited to Muslims immigrating from the Middle East. Some Canadians might see national security implications in the evidence of plurality approval for the Muslim Brotherhood and minority support for other terrorist organizations.

Canadian Muslims also appear to be of two minds about Israel and especially the United States. They reject the foreign policies of both countries while strongly embracing the United States as a relatively non-racist society. Some readily acknowledge that Israel is more democratically ruled than its Arab neighbours. The fact that Muslims in Canada readily acknowledge the domestic-governance strengths of the United States and Israel does not lend obvious support to the confrontational paradigm.

Many paradoxical differences of opinion based on national origin emerged from the data. For example, support for extremism is no lower among Muslims born in Canada or other advanced countries than those coming from violent dictatorships. Support for extremism might even be higher among the Canadian-born but the sub-sample is too small to be sure. Meanwhile, opposition to all forms of extremism seems to be highest among immigrants from Iran, a leader among extremist regimes, while lower among those arriving from the Middle East.

Support for extremism seems stronger than average among those who participate in meetings of small religious study groups. The apparent socialization effect of study groups and the effects of national origin warrant further research. Research is especially needed because the patterns are not entirely clear-cut.

The most encouraging finding is a general tendency to see Canada as welcoming and pluralistic, not racist. Canadian Muslims admire immensely Canada, its freedoms, and its lawfulness. Even when they believe that social acceptance, the media treatment of Muslims, and hiring practices are less than desirable, they do not find Canada to be racist and inhospitable. They certainly do not find Canada racist or inhospitable by world standards, including the standards of Islamic countries. They do not find Canada to be Islamophobic. Jobs and employment opportunities are the biggest concerns of this Canadian minority.

In an ironic twist, perhaps the most disquieting aspect of the research endeavour is the discovery of complexity. The sheer complexity of Muslim opinion, including its apparent variation by national origin, cries out for more and better research on its character, causes and extent. That a thoughtful minority of Muslim newcomers come to Canada to escape extremism and embrace pluralism is a cause for much celebration. So too is the fact that many Muslim newcomers to Ottawa and Canada are so admiring of Canada’s freedoms and lawfulness. That only a small minority of Muslim newcomers unequivocally reject terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah or the Iranian regime gives pause for thought.
What do Muslim Canadians Want?

Le Canada a accueilli ces dernières années des nouveaux arrivants à un niveau extraordinairement élevé selon des standards internationaux et à un niveau record selon nos propres standards. Plusieurs arrivent en provenance de sociétés où la violence sectaire a fait des ravages ou qui n’ont jamais connu les valeurs d’acceptation pluraliste, de tolérance et de retenue qui sont au cœur de l’identité du Canada en tant que démocratie libérale. Compte tenu des conséquences potentiellement nuisibles pour les valeurs libérales démocratiques, nous nous sommes demandé : Dans quelle mesure les valeurs et les opinions des nouveaux arrivants diffèrent-elles, si c’est le cas, de celles des Canadiens dans leur ensemble?

Il existe très peu de recherches empiriques sur les attitudes envers la démocratie des nouveaux arrivants au Canada en général, et des musulmans en particulier. Puisque l’Islam est, selon Statistique Canada, la religion qui connaît la plus forte croissance au pays, et les musulmans sont les communautés non chrétienne dont le nombre augmente le plus vite, il était logique de chercher à établir si les inquiétudes qu’a soulevées ce sous-groupe en particulier sont justifiées. Bien qu’aucune communauté, y compris les musulmans, soit homogène, cette étude vise à contribuer à une meilleure compréhension des attitudes des musulmans canadiens envers les valeurs pluralistes et démocratiques auxquelles les Canadiens tiennent profondément.

Notre approche

Cette étude se base sur des données quantitatives tirées d’un sondage téléphonique mené à Ottawa et de données qualitatives obtenues lors de réunions de groupes témoins à travers le pays.

En comparaison des sondages habituels qui se concentrent sur des communautés ethniques spécifiques, celui-ci a rejoint un échantillon relativement important et représentatif de 455 musulmans, en plus d’un échantillon plus restreint de chrétiens en provenance de pays arabes à des fins de comparaison.

L’étude comporte également des observations et de l’information tirées de onze groupes témoins composés de deux types de participants – des groupes représentatifs de la population musulmane canadienne en général, ainsi que des groupes témoins composés uniquement d’Ouïghours (des musulmans chinois) à des fins de comparaison. Les groupes témoins contenant un échantillon représentatif de musulmans étaient composés de participants vivant à Calgary, Ottawa et Gatineau. Les rencontres des groupes témoins composés d’Ouïghours ont été tenues à Calgary, Mississauga et Montréal. Le sondage téléphonique a été mené à Ottawa plutôt qu’à travers le pays de façon à permettre une comparaison plus directe avec les chrétiens arabes.

Un cadre pour comprendre les musulmans du Canada

On a beaucoup écrit sur la relation et les différences entre la culture musulmane et les valeurs occidentales. Pour les besoins de cette étude, nous avons conceptualisé la cacophonie de points de vue sur l’intégration des musulmans sous la forme de trois grandes perspectives explicatives :

i) Une perspective de confrontation – Si, dans l’esprit du « choc des civilisations » de Samuel Huntington, les pays musulmans sont perçus comme en conflit avec leurs voisins non musulmans, on peut s’attendre à observer des sentiments d’aliénation envers le Canada chez une bonne partie des musulmans qui vivent ici.

ii) Une perspective assimilationniste – On peut s’attendre à ce que les musulmans canadiens acceptent le Canada et ses valeurs démocratiques, et toute crainte de voir le contraire arriver relève d’une attitude islamophobe chez les Canadiens. La perspective assimilationniste maintient que les musulmans canadiens souhaitent de façon générale s’intégrer au Canada et acceptent les valeurs démocratiques.

iii) La perspective d’une communauté divisée – On peut s’attendre à ce que les musulmans canadiens aient des points de vue variés sur le terrorisme, la politique étrangère et la charia, ainsi que sur d’autres éléments de la doctrine islamiste. Inspirée des positions de Daniel Pipes, la perspective d’une communauté divisée part du principe qu’on retrouvera divers points de vue au sein de la communauté musulmane canadienne sur tous ces sujets.
Résultats et conclusions

Les données du sondage laissent croire que les positions des musulmans canadiens sont le mieux représentées par le paradigme de la communauté divisée, tel qu’exprimé par Daniel Pipes du Middle East Forum. On a demandé aux répondants ce qu’ils pensaient spécifiquement d’un retour du califat ou de l’introduction de la charia. Leurs réponses variées correspondent à la perspective d’une communauté musulmane diverse et divisée. S’ils avaient été largement opposés à l’instauration d’un califat ou fortement opposés à la charia, le portrait d’une communauté musulmane assimilée aurait été plus plausible. Mais les musulmans canadiens ne sont pas très opposés à un califat ni même modérément opposés à ce que la charia joue au moins un certain rôle.

Les répondants au sondage et les participants aux groupes témoins ont des positions divergentes concernant les terroristes, ce qui permet d’appuyer encore davantage l’idée d’une communauté divisée. D’une part, ils semblent en grande majorité opposés à Al-Qaïda. Le niveau d’appui ferme à Al-Qaïda (5-7 sur une échelle de 7 points) semblent inférieur à celui observé au Moyen-Orient.

D’autre part, l’appui aux Frères musulmans, une organisation qui sert de paravent intellectuel et logistique à des groupes plus ouvertement violents, est plus fort que ce à quoi on aurait pu s’attendre et en ne se limite pas aux musulmans qui ont immigré en provenance du Moyen-Orient. Ces indications d’un appui majoritaire aux Frères musulmans et d’un appui minoritaire pour d’autres organisations terroristes pourraient inciter certains Canadiens à y voir des implications pour la sécurité nationale du pays.

Les musulmans canadiens paraissent également divisés lorsqu’il est question d’Israël et en particulier des États-Unis. Ils rejettent les politiques étrangères des deux pays tout en ayant une opinion très favorable des États-Unis en tant que société non raciste. Certains admettent volontiers qu’Israël est un meilleur exemple de pays démocratique que ses voisins arabes. Le fait que les musulmans au Canada reconnaissent aisément les avantages des États-Unis et d’Israël sur le plan de la gouvernance domestique contredit le paradigme de confrontation.

Les données laissent entrevoir plusieurs différences d’opinion paroxales sur la base de l’origine nationale. Par exemple, l’appui aux positions extrémistes n’est pas moindre chez les musulmans nés au Canada ou dans d’autres pays développés que chez ceux qui viennent de dictatures violentes. Cet appui pourrait même être plus élevé chez ceux qui sont nés au Canada, mais le sous-échantillon est trop petit pour qu’on puisse en être certain. Par ailleurs, l’opposition à toute forme d’extrémisme semble être la plus élevée chez les immigrants en provenance d’Iran, l’un des régimes les plus notoirement extrémistes, alors qu’elle est plus basse chez ceux qui viennent du Moyen-Orient.

L’appui aux positions extrémistes semble plus répandu que la moyenne parmi les participants aux groupes témoins. L’effet apparent de socialisation des groupes témoins et l’influence de l’origine nationale justifient des recherches plus approfondies. Les recherches sont particulièrement nécessaires dans la mesure où le portrait n’est pas entièrement clair.

Les résultats les plus susceptibles d’alimenter l’optimisme montrent une tendance générale à voir le Canada comme un endroit accueillant et pluraliste, et non raciste. Les musulmans admirent énormément le Canada, ses libertés et son statut de pays où règne la loi. Même lorsqu’ils considèrent que l’acceptation sociale, le traitement médiatique des musulmans ainsi que les pratiques d’embauche laissent à désirer, ils ne considèrent pas le Canada comme une société raciste et inhospitalière. Il ne peuvent certainement pas le Canada raciste et inhospitalier selon des standards internationaux, y compris ceux des pays musulmans. Ils ne considèrent pas le Canada comme un pays islamophobe. Les emplois et les opportunités de travail sont les principales préoccupations de cette minorité canadienne.

Ironiquement, l’aspect le plus troublant de cette entreprise de recherche est peut-être la découverte de la complexité du sujet. La complexité irréductible de l’opinion musulmane, y compris les variations apparentes selon l’origine nationale, justifie qu’on consacre des recherches plus élaborées sur ses caractéristiques, ses causes et son ampleur. Qu’une minorité réfléchit de musulmans viennent au Canada pour échapper à l’extrémisme et vivre dans le pluralisme est une raison de célébrer. Que plusieurs nouveaux arrivants musulmans à Ottawa et au Canada admirent autant les libertés et l’État de droit l’est également. Mais que seule une petite minorité de nouveaux arrivants musulmans s’opposent sans équivoque à des organisations terroristes comme le Hamas et le Hezbollah ou au régime iranien devrait nous porter à réfléchir.
I. What do Muslim Canadians Want
by Christian Leuprecht and Conrad Winn

Introduction

Newcomers and Pluralist Democracy

Canada has been welcoming newcomers at an extraordinary rate by world standards and a record-setting one by our own1. Many arrive from societies that are burdened by a history of sectarian violence or that lack the habits of pluralist acceptance, tolerance, and self-restraint that are at the heart of Canadians’ identity as a liberal-democracy. Given the potentially deleterious consequences for liberal-democratic values, we wondered: To what extent do the values and opinions of newcomers differ, if at all, from those of Canadians as a whole?

There has been a dearth of empirically-based research on the attitudes to democracy of newcomers to Canada in general and Muslims in particular. Since Islam is, according to Statistics Canada, the country’s fastest-growing religion and Muslims the fastest-growing non-Christian community, it made sense to put to the test the heightened scrutiny to which this particularly subgroup has been subject. While no community, Muslims included, is homogeneous, this study is intended to contribute to an understanding of Canadian Muslims’ attitudes to the pluralist-democratic values that matter deeply to Canadians.

Methodology

This study is based on quantitative data from a telephone survey in Ottawa2 and qualitative data from focus groups held across the country. Insofar as ethnic-community surveys are concerned, the survey involved a relatively large, representative sample of 455 Muslims along with a small sample (n=47) of Christians from Arab countries for comparative purposes.

The eleven focus groups were of two types—cross-sectional groups that were representative of Muslim Canadians in general, supplemented by focus groups that were exclusively among Uyghurs (Chinese Muslims) for comparative purposes. Uyghurs are a helpful control group because of the well-documented modernist and pluralist attitudes of many of their leaders. In practice, eight cross-sectional focus groups were carried out among representative samples of Muslim residents of Calgary, Ottawa, and Gatineau. Three Uyghur groups were held in Calgary, Mississauga, and Montreal.

1 At 280,363 new immigrants in 2010, a rate per decade verging on 10 new immigrants per 100 citizens, Canada has not only the highest per capita immigration rate among the world’s industrialized democracies but the highest among any sizeable country in the world.

2 The project was one of many funded by the University of Maryland’s START program in support of cross-national research on attitudes to terrorism.
The telephone survey was carried out in Ottawa rather than nationally to allow a ready comparison with Christian Arabs. At over 50,000 in a city totaling 900,000, Ottawa is home to relatively large Muslim and Christian Arab populations. That makes it possible to compare the attitudes of Muslim and Christian populations originating in predominantly Muslim lands.

Restricting the research to a single city has the added advantage of what researchers call a “controlled” setting. By eliminating the influence of the effects of inter-regional or inter-city differences within Canada, we could more easily zero in on potential differences in the attitudes of Muslims and Christians from Muslim lands without worrying that any observed differences might be better attributed to the city or province of residency than religion.

The main disadvantage of restricting the telephone interviewing to a single city is the difficulty of making generalizations about Muslims across Canada. The extent to which a sample drawn from a single city really is representative of attitudes among Canadian Muslims more broadly is a legitimate concern. Yet, even a nation-wide survey could be problematic were it not designed to capture and report on differences in attitudes driven by national and regional origins of Muslim newcomers to Canada. It may be more important to know where Muslims lived before they came to Canada than after. From that perspective, a single-city study is actually less problematic than it may seem at first glance.

Still, we recognized that a single-city study could be distorting. That is why we followed up with focus groups across the country. The eight focus groups among representative samples of Muslims were intended to shed light on and help interpret the findings from the survey. The three focus groups among Uyghurs were intended to provide a comparative setting for the main focus groups.

Framework for Understanding the Questions and Answers

How, then, does Muslim public opinion differ from Canadians’ more broadly? Much has been written about the relationship and differences between Muslim culture and western values. For the purpose of this report, the cacophony of views spanning Muslim integration is conceptualized in the form of three broad explanatory perspectives:

i) Confrontational – If Islamic countries are thought to be in conflict with their non-Islamic neighbours in the spirit of Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, we might expect a somewhat homogeneous pattern of alienation from Canada among Muslims who live here.

ii) Assimilationist - One might expect Canadian Muslims to embrace Canada and its democratic values, with any fear to the contrary rooted in Islamophobic attitudes among Canadians. The assimilation perspective holds that Canadian Muslims generally embrace Canada and its democratic values.

iii) Divided Community - One would expect Canadian Muslims to hold diverse views on terrorism, foreign policy, and Sharia law, along with other elements of an Islamist

There are three broad views concerning Muslim integration: confrontationist, assimilationist, and divided.

---

agenda. The divided-community perspective, in the spirit of Daniel Pipes,\(^4\) takes the view that the Canadian Islamic community likely holds diverse views on all the potential elements of an Islamist agenda.

This study will analyse the extent to which these competing perspectives are supported by evidence on the opinions of Muslims in Ottawa and Canada more generally.

This three-fold classification is not without controversy. The President of the Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC), Wahida Valiante, perceives a simple dichotomy dividing those who, like herself, see Canadian Muslims as fully embracing democracy versus all others. She acknowledges no differences between the late Samuel P. Huntington on the one hand and Daniel Pipes or the liberal Bernard Lewis\(^5\) on the other hand. In her view, they together led “the sustained media assault on Muslims in North America and on Islam as a religion.”\(^6\)

**Anchoring the confrontational pole in the debate are Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* and those who perceive Islam as in conflict with neighbouring civilizations\(^7\) or incapable of accommodating itself to pluralist democracy.\(^8\) At the other end is Edward Said’s condemnation of western scholarship and journalism for a malevolent misrepresentation of Islam and its unaggressive goals\(^9\) and the perspective of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which deems Islamophobia as a central issue of our time.

Many commentators fall between the two extremes. An enthusiast for many of the cultural contributions of Islam and the Arab world, Bernard Lewis has written with sympathy of the Arab world’s decline from its highpoints.\(^10\) Others focus on conflict within Islam, between Islamists and moderates.\(^11\) Daniel Pipes captures this latter sensibility in his oft-repeated phrase, “militant Islam is the problem and moderate Islam is the solution.”

Commentary on Islam in Canada parallels commentary on Islam globally. At one end of the spectrum are commentators associated with the Canadian Islamic Congress or

---

\(^4\) For the corpus of his writings, see www.danielpipes.org.

\(^5\) Long considered the west’s top scholar on Islam and the Middle East, Lewis is author of almost three dozen books in the field.

\(^6\) See her “Echoes of the Past” at http://www.mediamonitors.net/wahidavaliante2.html.


\(^8\) See, for example, Oriana Fallaci, The Rage and the Pride (New York, 2002) and Nonie Darwish, Now They Call Me Infidel: Why I Renounced Jihad for America, Israel, and the War on Terror (Toronto: Penguin, 2006).


CAIR-Can, who maintain that fear of an imperial Islam is without foundation and that Islamophobia is the real problem. At the other end are commentators concerned about domestic security threats from within Muslim immigrant communities. It is not always clear to what extent security-conscious commentators perceive Canadian Muslims as constituting a homogeneous challenge.

A diversity of voices fall in between. The one-time Canadian journalist and now U.S. academic, Irshad Manji, calls for internal reform of Islam. The political scientist and journalist Salim Mansur expresses concern about intolerance within contemporary Islam. In a stroke of irony, Daniel Pipes, no idol of some of Canada’s Arab and Islamic organizations, forecasts that Canadian Muslims will become leaders in the export of pluralist democratic ideals to the ummah or Muslim world.

The full array of organizations that purport to represent Canada’s Muslims are no more united in their views than commentators in general. Tarek Fatah, the founder of the pluralist-minded Muslim Canadian Congress, characterizes the rival Canadian Islamic Congress as authoritarian and dictatorial. When the Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) accused him of apostasy, he complained to the RCMP that this was tantamount to a death sentence. Fatah has expressed alarm at what he perceives as CIC’s influence on the Ontario Human Rights Commission, which consequently acts as if “the only good Muslim is an Islamist Muslim.”

For its part, the Canadian Islamic Congress characterizes Fatah’s Muslim Canadian Congress as outside Islam and lacking legitimacy to speak for the community. According to CIC’s Wahida Valiante, Canadian Muslims discuss countless issues and “Tarek Fatah’s views are diametrically opposed to most Muslims.” Valiante’s perspective is the point of departure for our thinking on this issue. It does matter what Canadian Muslims think, as she rightly points out. So we set out to discover what Canadian Muslims think.

---


18 Sonya Fatah “Fearing for safety, Muslim official quits”, Globe and Mail, August 3, 2006


20 Globe and Mail, August 6, 2006.
Asking Islamic Canadians What They Think - findings from the survey

Feelings about Canada

Feelings about Canada are an issue of basic importance. If Canadian Muslims were deeply radicalized, a sense of political alienation from Canada would emerge in both the survey and the focus groups. Little evidence of this surfaced, except perhaps when respondents were asked lightening-rod questions about international affairs or terrorism.

On the ballot-type question about satisfaction with Canada, the overwhelming majority report satisfaction, as shown in Table 1. Feelings of satisfaction are just as high among the very religious, who attend mosque at least weekly, as among the secular. Muslims are about as satisfied as non-Muslims from the Middle East, many of whom would have been established in Ottawa and Canada longer than the Muslim respondents.

Table 1: Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in this country today?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NON-MUSLIMS N=47</th>
<th>MUSLIMS N=455</th>
<th>ARABS(^{21}) N=215</th>
<th>IRANI-ANS N=33</th>
<th>NON-(^{22}) OBSERVANT MUSLIMS N=96</th>
<th>MOSQUE 1+WEEK N=154</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-PROMPTED</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know or refuse to answer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey respondents likewise give very high approval scores to the Government of Canada, a minority Harper Conservative government,\(^{23}\) as shown in Table 2. Absolute approval, reflected in a score of 7 on a 7-point approval scale, is almost four times higher than the totality of disapproval scores (i.e. the sum of the scores <4).

---

\(^{21}\) Does not include non-Muslims from Arab countries

\(^{22}\) Never attend Mosque for prayer.

\(^{23}\) Please note that the survey work was completed prior to the 2011 federal election.
Table 2 Approval of Canada\textsuperscript{24}
Scoring Approval vs. Disapproval on a 7 Point Scale (7=Approval)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Support\textsuperscript{25}</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>DNK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t of Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>84</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given that the small sub-sample (n=22) of Canadian-born Muslims in the survey would be armed with skills not readily available to newcomers, would face fewer job barriers, and would have been socialized into Canadian political culture, we expected them to be less critical of Canada. Interestingly, the converse occurred: For example, 36% are dissatisfied with Canadian attitudes towards immigrants compared to 13% among Muslims as a whole.\textsuperscript{26}

Sharia Law and Islamic Government

Survey respondents were asked questions involving two conventional Islamist litmus tests—whether a [pan-Islamic] Caliphate\textsuperscript{27} should replace existing governments and, separately, whether Sharia law should be introduced as an option or obligation for Muslims.

Respondents were divided on each of the two questions, with resistance to the establishment of a Caliphate being stronger than resistance to the introduction of Sharia law, as shown in Tables 3a and b. The best evidence from these two tables in support of the assimilationist paradigm is that strong opposition to a Caliphate outnumbers strong support for it by ten to one. Nonetheless, only 39% of respondents disagreed strongly with the idea of introducing a Caliphate. Strong opposition rises to 50% among non-observant Muslims while falling to 25% among Muslims who attend Islamic study groups at least once a month.

\textsuperscript{24} “Please tell me how you feel about each of the following foreign countries and organizations, using a 7 point scale where 7 means approve a lot and 1, disapprove a lot, what score would you give…”

\textsuperscript{25} Calculated as % scoring 7-5 + ½ % scoring 4.

\textsuperscript{26} “On a 7 point scale where 1 means dissatisfied with the attitudes of the Canadian-born towards immigrants and 7, very satisfied, what score would you give?”

\textsuperscript{27} The term caliphate “dominion of a caliph (‘successor’)” refers to the first system of government established in Islam and represented the political unity of the Muslim Ummah (nation).
### Table 2a: Thinking generally, would you agree or disagree with the following statement: “All governments would be better if they were ruled under the Caliphate.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree strongly</th>
<th>Agree moderately</th>
<th>Disagree moderately</th>
<th>Disagree strongly</th>
<th>Don’t know, refuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MUSLIMS</td>
<td>ARABS</td>
<td>IRANIANS</td>
<td>NON-OBSERVANT MUSLIMS</td>
<td>MOSQUE 1+ WEEK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Opinion about Sharia law is diverse, with a plurality favouring Sharia as an option available to Muslims dealing with family-law issues. Opposition to any space for Sharia is strongest among non-observant Muslims (40%) and immigrants from Iran (44%) while weakest among Arabs (15%) and regular mosque attendees (15%). Among non-observant Muslims, 8% favour requiring Muslims to be ruled by Sharia courts on family or other legal issues. This triples to 22% among those attending Islamic study groups.

### Table 2b: There’s been some discussion, especially in the last Ontario provincial election, about what the laws in our province and country should be with respect to religion. In your judgment, should Ontario laws...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Make no space for the practice of Sharia Law</th>
<th>Allow individual Muslims or Muslim families to choose to be ruled by Sharia courts in the case of divorce and other family matters if they want to</th>
<th>Require Muslims to be ruled by Sharia courts on family matters</th>
<th>Require Muslims to be ruled by Sharia courts on all matters</th>
<th>Don’t know, refuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MUSLIMS</td>
<td>ARABS</td>
<td>IRANIANS</td>
<td>NON-OBSERVANT MUSLIMS</td>
<td>MOSQUE 1+ WEEK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Support for Terrorism

Survey respondents were asked to score their degree of approval or disapproval of four Muslim extremist groups, two non-Muslim groups, and the Iranian regime, as shown in Table 4.

The most encouraging finding is the pervasive repudiation of Al Qaeda. The late Osama bin Laden’s organization is fully rejected by 65% (score of 1), supported fully by 1% (score of 7), and supported partially or tolerated by the remaining 34%.

By contrast, Canadian Muslims are relatively approving of the Muslim Brotherhood—fully rejected by only 13%. Founded in Egypt in 1928, it is dedicated to creating an Islamic civilization inspired by the caliphates of the 7th and 8th centuries that would subjugate women and subordinate non-believers. The intellectual inspiration for Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other newer militant or terrorist organizations, the Brotherhood has been implicated in providing logistic support and money laundering on their behalf. 28

### Table 3: Approval or Disapproval of Terrorist Organizations or Extremist Iran29 (7=Approval)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Support30</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>DNK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezbollah</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil Tigers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The extent of support for the Brotherhood is worthy of note. Total support for the Brotherhood31 is almost twice as high as unequivocal rejection (24% versus 13%). The Brotherhood’s brand is so strong that support for the organization, whose belief system involves a Sharia law-based clerisy at its core, far exceeds support for Sharia law.

Support for the Brotherhood probably exceeds support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda because the Brotherhood has been more discreet in its approach to violence. It is more likely than the others to use proxies and less likely to claim authorship of

---


29 “Please tell me how you feel about each of the following foreign countries and organizations, using a 7 point scale where 7 means approve a lot and 1, disapprove a lot, what score would you give for…”

30 Calculated as % scoring 7-5 + ½ % scoring 4.

31 Calculated as % scoring 7-5 + ½ % scoring 4.
violent acts. Canadian Muslims originating in the Middle East may be more aware of the Brotherhood’s complicity in political violence, which may explain the paradox whereby Middle East-origin Muslims, who are at least as supportive of Sharia as Muslims as a whole, appear to be a little less supportive of the Brotherhood than Muslims as a whole.32

As intriguing as support for the Brotherhood is support for non-Muslim extremist organizations, notably the IRA and Tamil Tigers. Statistical analysis of the scores in table 3 reveals high correlations and a single, underlying factor or dimension. Those who approve of any one extremist organization tend to approve of them all irrespective of their religious provenance.

Not all commonly-held expectations were borne out. We had every reason to expect greater support for the Muslim Brotherhood among Muslims from the Middle East than among Muslims born elsewhere, including Canada. The Muslim Brotherhood is, after all, the main political opposition to incumbent dictators in most Arab countries. Hamas, Hezbollah, and Al Qaeda are all offshoots of the Brotherhood. Yet support for the Brotherhood is no higher among Muslims from the Arab world than elsewhere, quite possibly lower.33

Finally, another noteworthy finding is a very high rate of “do not know” answers, varying from 65% in the case of the Tamil Tigers to 25% in the case of Al Qaeda. In the case of the non-Muslim terrorist organizations, a reasonable inference is that respondents do not know their opinions either because they are unfamiliar with the group or have not thought through their own assessments. In the case of Muslim organizations, the high rate of “do not know” answers may be a way of signaling a discreet form of sympathy with the cause albeit not necessarily with some of the means.

Examples of Islamist extremism receive broad coverage in both domestic and overseas media and ought to be familiar to respondents. That is why it is reasonable to infer that a sizeable share of the “do-not-know” responses are diplomatic expressions of middling support.

The United States and Israel

The United States and Israel are both roundly repudiated, as shown in Table 4. The proportion approving the United States is roughly on a par with the proportion approving the Muslim Brotherhood, except that the share who fully repudiate the U.S.

---

32 In practice, 25% of Middle East originating Muslims (n=160) score the Brotherhood favourably (scores >4) compared to 38% among Muslims as a whole and a high of 61% among those born in Canada (n=22 ). Meanwhile, 52% of Middle East originating Muslims score the Brotherhood unfavourably (scores <4) compared to 44% among Muslims as a whole and a low of 15% among those born in Canada.

33 With DNK answers excluded from the calculation, 25% of Muslims from the Middle East gave favourable scores (>4) compared to 37% among Muslims as a whole while 52% gave unfavourable scores compared to 42% among Muslims as a whole.
Region of origin appears to be a factor in attitudes to the U.S., with Muslims from Asia (n=95) being less anti-American than the others. Among Muslims from Asia, the ratio of disapproval to approval scores is less than two to one (58% vs. 31%). The ratio jumps to five to one among Muslims from the Middle East and six to one among those born in First World countries (n=86) such as the U.S., the U.K., and Europe.

Survey respondents repudiated U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. By more than four to one, survey respondents said that they did not believe that the U.S.-led “War on Terror” was a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism.

Given that anti-Americanism is widely portrayed as a sentiment with a well-spring in the Third World, we expected Muslims from First World countries to be less anti-American than those from the Third World. Yet, Muslims born in North America and Europe turned out to be no less anti-American than Muslims as a whole.

### Table 4: Approval of Governments of United States, Israel, and Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total support</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>DNK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Focus Groups

**Introducing Regional Perspectives**

To mitigate at least some of the deficiencies of relying on a single-city sample, the authors conducted focus groups among a cross-section of Muslims in Calgary, Ottawa, and Toronto.

---

15 Fifty-four percent believe that the use of force in Afghanistan was the wrong decision compared to 21% believing that it was the right decision. The question: “Do you think the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force in Afghanistan?” <Where is this data?>

16 64% vs. 14%. The question, framed to allow comparison with U.S. data: “Do you think the U.S.-led war on terrorism is a sincere effort to reduce international terrorism or don’t you believe that?” Comparable U.S. numbers were 52% and 29%. <Where is this data?>

16 “Please tell me how you feel about each of the following foreign countries and organizations, using a 7 point scale where 7 means approve a lot and 1, disapprove a lot, what score would you give for…”

17 Calculated as % scoring 7-5 + ½ % scoring 4.
and Gatineau (henceforth, called “cross-sectional groups”)38 and among Uyghur Muslims in Calgary, Mississauga, and Montreal (henceforth called Uyghur groups).

Groups outside Ottawa were consulted partly to shed light on any potential regional bias in the survey data because telephone polling was restricted to Ottawa. The opinions of Uyghurs were included partly to incorporate a diversity of Islamic perspectives. Uyghurs appear distinctive in such cultural values as greater equality for women and approval of dance as well as in the public positions articulated by their leaders, notably religious tolerance and the relative absence of anti-Americanism.

Out of the focus groups emerged several related views on Canada and the world in the attitudes of Canadian Muslims. From these findings, it is possible to draw tentative inferences as to which of the three paradigms we have described is most supported by evidence. It is not possible to draw inferences about the legitimacy of the rival Islamic organizations in the eyes of Canadian Muslims. None of them appears to enjoy much support or interest or perhaps even much awareness.

**Canada Tops in Comparative Perspective**

The high approval scores for Canada that we noted in the telephone surveys are noteworthy. That is especially the case in light of the strong support for Israel in the current government’s foreign policy, a fact of which focus group participants volunteered an awareness.

Enthusiasm for Canada was loud and clear in the focus groups. In all groups, pointed questions about what people like or dislike about Canada tended to yield democracy and freedom as virtues and job barriers as the most prevalent grievance. In the focus groups in the National Capital Region, perceptions of job barriers, sometimes attributed to gatekeeping roles in hiring occupied by francophones, emerged to a degree not found in Mississauga or Calgary.

Women in an Ottawa group spoke of Canada as embodying peace, freedom, safety, and even “heaven.” A lady born in Morocco assailed the absence of liberty in her homeland: “We do not have freedom in my country to say what we think; everything is monitored.”

This view was echoed by an Asian woman. “We are free to practise our religion and free to speak our minds in Canada,” she said. “It’s not the same in our countries. I am not even at peace when I sleep [in country of origin]. You cannot speak out against the President; you will be shot.”

“I come from Iran,” interjected another woman, “and we are told what to think and how to act by the government. We would not be free to sit like this and share ideas like we are in Canada.” An Egyptian born male praised freedom of speech in Canada, where “militants” and people with pro-American views are both welcome to express their opinions.

---

38 The survey and cross-Muslim focus groups were undertaken under a project funded by the START program of the University of Maryland and support from Bryn Mawr College. We thank project leader Professor Clark McCauley. The Uyghur focus groups were made possible with the assistance of the Uyghur Canadian Society. We thank Mehmet Tohti and his colleagues for their assistance in making possible these groups.
Others in the Ottawa groups spoke of Canada as a country of multiculturalism and affluence that respects the family and is ruled by law. Participants spoke of a relative absence of racism in Canada, especially social racism.

According to a man of Kurdish origin with a Master’s degree in engineering, “Canada is the best place for racism in the world.” By this, he meant that there was less racism in Canada than anywhere else. He also volunteered that the average Canadian is more tolerant than the average Muslim. “Actually, Muslims are racist,” he declared. He may have been alluding to Iraqi and Arab antagonism to Kurds. Whatever his allusion, other members of the groups did not disagree.

A few participants spoke with conviction about anti-Muslim attitudes in society, especially in a job setting, as detailed in section 2 below. But the portrait of Canada as racist did not resonate, especially outside a job setting.

Many spoke about being treated as individuals in Canada and not just as members of a group. Several were adamant about the absence of discrimination in Canada. As one put it, “we don’t feel a problem in Canada.” According to another, “what’s best about Canada is that there is no discrimination. A lady wearing a scarf can work in Canada but not in France.” Another spoke of the special respect extended to her religion by local officialdom. “For example, I am a Shia Muslim and each June we have a prayer walk and the mayor comes. It shows he is interested and the government is committed.”

An occasional subtheme is that Canada allows people to lead a private life. A male in an Ottawa group struck a chord with others by talking about the ability to “lead a quiet life.” In a cross-sectional group in Calgary, an otherwise quiet man who was deeply religious expounded on how Canada is “the only country in the world” where “Muslims have true religious freedom.” A professional engineer working in the oil patch, he had spent most of his adult life in various oil producing countries of the Arab world. “One never knows if the cleric or the worshipper next to you is on the payroll of the secret police in these countries,” he explained. Whenever he was perceived as attending mosque too often, he would receive a visit from the intelligence apparatus to make sure that he was not plotting against the government. With a happy chuckle, he said that there was no politics in the mosque he attends in Calgary, and the RCMP would never bother coming.

Not all focus group participants were as convinced as the Calgary oil-patch engineer that Canadian mosques are entirely apolitical. An immigrant from Bangladesh in one of the Ottawa groups characterized mosques in his homeland as places where brainwashing is routine, “The Middle East comes into Canadian mosques,” he warned. “They don’t teach politics, but they don’t miss opportunities to tell people about bad events in the Middle East.” The problem with religion, he went on to say, is that it “is often used for personal gain. You can find good and bad in all religions.”

Uyghurs stood out for their single-minded emphasis on democracy as Canada’s greatest virtue. Participants in all three Uyghur groups were ecstatic about the pervasiveness of democratic culture in Canada. Two of the better educated males in the Mississauga Uyghur group went beyond praising Canadian democracy to praise the respect shown for women in this country as well. “Women’s rights—the right of women to have their own lives and make decisions for themselves like equal people—
is very important to us Uyghurs,” emphasized one male, a successful entrepreneur and professional. “We’re different from other Muslims in that way,” explained another.

The Montreal Uyghur group had a poignant opportunity to illustrate their regard for democracy in Canada. That focus group included individuals who had participated in an anti-Beijing demonstration on the occasion of the Dalai Lama’s address at Montreal’s Bell Centre, alongside Chinese students demonstrating in support of Beijing. “Only in Canada, a true democracy, can Chinese and Uyghurs both have a right to speak their opinions and demonstrate in freedom,” offered one Uyghur. “Isn’t this such a good thing? This can’t happen in China, you know.”

This theme of democratic give-and-take re-emerged spontaneously throughout discussions. Reflecting on what it is to be a Uyghur Muslim, one young father volunteered that “we’re not the type of Muslim that doesn’t like Jews. They have rights too.”

Participants in the cross-sectional groups were asked which of a handful of major western destination countries were the best or worst for Muslim immigrants. Except for some who felt that they knew too little about several of the countries to make an informed comparison, the general consensus was that Canada was the best and that France and Germany were the worst.

Those who focused their minds on the nature of American society tended to characterize the U.S. as virtually as hospitable as Canada. But some could not separate American culture and society from U.S. foreign policy, which they abhorred. Participants were not entirely sure how to score the United Kingdom. It certainly was not as welcoming and unprejudiced as Canada, but its foreign policy was more palatable to some.

Terrorism

The cross-sectional focus groups were informed of the results of the telephone survey. They were told of correlations between support for Arab “radical” organizations and support for the IRA and the Tamil Tigers. Most focus groups seemed not to understand the reference to “radical” organizations. When we translated “radical” as “militant,” at least one focus group participant would interject something like “you mean terrorist organizations.” Participants, including even those who supported them, understood Hamas and Hezbollah as “terrorist” organizations.

No one expressed surprise at the finding that supporters of Arab militant or terrorist groups also supported the IRA and Tamil Tigers. As a Lebanese-born participant put it, “they possibly feel this way because all of these groups are fighters.” In the words of another, “these groups are all against the West, aren’t they?”

The United States and Israel

Approval scores in the telephone surveys provide a good sense of respondents’ discomfort with these countries’ foreign policies but do not capture their admiration for American and Israeli societies. The cross-sectional focus groups revealed a rejection of American foreign policy along with a regard for the United States as a pluralist society. With the rarest of exceptions, focus group participants named the United States as the second-best country for Muslim immigrants, second only to Canada.
United States as the second-best country for Muslim immigrants, second only to
Canada, and far better than France or Germany.

Focus group participants were asked to explain a noteworthy statistical artifact from
the survey. Survey respondents who had approved of any particular terrorist or
extremist organization had tended to approve of all of them. But approval of terrorism
or extremism was not associated statistically with disapproval of the U.S. and Israel.
Among focus group participants who said that they could understand this pattern
in the survey data, the predominant explanations distinguished between foreign and
domestic policy, emphasizing that radicals despise the corrupt dictatorships that run
Arab countries.

Hamas and Hezbollah are not just hostile to Israel and the U.S., some participants
said; they are also hostile to brutal Arab dictatorships, who mistreat their peoples.
Supporters of Hamas and Hezbollah are not completely against either Israel or the
United States, insisted a Palestinian who was himself fervently anti-Israel. But he was
also fervently opposed to corrupt Arab governments. “Israel,” he emphasized, “is the
only democracy in the Middle East, you know.”

“I Israeli people,” said one Ottawa participant, “have a right to defend themselves. In
their context they have their right to self-defence. They’re standing up for their people.
That’s seen as admirable.” Supporters of the various radical (terrorist) organizations
may dislike how Israel treats its neighbours but they are not necessarily going to
hate all Israelis. They are certainly not going to hate all Americans. After all, “some
Muslims are taught that hate is a bad thing. Not even Israelis can be all bad.”

“We come from countries that are very black and white,” offered an Iranian-born
woman. “When we come here, Canada is great so people pick and choose what
they like about each group, and that may explain why [supporters of radical groups
don’t necessarily hate the U.S. and Israel].” Few focus group participants or survey
respondents were pro-Israel, but pro-Israel feelings were sometimes voiced as a
reaction against anti-Israel vehemence.

An Arab-Canadian with a Master’s degree in the social sciences triggered such a
reaction in one of the Ottawa focus groups. He expressed such frequent antagonism
to Canada’s support for Israel that two Iranian-born participants in his Ottawa
group responded by saying that they were tired of expressions of hate for Israel. “I’m
Persian,” declared one of the Iranians. In a metaphorical reference to the Persian King
celebrated in the Hebrew Bible for protecting Jews, the Iranian intoned “I’m Cyrus. I
like Jews.” To the purposeful chagrin of the Palestinian, the other Iranian in the group
added, “Persians are together, friends with Jews.”

In a Gatineau discussion, a male high-school teacher from French West Africa said
that, to understand extremism, one needs to distinguish between what is essentially
Arab as opposed to what is intrinsically Islamic. The Arabs, he said, have created a big
problem for themselves as a result of misogyny.

Mistreatment of women, he said, goes a long way to explain why Arab society and the
Arab economy are “so backward.” “They waste so much of their potential intellectual
capital.” Some Canadian Muslims may support radical (terrorist) organizations but
they know that some of the problems of the Arabs are of their own doing. This may

Few focus group participants or survey respondents were pro-Israel.
explain, he said, why some Canadian Muslims can support the terrorists without hating Israel or the U.S.

Uyghurs may have had the least difficulty understanding why some Muslims could embrace radical (terrorist) groups without necessarily abhorring Israel or the United States. From the perspective expressed by many Uyghurs, especially in Calgary, the U.S. is one of the Uyghurs’ best friends. The Saudis and other Arab countries are untrustworthy dictatorships, willing to sell out the Uyghurs so that they can flog oil to the Chinese or buy advanced Chinese munitions.

As for the Middle East, “we Uyghurs should normally take the side of Muslims against Israel,” declared one Uyghur speaking for his Calgary friends. “But in a fight between a democracy and Muslims without democracy, Uyghurs should not be against the democracy. Arab governments are not so good. So we stay neutral.”

Jobs—The Highest Real Concern

Satisfaction with Canada was tempered by job-related anxieties. Employment barriers emerged spontaneously as a topic in all groups, particularly in the Ottawa groups, and with special emphasis on the challenges faced by foreign-trained professionals. Participants in the Ottawa groups almost acted as if they were invited to attend focus groups on employment issues. Questions seemingly led to jobs as the answer:

• How could Canada be made better? Answer: by offering more job opportunities.
• Why is Canada better than France or Germany for Muslims? Answer: more job opportunities.
• What could Canada do to treat Muslims more fairly? Answer: offer more job opportunities.
• How could Canada’s major institutions, for example, the police, tax collection, schools, or media, be improved? Answer: regulate the media so that coverage of Muslim issues leads to greater social acceptance of Muslims and hence more job opportunities for Muslims.

Employment frustrations existed in every group, but the Ottawa groups were more focused on jobs than the others and more insistent that government play a role in addressing the problem.

Participants in the groups outside the nation’s capital tended not to look to government for solutions. Uyghurs in Montreal saw the solution in terms of moving to another province. Uyghurs in Calgary saw the solution in terms of improving English-language skills. Participants in the cross-sectional groups in Calgary seemed to resign themselves to the limitations of a smaller, less specialized job market in their city.

Participants in the cross-sectional Ottawa groups and in the Montreal Uyghur group shared a common perspective on the nature of the main barrier they face: francophone-hiring managers. In Ottawa and Montreal, a seeming consensus emerged that Anglophones were less prejudiced against Muslims than Francophones but that Francophones controlled the hiring. In their view, Francophone hiring managers preferred Francophones to Anglophones and Anglophones to newcomers from the Third World, including Muslims.
A lady born in Turkey spoke of a certain kind of “elegant racism” in the work world. “It’s not there but it is still there. It’s improving but still there.” Working at the office of a major resources company, she reported being “asked by my [new] colleagues when I was hired why they could not get a Canadian to do this job.”

Some focus group participants had a sense that job prospects might improve if media coverage became more sympathetic towards Muslims. As an Iraqi-born woman pointed out to widespread agreement in her group, “Muslims and Islam are associated with terrorism in the media.” Muslim immigrants suffer as a result.

But Muslims should not suffer, emphasized a lady from Afghanistan. “Islam is peaceful. We are not terrorists.” “If another person commits a crime, we do not hear about his religion first. But when it is a Muslim, you do.” The Afghan lady and some participants in some of the Ottawa groups perceived the media as Islamophobic. More than one participant called for government regulation. After all, said a male in an Ottawa group, “All Muslims are not the monster created by the propaganda machine.”

Themes That Failed to Emerge

In the nine focus groups held across the country, the relationship between Canada’s police and Islamic advocacy organizations was like the dog in the Sherlock Holmes story, Silver Blaze -- curious because unmentioned.

In the course of asking participants to reflect on how Canada could be improved or Muslims treated more fairly, the focus group moderator would invite comment on a range of institutions including the police. The verbal and nonverbal response of participants was to make brief allusions to the irrelevance of the police and to turn to other topics. In a similar spirit, focus group participants did not mention Islamic advocacy organizations.

If either the Huntington paradigm of civilizational confrontation or the CIC portrait of Islamophobia were valid, one might well expect at least some mention of the police and Islamic advocacy organizations. If Canadian society were as Islamophobic as the CIC has suggested, one might expect Canadian Muslims to have the police and Islamic advocacy organizations at the forefront of their minds—the former as a potential threat, the latter as a source of support. But the police and Islamic advocacy organizations received hardly a mention.

Ironically, the only severe criticism of Canada’s security apparatus came from a critic of its laxness following a heated debate about suicide bombing. A young, educated woman had lambasted Canadian support for Israel and declared passionately that there exists no higher form of action than suicide bombing.

Two women in their forties, both mothers, responded. Both said that they came to Canada to avoid endless wars and hatreds. One Arab lady explained calmly that Canada was a place where people were supposed to learn to get along. She herself had met several Jewish teachers in the course of upgrading her qualifications, and they had treated her with utmost respect. It pained her to hear about someone wanting to kill them.

A slightly younger mother of small children spoke about her experiences as a student in Shia schools in Lebanon. Students were indoctrinated to hate Christians and
Jews. Even mathematics textbook used arithmetic problems as a device for teaching contempt for non-Muslims.

She made many sacrifices, she emphasized, to come to Canada so that her own children could grow up in a tolerant, democratic society where schools did not teach students to hate each other. She did not know why the police and immigration authorities allowed into Canada so many people with extremist or terrorist views. She had never dreamed that she would have to worry about living next to such people after leaving Lebanon for Canada. She faulted the government for its laxness.

More Paradoxes than Platitudes

Since the data from the telephone survey showed a pattern of greater approval of terrorist organizations among respondents engaged in Mosque-related activities, we expected religious participants in the focus groups to be more radical in their views. In contradistinction, the most radical political views tended to be expressed by relatively secular people, often equipped with higher education in the social sciences, while devout Muslims were sometimes the most articulate advocates for Canada and democracy.

Conclusions

The polling data suggest that Canadian Muslims fit best the paradigm of a divided community with heterogeneous opinions as expressed by Daniel Pipes of the Middle East Forum. Survey respondents were asked specifically about the merits of a return of the Caliphate or the introduction of Sharia law. Their varied responses lend support to the paradigm of a diverse and divided Islamic community. Had they overwhelmingly opposed the establishment of a Caliphate or been strongly opposed to Sharia law, the portrait of an assimilationist Muslim community would have made sense. But Canadian Muslims are not strongly opposed to a Caliphate or even moderately opposed to at least some role for Sharia law.

Respondents in the survey and participants in the focus groups are of two minds about terrorists, providing further evidence in support of a community divided. On the one hand, they seem largely opposed to Al Qaeda. The level of decided support for Al Qaeda (scores of 5-7 on the 7 point scale) seems lower than the support observed in the Middle East. If Al Qaeda were a party contesting a Canadian election, outright support for it is sufficiently low for its prospects to be slim.

Polling data suggest that Canadian Muslims fit best the paradigm of a divided community with heterogeneous opinions.

39 The survey was conducted before Osama bin Laden’s killing in 2011. We do not know how Canadian Muslims might have felt about that.

40 On this point, see David Pollack, Slippery Polls (Washington, D.C. : The Washington Institute, 2008). A poll carried out in May, 2011 in Tunisia, one of the most westernized Arab countries, appears to show much more support for Al Qaeda than found in our Ottawa poll. In Tunisia, 9% chose the most favourable position on the 7 point scale compared to 1% in Ottawa, as reported in table 3, above. The question in the Tunisia poll was: “Please score [Al Qaeda] on a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 means you feel negatively or unfavourably towards it and 7, you feel positive or favourably to it.” The Tunisia poll was carried out jointly with Princeton-based Pechter Polls.
On the other hand, Al Qaeda’s challenge for Canada is security—rather than election—related. Sixty-five percent of the survey respondents repudiate absolutely the organization, choosing a score of “1” on the 7 point scale. From a security perspective, it is difficult to know if a 65% rate of repudiation is re-assuring or a 35% failure to repudiate troubling.

Meanwhile, support for the Muslim Brotherhood, the intellectual and logistical handmaiden of more overtly violent groups, is stronger than one might have expected, and not limited to Muslims immigrating from the Middle East. Some Canadians might see national security implications in the evidence of plurality approval for the Muslim Brotherhood and minority support for other terrorist organizations.

Canadian Muslims also appear to be of two minds about Israel and especially the United States. They reject the foreign policies of both countries while strongly embracing the United States as a relatively non-racist society. Some readily acknowledge that Israel is more democratically ruled than its Arab neighbours. The fact that Muslims in Canada readily acknowledge the domestic-governance strengths of the United States and Israel does not lend obvious support to the confrontational paradigm.

Many paradoxical differences of opinion based on national origin emerged from the data. For example, support for extremism is no lower among Muslims born in Canada or other advanced countries than those coming from violent dictatorships. Support for extremism might even be higher among the Canadian-born but the sub-sample is too small to be sure. Meanwhile, opposition to all forms of extremism seems to be highest among immigrants from Iran, a leader among extremist regimes, while lower among those arriving from the Middle East.

Support for extremism seems stronger than average among participants in Muslim study groups. The apparent socialization effect of study groups and the effects of national origin warrant further research. Research is especially needed because the patterns are not entirely clear-cut.

The most encouraging finding is a general tendency to see Canada as welcoming and pluralistic, not racist. Canadian Muslims admire immensely Canada, its freedoms, and its lawfulness. Even when they believe that social acceptance, the media treatment of Muslims, and hiring practices are less than desirable, they do not find Canada to be racist and inhospitable. They certainly do not find Canada racist or inhospitable by world standards, including the standards of Islamic countries. They do not find Canada to be Islamophobic. Jobs and employment opportunities are the biggest concerns of this Canadian minority.

In an ironic twist, perhaps the most disquieting aspect of the research endeavour is the discovery of complexity. The sheer complexity of Muslim opinion, including its apparent variation by national origin, cries out for more and better research on its character, causes and extent. That a thoughtful minority of Muslim newcomers come to Canada to escape extremism and embrace pluralism is a cause for much celebration. So too is the fact that many Muslim newcomers to Ottawa and Canada are so admiring of Canada’s freedoms and lawfulness. That only a small minority of Muslim newcomers unequivocally reject terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah or the Iranian regime gives pause for thought.

---

Canadian Muslims admire immensely Canada, its freedoms, and its lawfulness.

The sheer complexity of Muslim opinion, including its apparent variation by national origin, cries out for more and better research on its character, causes and extent.
II. Commentaries on the Study

1. Canada’s Muslims, Not of One Mind

by Daniel Pipes

In their study for the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, “What Do Muslim Canadians Want? The Clash of Interpretations and Opinion Research,” Christian Leuprecht and Conrad Winn open with a discussion of ways to understand Muslim attitudes in Canada, then go on to discuss specific data. I shall follow their organization and discuss these two topics separately, followed by a conclusion.

Paradigms for understanding Muslim attitudes: Two of the three paradigms hypothesized by Leuprecht and Winn assume a uniform Muslim community, with one of them seeing Muslims as uniformly hostile to Western ways and the other seeing them as uniformly accepting those ways. Only the third paradigm, the one they associate with me, espies a multiplicity of views.

It makes obvious intuitive sense that Muslims disagree among themselves – what group of people does not? It stands to reason that, in particular, they differ on the compatibility of Islam with Canadian values, a key issue at a time of jihad and of efforts to implement the Shari’a (Islamic law) in the West.

Before looking at specific survey results, it bears noting, along with Stephen Schwartz of the Center for Islamic Pluralism, that “Canadian Islam is more moderate, more diverse and more open to debate than American or even British Islam.” Why so? Primarily because of the nature of Muslim immigration, which prominently included Qadiri and similar Sufi traditionalists, heterodox Muslims from sub-Saharan Africa, and secularists from Tunisia and Algeria. Schwartz concludes on a positive note that “We should be glad that Canada is different, and offers a place where Muslim sanity is prized, rather than dismissed.”

Survey results: The survey results confirm this Canadian difference, being more positive in attitude toward the host country than one finds in other Western Muslim populations. Very high approval scores accorded to the Government of Canada, comparable to those of the general population, offers a basis for what follows, as does the fact that Canadian Muslims generally dismiss the notion of Canada as a racist country.

Questions about specific likes and dislikes reveal greater appreciation for generalities (democracy and freedom) than for one’s own circumstances (finding employment). I found it especially encouraging that Canadian Muslims understand democracy as not just a system for choosing leaders but as a mentality and a way of life permitting an individual the autonomy to think and act in freedom, to develop his own opinions, and to opt out of politics entirely.
Finding a job stands out as a key issue in the Macdonald-Laurier Institute survey. To sense the worry, imagine applying for a job with the name Muhammad or Fatima; non-Muslim employers are wary of taking on Muslim staff for reasons ranging from terrorism to demands for special privileges to fears of litigation. In part, non-Muslims need to deal with their own prejudices; but in part, Muslims must acknowledge the problems they have created and address them seriously and constructively.

The question about implementation of the Shari’a stands for its important implications. A substantial majority of 62 percent wish the Shari’a to be in some fashion implemented; when one factors out the don’t know/refuse category, that number jumps to 75 percent. This points to what may be the most intractable problem about Canadian Muslims: their desire to march to a different drummer. That 15 percent of Muslim wish to “require Muslims to be ruled by Sharia courts” is particularly alarming; it also confirms my estimate that Islamists make up some 10-15 percent of Muslim populations.

The 3 percent support of Al-Qaeda points to the hard-core Islamist element in Canada – not very large, but 3 percent of a Muslim population of some 700,000 comes to about 20,000 individuals with very dangerous sympathies and ideas. This information should alarm and rouse the immigration and security services alike.

The 13 percent approval of Israel in this study differs from a noteworthy estimate forwarded by Conrad Winn in 2004, when he suggested that a fifth of the Muslim population of Canada thinks “Israel is right on just about everything,” but the figures do not differ by much and the new one can be seen as an order-of-magnitude confirmation of the old one. So too, the observation in the present study that “pro-Israel feelings were sometimes voiced as a reaction against anti-Israel vehemence” echoes Winn’s observation seven years earlier that “Quite often [a pro-Israel outlook] is a reaction against what they would view as extremist leaders in their own communities or in their country of origin.”

When it comes to extremist views, Leuprecht and Winn acknowledge their surprise: “we expected religious participants in the focus groups to be more radical in their views. In contradistinction, the most radical political views tended to be expressed by relatively secular people, often equipped with higher education in the social sciences, while devout Muslims were sometimes the most articulate advocates for Canada and democracy.” This pattern establishes that Islamic piety is not in itself a problem; and that political outlook is the key to attitudes. Seculars can be extreme and the pious moderate.

Conclusion: Leuprecht and Winn find that while the attitudes they uncovered fit none of the three paradigms perfectly, they conclude that the polling data “suggest that Canadian Muslims fit best the paradigm of a divided community with heterogeneous opinions as expressed by Daniel Pipes.”

On the one hand, I am gratified by this conclusion. On the other, I wonder how else one might characterize a community made up of hundreds of thousands of individuals. Surely no one expects them to be of one mind, implying that Islam turns believers into automatons who lose their ability to think for themselves but are instead dominated by a leadership that programs them. No human population fits this description.
And if this notion of a quiescent people were once convincing, surely the Middle East uproar during 2011 suggests that even peoples who obey for decades retain a fire within them that unpredictably can bring down their rulers. Libyans, whom many assumed accepted the ravings of Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi, turned out, for example, to have been thinking for themselves.

The Leuprecht-Winn study reveals a number of problematic attitudes, from desire for Shari’a to support for Al-Qaeda, but it also establishes that Canada has the most moderate, diverse, and open Muslim population in the West. Not only is this an advantage to build on but it suggests a potential role for moderate Canadian Muslims to take their message and perhaps their institutions to other Western countries.
2. Deadly Attitudes: Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in Canada

by Alex Wilner

Canadians, No Strangers to Terrorism

There is no question that homegrown Islamist terrorism has reached Canada’s shores. Since 2008, more Canadians have been sent to jail for supporting terrorism inside and outside Canada than used to face such charges over decades. As of March 2010, fourteen Canadians have been found guilty under Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act, thirteen of whom were inspired by al Qaeda. The list of perpetrators includes Ottawa-native Mohammad Khawaja, guilty of building detonators for attacks in the UK, Quebecker Said Namouh, an al Qaeda sympathiser, and eleven members of the Toronto 18, a homegrown cell planning bombing atrocities in and around Toronto. Of these convicts, four are serving life sentences and another four are serving 10 years or more. Given these recent developments, one thing is certain: Canada, like many other Western liberal democracies, is grappling with the evolving threat of Islamist terrorism perpetrated by first, second, and third generation immigrants and Muslim converts.

To a certain degree, however, Canadians have been here before; we are no strangers to political violence. Canadians have long been both the victims and perpetrators of terrorism.1

As victims, terrorism threatens Canadians in a variety of ways. Foreign organizations target us within our borders. Al Qaeda and its affiliates have threatened Canada specifically on at least six occasions. They have called Canada a “second-rate crusader” and have promised to carry out an “operation similar to the New York, Madrid, [and] London” bombings in Canada. The Taliban has also threatened Canada directly, apparently graduating a group of suicide bombers trained specifically for attacks in Canadian cities. We also know that foreign groups, like Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers, have targeted third parties living in Canada as an extension of various regional conflicts. Canadians are also threatened by terrorism that takes place overseas. This happens more often than is generally acknowledged: al Qaeda killed 24 Canadians on 9/11; al Qaeda in Iraq killed two Canadians in its 2003 bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad; Jemaah Islamiyah, an al Qaeda ally in Southeast Asia, killed two Canadians and injured five more in three separate bombings between 2002-2009; and four Canadians were killed and injured by Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba in its bloody 2008 rampage in Mumbai, India. These Canadian victims have been at the wrong place at the wrong time, but other Canadians working abroad have been specifically targeted. In 2008, two Canadian diplomats travelling in Niger were captured by militants and delivered to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Canadian humanitarian workers have been specifically targeted in Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, and perhaps most notably, two Air Canada planes with flights from London, England to Montreal and Toronto were to be destroyed as part of al Qaeda’s 2006 plot to detonate liquid

---

1 For an overview see Alex Wilner, “Terrorism in Canada: Victims and Perpetrators,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 12(3) (2010), 72-99.
explosives aboard nearly a dozen transatlantic aircraft. Had al Qaeda not been foiled, hundreds of Canadians would have perished.

As perpetrators of terrorism, Canadians have facilitated political violence in a number of ways. Terrorists have used Canada as a base of operation to plan attacks against the United States and other countries. Ahmed Ressam is perhaps the most infamous. From his adopted city of Montreal he planned to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on New Year’s Eve 2000. He was caught driving a car bomb over the US-Canada border in British Columbia. Other Canadians suspected of facilitating international terrorism include Tahawwur Rana, a Pakistani-Canadian currently on trial in the US charged with supporting the Mumbai attacks, Albertan Sayfilden Sharif, arrested two months ago for allegedly orchestrating suicide attacks in Iraq, and Hiva Alizadeh, Misbahuddin Ahmed, and Khurram Syed Sher, currently on trial in Canada for allegedly supporting terrorism in Afghanistan. Canadians also have a sad history of facilitating terrorism by travelling overseas to join foreign organizations. Ahmed Khadr travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan in the 1980s and became a prominent supporter of Osama bin Laden. A few of his sons followed suit. And since 2003, at least a dozen Canadians have travelled to Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan to join jihad. Most notably, in 2008, Canadian Mohammed Jabarah was sentenced to life in prison in the US for plotting an al Qaeda-sponsored attack on the US embassy in Singapore while his brother Abdel died in a 2003 firefight with Saudi Arabian security officers.

Canadian involvement in terrorism – as both victims and perpetrators – is epitomized by homegrown terrorism. Herein, Canadian citizens specifically target other Canadians with indiscriminate violence. Regrettably, we are no strangers to this form of terrorism either. Quebec nationalists associated with the FLQ conducted dozens of attacks against Canadians between 1963 and 1970. They even bombed the Montreal Stock Exchange, injuring 27 individuals, and abducted James Cross, a British diplomat, and murdered Pierre Laporte, Quebec’s Minister of Labour. The Direct Action (aka the Squamish Five) bombed corporate headquarters, businesses, and government offices across Canada in the 1980s. And Canadian Sikh extremists associated with Babbar Khalsa were responsible for planting suitcase bombs on two aircraft departing Vancouver in 1985. An unprecedented 280 Canadians lost their lives that day.

**Homegrown Islamist Terrorism**

The focus today, however, is understandably on Islamist homegrown terrorism. In the years following al Qaeda’s 2001 attack on the United States, a preponderance of the mass-casualty terrorist attacks planned, foiled, and conducted in North America, Europe, and Australia have involved western citizens. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) considers the dual threats of homegrown Islamist radicalization and homegrown terrorism as top national security priorities. Of

---

critical importance to security officials is finding out why some Canadians come to sympathize with al Qaeda’s narrative, legitimize the use of violence, and organize acts of terrorism against fellow Canadians. Because homegrown terrorism begins with the radicalization process, effectively combating terrorism in Canada will require a better understanding of how and why radicalization occurs in the first place.

Christian Leuprecht and Conrad Winn, in this important study, raise the lid on homegrown Islamist radicalization in Canada by taking a closer look at the social, political, and religious attitudes of Muslim Canadians. By collecting, comparing, and analysing original data on Muslim Canadian attitudes, Leuprecht and Winn add some much-needed nuance to our understanding of a complex and evolving threat. To date, very little research has been conducted on the subject of radicalization and terrorism in Canada. This Macdonald-Laurier Institute (MLI) publication adds a much-needed voice that is particularly relevant to academics, politicians, and decision-makers alike.

In a comparative analysis of various Muslim communities living in Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec, the authors explore individual and group attitudes that help inform our understanding of the radicalization process. Some of their findings are welcome. For instance, among each of the study’s various sub-groups, survey data suggests a very high level of satisfaction with Canada, its government, and its political system. Most respondents also agreed that there was a “relative absence of racism” in Canada, that religious freedoms were well protected, and that Canada, when compared to the US, UK, France, and Germany, was altogether a more welcoming country for immigrants and minority religious groups. More worrisome, however, were findings suggesting shallow support for the eventual establishment of a pan-Islamic State (or Caliphate) and “a plurality favouring Sharia” as a legal option for Muslim Canadians “dealing with family-law issues.” And while respondents overwhelmingly disapprove of al Qaeda, they nonetheless moderately approve of other proscribed terrorist groups along with the Muslim Brotherhood (an Islamist, though generally non-violent, international organization).

From Radicalization to Terrorism

These findings offer insight on the importance of differentiating between radicalization and violent radicalization, as it relates to countering Islamist homegrown terrorism in Canada. Until very recently, it was commonly assumed that Islamist terrorism in Canada, the US, or Europe would be conducted by foreign operatives recruited and trained overseas and dispatched to attack the West. The 9/11 attacks, for instance, were conducted by 19 men from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Lebanon. Today, however, it is far more likely that an Islamist terrorist attack in the

---


4 For an excellent overview of the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities in the West, see Lorenzo Vidino, The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2010).
West will be at least partially (and oftentimes entirely) orchestrated by Westerners. British nationals, for instance, were involved in both the July 7 and July 21, 2005 attacks on London’s public transportation system, the foiled 2006 “liquid-bomb plot”, and the 2007 Glasgow Airport bombing. In Spain, of the nearly two dozen individuals convicted of participating in the 2004 Madrid train bombings, roughly one-third were Spaniards. In Europe more broadly, one study of over 200 Islamist terrorists found that over 90 percent were residents of a European country. In the US, of the nearly 50 cases of recruitment and radicalization to Islamist terrorism to have occurred between 2001 and 2009, a vast majority have involved American citizens. And here in Canada, all of our imprisoned Islamist terrorists have been Canadian nationals.

Most, if not all, of the individual Westerners involved in homegrown Islamist terrorism would have first gone through a process of radicalization, in which they internalized an extremist ideology and belief system. Radicalization is a process of personal, emotional, and cognitive change. It is marked by the adoption of extremist ideals that can prepare and motivate an individual to pursue violent behaviour. In what appears to be a very rapid progression, individuals go from ordinary Joe Canuck to Jihadi Joe; somewhere along the way other Canadians become legitimate targets. Accordingly, Western Islamist terrorists are also radical extremists. That is, individuals who contemplate killing their fellow citizens in campaigns of political violence do so because they come to believe that murder in the name of a cause is both feasible and just.

And yet there is a difference between radicalization and violent radicalization. Terrorism is chiefly about the latter – radical sentiments that guide violent behavior. But not all radicalization necessarily leads to violence. As European scholar Tarik Fraihi posits, there are “different forms of radicalization,” including, for instance, “radical Islamic puritanism” which involves a “return to a ‘pure’ Islam” and distancing oneself from the influences of Western society. Seeking greater religious purity in and of itself, however, is not a security threat until and unless it takes on intolerant, segregate attitudes or promotes the use of violence to force non-believers to accept particular beliefs. In fact, accepting radical values, even those based on literalist interpretations of religious texts or views that a vast majority of other citizens would find repugnant, does not necessarily lead to (or predict) involvement in political violence. There is a difference between solely accepting radical ideas and actively participating in violent
behavior as a result of those ideas. Not all, and in fact potentially few, individuals who radicalize end up participating in violent behavior. So while a vast majority of terrorists will also be radicals, few radicals will also be terrorists.

This is an important distinction. As terrorism expert Clark McCauley describes it, violent Islamist radicals travel up to the “apex of a pyramid” from the larger base of Islamist sympathizers to the much smaller tip of active terrorists. In terms of national security, gaining a better understanding of violent radicalization (as opposed to, simply, radicalization) is of great and immediate concern. Violent radicalization is marked by an internalization of radical views and participation in violence. It feeds homegrown terrorism. But non-violent radicalization is, comparatively speaking, a much less significant security dilemma. Tackling violent radicalization will fall into the realm of counterterrorism, but dealing with non-violent radicalization will be better handled as a societal problem. Conflating violent radicalization with radicalization more broadly risks improperly identifying the policy solutions.

By gauging Muslim Canadian attitudes on issues that are often considered lightening rods for radicals (i.e. US/Israeli foreign policy, the Caliphate, Sharia Law, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, etcetera), Leuprecht and Winn offer a preliminary glimpse of the radicalization process in Canada. In the case of violent radicalization, their data measuring attitudes towards various militant and radical groups is most pertinent. While a handful of respondents accept that Canadian Muslims should be “required” to be ruled by Sharia courts “on all matters” and that “all governments would be better if they were ruled under the Caliphate”, these attitudes are more appropriately interpreted as radical sentiments but not necessarily representative of violent radical sentiments. Instead, it is support for radical groups that already advocate and participate in violence that is more clearly associated with violent attitudes and potentially, homegrown terrorism. Herein, Leuprecht and Winn find surprising levels of approval for a number of proscribed terrorist organizations, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the IRA, and other non-proscribed radical Islamist groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood. And, pointing to the findings concerning the IRA, the authors posit that respondents “who approve of any one extremist organization tend to approve of them all.”

While it is false to suggest that the approval of various terrorist groups necessarily predicts future participation in political violence, support for violent radical organizations is nonetheless an exceptionally worrying trend. At best, it reveals that the Canadian government will have trouble pursuing its local, regional, and international counterterrorism strategy. At worst, support for and approval of various foreign terrorist groups will act as a gateway for eventual participation in political violence. But at the very least, it suggests that a non-trivial subset of those involved in the

12 Bartlett, Birdwell, and King “The Edge of Violence”, 11, 14
13 The authors do, however, find very little support for al Qaeda, suggesting that the terrorist organization resonates only poorly with a vast majority of Canadian Muslims.
study (and, presumably, of Canada’s general population) sympathize with a number of regional and global organizations that espouse violent agendas. Crossing the thin red line that divides radicalization and violent radicalization may evolve from sympathy for violent radical groups. What more, Canada is actively at war with the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan and considers Hamas, Hezbollah and over another dozen violent radical Islamist groups as illegitimate, illegal, and dangerous organizations. That even a small percentage of Leuprecht’s and Winn’s respondents show some form of acceptance for these and other groups is clearly problematic.

Countering Radicalization: Moving Forward

In the coming years Canada will have decide how best to tackle homegrown Islamist radicalization. Empirical studies, like this MLI report, will have to lead the way in both identifying patterns of radicalization more broadly while simultaneously distinguishing the markers and characteristics of violent radicalization in particular. Canadians are also going to have to openly debate the goals and priorities of their counter-radicalization strategy. There are two principal paths Canadians can follow: de-radicalization or disengagement from terrorism.

The two strategies are related but differ in subtle and important ways. De-radicalization involves turning an already radicalized individual against the extremist values and worldview they adhere to. The strategy is ultimately about getting a violent radical to reject the ideologies that led them to facilitate violence. Disengagement from terrorism, on the other hand, is about convincing a violent radical to reject the legitimacy of using violence to acquire ones’ goals. But it stops short of trying to change these goals or reverse the ideology that helped formulate these goals. Herein, the policy objective is to get a radical to stop supporting violence, not to get them to change their radical views. The former strategy leads to a rejection of both the violent ideology and the violent behavior while the latter process ends violent behavior only.

In a western, liberal society, individuals are morally and legally allowed to hold any number of views, however unpopular they are with others. Only when these views are used to break the law is punitive action taken. But the question remains: are Canadians ready to share their society with non-violent, but decisively radical individuals? On the one hand, deradicalization is much more difficult to do effectively than convincing radicals to disengage from violence. It will require that the government engage in complex religious debates, select a firm ideological position, and distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate beliefs. On the other hand, disengagement from terrorism leaves the ideas that were used to advocate violence in place, despite the fact that they may endanger other liberal values (like sexual, minority, and women’s rights, freedom of speech, and so on) and are an affront to democratic ideals. The challenge ahead of us is arguably a daunting one.


3. A Response to

What do Muslim Canadians Want

by Salim Mansur

If not for the 9/11 attacks on the United States by radical Muslims and fears of “home- grown” terrorists recruited within Muslim communities in North America and Europe, the question “what do Muslim Canadians want?” would be of as little interest as what any other ethnically or religiously defined community of Canadians want in an advanced liberal democracy and a G-8 country. In the decade since the horrific attacks that demolished the World Trade Center in New York and killed some three thousand people on a calm September morning, the need to know about Islam and Muslims has acquired a strategic imperative to effectively deal with Islamists.

Christian Leuprecht and Conrad Winn conducted a telephone survey in an effort to understand what Muslim Canadians want. What do they think about their adopted country as home? What are their opinions of the Canadian government? What are their attitudes regarding the place and role of Islam as it shapes their political views and manner of living? These questions and others were put to a representative sample of 455 Muslims residing in three cities – Calgary in Alberta, Ottawa in Ontario, and Gatineau in Quebec. In assessing their findings from the responses, Leuprecht and Winn observe that the most surprising result is the complexity of Muslim opinion. They write, “The sheer complexity of Muslim opinion cries out for more and better research in its character, causes and extent.” The surprise expressed here is indeed no surprise, and their findings in general do not vary much from similar surveys such as the one conducted by the polling firm Environics Research Group with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC).¹

The overall findings in the Leuprecht and Winn study about Muslim attitudes and thinking on a host of subjects confirm what we already knew about Muslims settled in the West from surveys such as those conducted by the Pew Research Center in the U.S.² The specific findings in the Leuprecht and Winn study pertaining to Muslims Canadians and their views about Canada are also in line with the Environics/CBC survey. The Leuprecht and Winn study confirms a very high level of publicly disclosed satisfaction among Muslim Canadians with their living circumstances in Canada, a very low level of complaint or discomfort about any prejudice or Islamophobia directed against them because of their ethnicity and/or faith, an elevated sense of security in terms of personal freedom along with a near absence of fear or concern about police forces in the country, and a broad consensus among respondents in the survey that any anxiety about their situation in Canada can be alleviated if job-opportunities in the present economic environment are more positive.

In moving from domestic to foreign policy issues the Leuprecht and Winn study more or less confirms the expected opinion of a majority of Muslim Canadians. Leuprecht


What do Muslim Canadians Want?

and Winn point out in their conclusion, “The polling data suggest that Canadian Muslims fit best the paradigm of a divided community with heterogeneous opinions.” Moreover, as in the survey questions about the merits of restoring the Caliphate (the framework of Islamic authority or governance established in the earliest years of the post-prophetic period) or on introducing the Sharia law (the Islamic code of law derived from the Qur’an and the traditions of prophet Muhammad, and fixed in the first three centuries of Muslim history⁴), the “varied responses lend support to the paradigm of a diverse and divided Islamic community.”

If the purpose of such surveys is to assess the opinion of Canada’s Muslim population, then the findings are mostly reassuring and confirm, as the CBC survey concluded, that “Canadian Muslims appear to be the most contented, moderate and, well, Canadian in the developed world.”⁴ But in the post-9/11 world and in the context of the “war on terror” – or in the framework of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis that Leuprecht and Winn make reference to in their study – we need studies whose purpose is to identify that segment of the Canadian Muslim population where the most likely source of Islamist threat to security is embedded. The usefulness of past surveys is minimal apart from the finding that a small portion of Canadian Muslims, somewhere in the low teens, identify with or support the politics of those Muslims who preach jihad (holy war) and engage in terrorist violence as a religious obligation of Islam. The fact that a small portion of Canadian Muslims – in the Environics/CBC survey 14 per cent of Canadian Muslims identified with extremist Muslims – is in some manner supportive of Islamists (Muslims who have made Islam into a political ideology and are committed to wage jihad, and are associated with or supportive of al Qaeda and similar organizations) should be a matter of alarm for the public and the government responsible for the security of Canadians.

As someone who is a Muslim and a Canadian, my knowledge and experience provide me with insight into the Muslim Canadian community that is absent in the findings of these surveys. Proper context is crucial to derive an insider’s view of people and issues pertaining to culture and religion. The best of polling data only provides aggregate numbers revealing the bare topography of the subject. What follows are a few observations after reading the Leuprecht and Winn study of the context in which Muslim Canadians need to be situated to explain their thinking and attitudes, and the reality of their circumstances as immigrants to understand them in their private lives as distinct from what they disclose of their views in public.

First, “Muslim” is not an ethnic marker; it is the religious identity of people accepting Islam as their faith. Secondly, the Muslim world is ethnically diverse, and Islam is not a monolith in terms of how it is observed, understood, and practiced by some 1.6 billion people. And thirdly, though the cradle of Islam was in the Arab milieu and its sacred text, the Qur’an, is in Arabic, Arabs in number are about one-fifth of the total global Muslim population. These facts are relevant to consider in discussing the views of Muslim Canadians and Muslims in general, since much of the discussion in recent years of Islam and Muslims in the Western media – and in colleges and universities in the West – is driven by the news from the Middle East or what constitutes the Arab

---


⁴ Fn. 1.
world. The reasons for this are situated in the strategic importance of the Middle East for the West given the oil resources of the Arab world, in the geographical location of the Middle East at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa, in the volatility of inter-Arab politics and the instability of the balance of power in the region, in the nature of Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts that remain unsettled, in the role of the Arab states in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and of oil-producing Arab states in amassing petrodollar wealth that has given some of these states, particularly Saudi Arabia, immense influence in shaping the practice of Islam among non-Arab Muslims.

Muslims in Canada are recent immigrants. The vast majority of immigrant Muslims come from the economically less developed countries of Asia and Africa, and from cultures that are predominantly tribal, collectivist, illiberal, non-secular and non-democratic in contrast to Canada’s liberal democracy. The political reality of these countries is that they are failed states unable to fulfill basic needs for the security and well-being of their people. Hence, the economic-cultural-political gap between the country of origin of Muslims and the host country, Canada, is huge and unlike the cultural make-up of earlier generations of immigrants to Canada from Europe. Muslims immigrating to Canada bring their cultural baggage, most conspicuously their identity in terms of religion, which is, at a minimum, at odds with the culture of liberal democracy based on individual rights. Multiculturalism as an official policy in Canada has provided Muslim immigrants with a haven to make substantive gains in their economic well-being in an advanced capitalist democracy, while having the freedom to preserve the practices of their respective cultures and faith-tradition.

When Islam is an identity of a people, and not a personal faith, as it is in the Arab countries, in Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and just about every other Muslim-majority country, then politics get expressed and done within the framework of Islam provided by Muslim history and tradition. Four-fifths of the global Muslim population belong to the Sunni sect of Islam, and the balance belong to the minority Shi‘i sect, and in recent years the Wahhabi school of Islam among Sunni Muslims, which is the Saudi version of the most extreme fundamentalist interpretation of Islam that was once at the margin of the Muslim world, has gained a dominant status as a result of Saudi oil-wealth in shaping Muslim understanding and practice of the faith. The chief characteristic of this phenomenon among Muslims is the imperative to follow Sharia law in full as it was codified in the classical period of Islam during the first three centuries of Muslim history, the 8th-11th centuries CE. Following the 1979 revolution and the making of the Islamic republic, Shi‘i Muslims in Shi‘i majority Iran, in competition with Saudi Arabia have pushed for the implementation of the Shi‘i version of the Sharia law. Consequently, over the past several decades politics in the Muslim world have become generally less secular and more religious, and the official or state-approved practice of Islam is adherence to Sharia law even in those Muslim-majority countries where such practice falls short.

In Muslim immigrant communities among majority non-Muslims, as in Canada, we find the first collective effort is to raise funds for establishing a mosque. This effort is not unique since other minority religious groups, such as Jews, have also acted similarly in building a house of worship which then also becomes a centre of social

---

5 For definition and description of failed-state, see the seventh annual index of failed states in Foreign Policy, August 2011.
What do Muslim Canadians Want?

and cultural life of that community. But this effort of Muslims has taken on a distinctly different shade from that of other minority groups in recent years due to how the funds for such efforts are arranged. Muslim immigrant communities in Canada and the West have solicited money off-shore for building mosques, and Saudi Arabia, Libya, Gulf emirates and Iran have generously provided petrodollars as charitable funds. These petrodollar-funded mosques are generally managed by Muslims deeply influenced by Saudi Islam and those belonging to or affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood founded by the Egyptian Hasan al-Banna and the Jamaat-i-Islami founded by the Pakistani Maulana Maudoodi. Both Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-i-Islami blended their doctrinal views with that of the Wahhabi sect under the influence of the Saudi rulers and their generous funding support.

Petrodollar-funded mosques are generally managed by Muslims deeply influenced by Saudi Islam and those belonging to or affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.

The key to understanding Muslim Canadians is to distinguish between those who regularly attend mosques, especially those who participate in the weekly Friday communal prayer, and those who rarely go to mosques. Most mosques are run by religiously-trained imams from a Muslim country, preferably an Arab country, or by men inclined to the teachings of the Brotherhood (Ikhwan) or the Jamaat. The culture of these mosques is supportive of Sharia-adherence and Sharia-compliance. Sex segregation is imposed and women are required to wear hijab (full head covering), and the religious sermons supportive of jihad are barely distinguishable from what would be a political sermon covering the spectrum from anti-Israel and anti-American views to anti-West in terms of West’s cultural values and civilizational opposition to Islam and Muslims.

A recent study based on a representative sample of surveys done of some 100 mosques across the U.S. reveals the extent to which understanding what goes on inside mosques is critical in identifying that segment of immigrant Muslims from whom the Islamist threat is likely to emanate. The authors of this study, Mordechai Kedar and David Yerushalmi, write,

Unfortunately, the results of the current survey strongly suggest that Islam – as it is generally practiced in mosques across the United States – continues to manifest a resistance to the kind of tolerant religious and legal framework that would allow its followers to make a sincere affirmation of liberal citizenship. This survey provides empirical support for the view that mosques across America, as institutional and social settings for mosque-going Muslims, are at least resistant to social cooperation with non-Muslims. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of mosques surveyed promoted literature supportive of violent jihad and a significant number invited speakers known to have promoted violent jihad and other behaviors that are inconsistent with a reasonable construct of liberal citizenship.6

Mosques in Canada receiving off-shore funding are similarly supportive of an Islam oriented to the teachings of the Ikhwan and the Jamaat. This Islam is preached by men who find jihad praiseworthy and place great importance on living by the Sharia code. From the ranks of these mosques emerge Muslim activists who join the broader Canadian society with the ultimate political and religious objectives of gaining recognition from the Canadian state of Sharia law as the basis by which Muslim

Canadians will be judged in their private and public conduct. It might be noted here that the official position of the Muslim world for all Muslims was set forth in the Cairo Declaration of August 5, 1990 signed by the ministers for foreign affairs of the member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. This OIC declaration makes it abundantly clear that all rights and freedoms for Muslims as set forth in the Declaration are derived from the Sharia, and the Sharia is “the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification to any of the articles of this Declaration.” Muslim Canadians, in other words, are required to give loyalty to the global Muslim ummah (community) as represented by the OIC when it comes to matters of faith than they owe to the state where they reside as a minority. Since faith and politics are fused in Islam, religious fealty of Muslim Canadians abiding by the teachings in mosques is inseparable from their politics.

A recent 2010 research by the Washington-based Center for Security Policy titled Shariah: The Threat to America, and also known as the Report of Team B II, provides a very detailed and comprehensive study on how the political activism of American Muslims to advance Sharia-compliance vitiates the American Constitution. This study is also relevant to Canada since there are cross-border organizational linkages between mosque-based Muslim organizations in America and those in Canada, such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) operating on both sides of the U.S.-Canada border. Since mosques are the main institutions of immigrant Muslims in the West, the key to explaining and understanding Muslim thinking and conduct in Canada is to analyse mosque-based activities. Consider the Muslim Canadians attending mosques infrequently or only on religious holidays, are assimilationists seeking to integrate the political and cultural values of their adopted home as immigrants, while striving to maintain their religion as a matter of private and personal belief; perhaps they constitute a large percentage of the total number of Muslim Canadians, if not the majority. They are Muslim Canadians who need support and encouragement by the wide majority of society and by the government since they are considered to be lapsed Muslims or even worse, heretics and apostates, by the regular mosque attending Muslims. They suffer ostracism, or the threat of ostracism, from Muslims connected with mosques and instructed by imams and leaders of Muslim immigrant communities. It is the fear of such latent threats that prevents most Muslim Canadians from disclosing to non-Muslims their real thoughts on matters specifically connected with Islam in the public life of immigrants. The corollary to this is that mosque attending Muslims in general are likely to be consciously engaged in dissembling their real thoughts on Islam when discussing the subject with non-Muslims.

In conclusion, the Leuprecht and Winn study asking “What Do Muslim Canadians Want?” is instructive in disclosing what Muslim Canadians do not speak about and what they are not asked. I agree with the authors that more in-depth research is needed to better grasp the attitudes and behaviour of immigrant Muslims in Canada, and to prevent the fault-lines between Muslim Canadians and the majority of Canadians from becoming unbridgeable or lethal as happened in London on July 7, 2005 when young Muslim men born in Britain turned homicidal against their country and engaged in suicide-bombings of the London public transport system in the name of Islam.

The key to understanding Muslim Canadians is to distinguish between those who regularly attend mosques and those who rarely attend.
Christian Leuprecht

Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Economics at the Royal Military College of Canada and cross-appointed to the Department of Political Studies and the School of Policy Studies at Queen’s University, Christian Leuprecht has held visiting appointments at Yale University, the University of Augsburg and the Swedish National Defence College. He has published seven books and over 40 book chapters and articles in scholarly journals.

Conrad Winn

President of COMPAS Research and Professor of Political Science at Carleton University, Conrad Winn is author of many professional books and articles on media and public opinion. Three relevant to this study are Theater of Terror: Mass Media and International Terrorism (New York, 1994), “Canada and the Clash of Media Civilizations” (London, 2007), and Public Consultations on Canada’s Democratic Institutions and Practices (Ottawa, 2007).

Daniel Pipes

Daniel Pipes, a historian, is president of the Middle East Forum and Taube distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. A former official in the U.S. Department of State, he has taught at the University of Chicago, Harvard University, the U.S. Naval War College, and Pepperdine University. He has written twelve books and his website, DanielPipes.org, with a near-complete archive of his writings, has recorded 60 million page visits. He writes a bi-weekly column for the Jerusalem Post, National Review, and other publications; his writings have been translated into 33 languages. Two U.S. presidents have appointed Mr. Pipes to U.S. government positions. Al-Qaeda has invited him to convert to Islam, Edward Kennedy borked him, and Edward Said called him an “Orientalist.” His current focus is on the phenomenon of lawful Islamism (or soft jihad), the forwarding radical Islam through legitimate means. Contact: Pipes@MEForum.org.
Alex Wilner

Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies at the ETH Zurich (Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) in Switzerland, Alex Wilner’s primary research interests include terrorism, counterterrorism, and deterrence theory. A native of Montreal, he holds a Doctorate and Master’s degree from Dalhousie University and a Bachelor’s degree from McGill University. His research has been awarded a number of scholarships, including two from the Department of National Defence. Dr. Wilner’s work has been published in a number of academic journals and he is a regular contributor to The Globe and Mail and The National Post. He recently co-edited a book, Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice (forthcoming 2012, Stanford University Press). In 2010, he gave testimony before the Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism (Government of Canada) on prison radicalization. Currently, he is completing his own book on the subject of deterring terrorism and teaches a course, Issues in Contemporary Terrorism and Radicalization, at the University of Zurich.

Salim Mansur

Salim Mansur is an Associate Professor of political science at the University of Western Ontario. His research interests include comparative/political economy of development, the Muslim world, Islam, South Asia, Middle East. He is the author of the recently released Delectable Lie: a liberal repudiation of multiculturalism (2011).
The Macdonald-Laurier Institute publishes works of research on a regular basis. We endeavour to work with authors and create publications that mirror our mission and move us closer to our goal. Ultimately we hope that our publications will encourage Canadians to think about public policy issues and ways that these policies can be improved.

The University of Pennsylvania’s “Think Tanks and Civic Societies” Program rated MLI one of the top 20 new think tanks in the world in 2009-10.
True North in Canadian Public Policy

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy exists to make poor-quality public policy in Ottawa unacceptable to Canadians and their political and opinion leaders, by proposing thoughtful alternatives through non-partisan and independent research and commentary.

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is an independent, non-partisan registered charity for educational purposes in both Canada and the United States. We are grateful for support from a variety of foundations, corporations and individual donors. The Institute would not be able to continue making a difference for Canadians without the support of people across Canada and the United States for our publications on policy issues from aboriginal affairs to democratic institutions; support for our events featuring thought and opinion leaders; and support for our other activities.

For information on supporting the work of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute by making a charitable donation, please visit our website at www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/supportMLI

The notion that a new think-tank in Ottawa is unnecessary because it would duplicate existing institutions is completely mistaken. The truth is there is a deep dearth of independent think-tanks in our nation’s capital.

- Allan Gotlieb, former Deputy Minister of External Affairs and Ambassador to Washington

To surmount the enormous challenges of getting Canada’s place in the world right and taking advantage of changing opportunities, we need more ideas, input, discussion and debate in Ottawa - that is where the crucial decisions about our future are made. That’s why MLI is so vital to Canada today.

- Hon. James S. Peterson, former Minister of International Trade and Member of Parliament for 23 years

MLI is a registered charity for educational purposes with the IRS and CRA
Making a Name for Ourselves!

Winner, Sir Antony Fisher International Memorial Award
Best Think Tank Book in 2011
as awarded by the Atlas Economic Research Foundation

“Top 20 New Think Tank” in the world for 2010
as rated by the University of Pennsylvania

What people are saying about MLI:

Very much enjoyed your presentation this morning. It was first-rate and an excellent way of presenting the options which Canada faces during this period of “choice.”... Best regards, and keep up the good work.

Preston Manning, President and CEO, Manning Centre for Building Democracy

Congratulations all for the well deserved recognition. You’ve come a long way in a very short period of time.

Marc Patrone, Commissioner, CRTC

The reports and studies coming out of MLI are making a difference, and the Institute is quickly emerging as a premier Canadian think tank.

Jock Finlayson, Executive Vice President of Policy, Business Council of BC

In the global think-tank world, MLI has emerged quite suddenly as the “disruptive” innovator, achieving a well-deserved profile in mere months that most of the established players in the field can only envy. In a medium where timely, relevant, and provocative commentary defines value, MLI has already set the bar for think-tanks in Canada.”

Peter Nicholson, former senior policy advisor to Prime Minister Paul Martin

Where you’ve seen us:

THE GLOBE AND MAIL
NATIONAL POST

and in other major Canadian and international media

www.macdonaldlaurier.ca