<?xml version="1.0" encoding="windows-1252"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" >
<channel>
<title>The Macdonald Laurier Institute</title>
<description>True North in Canadian Public Policy</description>
<link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/</link>
<language>en-us</language>

<item>
<title>A Glimpse at Canada’s Place in Obama’s World</title><description><![CDATA[On May 27, the Obama administration released its first National Security Strategy, a public document that  every U.S. administration is required to produce every four years by  Congress &ndash; it is a statutory requirement under section 108 of the  National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C. 404a).
The purpose of the document is to provide an outline of how the  United States government sees the threats and opportunities confronting  U.S. interests in a dangerous world in a public way, so that citizens  can join a democratic debate about U.S. national security policy (and,  not coincidentally, generate public pressure that can strengthen  Congress in U.S. foreign policymaking).
Here is the sum total of the document&rsquo;s explicit mentions of Canada  (pages 42-43):

&quot;North America: The strategic partnerships and unique  relationships we maintain with Canada and Mexico are critical to U.S.  national security and have a direct effect on the security of our  homeland. With billions of dollars in trade, shared critical  infrastructure, and millions of our citizens moving across our common  borders, no two countries are more directly connected to our daily  lives. We must change the way we think about our shared borders, in  order to secure and expedite the lawful and legitimate flow of people  and goods while interdicting transnational threat that threaten our open  societies.
&ldquo;Canada is our closest trading partner, a steadfast security ally,  and an important partner in regional and global efforts. Our mutual  prosperity is closely interconnected, including through our trade  relationship with Mexico through NAFTA. With Canada, our security  cooperation includes our defense of North America and our efforts  through NATO overseas. And our cooperation is critical to the success of  international efforts on issues ranging from international climate  negotiations to economic cooperation through the G-20.
&ldquo;With Mexico, in addition to trade cooperation, we are working  together to identify and interdict threats at the earliest opportunity,  even before they reach North America. Stability and security in Mexico  are indispensable to building a strong economic partnership, fighting  the illicit drug and arms trade, and promoting sound immigration  policy.&rdquo;

In addition to the above section, Canada is also addressed (without  being named) as part of the discussion of NATO (which is part of a  section on European allies, and part of the section on Afghanistan and  Pakistan) and the G-8 and G-20.
Reading the Obama administration&rsquo;s framing of Canada in the context  of U.S. global interests and relationships, a few things stand out.
First, the Obama administration gives about the same weight (and  space) to Canada as the George W. Bush administration did. Canadian  energy, which rated attention for Bush, is not emphasized here. The  Obama team offers to &ldquo;rethink&rdquo; border security approaches, rather than  toughening border security, which holds out the hope of at least a  dialogue on easing border barriers to legitimate flows of people and  goods.
The Obama strategy follows the Bush strategies by placing Canada  firmly in the North American region, along with Mexico. Toward the end  of the Bush administration, several prominent Canadians called for a  re-emphasis on bilateral dialogue with the United States, with  trilateral conversations including Mexico continuing on an &ldquo;as needed&rdquo;  basis. The Obama administration&rsquo;s response here is to continue to  emphasize North American diplomacy.
At the same time, the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy&rsquo;s language  on U.S. cooperation on security and prosperity with Canada and Mexico  is not very specific. In the second of the George W. Bush  administrations&rsquo; National Security Strategy documents (issued in 2006)  the rhetoric of cooperation was translated into action in the form of  the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, or SPP. The  elaborate SPP process &ndash; it had twenty trilateral working groups, regular  ministerial steering committee meetings, reports to the leaders and  annual North American leaders&rsquo; summits &ndash; was dropped at the 2009 North  American leaders&rsquo; meeting in Guadalajara in favour of a simpler,  bureaucratically-driven and top-down led model of results-oriented,  limited cooperation in a handful of priority areas.
Of the old SPP structure, only the annual leaders&rsquo; meetings remain  and it is Canada&rsquo;s turn to host in 2010. Amidst the preparations for the  upcoming G-8 summit in Huntsville, Ontario and the subsequent G-20  meetings in Toronto, it is striking that the date and location for a  2010 North American leaders&rsquo; meeting have not been announced.
It remains unclear when the three leaders will meet to address  regional issues and follow-up on the agenda they agreed to in  Guadalajara. If the North American leaders&rsquo; meeting in 2010 is reduced  to a press conference on the side of the G-8 or G-20 meetings later this  month, it will confirm the vague approach to North American cooperation  in the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy as a down-grade of the  level of formal intra-regional diplomacy from the previous  administration&rsquo;s SPP benchmark.
Unlike past national security strategy documents, the 2010 edition  has a lengthy section on the U.S. economy, entitled &ldquo;Advancing Our  Interests: Prosperity&rdquo; (pages 28-34). There are references to  international markets, competitiveness, and innovation here &ndash; but no  recognition of the continental linkages that bind the economies of the  United States, Canada, and Mexico so tightly together that the  competitiveness and prosperity of each is interdependent on the others.
President Obama is clearly more comfortable with domestic policy that  foreign policy, but there is a need to overcome a false dichotomy  between domestic and international issues and policies that many of us  encounter &ndash; a split we see in college courses, news media, and elite  commentary. One way to begin to integrate U.S. strategic thinking about  the global economy would be to acknowledge the significant economic  interdependence of the United States and its immediate neighbours. For a  document that reflects the intellectual framing of U.S. interests by  the administration, Canada&rsquo;s absence from the economic portion of the  strategy is a disappointing lacuna.
The new U.S. National Security Strategy also devotes attention to the  promotion of U.S. values in a section that echoes former Canadian  foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy&rsquo;s claims on behalf of Canada to &ldquo;moral  superpower&rdquo; status. The Obama administration, too, hopes that U.S. soft  power can grow into a central instrument of U.S. strategy. Democracy,  development, human rights are all important priorities and it is good to  promote these in pursuit of a better world. Canadian readers of this  section of the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy will certainly feel  that they&rsquo;ve heard all of this before, of course. The point is not that  it is bad for any government to aim to promote certain values, but that  both Canada and the United States share these values and it is a pity  that neither has recognized that their strategies ought to promote doing  so cooperatively.
To summarize, the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy addresses the  importance of Canada to U.S. national security and vital national  interests only in the context of the North American region, and linked  to U.S. relations with Mexico. This is not how many Canadians would  prefer to be viewed. In other multilateral bodies and alliances,  Canada&rsquo;s presence is implicit and unmentioned; this clearly contributes  to an underestimation of Canada&rsquo;s potential to aid the United States as a  friend and ally around the world.
And most significantly, in a U.S. National Security Strategy document  that goes farther than any previous one to place domestic economic  challenges in a global context, Canada is not seen as part of a shared  continental economy with the United States. The new strategy fails to  grasp Canada&rsquo;s role as a major foreign investor, the largest U.S. export  market, intimately linked to the U.S. economy by complex cross-border  supply chains that make American and Canadians co-workers rather than  mere trading partners. This is more than an oversight &ndash; it is a failure  to accurately perceive U.S. economic interests in their totality.
It is possible to make too much of a public relations document like  the U.S. National Security Strategy. But since its purpose is to engage  the public in a debate about foreign policy, Canadians might well take  from the Obama administration&rsquo;s latest effort a broad indication of what  U.S. officials are thinking about Canada &ndash; and what they have missed. A  better U.S. strategy for the future would take into account how the  fate of Canada influences the fate of the U.S. economy and our national  economic interests.
Perhaps Canadian national security strategy should begin by trying to  change American thinking for the better.
Christopher Sands is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and a  member of the Research Advisory Board of the Macdonald-Laurier  Institute.]]></description><pubDate>2010-06-07</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=153</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>Moving out of America's Shadow?</title><description><![CDATA[It&rsquo;s the classic tale of hopes dashed through craven failure to heed a  hero&rsquo;s words. Wilfrid Laurier said that Canada would own the twentieth  century. It didn&rsquo;t happen.
As Brian Lee Crowley, Jason Clemens, and Niels Veldhuis tell it,  Canadians failed to claim their place in the world because they  abandoned Laurier&rsquo;s economic program (Canada&rsquo;s Century, Moving  Out of America&rsquo;s Shadow, published this week by Key Porter for the  Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Policy Studies). But we may yet  prevail!&nbsp; Laurier envisaged this country as an &ldquo;economic out-performer,&rdquo;  they argue; &ldquo;a land of work for all who want it, of opportunity,  investment, innovation, and prosperity.&rdquo; We have only to gather up our  courage.
The prime interest of this book lies in the comparison of Laurier&rsquo;s  policies with economic reforms of the 1980s that were introduced equally  by political parties of the right, left, and centre at both levels of  government in an effort to reduce deficits and strengthen the Canadian  economy. I will leave the discussion of these reforms and the comparison  with Laurier to the economists, noting only that while the book has a  strongly nationalist bent &ndash; the authors&rsquo; hope is that Canada will move  out of &ldquo;America&rsquo;s long shadow&rdquo; &ndash; the reforms said to exemplify Laurier&rsquo;s  wisdom and Canada&rsquo;s hopes are typically neo-liberal. It used to be  received wisdom that the Canadian way of life was preferable to the  American because it was less individualistic and less materialistic.  Crowley, Clemens, and Veldhuis argue that the Canadian way &ndash; Laurier&rsquo;s  way, as they convince us &ndash; is superior because it respects individual  freedoms, rewards individual effort, and generates wealth for all.
It&rsquo;s an inspiring project. There&rsquo;s one point that need clarifying &ndash;  needs, I would say, sober second thought. The authors propose a joint  committee of Congress and Parliament to determine Canadian-American  issues. They write:
&ldquo;By creating a formal joint body, composed of equal numbers of  members from both national legislatures, co-chaired by a Canadian and an  American, required to meet regularly and frequently, and empowered to  hold hearings, summon witnesses and issue reports to the two originating  bodies [Parliament and Congress] we move continental issues into the  heart of [policy-makers&rsquo;] decisions. We engage senators and  representatives by giving them a forum to voice their concerns and get  their issues on the table. Creating a body where important policymakers  get to know one another and learn to cooperate across the border to  advance their issues builds relations that can only advance Canada&rsquo;s  interests. (See Canada&rsquo;s Century, pages 167-169, or the excerpt  from Canada&rsquo;s Century in the National Post, Thursday  May 27, A19).
Whoa! A continental legislative committee? I can&rsquo;t see all the  ramifications. Would all political parties be represented? Our four  Canadian parties plus their two? What&rsquo;s the view in the Canadian  provinces about this idea of an American-Canadian committee of  legislators? The authors suggest that the joint body should meet  &ldquo;regularly and frequently.&rdquo; Will that mean that members will sometimes  be absent from their national legislature on vital matters? Will they  sometimes be absent from Parliament and Congress when Canadian-American  matters come up at home?
The Canadian Parliament is a national institution, representing all  Canadians. Each Member of Parliament speaks for her/his home  constituency and also for the country of Canada from coast to coast to  coast. The great strength of a parliament is that in law each member  must debate national issues with his home constituency in mind, and  matters of importance to his constituents with the nation in mind. It&rsquo;s  not an easy thing to do as Edmund Burke knew and as every Canadian MP  and Senator knows.
Will a continental legislative committee take us out of America&rsquo;s  shadow? Or effect a continental political integration?]]></description><pubDate>2010-05-27</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=144</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>The Roads to Victory</title><description><![CDATA[Historian Jack Granatstein, a member of MLI's Research  Advisory Board, writes about Canada's role in the Netherlands during the Second  World War, in Legion Magazine. Reprinted  with permission.]]></description><pubDate>2010-05-08</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=120</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>The Roads to Victory</title><description><![CDATA[Historian Jack Granatstein, a member of MLI's Research  Advisory Board, writes about Canada's role in the Netherlands during the Second  World War, in Legion Magazine. Reprinted  with permission.]]></description><pubDate>2010-05-08</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=119</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>Terror at Times Square: Measuring a Near Miss</title><description><![CDATA[Last Saturday afternoon, a car bomb parked near Times Square failed  to detonate. On Monday night, Faisal Shahzad was arrested for allegedly  constructed the device. On the surface, this was a happy ending to a  potentially devastating episode: no one was killed and the suspected  bomber was caught.
Like so many other recent terrorist plots, however, the Times Square  bombing represents both a resounding failure and at best a partial  success of post-9/11 US counterterrorism efforts.
First, let&rsquo;s be absolutely clear: this wasn&rsquo;t a counterterrorism  success, but a lucky break. There&rsquo;s an important difference. The plot  was neither uncovered at its inception, nor was it impeded in practice.  The bomb simply failed. That May 1, 2010 will not go down in  history as a day of mourning for the scores of Americans and tourists  killed and maimed in the first act of mass-casualty terrorism on US soil  since 9/11, notwithstanding the 2009 Fort Hood attacks, has almost nothing to do  with successful counterterrorism. &nbsp;Like the failed bombing attempt over  the skies of Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, Americans have Lady Luck to  thank for Saturday&rsquo;s bust.
This isn&rsquo;t to belittle the vigilance of various New Yorkers who  spotted the smoking vehicle and had the good sense to immediately alert  police. Nor is it to mock the courage and quick-thinking of the New York  Police Department. It is, however, about putting the bombing attempt in  proper perspective. The Washington Post&rsquo;s David Ignatius  suggests the attack was &ldquo;thwarted by a combination of high-tech surveillance and  vigilant citizens.&rdquo; Technically, Ignatius has it exactly wrong.  Surveillance was exceptionally useful in catching Shahzad after the  fact, but it did little to hinder or deter his attempt to bomb Times  Square. Public vigilance, too, is always a good thing. It might have  saved lives had the bomb actual gone off, but while the t-shirt vendors  who spotted the vehicle are indeed heroes, their vigilance&nbsp;didn&rsquo;t thwart the bomber  either.
The would-be bombing attempt instead brings to light other failures.&nbsp;  Consider these three:

    Shahzad was naturalized as an American citizen one year ago

Shahzad lived in the United States for over a decade,&nbsp;received  university degrees (including an MBA) in the US, married an American  citizen and raised two little girls, settled in a nice home in  Connecticut, and worked as a junior financial analyst for over three  years. On all counts, Shahzad lived as an integrated and motivated  immigrant. Despite all of his successes living and working in the US, he  still came to believe that he had a legitimate obligation to target  Americans with terrorism. At some point in mid-2009 he became  radicalized; he dropped everything, quit his job, and moved the family  to Pakistan. He returned to the US after having received terrorism  training in Pakistan and with the intent to kill Americans. For some  reason, the American dream failed Shahzad. He certainly isn&rsquo;t the first &ndash;  as many as 10 would-be terrorism plots involving Americans were  uncovered in the US in 2009 alone &ndash; and he won&rsquo;t be the last. But the  Times Square plot does raise prickly questions anew: What&rsquo;s going on  here? Why are Western citizens, long-time residents, second-generation  immigrants, and Muslim converts participating in terrorism?

    Shahzad was not on any international, federal, or state terrorism  watch list

Despite the fact that he apparently received terrorism training in  Pakistan, is thought to have established some form of affiliation with  either the Pakistani Taliban, Jaishe-e-Muhammad, or another  group, and was actively recruited to conduct an attack &lsquo;back home&rsquo;,  Shahzad was invisible and unknown to authorities until 24 hours after  his car bomb fizzled. Upon his return to the US on February 3, 2010,  Shahzad spent three months preparing his attack and successfully eluded  all security measures designed to trap terrorists. As an American  citizen, he easily passed US customs at the airport: &ldquo;I was visiting my  parents in Pakistan&rdquo; he is reported to have told US officials. In April,  he used cash to purchase a prepaid cell phone and activated it for 12  days. With it he purchased the vehicle and the fireworks he would later  use in the car bomb. On the day he bought the vehicle (also in cash) he  received calls from Pakistan, presumably from his  handlers.&nbsp;For the next two weeks, Shahzad went undetected as he  collected various materials &ndash; all of them (gasoline, fertilizer, propane  tanks) easily and legally purchasable &ndash; and constructed the device.  While car bombs are generally difficult to detect  and US  security officials probably did little wrong in overlooking Shahzad,  none of this brings much comfort. If the most sophisticated  counterterrorism system in the world couldn't stop Shahzad, how many  other &ldquo;unknown unknowns&rdquo; are we missing today?

    Shahzad was not an incompetent terrorist

When terrorists fail, there&rsquo;s often a drive to paint them as  incompetent. If only shoe bomber Richard Reid had thought of blowing up  his shoe in the plane&rsquo;s lavatory, he might have succeeded in his 2002  attempt to destroy American Airlines 63. Ditto knicker-bomber Umar  Abdulmutallab in 2009. And if only Nicky Reilly hadn&rsquo;t decided to  detonate his bombs in a bathroom in his 2008 attack on an Exeter  restaurant in England, he might have actually hurt someone other than  himself. History is replete with suicide bombers tripping down stairs,  triggering their bombs in deserted alleys, purchasing explosives from  security officials, and bungling their plans. US Senator Christopher  (&lsquo;Kit&rsquo;) Bond, the ranking Republican on the Senate intelligence  committee, just couldn&rsquo;t help himself in describing Shahzad: &ldquo;Like the  Christmas Day bomber, we were lucky that both of these folks were incompetent  - they couldn&rsquo;t trigger the explosives.&rdquo;&nbsp;&nbsp;But Senator Bond is only  partially correct. Both men did everything else right to put  themselves in positions to kill tens and potentially hundreds of  Americans. Shahzad&rsquo;s plan only failed at the very last phase after he  successfully acquired, constructed, and placed the car bomb, undetected,  in Times Square. In his many cumulative successes, he proves himself no  fool. Had Shahzad been a willing suicide bomber instead of simply  lighting the fuse and running off to catch a flight to Dubai, he very  well might have succeeded.
So while Americans are right to breathe a sigh of welcome relief  following Saturday&rsquo;s near disaster and should applaud security officials  and various government agencies for their expeditious work in gathering  intelligence and arresting Shahzad a mere 53  hours after he lit the fuse,&nbsp;the episode leads&nbsp;to a&nbsp;lot more  uncertainty than it does comfort.]]></description><pubDate>2010-05-05</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=115</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>William Thorsell's Senate</title><description><![CDATA[In an article slamming Stephen Harper&rsquo;s proposals for reform of the  Canadian Senate (Saturday&rsquo;s Globe and Mail), William Thorsell  pulls out all the stops.
Harper&rsquo;s elective Senate would &ldquo;encourage delay and obstruction of  legislation by factions with Senate seats (separatists, religious  groups, [and] cantankerous individuals beyond the discipline of a caucus  in the House of Commons).&rdquo;
&ldquo;Separatists, religious groups and cantankerous individuals!&rdquo; Well,  no right-thinking person would want to turn the government of Canada  over to separatists and cranks. But who is Mr. Thorsell really talking  about when he speaks of members &ldquo;beyond the discipline of a caucus in  the House of Commons&rdquo;? He is talking about what is usually called Her  Majesty&rsquo;s Loyal Opposition.
It is famously said about the British Parliamentary system that its  most precious feature is the security it affords the opposition.  Thorsell is calling for the opposition&rsquo;s suppression. In his peculiar  vision, parliamentary government is supposed to keep the stream of  legislation rolling along with less &ldquo;delay.&rdquo; More laws! More laws! Less  &ldquo;obstruction.&rdquo; Less noise from all opposed.
John A. Macdonald put the case for the parliamentary opposition this  way. He was speaking in the debates of 1865 on the Quebec Resolutions.  &ldquo;[We] &hellip; enjoy the privileges of constitutional liberty according to the  British system &hellip; We will enjoy here that which is the great test of  constitutional freedom &ndash; we will have the rights of the minority  respected. In all countries the rights of the majority take care of  themselves, but it is only in countries like England, enjoying  constitutional liberty and safe from the tyrannies of a single tyrant or  of an unbridled democracy that the rights of minorities are regarded.&rdquo;  By &ldquo;the minority&rdquo; and &ldquo;minorities,&rdquo; Macdonald meant the political groups  and parties on the opposition benches, the groups and individuals that  disagreed with the governing majority.
It&rsquo;s truly surprising how little understanding Thorsell has of the  Westminster system. The Senate or Upper Chamber &ndash; call it by whatever  name &ndash; has a vital role to play in querying, stalling or vetoing  legislation when a prime minister attempts to use his clout in the  Commons to ride roughshod over dissenters.
The importance Macdonald attached to the Senate&rsquo;s obligations in this  regard is shown by his reluctance to countenance appointment of  additional senators to break a deadlock between legislative houses.  (There was no provision for appointment of additional senators in the  Quebec Resolutions.) He said:

&ldquo;No ministry in Canada in the future can do what they  have done in Canada before &ndash; they cannot, with the view of carrying any  measure or of strengthening the party, attempt to overrule the  independent opinion of the upper house by filling it with its partisans  and political supporters.&rdquo;

Macdonald was the leader of the majority party in the provincial  assembly. He was in his prime. He could expect to lead the  Conservatives, the province, and if all went as expected and hoped for,  the new country, for years to come. Yet here he in the debates on the  new constitution defending the rights of the opposition parties, that  is, the Independents, the Liberals, and the Rouges. And to secure those  rights he wants the new nation to have an effective upper house, with  powers secured by the law.
Thorsell tries to spice up his argument with a little  anti-Americanism. An elected Senate &ldquo;would import much of the American  political dynamic (or disease).&rdquo; But it&rsquo;s a dreary essay. He is looking  forward to the Senate&rsquo;s demise.
[From the Idea File]]]></description><pubDate>2010-05-03</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=114</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>Mr. Harper and the Senate</title><description><![CDATA[Do we need a Senate? Yes. It is one of the institutions securing  Canadians&rsquo; liberty. A free country requires a legislature that hears all  political and ideological arguments and it is supremely the Senate&rsquo;s  duty to resist attempts by the Prime Minister and Cabinet to use their  numbers in the Commons to discourage criticism and limit debate.
That&rsquo;s what the Fathers of Confederation believed. They didn&rsquo;t think a  constitutional bill of rights was necessary. The freedom of political  deliberation guaranteed by parliamentary institutions would suffice.
These days Mr. Harper is doing his best to reform the Senate. You&rsquo;d  think he would prefer to let it languish or die. Not a few Canadians  believe Harper is prone to act high-handedly and is intolerant of  political criticism. But here he is, bent on saving an institution that  will be likely if his efforts succeed to house effective opposition.
Most of the provinces started out with two legislative chambers but  first one ambitious premier and then another found the frustration of  coping with the dual legislative process intolerable and used his  constitutional powers to write the upper house off the books.
Abolishing the Senate of Canada would require amendment of the  Constitution Act (1867), something difficult under our present stiff  amending formula. Difficult, but perhaps not impossible. The provincial  premiers don&rsquo;t like the Senate. The Canadian public is more or less  indifferent. (I won&rsquo;t speak about the academics.) The idea that an upper  chamber fosters liberty is unknown. (&ldquo;What&rsquo;s the Charter for then?&rdquo;)
Consider the arguments an anti-Senate campaign could mount. With the  senators out of the way the party in office will be able to get more  done, and do it faster and more cheaply. The Commons represents the  electoral majority; Senate interference is positively anti-democratic.  Those arguments might fly. It would be said that while the Canada of  Confederation needed an Upper Chamber to represent provinces and  regions, today we have other mechanisms in place.
What could a pro-Senate campaign offer in reply? &ldquo;We&rsquo;ve always had an  Upper Chamber. It&rsquo;s part of the Confederation bargain. Efficiency isn&rsquo;t  the be-all and end-all of politics. Make haste, make waste.  Unicameralism would be faster and cheaper, true, but you get what you  pay for.&rdquo; How effective would those sentiments be? It would be said that  the Senate excels at turning out political reports and studies. Are  Canadians addicted to the idea of political research?
Abolition, thank goodness, is not on the agenda and Mr Harper is  determined to save an institution that has served Canada well and  continues to serve. What&rsquo;s odd is that the political opposition appears  uninterested.]]></description><pubDate>2010-05-01</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=113</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>Parliamentary Deliberation as Canadian Tradition</title><description><![CDATA[Pierre Elliott Trudeau was notorious for saying that few yards from  the House, Members of Parliament were &ldquo;nobodies.&rdquo;
All governments, conservative or liberal, come in time to think of  hoarding information and curtailing public debate. Power corrupts.
Prime Minister Harper&rsquo;s prorogation of Parliament last January in an  attempt to forestall debate on the treatment of Afghan prisoners of war  looked dodgy then and seems positively shabby now, evidence of the  government&rsquo;s disdain for Parliament.
Now House of Commons Speaker Peter Milliken has upheld Parliament&rsquo;s  right to examine the documents necessary to assess the policy of  releasing prisoners of war to Afghan allies. There will be a debate. The  two hundred or so Canadian political scientists, philosophers, and law  professors who signed a petition four months ago protesting prorogation  are entitled to feel vindicated.
Parliament may decide to limit publication of information threatening  national safety or the Canadian troops. But the important matter has  been settled. In a parliamentary democracy the government of the day may  not high-handedly control an issue from start to finish.
A.V. Dicey said it; the Canadian parliamentarians of the 1860s said  it: parliamentary deliberation secures a country&rsquo;s liberty.]]></description><pubDate>2010-04-28</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=105</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>Revisiting Nuclear Terrorism: What Role for Deterrence?</title><description><![CDATA[If the United States is worried about nuclear terrorism, it holds  that Israel &ndash; embroiled as it is in multiple protracted conflicts with  Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorists and situated as it is next to  nuclear aspirant, terror-sponsoring Iran &ndash; should be doubly worried  about nuclear terrorism.
This is Chuck Freilich&rsquo;s starting assumption. A former  Israeli Deputy National Security Advisor for Foreign Affairs, Dr.  Freilich is currently a Senior Fellow at Harvard University&rsquo;s Belfer  Center. In a recent op-ed&nbsp; in Israel&rsquo;s leading daily paper, Haaretz (based  on&nbsp;a policy  brief he wrote for the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies)&nbsp;he  dubiously suggests nuclear terrorism poses &ldquo;two  unique problems in terms of deterrence&rdquo;&nbsp;for Israel.
First, he explains that terrorists who aspire to use nukes against  Israel &ldquo;are nihilist in nature&rdquo; and irrational as a result, and second,  he writes that because these groups are stateless they have no return  &ldquo;address&rdquo; for Israel to target, threaten, and retaliate against. In a  nutshell, deterrence only works if your adversary calculates the costs  and benefits of its actions (i.e. it acts rationally) and if you can  credibly threaten to punish and/or destroy something it values if and  when it decides to attack. The latter process, by threatening  punishment, raises the costs of a given action, which theoretically  deters and influences a rational actor.
Freilich&rsquo;s position is that Israel&rsquo;s current adversaries are either  purely &ldquo;nihilistic&rdquo; (in the case of al Qaeda and its supporters) or will  become irrational once they develop nuclear capabilities (in the case  of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran, whose &ldquo;ability to employ nuclear  terrorism is liable to change&rdquo; their current &ldquo;patterns&rdquo; of rational  behavior). He also assumes that Israeli threats of conventional and/or  nuclear retaliation might work to dissuade Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran  (all of whom have territory and assets that Israel can target) but that  &ldquo;it is very doubtful&rdquo; these threats will &ldquo;influence al Qaeda&rdquo;. His  solution to the latter case &ndash; one he describes as &ldquo;repugnant&rdquo; &ndash; is to  explore whether threatening to destroy &ldquo;population centers and sites of  symbolic and religious importance to Islam&rdquo; might be sufficient to deter  al Qaeda.
Setting aside the debates over the likelihood of nuclear terrorism (it&rsquo;s not likely in my opinion) and al Qaeda&rsquo;s  supposed irrationality, I want to further explore two of Freilich&rsquo;s  assumptions.
First, why would nuclear capability make Hezbollah, Hamas, and Iran  less rational and less cautious? Surely if these actors currently  appreciate the costs of engaging in warfare with Israel, as Freilich  writes, than they will appreciate the costs of attacking Israel if and  when they develop or obtain nuclear weapons. In fact, they may be more  sensitive to Israeli capabilities. Iran certainly could expect an  unprecedented Israeli onslaught for organizing a nuclear attack on  Israel (trading Tel Aviv for Tehran and all other major Iranian cities).  Instead of acting carelessly, a nuclear Iran might caution against  geo-political situations and conflicts that could spiral out of control.  Nobody, not even Iran, wants to slip accidently into a costly nuclear  exchange. The same goes for Hamas and Hezbollah. Both groups could  expect an end to their affairs for facilitating a nuclear attack on  Israel, at the expense of massive causalities in Gaza, the West Bank,  Lebanon, and Syria. If discussing untold human suffering seems unnerving  &ndash; it&rsquo;s meant to. Let&rsquo;s not forget, that during the Cold War, Canada and  its NATO allies held millions of Eastern Europeans hostage in exchange  for the lives of Western Europeans and North Americans in its deterrent  dealings with the USSR and the Soviet Bloc. Let&rsquo;s also recall that as  soon as everybody understood the costs of engaging in nuclear warfare,  behavior become more (not less) cautious.
Second, while it is true that al Qaeda (especially since its routing  from Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2007/8) is ostensibly &lsquo;stateless&rsquo;  and lacks territorial assets and a population base that can be  threatened, the organization does value other things. Freilich&rsquo;s  (controversial) call for investigating the deterrent effect of targeting  Islamic holy sites and population centers is an old one. The  strategy is not all that convincing, either. What Freilich fails to  illustrate, however, is that there are other assets non-state terrorist  organizations like al Qaeda value. Strategic and tactical terrorist  leaders, for instance, can be located, tracked, and killed or captured.  The expertise these individuals bring to the table is of value to al  Qaeda, so their removal and/or elimination represent a potential cost to organizing terrorism. Other  individuals who facilitate terrorism (legitimizes, donors, recruiters,  logisticians, and so on), can be threatened with capture, fines, jail  time, extradition, and so on. That these individuals are rarely suicidal  suggests their behavior can be influenced in various ways, to the  overall determinant of their organization.
Finally, deterrence theory posits that behavior is dictated by costs and  benefits. But Freilich limits his investigation to the effects of  raising the costs of an action (in terms of tacking on punishments).  There&rsquo;s another side to the calculus, however: an adversary&rsquo;s behavior  can be manipulated by lowering the benefits it can expect to achieve  with a particular action. That is, by denying the expected benefits  associated with an action, we make it less likely it will be held in  positive light. By doing that, we make the action less attractive and  manipulate the cost/benefit calculus associated with taking&nbsp;it. Israel,  the United States and others can deny nuclear terrorism by blocking  access to nuclear materials and expertise (which the April 2010 Summit  in Washington sought to do), by complicating the trade, transfer, and  shipment of nuclear materials (by honing abilities to locate, track, and  intercept hidden nuclear devices), and by hardening access to desired  target&nbsp;states&nbsp;(with better land, air, and sea border controls). Each  denial process manipulates an actor&rsquo;s behavior by underscoring that a  particular action is simply too difficult to pursue and that its  expected benefits are too uncertain to merit much effort.
In thinking about combating nuclear terrorism, we should investigate  the theory, logic, and practice of deterrence. It served us well in the  Cold War. Let&rsquo;s see if it can help us out today.]]></description><pubDate>2010-04-28</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=104</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>The Canadianization of Britain</title><description><![CDATA[On April 2, the Christian Science Monitor reported the news that  British Prime Minister Gordon Brown had called an election for May 6,  2010 with a comment on &ldquo;the Americanization of Britain&rdquo;.
This is a trend that the British themselves have worried about  militarily, culturally, economically, and now politically with varying  degrees of alarm since at least the end of the Second World War. Of  course, in this the Brits must acknowledge that Canada got there first,  with concerns about the Americanization of Canada pre-dating  Confederation.
Seen from my perch as a Canada-watcher in the United States, though,  the trend in the United Kingdom seems to be the gradual Canadianization  of Britain. Three recent developments in British politics seem more  Canadian than American to me.
First, there is the introduction of televised leaders&rsquo; debates as a  new feature of British parliamentary election campaigns in 2010. True,  the United States had its first televised debate among presidential  candidates in 1960 &ndash; the famous debate where radio listeners thought  Republican candidate Richard Nixon won, but his shifty eyes, nervous  fidgeting, and five o&rsquo;clock shadow put off television viewers who rated  John F. Kennedy the winner of the contest and ultimately Kennedy went on  to win the election.
In 1962, Radio-Canada broadcast the first televised leaders&rsquo; debate  in Canada between Daniel Johnson Sr. and Jean Lesage, three days before a  provincial election. The CBC and CTV networks co-sponsored the first  televised leaders&rsquo; debate in a federal election in 1968, and like the  recent British leaders&rsquo; debates, the 1968 debate featured three leaders:  Liberal Pierre Trudeau, Progressive Conservative Robert Stanfield, and  Ed Broadbent of the NDP. The Canadian debates were closer to what  Britain is trying in 2010, because they were an adaptation of the U.S.  model to the parliamentary system. In the United States, eligible debate  viewers would eventually have the opportunity to vote for either  candidate; in a parliamentary system, the leaders debating are not  actually contesting the same seat &ndash; instead, they appear as party  champions that few viewers will be able to vote for  or against. In a  practical sense, Britain is imitating Canada more than the United  States.
A second example of Canadianization in Britain can be seen in the  debate about Britain&rsquo;s role in the world, and its &ldquo;special relationship&rdquo;  with the United States. This did not start with the 2010 election  cycle, and in some sense the British have been having this debate since  1776. But Prime Minister Tony Blair stole a page from the Canadian prime  minister&rsquo;s playbook by positioning himself as the United States&rsquo; most  loyal and reliable ally after September 11, 2001 &ndash; and, in a very  Canadian way, then sought influence on U.S. policy from &ldquo;within the  tent.&rdquo;
Lately, as Britain has sought a reflection of itself in pop culture,  and world affairs, uneasiness about the state of British identity has  emerged. Canadian slogans such as &ldquo;A Canada at home in the world and  respected abroad&rdquo; or &ldquo;The world needs more Canada&rdquo; may soon be adapted  for British use.
The obsession with the relationship between the U.S. president and  the prime minister is common to British and Canadian media. So is  ambivalence about being a principal ally of the United States without  becoming a policy poodle. Culturally, many commentators lament that the  top British and Canadian talent in music, acting, and other arts heads  to the United States &ndash; while at the same time feeling proud that a  compatriot has won recognition, in a sense for the whole country, by  succeeding on the grand American stage.
Again Canada got there ahead of Britain; in Canada, proximity and  asymmetry made comparisons with the United States inescapable. Yet as  globalization has made the English-speaking world smaller, now Britain  experiences similar feelings.
Finally, depending on the outcome of the May 6 election in Britain,  the political situation at Westminster may come to more closely resemble  Ottawa than Washington. Many observers are predicting that the election  will produce a &ldquo;hung parliament&rdquo; with no party holding a 50  percent-plus-one majority of seats. In Canada, where the third minority  government in a row holds power, a hung parliament has become a familiar  feature. Obviously there is no equivalent of a hung parliament or  minority government in the United States. The unique handicap this puts  on a government is not matched by divided government &ndash; when one party  holds the presidency and another controls the Congress.
Canada has shown that under minority governments it is still possible  to have an assertive policy toward the United States when it comes to  defending national interests &ndash; on the &ldquo;Buy American&rdquo; provisions of the  U.S. stimulus, or with regard to Afghanistan, to cite just two salient  examples. The next British government need not assume that a hung  parliament will force Britain to acquiesce to Washington&rsquo;s demands, not  paralyze its ability to contribute as a staunch ally of the United  States when circumstances warrant.
There is a kind of genius to Canadian politics, which draws from the  spirit of the Canadian people, which has generated innovative,  imaginative, and often surprising ways to adapt the best of the American  model to life in a parliamentary democracy without losing what is  essential to Canadian identity. Part of this genius is a constant worry  about striking the right balance between positive change and cultural  surrender. Rather than accept that &ldquo;if you can&rsquo;t beat &lsquo;em, join &lsquo;em&rdquo; is  the only option, and at moments of national insecurity or political  weakness, the ineluctable force of Americanization will prevail,  Canadians have shown that it is possible not to Americanize, and to take  what is most appealing from the American experience without losing your  identity.
I think many in Britain will find, particularly after May 6, that  they might draw considerable inspiration &ndash; and even encouragement &ndash; from  the resourceful and largely successful Canadian experience coping with  the United States.
Stop the Americanization of Britain! Let the Canadianization of  Britain begin!
Christopher Sands is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and a  member of the Research Advisory Board of the Macdonald-Laurier  Institute.]]></description><pubDate>2010-04-23</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=103</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>The Quilliam Foundation: Fighting British Islamist Extremism One Idea at a Time </title><description><![CDATA[If Canada wants to help win the global war on al Qaeda, turn back the  tide of homegrown Islamist radicalism coursing through segments of its  population, and protect its pluralistic, democratic, and inclusive  society from terrorism, Ottawa must send an official to London, England  to visit Ed Husain, Maajid Nawaz, Iqbal Wahhab, and their team at The Quilliam  Foundation.
Quilliam is the &ldquo;the world&rsquo;s first counter-extremism think tank&rdquo;. It  was established in 2008 by Husain and Nawaz, both former leaders of  British extremist organizations who came to reject and renounce  Islamism, political violence, and terrorism. These guys know Islamist  thought, inside-out. Husain published an autobiographical account of his  radicalization (and eventual de-radicalization) in The Islamist (Penguin, 2007) and Nawaz  recently retold his personal story in a Quilliam  publication.
Teaming together, they attracted other like-minded British Muslims  and established Quilliam to &ldquo;actively challenge extremism&rdquo; in the UK, Europe,  and internationally. They&rsquo;re literally fighting the &ldquo;war of ideas&rdquo; with  ideas.
They do so publishing counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization  research, vocally challenging extremist ideology in Britain, and  exposing &ldquo;the intellectual bankruptcy&rdquo; of Islamist thinkers. As Wahhab,  the Foundation&rsquo;s Chairman explains, he joined Quilliam to help &ldquo;redress  the distortion of British Muslim opinion and to support [the  Foundation&rsquo;s] consistent and articulate challenges of the hardliners,  exposing their activities and recruitment procedures, and pushing  forward the more mainstream, pluralist set of views that British society  is built on.&rdquo;
These guys are deadly serious.
By taking a vocal stance against Islamism and terrorism, they&rsquo;ve put  themselves at great personal risk. Western Islamists aren&rsquo;t known for  their gentle methods and acceptance of criticism. Consider that just  weeks before Quilliam&rsquo;s 2008 launch, its &ldquo;Gulf-based donors&rdquo; pulled  their funding because the Foundation &ldquo;unreservedly, unexceptionally condemned suicide bombing.&rdquo;&nbsp;&nbsp;Husain  and Nawaz received the news by phone as they were being &ldquo;accosted by a  group of Islamist thugs&rdquo; shouting at them in the streets of Copenhagen  for &ldquo;promoting democracy.&rdquo; Lucky for the rest of us, neither was cowed  by these events and Quilliam is today at the forefront of Britain&rsquo;s  counter-Islamist movement. They not only deserve our deepest thanks and  gratitude, but our support, as well.
Canadians can learn from Quilliam&rsquo;s experience. It is a cutting edge,  media savvy, and accessible public policy think tank. It&rsquo;s run by  practicing British Muslims who advocate on behalf of the Muslim  mainstream and stand up against radical fringe elements within their  communities. Their goal is to build an anti-terrorism Muslim civil  society in Britain. They do that by speaking out and responding to  radical Islamists and organizing public roundtables and conferences.  They galvanize public debate in the UK by writing columns and addressing  the media, organizing speaking engagements, and delivering  presentations to think tanks, NGOs, and government departments. Last  March, they proactively supported the launch of an anti-terrorism fatwa by prominent Shaikh Dr. Tahir ul-Qadri in London, in which he asserts that  &ldquo;suicide bombers would go to hell.&rdquo; They&rsquo;ve launched a  counter-radicalization campaign tailored for British university students  and offer a Radicalization Awareness Program for British public sector  workers. They run outreach programs with local schools, mosques, and  community centers and began, in 2009, teaming up with Pakistani NGOs,  universities, and civil society actors to counter extremism in the  region. In Britain, Quilliam briefs policy makers, addresses  radicalization in British prisons, and has sought to strengthen  Muslim-Jewish relations. Finally, it publishing in-depth, exceptionally  accessible, and free reports on a variety of subjects, including these  three must-reads: A Brief history of Islamism (which  introduces readers to the history and various strains of Islamist  thought); Re-programming British Muslims (which  evaluates and criticises Britain&rsquo;s &ldquo;Islam Channel&rdquo; for promoting rather  than denouncing radical Islamism); and Unlocking al-Qaeda: Islamist Extremism in British  Prisons (which addresses the phenomenon of radicalization and  terrorist recruitment of Britain&rsquo;s prison population).
Basically, Quilliam gets right up into the Islamist&rsquo;s face, on a  daily basis and on every conceivable topic. They&rsquo;ve not backed down and  they&rsquo;re making headway. This is exactly how we&rsquo;re going to win the &ldquo;war  of ideas&rdquo; with al Qaeda, its regional franchises, and local Western  aspirants.]]></description><pubDate>2010-04-23</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=102</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>Nuclear Terrorism: Fact versus Fiction</title><description><![CDATA[One of my favourite movies is The Sum of All Fears,  the 2002 blockbuster adaptation of Tom Clancy&rsquo;s 1991 best-selling  novel.
The plot centers on a nuclear strike on the city of Baltimore  orchestrated by an international, neo-Nazi terrorist organization with  aspirations of sparking a Russian-American war to facilitate the rise of  a German empire. The arch bad guy, Austrian neo-Nazi Richard Dressler,  purchases the device on the black market and smuggles it into the US by  cargo ship. The bomb, concealed in a pop machine, is picked up and  delivered to its target (the Baltimore football stadium) by an American  member of Dressler&rsquo;s group. It detonates during a football game with the  American President in attendance. Post-detonation, it&rsquo;s up to American  academic/CIA analyst/millionaire stockbroker/future American President  and all-round wunderkind, Jack Ryan, to unravel the terrorist plot and  diffuse global tensions. SPOILER ALERT! The nuclear device is  an American product constructed in the 1960s and secretly delivered to  Israel to assist its nascent nuclear program. The bomb is lost when the  Israeli jet carrying it is shot down over Syria during the Yom Kippur  War (1973) and is buried in the desert until it is unearthed and sold by  the arms trader decades later.
This past week, President Obama convened the first Nuclear Security  Summit in Washington, DC, with a script pulled right out of Clancy&rsquo;s  book.
Delegates from nearly 50 countries (including roughly 40 heads of  state)&nbsp;met to discuss the threat of nuclear terrorism. Obama&rsquo;s goal was  to persuade them to agree on steps that would deny terrorists the  materials needed for nuclear attacks (plutonium and/or highly enriched  uranium). He called for better protection of nuclear materials within  each country and greater multilateral capacity to control nuclear  materials globally. Canada did its part by urging others to support its  2002 initiative (the Global Partnership Program) to secure nuclear  sites in the former USSR, by agreeing to safeguard and curb its use of  weapons-grade uranium in its national research reactors, and by calling  on other states to phase out the use of highly enriched uranium in their  own research initiatives.
These are all worthy policy goals and deserve our full attention. But  reading the news coverage, official transcripts, editorials, and  analysis of the summit, you would be excused if you considered the  threat of a nuclear &ldquo;catastrophe&rdquo; higher today than during the Cold War,  if you believed the acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorists was  an effortless task, and accepted with near certainty that nuclear  terrorism was just around the proverbial corner.
It isn&rsquo;t that nuclear terrorism isn&rsquo;t a grave concern or that the  Summit didn&rsquo;t produce some good; it&rsquo;s just that the nuclear hyperbole  flowing from Washington was a little thick.
For instance, Obama&rsquo;s opening remarks included these warnings:

    &ldquo;Nuclear materials that could be sold or stolen and fashioned into a  nuclear weapon exist in dozens of nations.&rdquo;
    &ldquo;Just the smallest amount of plutonium &ndash; about the size of an apple &ndash;  could kill and injure hundreds of thousands of innocent people.&rdquo;
    &ldquo;Terrorist networks such as al Qaeda have tried to acquire the  material for a nuclear weapon, and if they ever succeeded, they would  surely use it.&rdquo;
    &ldquo;We are drifting towards a catastrophe beyond comparison. We shall  require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to  survive.&rdquo;

Others followed suit.
In the New York Times, former IAEA Director General Mohamed  ElBaradei, Harvard Professor Graham Allison, and former Mexican  President Ernesto Zedillo called nuclear terrorism &ldquo;the biggest potential threat to civilization&rdquo;  adding that &ldquo;the highly enriched uranium required to make an elementary  nuclear bomb could be hidden inside a football.&rdquo; And Robert Gallucci,&nbsp;a  former US nuclear proliferation negotiator, was quoted in The Globe  and Mail suggesting that &ldquo;it is possible, plausible and &hellip; probable that a &hellip;  terrorist group will set off a nuclear blast.&rdquo; It&rsquo;s just a matter of  time, really, before terror goes nuclear.
But where&rsquo;s the nuance? With all the squawking going on in Washington  the rest of us missed&nbsp;out on the few critical points of contention that  should help inform policy.

    Terrorists cannot develop their own nuclear weapons

Over a period of 60 years, only a handful of states have managed to  autonomously develop nuclear weapons. The odds that al Qaeda or another  non-state organization will have the dollars, industrial infrastructure,  scientific knowhow, resolve, and time to develop their own nukes  approaches zero. Brian Michael Jenkins suggests in Will  Terrorists Go Nuclear? (2008), that it isn&rsquo;t impossible  that terrorists may build nuclear weapons, but it isn&rsquo;t very likely  either. There&rsquo;s evidence that Osama bin Laden has sought nuclear  weapons, but Jenkins presents al Qaeda&rsquo;s quest as &ldquo;na&iuml;ve, poorly  informed, and vulnerable to con artists.&rdquo; Obama knows this, which is why  the recent Summit focused on bulking up security of existing nuclear  materials (which makes it harder for terrorists to steal what they may  want) and strengthening global counterterrorism norms, institutions, and  conventions (which further dissuades the very few states who might  think about sharing WMD knowhow with non-state actors).

    States are not likely to share their nuclear arsenals with  terrorists

While it is true that some regimes certainly do support international  and regional terrorism, sponsoring nuclear terrorism is of a totally  different order of magnitude. No state has much to gain by doing so.  Concerning Iran, the current patron of terror, Daniel Byman writes that it is &ldquo;not likely [to]  transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorist groups&rdquo;,  because doing so &ldquo;offers Iran few tactical advantages&rdquo;, Tehran has grown  &ldquo;more cautious in its backing of terrorists&rdquo; since 9/11, and it is  &ldquo;highly aware&rdquo; that supporting nuclear terrorism would incur  unprecedented &ldquo;U.S. wrath and international condemnation.&rdquo; Simply put,  supporting a WMD terrorist attack is the surest way to regime change and  doesn&rsquo;t make rational sense.

    Buying a nuclear weapon isn&rsquo;t that easy

The best thing about black markets is that they can be destabilized  and destroyed. The weakest point in a black market system, Thomas  Schelling explained at a recent conference in Zurich, is the  relationship between a seller and a buyer: each has to trust that the  other will produce the goods to be&nbsp;exchanged. One way states can disrupt  this system and make it harder for peddlers and purchasers of nuclear  material is to actively introduce uncertainty into the buyer-seller  relationship. For instance, the US might consider clandestinely entering  the nuclear black market as either a buyer or a seller. As a buyer, it  can locate those individuals and groups selling materials, track them  down and/or eliminate them, or&nbsp;buy the material and destroy it. As a  seller, the US can make contact with potential buyers, trade them shoddy  goods, and/or&nbsp;capture and eliminate them. By doing both, the US  disrupts the market forces, adds uncertainty to the process, and  destabilizes the system. The end result is that neither the terrorist  nor the criminal would know who to trust.

    Nuclear possession might not necessarily lead to nuclear use

The assumption that terrorists will detonate nuclear weapons once  they acquire them is a prevalent one. The problem with this line of  thinking is that it too easily strips away the strategic thought that al  Qaeda puts into its violent behaviour. Al Qaeda has a strategy. Jerry Mark Long write that its &ldquo;long-term goals have  been articulated in a multitude of venues and with remarkable  consistency.&rdquo; It couches its war with the West as a &ldquo;defensive&rdquo; and  &ldquo;morally legitimate&rdquo; one. It acts in accordance with a particular set of  religious beliefs and is careful to behave in ways that remain within  certain jurisprudential limitations. Al Qaeda is also sensitive to  Muslim condemnation. The point is that there is some disagreement within  al Qaeda with regards to the legitimacy and strategic utility of using  nuclear weapons. One way the West might manipulate these debates is to  take steps to heighten al Qaeda&rsquo;s concern that nuclear use will provoke a  backlash among the wider Muslim audience. Doing that rests on spreading  existing anti-nuclear norms and taboos among and within states.
In sum, Obama has done the world a service by calling for greater  control over nuclear weapons and materials. Let&rsquo;s just make sure the  discussion is built on fact rather than fiction.]]></description><pubDate>2010-04-16</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=97</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>Constitutions, Politics, and Pragmatism</title><description><![CDATA[It&rsquo;s often said that the Fathers of Confederation were not political   thinkers. They were practical men, men who could make a &ldquo;deal.&rdquo; E.R.   Black&rsquo;s comment is typical: &ldquo;Confederation was born in pragmatism   without the attendance of a readily definable philosophic rationale.&rdquo;
The Fathers had their pragmatic side. Who would deny it? But when   they bent their thoughts to the task of making a constitution for   British North America they had to think of principles and philosophy.   They were designing a great and innovative political constitution   modeled on the fundamentals of the European Enlightenment.
Now I hear from an eminence in the field of national history: why is   Ajzenstat always complaining about that comment by Black? &ldquo;What&rsquo;s wrong   with being pragmatic? There&rsquo;s nothing wrong with it; there&rsquo;s nothing   shameful.&rdquo;
And I feel a pang. I think of all the times I&rsquo;ve lectured students on   the necessity of give and take in politics; all the times I&rsquo;ve tried   gently to persuade some admirably principled young woman or man that   politics works best for everyone when it&rsquo;s seasoned with a hefty dash of   pragmatism.
I agree that politics requires &ldquo;doing deals,&rdquo; making   concessions, horse-trading, if you like. But Confederation was not about   politics per se. It was about making a constitution to   facilitate the doing of politics. The difference between   statutes and constitutions is exactly that statutes are &ldquo;deals,&rdquo; and as   &ldquo;deals&rdquo; can be amended, trashed, reviled, or indeed, rehabilitated, as   the political seasons change.
Constitutions, in contrast, set out the conditions for deal making   and for exactly this reason are supposed to be difficult to change. The   Fathers of Confederation and the legislators in the ratifying   parliaments speak of the process of making and ratifying the British   North America Act as lawmaking &ldquo;for all time.&rdquo; The phrase recurs in the   debates in several provinces: &ldquo;for all time.&rdquo; The question was whether   ordinary lawmakers, elected to their colonial parliaments for a limited   term, could make law &ldquo;for all time.&rdquo;
In the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada (March 8,   1865), James O&rsquo;Halloran says: &ldquo;You sir, and I, were sent here to make   laws, not legislatures.&rdquo; It&rsquo;s one of my favourite quotations. Here&rsquo;s   another, addressing the same issue while conceding the necessity of a   degree of pragmatism even in constitution making: &ldquo;Where there are two   great parties in a nation &ndash; as there have been with us &ndash; it is clear   that, when they agree to effect a settlement of the constitutional   difficulties which have separated them, this can only be accomplished by   mutual compromise to a greater or less extent&rdquo; (Alexander Mackenzie,  in  the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada, February 23,   1865).&nbsp; Yes, there was a principled debate on pragmatism at   Confederation.]]></description><pubDate>2010-04-11</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=96</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>Preparing for Tomorrow's Wars</title><description><![CDATA[John Arquilla, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, offers a  thought-provoking article in Foreign Policy (March/April 2010) on the  tools, tactics, and strategies needed for fighting modern wars.
Arquilla, perhaps best known for his earlier work at the RAND  Corporation on fighting &ldquo;netwars&rdquo;  and combating &ldquo;networks&rdquo;,  suggests large, bulky mechanized militaries are ill-equipped for  fighting &ndash; let alone winning &ndash; modern conflicts with more nimble,  creatively connected, and flexible adversaries. &ldquo;The greatest problem  traditional militaries face today,&rdquo; he explains, &ldquo;is that they are  organized to wage big wars and have difficulty orienting themselves to  fight small ones.&rdquo;
Arquilla discusses the American military but his insights are of  value to the Canadian Forces, too. Our focus today remains on preparing  for large-scale conflicts against equally powerful adversaries. In  preparation, we spend our resources on developing, acquiring, and  refining large weapons systems. The paradox, Arquilla suggests, is that  our vast and complex militaries are proving themselves ineffective for  winnings today&rsquo;s conflicts against diffuse, &ldquo;disorganized&rdquo;, and  traditionally powerless adversaries (insurgents, terrorists, pirates)  and are sure to be the wrong tools for fighting tomorrow&rsquo;s wars.
The point isn&rsquo;t that traditional state-on-state conflicts are no  longer relevant, but rather that technological developments in weaponry  and communication favour different forms of military organization  (networks rather than hierarchies) and different coercive tactics  (small-unit, multidirectional &ldquo;swarming&rdquo; over mass-unit, unidirectional  confrontations). In tomorrow&rsquo;s conflict environment, a column of tanks  will retain some coercive value, but it will prove less than useful in  combating a handful of unidentifiable insurgents using light weaponry in  hit-and-run operations and in preventing suicide bombers from killing  commuters with improvised explosives hidden in knapsacks.]]></description><pubDate>2010-04-09</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=95</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>

<item>
<title>Urban Aboriginal Study Highlights Importance of Post-Secondary Education</title><description><![CDATA[On Tuesday, April 6, Environics released its Urban Aboriginal Peoples  Study (UAPS), a long awaited and much needed study of the  Aboriginals living in Canadian cities. As of 2006, half of the  Aboriginal population lived in Canadian cities, yet prior to this  report, very little was known about their experiences and perspectives  on Canadian life. By interviewing thousands of urban Aboriginals living  in 11 Canadian cities, the UAPS has filled an important gap in our  understanding of the life prospects for Canadian Aboriginals.
The findings are telling. Although urban Aboriginals retain a &ldquo;strong  sense of connection to their ancestral communities or places of  origin,&rdquo; a majority of urban Aboriginals consider their current urban  residence to be their &ldquo;home&rdquo; (p.8). Urban Aboriginals want to become a  part of their urban landscape; they enjoy living in cities as much as  non-Aboriginals, and they still feel very connected to Aboriginal  communities within their cities.
Like non-Aboriginals, urban Aboriginals aspire to the &ldquo;good life&rdquo;;  they want a family, a balanced lifestyle, a good job and financial  independence (p.8). Their &ldquo;leading life aspiration,&rdquo; according to the  UAPS, is the pursuit of higher education. As the UAPS summarizes, &ldquo;Not  only do urban Aboriginal peoples see higher education as a path to a  good job or career for their own generation, many say that they hope  higher levels of education will be key to how future generations of  Aboriginal peoples will distinguish themselves from their ancestors&rdquo;  (p.9). Those planning to pursue post-secondary education, of course, see  higher education primarily as a way to advance their personal career  prospects and quality of life. Yet those who have already completed  pose-secondary education say &ldquo;the greatest impact of higher education  has been to help them feel more empowered &ndash; in part by expanding their  knowledge of their Aboriginal heritage and identity&rdquo; (p.9).
This important study should put to rest the fallacy that Aboriginals  who move off reserve to pursue higher education and seek a better life  for themselves and their families are abandoning their own culture and  history. As the study notes, &ldquo;Higher education emerges as a passport  towards learning more about one&rsquo;s Aboriginal identity &ndash;  those urban Aboriginal peoples with a college or university education  are more likely than others to claim a better understanding of their  Aboriginal heritage and to believe this knowledge has contributed  positively to their live&rdquo; (p.9, emphasis added). For Aboriginals,  post-secondary education offers more than the means to material  well-being; it offers the opportunity to pursue a richer understanding  of their culture and heritage.
Moreover, the study highlights a critical point that Calvin Helin and  I noted in Free to Learn: the biggest obstacle to urban  Aboriginals pursuing post-secondary education is funding.  Urban Aboriginals who started but did not finish post-secondary  education were less likely to have received financial support than those  who finished post-secondary education.
In short, funding determines progress. Yet the barriers to funding  are particularly acute for Aboriginals living off reserve. Under the  current Post-Secondary Student Support Program (PSSSP), the federal  government distributes $314 million annually to Indian bands across the  country, who then distribute the funds to individual students. Although  the money is intended for post-secondary education, due to a complete  lack of oversight and accountability there is no information about which  students are receiving funding, or how much funding they receive.  Nepotism and favouritism abound as criteria for funding. And as our  study (p.16) pointed out, off-reserve students, due in part to a lack of  relationship with band leadership, are particularly prone to being  unfunded.
Under our proposal, the PSSSP would be phased our, and replaced with  an Aboriginal Post-Secondary Savings Account (APSSA) at birth for each  Registered Indian student, regardless of whether they live on or off  reserve. Upon graduation from high school, the accounts would contain at  least $25,000 to be put toward post-secondary education. In addition to  introducing fairness, transparency, and predictability into the system,  the APSSA would rectify a problem highlighted by the UAPS study: It  would ensure that all Registered Indians, including those living in  urban areas, would have financial support necessary to pursue higher  education.
We know that Aboriginals, particularly those living in urban areas,  are not receiving the funding to which they are not entitled. And now,  thanks to this critical study, we know that the absence of funding is  preventing urban Aboriginals from entering and completing post-secondary  education, which is their &ldquo;leading life aspiration.&rdquo; Our proposal in Free  to Learn outlines a way in which urban Aboriginals can begin  receiving this funding immediately. The UAPS study underscores the fact  that it is time for policymakers and Aboriginal organizations to take  seriously the idea of Aboriginal Post-Secondary Savings Accounts.]]></description><pubDate>2010-04-08</pubDate><link>http://www.macdonaldlaurier.ca/main/issue.php?issue_id=94</link><category>RSS Entries</category>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>