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The Macdonald-Laurier Institute

True North

IN CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY

The threat of Islamist
prison radicalization
in Canada

We cannot assume
we are immune

Keep radicals from
indoctrinating their
fellow inmates

Se prémunir contre
la menace

Alex Wilner,
author and scholar
of domestic radicalism

**From Rehabilitation
to Recruitment**





THE MACDONALD-LAURIER INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY

True North in Canadian Public Policy



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October 2010

FROM REHABILITATION TO RECRUITMENT

STOPPING THE SPREAD OF TERRORIST DOCTRINES WITHIN
OUR PRISONS BEFORE IT BECOMES A NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEM

By Alex Wilner

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**"TERRORISM OFFENCES
STRIKE AT THE HEART
OF CANADIAN VALUES AND
SOCIETY."**

~ Justice Bruce Durno



Author photos, John Major Photography

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STOP IT BEFORE IT STARTS

Canada has a problem with home-grown radicalism. It comes from many sources and when it crosses the line from advocacy to violence, law enforcement steps in. People are arrested, tried and, if convicted, sent to jail. Unfortunately what looks like a solution to most people can be the start of another problem. Prisons are a fertile recruiting ground for radicals and terrorists in many other countries. If we do not want to jail one terrorist only to release three, we need to take preemptive action based on the experiences of our friends and allies.

The problem

At first glance, those incarcerated for plotting terrorism might seem very different from members of the general prison population. But in Britain, France, Spain and other European countries, and more recently in the United States, authorities have encountered a worrying trend.

Individuals arrested for terrorist violence often have prior criminal records for non-terrorism offenses and, moreover, had their first serious encounter with radical ideas while behind bars. Ideologies that foment political violence can offer structure and meaning to people with disorderly lives while exploiting their sense of alienation and willingness to engage in acts of violence. Allowing these ideologies to spread within our prison system is asking for trouble.

The opportunity

This paper does not take an alarmist view of the situation within Canada. But it does sound an alarm. We have only just begun incarcerating Canadian terrorists in significant numbers and the problem of prison radicalization is not yet a serious concern. But our allies have found that when steps are not taken to prevent it, prison radicalization can occur on a scale that presents a major security dilemma.

From failed British “shoe bomber” Richard Reid to London Underground bomber Muktar Said Ibrahim and from Madrid train bomber Emilio Trashorras to Californian radical Kevin James, the biography of a petty thief or drug peddler turned *jihadi* is all too familiar to international law enforcement agencies. If we do not act, it can happen here. Fortunately, time may be on our side.

The danger

If we want to avoid this problem we cannot persuade ourselves that we are immune to the danger, that our geographical location, benign foreign policy, or multicultural society insulate us from the threat of terrorism or from various sorts of radical ideologies.

We have already witnessed terrorist plots from a variety of sources, from the Air India bombing to Tamil Tiger fundraising and, more recently, the Toronto 18 and an alleged plot centred in Ottawa. Canadians are also threatened by foreign organizations like al Qaeda and al Shabab, and increasingly, are targets of terrorist recruitment. As Canadian terrorists go to jail, other inmates may represent an important and vulnerable population.

Our recommendations

While the paths to radical beliefs and terrorism are complex and often idiosyncratic, we know some of the factors involved in the prison radicalization process and the typical profiles of would-be terrorist recruiters. Combatting radicalization in Canadian prisons will require a multifaceted strategy that isolates recruiters, denies extremists access to prisoners, and excludes radical religious service providers and extremist texts from prison.

We also need to familiarize prison staff with radicalization, ensure that perceptions of discrimination that sustain radical beliefs are stamped out within the prison system, and establish a de-radicalization strategy that can help Canadian terrorists disengage from violence and properly reintegrate into society. By learning from our allies’ experiences, we can reduce the likelihood that terrorists will emerge from our prisons in larger numbers than they entered them.

Time to act

That prison radicalization is not yet a problem in Canada is cause for quick action not complacency. Our government should learn from the successes and failures of others to get ahead of the issue. Preventing radicalization and recruitment in (and out) of prison is the best way to keep Canadians safe from terrorism.

SUMMARY OF KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

- Identify how radicalization occurs in Canada. Study what it shares with the process in other nations and what specific patterns of immigration, demographics, ethnic politics, imported political traditions, and religious attitudes make a difference in this country.
- Deny extremists access to other prisoners. Find the right balance between placing them in special facilities, separating them from the general population and other hard-core radicals in regular prisons, and moving them frequently within the system to disrupt their social networks.
- Mine convicts for intelligence. Proper surveillance of those inmates who have not renounced radicalism can yield vital information about plots within and outside prison walls.
- Investigate how well various disengagement and de-radicalization programs work. The goal is important but we need to know much more than we do about which approaches actually succeed.
- Assist convicts in properly reintegrating into society. Most are not serving life sentences and those unable to find a normal place in the community are far more likely to return to hatred and violence.
- Exclude radical religious leaders from prison. Muslim inmates, like all prisoners, have a right to access leaders of their faith, but CSC must carefully screen prison imams before granting them access and then monitor what they actually say to prisoners once they are accredited.
- Provide educational services. These must include speakers and literature that present moderate ideas including a variety of interpretations of Islam so radicals cannot convincingly portray their own as the one true version.
- Screen prison libraries for radical literature. Prisoners should not be reading *Mein Kampf*, *The Anarchist Cookbook* or *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* nor should they be reading radical Islamist manifestos advocating terrorism.
- Combat prison radicalization by fighting radicalization in society. If society generally, and Muslim communities particularly, more clearly and vocally reject terror and its justification those who find themselves in prison will also be less receptive and more aware of other interpretations.
- Deal sensitively with legitimate prisoners' grievances. If inmates' religious or other rights are violated, radicals will seize on these incidents to start promoting their message of alienation and hate.

SE PRÉMUNIR CONTRE LA MENACE

Le fondamentalisme est un danger pour le Canada. Son origine a plusieurs sources, et lorsqu'il traverse la ligne entre la promotion d'idées et la violence, les autorités s'en mêlent. Des gens sont arrêtés, jugés et, si trouvés coupables, envoyés en prison. Malheureusement, ce qui semble être une solution peut en fait être le germe d'un autre problème. La prison est un terreau fertile pour le recrutement des terroristes et radicaux dans plusieurs pays étrangers. Si nous voulons éviter de créer trois terroristes chaque fois qu'on en emprisonne un, nous devons prendre des mesures préventives basées sur les expériences de nos alliés.

Le problème

Les gens incarcérés pour complot terroriste semblent à première vue bien différents de la population carcérale en général. Mais en Angleterre, en France, en Espagne ainsi qu'ailleurs en Europe, et plus récemment aux États-Unis, les autorités font face à une tendance alarmante. Les individus arrêtés pour violence terroriste ont souvent un casier judiciaire pour des crimes qui n'ont rien à voir avec le terrorisme, et ils ont eu leur premier contact sérieux avec des idées radicales alors qu'ils étaient derrière les barreaux. Les idéologies qui fomentent la violence politique peuvent offrir une structure et un sens à des gens qui mènent une vie désordonnée tout en exploitant leur sentiment de désaffection et le fait qu'ils soient prêts à commettre des actes de violence. Permettre à ces idéologies de se répandre à l'intérieur de notre système carcéral est de la folie.

L'opportunité

Cette étude ne se veut pas alarmiste. Mais elle sonne tout de même l'alarme. Nous commençons à incarcérer des terroristes Canadiens et la radicalisation des prisonniers n'est pas encore un problème grave. Mais nos alliés ont démontré qu'elle peut se produire à une échelle suffisante pour causer des problèmes de sécurité majeurs lorsque les mesures pour l'empêcher ne sont pas prises. Du fameux « Shoe Bomber » Richard Reid à Muktar Said Ibrahim (attentat contre le métro londonien) en passant par Emilio Trashorras (attentat de Madrid) et le radical californien Kevin James, le scénario d'un cambrioleur ou trafiquant de drogue transformé en djihadiste en est un que les agences internationales de lutte contre le crime connaissent bien. Ce scénario peut se produire ici si nous n'agissons pas.

Le danger

Si nous voulons éviter ce problème, nous ne pouvons prétendre être immunisés contre ce danger, et croire que notre situation géographique, notre politique étrangère bienveillante et notre société multiculturelle nous isolent de la menace terroriste ou des idéologies radicales. Nous avons déjà vu des complots terroristes, de l'attentat à la bombe contre le vol d'Air India au financement des Tigres Tamouls en passant par les « 18 de Toronto » et le présumé complot terroriste visant Ottawa. Les Canadiens sont également menacés par des organisations étrangères comme al Qaïda et al Shabab, en plus d'être la cible de recrutement terroriste. Pour les terroristes canadiens emprisonnés, la population carcérale peut sembler une population importante et vulnérable.

Nos recommandations

Les chemins menant au radicalisme et au terrorisme sont complexes et souvent particuliers, mais nous connaissons plusieurs facettes du processus de radicalisation et le profil typique des recruteurs terroristes potentiels. Combattre la radicalisation à l'intérieur des prisons canadiennes requiert une stratégie à facettes multiples qui isole les recruteurs, interdit aux extrémistes accès aux autres prisonniers, en plus d'exclure les fournisseurs radicaux de services religieux ainsi que les textes extrémistes des prisons. Nous devons aussi familiariser les gardiens de prison avec la radicalisation, nous assurer que les perceptions de discrimination qui soutiennent les croyances radicales soient éradiquées du système carcéral, en plus d'établir une stratégie de déradicalisation pour aider les terroristes canadiens à se désengager de la violence et à réintégrer la société. En apprenant de l'expérience de nos alliés, nous pouvons réduire le risque que nos prisons servent à la multiplication du nombre de terroristes.

Le temps d'agir

Le fait que la radicalisation des prisons ne soit pas encore un problème au Canada doit nous inciter à agir rapidement, pas à être complaisants. Notre gouvernement devrait apprendre des succès et des échecs des autres afin de nous prémunir contre ce danger. Prévenir la radicalisation et le recrutement à l'intérieur (et à l'extérieur) des prisons est le meilleur moyen de protéger les Canadiens contre le terrorisme.

RECOMMANDATIONS PRINCIPALES

- Identifier les façons dont la radicalisation prend place au Canada. Identifier les points communs avec d'autres pays ainsi que les traits spécifiques reliés à l'immigration, la démographie, la politique ethnique, les traditions politiques importées et les attitudes religieuses qui sont propres à l'expérience canadienne.
- Interdire aux extrémistes accès aux autres prisonniers, soit en les plaçant dans des institutions spécialisées, en les séparant de la population générale ainsi que des autres radicaux dans les institutions régulières, ou en les transférant fréquemment afin de perturber leurs réseaux sociaux.
- Cueillir des renseignements parmi les détenus. Une surveillance adéquate des radicaux peut fournir des informations cruciales sur les complots à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur des prisons.
- Documenter les résultats des programmes de déradicalisation et de réinsertion sociale. Il est essentiel d'en savoir davantage sur ces programmes afin d'identifier les approches qui ont plus de chances que d'autres d'avoir du succès.
- Encourager les détenus à réintégrer la société. La majorité d'entre eux ne sont pas en prison à perpétuité et ceux qui ont de la difficulté à mener une existence normale dans la communauté sont beaucoup plus enclins à retourner à la violence et la haine.
- Exclure les leaders religieux radicaux des prisons. Les détenus musulmans ont eux aussi droit à des services religieux qui leur sont propres, mais les services correctionnels se doivent de sélectionner avec soin les imams avant de leur donner accès et de surveiller ce qu'ils disent aux prisonniers une fois accrédités.
- Fournir des services d'éducation. Ceux-ci doivent inclure des conférenciers et de la littérature qui présentent des idées modérées, incluant des interprétations musulmanes variées pour empêcher les radicaux de présenter leur version comme étant le seul véritable portrait de l'Islam.
- Passer les bibliothèques des prisons au peigne fin afin d'en éliminer les écrits radicaux. Les détenus ne devraient pas lire *Mein Kampf*, *The Anarchist Cookbook* ou *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, et ils ne devraient pas lire des écrits radicaux faisant la promotion du terrorisme.
- Combattre la radicalisation dans la société. Si la société en général, et les communautés musulmanes en particulier, rejettent le terrorisme de façon claire et forte, ceux qui se trouvent en prison seront moins réceptifs au fanatisme et plus au courant des autres interprétations.
- Traiter les plaintes des prisonniers de façon sensée. Si les droits religieux ou autres des détenus sont bafoués, les radicaux s'en serviront pour promouvoir leur message de désaffection et de haine.

PART I: PRISON RADICALIZATION IN THE WEST

When it comes to combatting terrorism, Canadians have acquired a dangerous habit: thinking the job is finished when, in fact, it is just starting.

Consider the case of Ali Mohamed Dirie. In September, 2009, he became the second member of the Toronto 18 to plead guilty to participating in the activities of a home-grown terrorist cell.¹ In sentencing Dirie to a seven-year prison term, Justice Bruce Durno observed that “terrorism offences strike at the heart of Canadian values and society.”²

Dirie’s sentencing resulted from an exceptionally successful multi-year counter-terrorism operation conducted by Toronto’s Integrated National Security Enforcement Team (INSET). This multi-agency task force combines representatives of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), municipal and provincial police departments, and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA).

With Dirie and his co-conspirators sitting in jail, Canadians were safer. At least this is the conventional thinking. But what happens when convicted terrorists go to jail?

The threat of radicalization

The problem with incarcerating terrorists, would-be terrorists, and their ideological sympathizers is the very real danger of prison radicalization and terrorist recruitment behind bars. Far from being the last phase of a successful security operation, the incarceration of individuals who orchestrate, support, and facilitate terrorism represents the beginning of a second series of related threats. A particular concern is Islamist prison radicalization, whereby members of the general prison population are introduced to and adopt militant interpretations of Islam that condone and support terrorism and political violence.³

Ali Dirie, a man who has become as big a threat inside prison as he was outside it, is a classic example of this danger. First arrested in 2005 while crossing into Canada from the United States with two handguns acquired for terrorist

purposes taped to his thighs, he was sent to prison. But while serving his sentence, he remained an enthusiastic member of the Toronto 18. At his most recent trial, Crown prosecutors revealed that he took steps to facilitate the acquisition of weapons and travel documents and provided “encouragement, advice, and direction” to other terrorists living in Canada. The prosecutors added perhaps the most frightening comment, that while under remand Dirie also “took an active role in recruiting other inmates to adopt extreme jihadi beliefs.” He urged other prisoners “to be-

come members of ... the terrorist group through means such as ‘hardcore *dawas*’” and by preaching and advocating his radical views.⁴

If, while in prison, Dirie manages to convince even one other inmate to adopt his violent ideology, would we still judge his conviction

for terrorism a resounding success? Counter-terrorism does not end with arrests and incarcerations. With Canadian terrorists heading to Canadian jails, we need to make sure our prisons do not become incubators of more terrorism. We need a counter-terrorism strategy that includes prison policy, to ensure that getting one terrorist off the street does not inadvertently breed two others.

This report provides an overview of Islamist prison radicalization and, by drawing on trends emerging overseas, explains how this phenomenon might develop in Canada. This paper will compare trends in Western prison radicalization, explore the processes involved in radicalization both outside and inside prison, and put forward recommendations for dealing effectively with prison radicalization in Canada.

Canadians are front and centre

Prison radicalization is not just a problem for Americans, or Europeans, or Australians. It confronts Canadians directly.

In the first place, Canadians are at the forefront of the global struggle against terrorism. Our country is a signatory, supporter, and sponsor of dozens of international conventions and resolutions designed to denounce and combat terror-

ism. Our political leaders unabashedly and vociferously condemn terrorism, wherever and whenever it occurs.

As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (UN), Canada has deployed thousands of military and civilian personnel overseas, both in Afghanistan (as part of the UN's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)) and in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean (as part of Combined Task Force 150 and NATO's *Operation Active Endeavour*) to join multinational coalitions combatting terrorism.

As a result, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other groups have threatened Canada specifically on at least six separate occasions.⁵ Besides the 24 Canadians al Qaeda killed in New York on September 11, 2001, dozens of other Canadians have been killed and injured in terrorist attacks worldwide since then.⁶

In the second place, despite the fact that foreign terrorists continue to seek ways to kill Canadians indiscriminately, they continue to find support within pockets of Canadian society. Even though a vast majority of Canadians and all our political leaders consider terrorism a despicable crime, and notwithstanding Canada's commitment to counter regional and international terrorism, al Qaeda, Somalia's al Shabab, Hezbollah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers), Sikh extremists, and many other groups have all had success in inspiring and recruiting Canadians within Canada's borders. Some Canadians have voluntarily travelled overseas to train, fight, and die alongside foreign organizations. Others have sought to attack Canadians at home.

As a result, more Canadians have been indicted on terrorism-related crimes between September 2008 and September 2010 than used to face such charges over decades. That has created a spike in the number of Canadians imprisoned in our correctional facilities for supporting home-grown and international terrorism. By European standards, the figure of 14 Canadians sentenced to prison terms for the facilitation, sponsorship, and/or organization of terrorism is very small. But it is larger than ever before and rising. And the more terrorists we have in our jails, the higher the associated risk of prison radicalization.

Islamist radicalization is different

The threat of Islamist prison radicalization is an essential yet relatively under-explored feature of modern counter-terrorism. To a certain degree, prisons have always fostered radical and violent ideologies, from Nazism, to violent Marxism, and national liberationism. They have also historically facilitated violence and terrorism of every sort. Americans John King and Russel Brewer, for instance, were both petty criminals with no known ideological grievances when they were imprisoned in the 1990s. They left prison as radical white supremacists and were later convicted (and ultimately put to death) for the brutal lynching of African-American James Byrd, Jr. in 1998. At his trial, King's attorney noted the importance of his client's time in prison: "What I do know, is [King] wasn't a racist when he went in. He was when he came out."⁷

Islamist prison radicalization shares some similarities with these other forms of prison radicalization. But it represents a more complicated and potentially greater threat.

Terrorists are not ordinary offenders. Unlike other criminals, they enter prison with strong political and ideological beliefs. By reflexively labelling terrorism a "crime" and treating terrorists as regular "criminals", Western governments do an excellent job of denying terrorism any legitimacy. But that creates a paradox, in that they thereby ignore the political or religious motivation that necessarily shapes a terrorist's behaviour in ways much less relevant to other offenders like bank robbers or murderers.

Dealing with terrorists as if they were like other "normal" criminals unwisely minimizes the importance of a motivation central to the terrorist's self-perception, attitudes, goals, and general behaviour while imprisoned – ideology. "Criminalizing and 'de-politicizing' terrorist offences," a 2010 report published by The International Center for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) argues, "is contradictory" and may actually "prevent prison authorities from developing a sophisticated understanding of the particular challenges posed by politically motivated offenders."⁸

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The specific problem is that many terrorists do not think of themselves as mere criminals, but rather as foot soldiers in a global and cosmic conflict. Instead of idly serving their sentences as other criminals might, they treat their imprisonment as an opportunity to refine their movement's ideology and strategy, to influence a new and potentially susceptible population, and to mobilize support for their cause.

Imprisonment certainly restricts a terrorist's ability to orchestrate acts of violence, but it is not necessarily an effectively enforced "time out" from radical activism. Rather, when the prison gate swings shut behind them, it opens a new door in front of them for spreading their message and methods.

Over the past decade, in Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia thousands of individuals have been incarcerated on Islamist-related terrorism charges. Many are Westerners, second- and third-generation citizens, nationalized immigrants, and long-term residents of the countries in which they are jailed. Because Islamist terrorists claim to derive their beliefs from the tenets of a major world religion, it is difficult for prison officials and policy-makers to restrict their proselytizing without breaching democratic laws, norms, and ideals. So imprisoning Islamist terrorists poses a serious security and policy challenge not properly understood by officials or citizens. Yet we have at hand many promising avenues to comprehension, starting with the historical.

Historical cases

Qutb, Rahman, and Zarqawi

Islamist prison radicalization is not a new phenomenon. Between 1954 and 1964, while in an Egyptian jail, Sayyid Qutb, an early Islamist ideologue and founder of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, wrote two influential treatises, *Milestones* and *In the Shade of the Qur'an*. *Milestones* is today the "core theological ideology for many jihadist movements."⁹ It was in

prison that Qutb formulated and solidified his views, and explained how Muslims could recoup their power *vis-à-vis* the non-Muslim world by following Islam's guiding political principles and establishing an Islamic state (or Caliphate). This idea is today a central pillar of *jihadism*.

Other ideologues have used prison to issue *jihadist* decrees. The United States convicted Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the leader of Egypt's *Gamaat Islamiya* (the Islamic Group), for facilitating the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and for conspiring to attack other New York City landmarks. While serving his sentence, Rahman wrote and smuggled out a *fatwa*

(a religious decree) urging Muslims to wage a holy war against Americans. It states: "tear them apart, ruin their economy ... sink their ships ... shoot down their planes, kill them on land, at sea, and in the air. Kill them wherever you find them." Rahman's *fatwa* would eventually have a direct effect on Osama bin Laden, who justified al Qaeda's 2001 attack on the US with reference to Rahman's decree. Bin Laden claimed

it gave him the religious authority to kill Americans indiscriminately.¹⁰

Other inmates have used their time in prison to attract and build *jihadi* support. The most notorious is the brutal leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who played a major role in frustrating American efforts to stabilize that country before he was killed in 2006. His radicalization began in a Jordanian prison in the 1980s after he was convicted for dealing drugs and thieving. In prison, he adopted an austere interpretation of Islam and, upon release, travelled to Afghanistan to fight the remnants of the Soviet army.

Jailed again in 1993 for a foiled attack on Western targets in Jordan, Zarqawi used this imprisonment to join forces with another inmate, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (also known as Isam Barqawi), a prominent Islamist ideologue. Together they formed a prison gang with the intent of spreading al-Maqdisi's ideology throughout the prison system. They were exceptionally successful. Following his 1999 release, Zar-



qawi again traveled to Afghanistan and then to Iraq in 2003 where he used his prison connections and contacts to hoist al Qaeda's banner and lead a devastating terrorism campaign.¹¹

Individual Western cases

From Richard Reid to Kevin James

Over the past decade, prison radicalization in the West has become a major concern.¹² In the UK, recent prison converts to violent Islamism include Richard Reid, Muktar Said Ibrahim, Mohammad al-Figari, and Martin Mubanga.¹³

Reid converted to Islam while serving time for petty crimes during the 1990s. He became radicalized after his release and went on to become the failed 2001 shoe bomber.

Ibrahim, a British immigrant from Eritrea, was jailed for gang-related violence in 1996 and introduced to radical Islamism in prison. Upon his release, he travelled to Pakistan and Sudan for terrorism training and, in 2005, organized and led the failed July 12 bombings in London.

Al-Figari, born in Trinidad as Roger Figari, converted to Islam shortly before serving a drug-related prison sentence in the late 1990s. In prison he adopted radical beliefs and received UK-based terrorism training upon his release, an offense for which he was re-imprisoned in 2008.

Mubanga, a second-generation Zambian immigrant, converted to Islam while serving time for theft in 1992. The US later accused him of taking part in terrorist training in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan and – though he was never formally charged – he spent time in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp.

Similar cases have occurred in other countries.

High-profile examples include Jamal Ahmidan, one of the leaders behind the March, 2004, Madrid train bombings, an attack that killed almost 200 people and injured thousands more. Ahmidan is suspected of having been radicalized while serving time for petty crime in Morocco in 2000. Returning to Spain in 2003, he acquired explosives for the train bombs from Emilio Suarez Trashorras, a Spaniard who converted to Islam while serving time in 2001 on drug offenses.¹⁴

Abderrahmane Tahiri (alias Mohamed Achraf) established the *Martyrs for Morocco* while serving time for credit-card

fraud in Spain. He went on to recruit nearly 30 inmates and ex-convicts for attacks on Spain's National Court. In a prison letter to his second-in-command, Tahiri writes: "I have formed a group of good brothers who are ready to die at any moment for the cause of God. We are waiting to get out [of prison] to go directly to work. It is our duty to think and plan, we have men, weapons too, we don't lack places, just practice."¹⁵ In February 2008, Spanish courts sentenced 20 men, including Tahiri, for belonging to the terrorist group.

Safe Bourada was imprisoned in France in 1995 for his role in a string of bombings that rocked Paris in the 1990s. He spent his time behind bars in the recruitment of other inmates. After his release in 2003, Bourada used his prison contacts to establish a terrorist cell, *Ansar Al Fath* (the Partisans of Victory), and planned further attacks in Paris. He was re-arrested in 2005.¹⁶

Comparable trends have taken place in the United States.

Michael Finton, arrested in September, 2009, while attempting to detonate a truck bomb in Illinois, and several men arrested in 2009 for plotting attacks on New York City synagogues, were all introduced to radical Islam while serving time on non-terrorism-related charges.

Ruben Shumpert (also known as Amir Abdul Muhaimen) is also thought to have converted to Islam while imprisoned in the US. Eventually arrested on terrorism charges, he managed to flee to Somalia only days before his 2006 sentencing. In 2008, he was reportedly killed in a US missile strike targeting al Shabab fighters.¹⁷

Kevin James founded *Jam'iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheed* in California's New Folsom Prison while serving a 10-year sentence for robbery. He recruited other inmates and parolees for attacks in Los Angeles.¹⁸

Most recently, the 2010 US Senate report, *Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb*, noted that as many as three dozen American ex-convicts who "were radicalized in prison ... [had] travelled to Yemen, possibly for al Qaeda training" upon their release.¹⁹

National trends

Statistical studies support the trend revealed by these high-profile anecdotal cases. In his 2006 study of terrorism in

Europe, Edwin Bakker, a Dutch terrorism expert, compiled data on over 200 European *jihadists*. He found that over 90 percent were residents of a European country and that almost 60 percent retained European citizenship. He also found that at least 58 individuals had spent time in prison before later being arrested on terrorism offenses but that only “half a dozen” of these ex-convicts had been previously charged with terrorism-related crimes.²⁰ This suggests that roughly one-quarter of Bakker’s sample of terrorists had previously spent time in jail on non-terrorism offenses. While Bakker’s focus is not radicalization, it is conceivable that at least some of these criminals may have been introduced to *jihadism* behind bars. Country-specific data, where and when it exists, complement these assumptions.

United Kingdom

In England and Wales, as of March, 2008, terrorist-related offenses had landed 125 individuals in prison, along with another 17 persons classified as “domestic extremists/terrorists” (i.e. motivated by Irish nationalism). Sixty-two percent of those in the former group were UK nationals and a vast majority, 91 percent, self-identified as Muslims. Between 2001 and 2008, nearly 1,500 terrorism arrests were made in the UK.²¹ According to the UK Home Office, 520 terrorism arrests resulted in at least one charge (35 percent) – comparable to the percentage of charges derived from other criminal arrests – and in 340 cases the most serious charge was considered to be related to terrorism.²² Of the 340 terrorism-related charges, 196 convictions were eventually handed down, a success rate of roughly 60 percent.

As a result, since 2001 British prisons have witnessed a precipitous increase in the number of *jihadi*-inspired terrorist inmates. Internal government documents reveal that the British government projects the number of terrorist prisoners to soar to more than 1,500 by 2017.²³

The number of self-identified Muslim prisoners in England and Wales as of June, 2005, was 7,250. This represents

roughly 9.5 percent of the total prison population (an increase of 2.5 percent from 2001).²⁴ Stephen Suleyman Schwartz, director of the Center for Islamic Pluralism in Washington, DC, argues that “the UK is on the frontline of Islamic radicalization in Europe.” He further suggests that of the overall British Muslim population, as much as “30 percent ... is jihadist – they are extremists and accept violence and will participate and support, donate money, and possibly fight for their cause.”²⁵

Put hard-core *jihadis* in a prison population that is almost 10 percent Muslim, nearly a third of whom are disposed to radical Islam, and the opportunities for spreading not just violent ideas but violent behaviour are exceptionally worrying.

A recent article published by the influential British think tank, the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, suggests that as many as 800 British prisoners incarcerated for non-terrorism offences and nearing the end of their prison terms have been radicalized behind bars. These individuals are due for release in the coming years and represent a “new wave” of terrorism in the UK.²⁶

Spain

In Spain, over 175 inmates are imprisoned on *jihadi*-related charges. However, unlike the British sample, a vast majority of these inmates are not Spaniards. In their study of Islamist radicalization in Spanish prisons, Humberto Trujillo and his colleagues found that al-

most 90 percent of Spain’s Islamist terrorism convicts were foreign nationals, notably Moroccans and Algerians. That group included only 16 Spaniards.²⁷ Expanding the authors’ figures – which were limited to trials and convictions up to March, 2007, – to include subsequent trials and rulings (including, most notably, the Madrid train-bombing trials in October, 2007, and an associated Supreme Court ruling in July, 2008, the Madrid courthouse plot trials in February, 2008, and the Barcelona subway-plot trials in December, 2009), provides a similar breakdown: of roughly 50 individuals imprisoned in these cases, only four were Spaniards.²⁸



A Catholic memorial for the victims of the Madrid train bombings.

In general, then, Islamist terrorism in Spain overwhelmingly involves foreign nationals. But Spain's *jihadi* prison population reflects overall Spanish prison trends. The foreign population of all inmates in Spain has doubled from 18 percent in 2000 (roughly 8,000 individuals) to almost 33 percent seven years later (nearly 19,000 of 58,000 inmates). That several hundred Islamist terrorists are incarcerated in Spain alongside 6,000 prisoners who retain nationality in a Muslim majority country suggests Spain's prison system may be especially susceptible to Islamist radicalization and recruitment, with grave international implications.²⁹

France

In France, the figures are even more dramatic. Data on incarceration rates range widely but, according to former Minister of the Interior Michele Alliot-Marie, as many as 100 French prisoners are considered "hard core" extremists and another 200 to 300 inmates "could be tempted" to participate in *jihadism*. "French prisons," Alliot-Marie adds, "are a favoured recruiting ground for radical Islamists."³⁰ *Le Figaro*, a leading French paper, presents an even darker picture. Citing confidential prison documents, the paper reports that as many as 442 Islamists are imprisoned in France and that 147 of these actively proselytize Islamism behind bars.³¹ Combine these figures with findings which illustrate that roughly *half* of the country's 60,000 prisoners identify as Muslims, and it becomes clear that the French prison system is ripe for radicalization.³²

United States

Collecting reliable data on annual terrorism arrests and conviction rates in the United States is surprisingly difficult due, in part, to terrorism cases being filed and defendants charged under state jurisdiction. A 2009 report published by *Human Rights First* found, for instance, that 35 separate US jurisdictions had filed terrorism cases since 2001.³³ This complicates the collection of historical examples.

Furthermore, the US government has, until only recently, failed to publicize its own data on the subject properly; terrorism and criminal offenses are often counted differently by various government bodies, private organizations, and researchers.³⁴ Predictably, the data and figures that have been compiled and published vary widely. The results are staggeringly difficult to interpret and frustrate comparative analysis.

For example, in 2008, the Bush administration noted in passing that more than 319 terrorism-related convictions had been handed down in the US since 2001 (though it did

The bottom line is that dozens – if not hundreds – of American citizens have been incarcerated in the US on terrorism-related offenses since 2001.

not relate this figure to the total number of terrorism-related arrests).³⁵

The 2009 *Human Rights First* study, on the other hand, identified only 119 cases (involving 289 defendants) which resulted in the incarceration (as of June, 2009) of 195 individuals on terrorism-related offenses. But a January 2010 study published by the New York University School of Law lists a whopping 337 cases against 804 individuals, resulting in 828 terrorism-related indictments since 9/11. Of the 593 indictments that have been resolved, the report submits that 524 defendants were convicted on terrorism-related charges.³⁶

The Obama administration complicated things further when it stepped into the void and published its own findings in March, 2010. The Justice Department revealed that 403 terrorism-related convictions had been obtained in civilian courts since 2001 (though, as with the Bush administration, these figures do not report the number of arrests or the conviction rate).³⁷ Though reliable data is unavailable, the bottom line is that dozens – if not hundreds – of American citizens have been incarcerated in the US on terrorism-related offenses since 2001.

In terms of demographics, statistics compiled by the US Department of Justice reveal that 1.6 million individuals were incarcerated in state and federal prisons in 2009. The figure jumps to nearly 2.3 million when individuals imprisoned in local jails are included.³⁸ Though figures on the number of Muslims in US prisons are not consistently tallied, Dr. J. Michael Waller, professor at The Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC, estimates that approximately 350,000 US inmates self-identify as Muslims. Waller also adds that, of American inmates "who seek faith while imprisoned, about 80 percent come to Islam." This translates into a yearly conversion rate (at all levels of American correctional facilities) of roughly 35,000 individuals.³⁹

American prisons are also unique in comparison to their European counterparts because of the influence the Nation of Islam (NOI) has had on the African-American commu-

nity over several decades. The NOI preaches self-reliance for black Americans (including political separation from the American state) by means of an intellectual framework heavily influenced by Islamic teachings.⁴⁰ Because African-Americans are disproportionately represented in US prisons – 40 percent of all inmates are black (906,000 individuals) compared to only 12 percent of the total American population – the NOI, along with other forms of Islam, has long played a major role in the American correctional system.⁴¹ Under these conditions, radical Islamic beliefs may find fertile ground.

Terrorism in Canada

By comparison, the scale of the threat in Canada is much less severe.⁴² Neither the 2008 nor the 2009 statistical reports on Canada's prison population from the Department of Public Safety makes any mention of terrorism or terrorist convictions; this reporting deficit may be naïve, if not mysterious, given recent convictions. But it does suggest that terrorism offenses in Canada are far from common. Even though CSIS Director Richard Fadden suggested that, as of May, 2010, CSIS was "investigating over 200 individuals ... whose activities meet the (official) definition of terrorism," including many "second or third generation Canadians," the threat of terrorism in Canada, comparatively speaking, remains modest.⁴³

Of course, it only takes a small group to organize, plan, and perpetrate an act of terrorism. But the relatively minor threat within Canada is a positive sign. It does not only mean we are safer; it means we can learn from our allies' problems with prison radicalization before ours become nearly as urgent. If we take the problem seriously and do our homework, Canadians can get ahead of prison radicalization before it becomes a major security concern.

According to Statistics Canada, terrorism-related incidents between 2002 and 2008 break down as follows. Table 1 (see next page) shows that nearly 200 incidents recorded between 2002 and 2008 resulted in 18 separate terrorism charges.⁴⁴ Some of the more high-profile events incorporated here include the 2006 arrest and subsequent trial of the Toronto 18, Said Namouh's 2007 arrest for aiding an al Qaeda-affiliated plot in Germany and Austria, the 2006 seizure of the World Tamil Movement's offices and bank accounts in Montreal and

Toronto, Prapaharan Thambithurai's 2008 charge of supporting and financing the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and a series of blasts near Dawson Creek, British Columbia, between 2008 and 2009 that targeted EnCana oil and gas infrastructure.

Canadian terrorism convictions

As of September 2010, our country has incarcerated 14 Canadians for facilitating, sponsoring, and/or organizing terrorism. The overall trend reveals a slow but deliberate increase in the number of terrorism-related incidences and incarcerations in Canada over the past five years.

Found guilty of financing terrorism in the UK and of having designed and constructed a remote-controlled transmitting device capable of setting off home-made explosives, Mohammad Momin Khawaja was the first Canadian imprisoned under the country's *Anti-Terrorism Act*.⁴⁵ In March 2009, he was sentenced to 10 and a half years in prison.

Found guilty of conspiracy, participating in, and facilitating the activities of a terrorist group in October, 2009, Said Namouh received a life sentence in February, 2010.⁴⁶

In May, 2010, Prapaharan Thambithurai pleaded guilty to knowingly providing financial services to the benefit of a terrorist group, the Tamil Tigers. He became the first Canadian convicted of a terrorism offence based solely on fundraising and the first Canadian convicted of financing the LTTE since the group's blacklisting in 2006.⁴⁷

Of the Toronto 18 suspects, 11 have been incarcerated; four were convicted in court and seven admitted their guilt.

Trials for three Canadians arrested in Ottawa and London, Ontario in August 2010 for allegedly facilitating both foreign and domestic terrorism are expected over the coming years.

As far as can be determined from available data, no one sentenced for terrorism-related offenses in Canada had previously been incarcerated for non-terrorism-related offenses; this indicates that we do not yet have a problem with prison radicalization. But, for all the reasons noted in this paper, and given the experience of other Western countries, this encouraging statistic means we have time to act preemptive-

It only takes a small group to organize, plan, and perpetrate an act of terrorism.

Table 1: Canadian Terrorism Statistics (Incidents and Charges)

Annual Number of Incidents	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
Property or service for terrorist activity	1	n/a	0	0	6	14	40	61
Participation in terrorist activity	1	2	2	0	17	21	41	84
Facilitation of terrorist activity			0	1	8	5	12	26
Commission or instructing to carry out terrorism		0	n/a	n/a	7	3	14	24
Harbouring/concealing a terrorist						0	1	1
Total Persons Charged	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Total
Property or service for terrorist activity	0	n/a	0	0	0	6	1	7
Participation in terrorist activity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Facilitation of terrorist activity			0	0	0	6	0	6
Commission or instructing to carry out terrorism		0	n/a	n/a	1	1	0	2
Harbouring/concealing a terrorist						2	1	3

Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM (April 2010)

ly, not that we can afford to ignore the problem. Opportunities for prison radicalization are growing and Canadians must remain vigilant.

Canada's prison system and population

How might incarcerated terrorists influence patterns of radicalization in Canadian prisons? The correctional system in Canada is administered by both the federal and provincial governments. Serious criminal offenders receiving a sentence of two or more years – usual in criminal cases involving terrorism – fall under federal jurisdiction and serve time in one of Canada's 54 federal penitentiaries. These are a tiny and unrepresentative segment of the criminal population. In 2005/6, for instance, of roughly 2.6 million crimes reported to the Canadian police, only 243,000 resulted in convictions. Of these, a relative handful – just over 5,000 – ended up in federal jurisdiction.⁴⁸ However, because most of those convicted for terrorism land in federal custody, the federally administered prison population is at the greatest risk for Islamist radicalization.

Between 1998 and 2008, Canada's federal prison population hovered between 12,400 and 13,500 individuals. Another several thousand federal offenders are "actively supervised" or are on some form of "conditional release" or parole, but are not

physically incarcerated. Demographically, the 2008/9 federal prison population broke down accordingly: the majority (67 percent) were Caucasian; Aboriginals made up the second largest group (17 percent); and only 919 prisoners (4 percent) self-identified as Muslim.⁴⁹

Not only does Canada have fewer terrorists in the prison system than other Western states, but our prison population as a whole may be less susceptible to Islamist radicalization. That does not mean, however, that *jihadism* resonates only with Muslim inmates. Numerous international cases highlight the fact that non-Muslim prisoners may also find these radical ideologies appealing. Furthermore, some violent criminals may have a natural attraction to ideologies that excuse, legitimize, and sanitize their penchant for violence. In some cases, a non-Muslim prisoner may first be converted to mainstream Islam and then fall into the intellectual clutches of violent Islamists.

The threat of prison radicalization in Canada has, until very recently, remained low. But as more terrorists are incarcerated in this country, Canadians will face new challenges. As Dirie's case indicates, some prisoners will actively try to promote Islamist causes. Further, prisons themselves continue to provide a social environment conducive to the spread of ideologies that legitimize, condone, and facilitate political violence.

PART II: UNDERSTANDING RADICALIZATION

An effective strategy to combat the threat of terrorism in Canada requires that we understand in some detail how radicalization spreads in prisons and what we can do to contain it. We cannot simply call terrorists criminals and leave it at that. We must instead focus on the motivational differences between terrorists and the vast majority of other inmates.

The key difference is this: Individuals who set out to kill their fellow citizens in campaigns of political violence do so because they come to believe that murder for a cause is feasible and just.⁵⁰ Radicalization is a personal experience through which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/or religious ideals and aspirations, including the belief that the attainment of crucial goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence against civilians. A psychological and intellectual process, it entails a mental, emotional, and cognitive transition that prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behaviour. With specific reference to Islamist radicalization, Brian Michael Jenkins of RAND expresses it as the internalization of a “set of beliefs, a militant mindset that embraces violent *jihad* as the paramount test of one’s conviction.”⁵¹

Describing radicalization is easy. Understanding what drives it – so we can develop counterstrategies – is a great deal more challenging. Few rules seem to apply. As CSIS notes in its report, *Paths to Radicalization of Home-Grown Islamic Extremists in Canada*, “there does not appear to be a single process that leads to extremism: the transformation is highly individual.”⁵² Despite this complexity, various precursors to radicalization – the factors that may lead a person to accept and participate in violent behaviour – have been identified. They offer insight as to how states might best respond.

Radicalization in society

Three precursors to radicalization stand out: socio-political alienation, deepening religious identity, and anger over a state’s foreign policy. These precursors help motivate some individuals living in the West to embrace violence as they reject their society’s democratic mores, social norms, and liberal traditions. In part, they explain why members of the Toronto 18, for example, despite exhibiting an unmistakable degree of “Canadian-ness,” nevertheless sought to kill other Canadians in acts of terror. What follows is a description of

how these precursors influence the radicalization process inherent in home-grown terrorism.

Socio-political alienation

The most commonly cited element in Islamist radicalization is the lack of integration particular Western Muslim communities demonstrate with their broader societies, and their related experiences of, and sense of, discrimination and victimization.⁵³ Individuals and groups who feel that they cannot achieve meaningful success in their host or native country and its culture may turn towards like-minded individuals with whom they share a grievance. As a result, they eventually construct a narrow social network that is distinct from the broader societal one. They establish identities that reflect the small “clique” rather than the much broader nation and, indeed, depend on a rejection of the larger society and its norms. As David Wright-Neville and Debra Smith, both of Australia’s Global Terrorism Research Center, write, “alienation is replaced by identification with the group ... [and] humiliation is mitigated by participation in actions.”⁵⁴

To be part of something grander – a group, a belief, or a goal – feels good. Over time, radicalizing individuals distance themselves politically, socially, and ideologically from their broader Western community. They eventually reject the national identity they once shared with other citizens, along with the collective’s underlying political ideology, historical narrative, and related value-systems. A potential outcome of this process is anti-social behaviour, including violence and terrorism.

Religious identification

Militant *jihadism*, whether pursued in North America or North Africa, is intrinsically associated with Islam. Regardless of the negative attitudes of mainstream Muslims to the sorts of indiscriminate and brutal violence committed in Islam’s name, adherents of militant *jihadism* self-identify as “good Muslims” and evoke Islam to justify their actions. At his trial for the vicious murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam, Mohammed Bouyeri – a member of the Dutch home-grown group, the Hofstad Network – put it bluntly: “What moved me to do what I did was purely my faith. I was motivated by the law that commands me to cut off the head of anyone who insults Allah.”⁵⁵

As Oliver Roy, a French terrorism expert, explains, the forces of globalization – modernization, urbanization, secularism, displacement, hi-tech communications, and so on – create tension for young Western Muslims who find it difficult to adhere to traditional religious beliefs in a non-religious setting. One potential outcome is insecurity and confusion over one's identity, and a bewildering failure to fit either into one's ethnic and religious community or broader society.

By vigorously reasserting their religious identity within and against their non-Muslim environment, radicalization becomes a way for Muslim youths to overcome this sense of not belonging anywhere. "In radical Islam," writes Roy, individuals find "a way to recast and rationalise their sense of exclusion," replacing missing interpersonal ties and re-establishing a sense of belonging. In the 21st century, a critical component of that remedy is the Internet, which allows individuals to create a "virtual community" of believers that rests outside the confines of a specific city, country, or region.⁵⁶

Foreign policy

Finally, radicalization is often considered as a reaction to – and violent rejection of – a host or native state's foreign and defence policy. Western militant *jihadists* certainly cite perceived injustices taking place against Muslims around the globe as a major motivation. Bin Laden states: "The truth is the whole Muslim world is the victim of international terrorism. We are a nation whose sacred symbols have been looted and whose wealth and resources have been plundered."⁵⁷

A transnational religious solidarity – spurred by alleged grievances like the victimization of Muslims in Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Palestinian territories, Somalia, Chechnya and elsewhere by the US, the EU, Canada, their allies, and other international organizations (like NATO, the World Bank, and the UN) – compels some Western Muslims to act. "Perceived provocation," explains British academic Akil Awan, "serve[s] as a *casus belli* that sanctions the recourse to jihadism."⁵⁸ These perceived grievances fall into at least three categories: insults against Islam (i.e. the Mohammed cartoons); Western complacency in the face of Muslim suffering (i.e. in Chechnya); and overt Western military aggression against Muslims (i.e. in Afghanistan and Iraq).

Some of these geopolitical developments humiliate and anger a tiny portion of Western Muslims to the point that they feel justified in taking revenge against the states and their citizens who participate in these perceived injustices. In his quantitative study of British radicalization, Brendan O'Duffy of the University of London finds that "British foreign policy [is] a significant source of alienation among younger British Muslims" and that "attitudes towards British foreign policy interact with ... domestic social, cultural, and economic sources of discontent."⁵⁹

By vigorously reasserting their religious identity within and against their non-Muslim environment, radicalization becomes a way for Muslim youths to overcome this sense of not belonging anywhere.

This has little to do with whether some form of organized persecution, xenophobia, or dishonor against Muslims is actually taking place, or whether Western policies concerning the Arab and Muslim world are in fact biased. What matters is that some Western Muslims accept these grievances and don the

seductive mantle of victimhood. At his plea hearing, Faisal Shahzad, the American who orchestrated the failed 2010 Times Square bombing in New York City, explained his rationale for participating in *jihad*:

I'm going to plead guilty a hundred times over because until ... the U.S. pulls its forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and stops the drone strikes in Somalia and Yemen and in Pakistan and stops the occupation of Muslim lands and stops killing the Muslims and stops reporting the Muslims to its government, we will be attacking [the] U.S., and I plead guilty to that. [O]ne has to understand where I'm coming from – I consider myself a *mujahid*, a Muslim soldier. The U.S. and the NATO forces, along with 40, 50 countries has [sic] attacked the Muslim lands.

The presiding judge interrupted Shahzad and asked about "the people who were walking in Times Square that night. Did you look around to see who they were?" Shahzad answered bluntly that "the people select the government. We consider them all the same."⁶⁰

Shahzad's case is especially troubling because he lived in the United States for more than a decade, received university degrees (including an MBA) and scholarships in the US, married an American citizen and raised two little girls, settled in a nice home in Connecticut, and worked as a junior

financial analyst for three years.⁶¹ On all counts, he lived as an integrated and motivated immigrant. Despite all of his successes living and working in the US, Shahzad still came to believe that he had a legitimate obligation to target Americans with terrorism.

In his particular case, anger with US foreign policy, a deep-seated sense of victimization, and resentment of American indifference toward Muslim suffering fed his radicalization process. At some point in mid-2009, he was fully radicalized; he dropped everything, quit his job, and moved the family to Pakistan, where he sought and made contact with members of the Taliban and received terrorism training. He returned to the US months later to kill and maim Americans.

Precursors are not perfect

Although the precursors to radicalization offer some insight concerning the conditions that help foment home-grown terrorism, they are imperfect. None alone explains how Westerners come to accept and participate in *jihadism*.

Alienation, for instance, may tell us something about the social state of the radicalizing individual, but it does not identify the tipping point that ultimately leads to the radicalization process. Moreover, a vast majority of Western Muslims who suffer from real or perceived alienation do not partake in violence. As Schwartz explains, there may be “problems in how Muslims are treated in the West, but those grievances have always existed, long before radical Islamism became a problem.”⁶²

Given that many of the radicalized Westerners who have supported terrorism are neither alienated nor deprived, something else, perhaps in combination with social and political alienation, is likely driving the process. The 2007 Glasgow International Airport attack, for instance, was conducted by highly-educated and successful British Muslims. Some were medical doctors and one was working towards a doctorate. These were not “typical” alienated terrorists.

Religiosity is equally problematic. While religious adherence and globalization may create an environment in which *jihadi* radicalization can more easily occur, they do not cause

radicalization. Nor, for that matter, does religious practice explain why one individual radicalizes and another does not.

The same can be said of foreign policy precursors. The connections between violent radicalization and anger over foreign policy are fuzzy and it is not obvious in which direction the causality runs. Take the 2003 Iraq War.

Conventional thinkers believe that some Western Muslims were incensed by the invasion and driven to exact revenge. But a number of major attacks – notably, Ahmed Ressam’s foiled attempt to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on New Year’s Eve 2000, al Qaeda’s 2000 attack on the USS Cole, the 2001 shoe bombing attempt, the 2002 Bali nightclub bombing in Indonesia that killed over 200 people (including 88 Australians and another 65 Westerners), the planning behind the Madrid attacks, and 9/11 itself – predate the invasion.⁶³

Moreover, countries that refused to participate in the conflict (Canada, Belgium) and others that unabashedly condemned the United States (France, Germany) nonetheless suffered *jihadi* terrorism, while countries that *did join* the US have not (Poland, Romania, South Korea, Portugal, Iceland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan). In addition, countries that participated in the invasion only to withdraw prematurely (Spain, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands) nonetheless suffered attacks, even after having retreated.

Given that many of the radicalized Westerners who have supported terrorism are neither alienated nor deprived, something else, perhaps in combination with social and political alienation, is likely driving the process.

Spain’s experience following the Madrid bombings is especially telling. Ostensibly intended to compel Spain to withdraw its troops from Iraq, the first attack, timed to coincide with the national election, took place on March 11, 2004. Voters blamed Spain’s involvement in Iraq for provoking the bombings and replaced the governing People’s Party, which had sided with the US, with Socialist, antiwar candidate José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. He immediately followed through with his pledge to remove Spanish soldiers from Iraq.⁶⁴

Zapatero’s election and Spain’s foreign policy reversal were a strategic victory for al Qaeda and its supporters. They achieved a dramatic shift in Spanish policy, fostered a crisis within the American-led coalition in Iraq, and gained a par-

tial cessation of foreign occupation. Spaniards themselves, however, might be excused for their act of electoral appeasement and for handing those responsible for the Madrid attacks exactly what they wanted. They were, after all, voting for what they presumed would put an end to the terrorism.

But the attacks kept coming. On April 2, after Zapatero broke with the US, a second train bomb was defused. The next day, authorities tracked the terrorist cell to an apartment and an ensuing gun battle ended when the terrorists blew up the apartment. In the investigation, police uncovered another 200 detonators, several kilograms of explosives, suicide vests, and a car bomb parked on the street. That the Madrid terrorists were preparing a multitude of further attacks, despite the fact that their supposed political grievances had been addressed, suggests that something other than the Iraq war had motivated them.⁶⁵ The apparent lesson for other Western voters? There was little point in raising the white flag, because *jihadis* were not interested in taking prisoners.

Radicalization in prison

Despite their shortcomings, the precursors of radicalization constitute an important piece of the terrorism puzzle. They help us understand some of the factors involved in turning Westerners into *jihadists* and highlight how different social, political, and religious factors intertwine to influence violent behaviour. They also offer us a starting point for understanding prison radicalization; the precursors evident in society are also found in prison.

Obviously a prison environment differs markedly from that of open society; prisons are highly restrictive institutions filled with potentially violent individuals. But the three precursors of radicalization are common to both. By relying on them, we can distinguish the forces that help drive radicalization behind bars, learn to identify radicalization as it is happening, and give authorities something specific to watch for when radical prisoners interact with other inmates.

Social alienation and prison gangs

Even though it is reflective of prison dynamics, not societal ones, alienation occurs in prison just as it does in society. Inmates experience social pressure and a “deprivation of autonomy” that can lead to feelings of isolation, insecurity, and anxiety.⁶⁶ As prison facilities are also filled with individuals

with a predilection for antisocial behaviour, social interactions within this community are fraught with suspicion and danger.

This environment forces some inmates, especially those with a poorly developed sense of self, into protective groups. Prisoners seeking ways to alleviate their insecurities might well turn to others with whom they share common cultural, religious, or ethnic characteristics. Prison gang culture, inherent to all prison systems, fills the individual’s need for personal security. Gang association can be driven by what has been dubbed the “prisonization process”, in which new inmates accept certain identities and group membership in order to assimilate into the prison system and “survive” their prison terms.⁶⁷

A recent study of US prison gangs and prison-based security threat groups (STG), conducted on behalf of Correctional Service of Canada, found that one-half of prison gang members were unaffiliated with a gang prior to incarceration. They were recruited once they had entered prison. Inmates joined gangs out of “fear of other inmates”, because they had “a sense of not belonging [or had] no other friends” in prison, or because they sought to “increase their social status” among prisoners.⁶⁸ By accepting identification with a gang, an inmate gains protection and acquires a sense of corporate identity and common purpose. Gang membership comes with a price, however; it usually requires an oath and proof of group loyalty, including a willingness to stand up for fellow gang members and abide by gang rules, norms and instructions.

While gang membership can offer inmates protection in a volatile environment, one outcome of gang affiliation is the development of an in-group and out-group mentality in which members of the gang outwardly and socially disassociate themselves from the general prison population. When gang membership is based on a particular ideology, religion, or cultural characteristic, disassociation can lead to social polarization and eventually, radicalization. “Racist prison gangs”, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) suggests in a 2002 report, can “capitalize on, and sharpen, existing prejudices and hatreds held by incoming prisoners,” further driving a wedge between racially divided prison groups.⁶⁹

It does not help, Stephen Schwartz says, that “in prison, you usually have an intersection between race and religion, and between ethnic markers and radical ideology.” In the US,

he continues, the nexus “has to do with African-American prisoners”; in Russia, “you’ve got the Tatars”; in “France and Spain, Arabs”; “in the Netherlands and Germany, Moroccans, Turks, and Kurds.”⁷⁰ In each of these cases, race, ethnicity, and radical beliefs intersect.

Muslim-defined prison gangs offer all the necessities for the formation of a particular in-group that can foster radicalization and support for violence and terrorism. In 2009, James Brandon, head of research at the Quilliam foundation – a London-based “counter-terrorism think tank” whose “founders are former leading ideologues of UK-based extremist Islamist organizations” – authored an expansive study of British prison radicalization. Brandon writes that “while Muslim-centric prison gangs may evolve for protection ... Islamist prison gangs often additionally promote an exclusive, separatist ideology that glorifies violence and intolerance.”⁷¹

These Islamist groups actively legitimize, encourage, and promote political violence. Likewise, incarcerated Islamist extremists bent on advancing *jihadism* in any and all social environments purposefully assume leadership roles in Muslim and Islamist prison groups in order to radicalize other inmates. Selective gang recruitment can ensure that susceptible inmates are first identified upon entering prison, then properly approached, and finally persuaded to join the group’s protective fold. Once there, they can be indoctrinated. According to this pattern, faith-based gang membership may act as an incubator for violent ideologies. The development of Islamist prison gangs becomes a national security threat if and when they solidify an “us versus them” social divide within prison that spills over into society once inmates are released.

Religious and ideological conversions

Second, as in society, religious identity can play a factor in Islamist radicalization of prison inmates. Finding definitive figures on the number of prisoners who convert to or re-join Islam is difficult; changes in religious affiliation are difficult to track, are rarely systematically recorded, and are not readily publicized. Nonetheless, aforementioned US trends which suggest that 80 percent of inmates who do turn towards religion in American correctional facilities select Islam, are informative.⁷² A number of social forces inform Islam’s popularity in American prisons, including kinship and social interventions, the impact of race in American society,

the role of religion among African-Americans, and the volatility of prison interactions. Similar forces are at play in Europe and potentially in Canada, too.

It is important to note that increasing religiosity, Muslim conversion, and newfound identification with Islam among prisoners can be a positive development. Islam – like other religions – can have a calming effect on a prisoner’s behaviour by imposing strict guidelines on individual actions. It can create self-respect and self-control in individuals whose criminal careers were driven primarily by a lack of both.

Mark Hamm, a professor of criminology at Indiana State University and a leading proponent of this theory, has found that, for the majority of American inmates who convert to Islam, “the experience increases self-discipline and helps them to interact in a positive manner with other inmates and staff ... making a meaningful contribution to their rehabilitation.”⁷³ According to Hamm and others, Islam gives inmates a sense of self-worth and purpose and helps them direct and control their urges.⁷⁴ Many prisoners use conversion as a spiritual and social “new start” and as a way to get past unwanted behaviour, like drug addiction, delinquency, criminal activity, and other bad habits.

Of course, the risk associated with prison conversion is that converts may be susceptible to and adopt hard-line or radical interpretations of their new religion. That can facilitate violence down the road. So while Hamm is careful to press the good that comes with prison conversions, he is quick to add that “from the crucible of good behaviour comes the potential for radicalization.” Herein, the process of Muslim conversion becomes intertwined with gang association, producing a worrisome offshoot of the Muslim faith: “Prison Islam” or “Jailhouse Islam”.⁷⁵ This is a diluted form of Muslim practice mixed in with gang identification, Islamist predation, intimidation, and violence. “Prison Islam,” Schwartz explains “is an absence of religious study and even practice infused with race identity and gang dynamics.”⁷⁶ It does, however, provide a potent and dangerous brew of religious faith and socio-political ideology.

In the UK, one inmate told a British prison inspector that “a lot of people are becoming Muslim just because it [is] a bigger group ... If you are not in a gang, you’re in trouble. People are converting to Islam for protection.”⁷⁷ This is a conversion process based less on sincere religious belief than on fear, coercion, and intimidation. Under certain conditions,

Islamist radicalization and terrorism recruitment can result. When prisons are overcrowded, uncontrolled, and either plagued with a lack of prison chaplains or infested with radical ones, unchecked gang predation and the active recruitment by extremists can help augment the rate of conversions to radical Islam behind bars.⁷⁸

Prison policy and inmate grievances

Third, anger towards and resentment of authority is as potent a precursor to radicalization in prison as it is in society. The main difference is that, under prison conditions, antipathy is normally directed against the incarceration system and its inherent faults rather than a national government, a military or police force, or foreign policy. This makes obvious sense. Prisoners who must live under restrictive conditions may naturally come to reject the authority managing their incarceration. But when it comes to prison radicalization, another factor comes into play: the active manipulation of real or perceived Muslim grievances by Islamist inmates, in the hope of amplifying radicalization in prison.

James Brandon has made a particular study of the role the manipulation of grievances and other related “push factors” (like racism, systematic maltreatment, institutional discrimination, and social exclusion) have on prison radicalization. He defines “push factors” as “aspects of prison life that ‘push’ individuals away from mainstream society and towards extremist individuals” and ideas. British Muslim prisoners, he explains, “frequently perceive themselves as being targeted for violence” and other forms of discrimination by non-Muslim prisoners and prison guards alike. In certain cases, racism, hostility, and violence are acute.


Citing various prison surveys, Brandon finds that Muslim prisoners in the UK consistently feel higher levels of victimization perpetrated by prison guards and the prison institution than do non-Muslim prisoners. Those feelings combine with Muslim mistrust concerning the way the prison system handles Islamic religious obligations and sensitivities; these points of potential contention include the authenticity of halal food, the use of security tactics that some find religiously degrading (like strip searches, which contradict codes of modesty, and sniffer dogs, considered by some as unclean

animals), and perceived discrimination when it comes to participating in communal prayer services. The result, Brandon explains, is that a “perception of discriminatory treatment can lead inmates to adopt and repeat the Islamist view that the British government ... [is] systematically opposed to Muslims.”⁷⁹ This strengthens the potency of the radical’s message.

Islamists are able to make political capital out of almost any issue which concerns or distresses ordinary Muslim prisoners. Logically, then, prison officials need to minimize the number of issues Islamists can exploit to garner wider acceptance within the prison population. But too much stress should not be placed on accommodating real or perceived grievances, because other experts make clear that discrimination

alone does not explain prison radicalization.

In their research on US prisons, for instance, professors Bert Useem and Obie Clayton cite Kevin James’ radicalization in California. James established *Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-Saheed* in prison and recruited inmates for attacks in the US. As its leader, he was a prolific writer who offered scholarly justification for his support of terrorism. “If bad prison condi-



tions or the humiliation of the prison experience had moved James towards radicalization,” Useem and Clayton write, “then ... he would have said so in [his] document.”⁸⁰ But he did not; he was too busy citing other rationales.

Stephen Schwartz relates the debate this way: “There are two paradigms for dealing with radical Islam: either you see it as an issue of grievances or you see it as an imported ideology.” He takes the latter position, suggesting that Brandon and the grievance camp misjudge the importance of external factors in the radicalization of inmates.

Schwartz points to a number of critical external factors, including radical Islamist literature, radical Imams, and the American “Wahhabi lobby” – a conglomerate of organizations “financed by radicals in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan” that represent “the most reactionary, exclusivist, fundamentalist and violent phenomenon in the recent history” of Sunni Islam.⁸¹ Schwartz does not see radicalism in prison as a grievance-based phenomenon. In American prisons, he explains, Muslim inmates have the right to act in accordance to their religious beliefs (as do non-Muslim

prisoners), to halal food, to collective Friday prayers, and so on. Prison radicalization is instead, he believes, a consequence of active steps taken by both domestic and foreign radical groups to infiltrate prisons and influence inmates with radical ideology, literature, and leadership.⁸²

In all likelihood, the two forces – grievances and the active importation of radical ideologies – interact. Radicals in prison might find it to their benefit to downplay the rights Muslims have in prison while aggravating and aggrandizing the problems and difficulties they supposedly face. A 2008 investigative report conducted by UK Chief Inspector of Prisons, Dame Anne Owers, revealed a “real danger that the alienation of Muslim prisoners in general, and the suspicion with which they perceived they were treated, would in fact feed radicalization.”⁸³ Especially if radical inmates actively inflame that suspicion. Dealing with prison radicalization will therefore require a multitude of different approaches that tackle both the passive precursors, like prison grievances, and active precursors, like Islamist aggravation, that foster the problem.



PART III: COMBATTING PRISON RADICALIZATION

Despite the impossibility of stating with mathematical certainty which prisoners will be radicalized, common sense and determination should allow Canadians to deal with these threats. By informing ourselves on emerging international trends and applying the lessons derived from various studies on radicalization, we can develop tactics and policies to help thwart Islamist radicalization and terrorism recruitment in our prison system before they reach truly dangerous proportions.

The two key elements are preventing incarcerated Islamists from proselytizing to and recruiting other inmates, and combatting those conditions within prisons that push vulnerable inmates to seek physical and social safety in gangs, including Islamist ones. These elements suggest three subsets of recommendations, to deal with structural policy, religious policy, and grievance-based policy.

Structural recommendations

Identify how radicalization occurs

First, we need to understand better how radicalization occurs in Canada. While our domestic version may share certain core factors with American, British, and French radicalization, specific patterns of immigration, demographics, ethnic politics, imported political traditions, and religious attitudes likely create measurable and significant differences. Because Canada is a distinct national entity, radicalization within our borders will have a particular Canadian flavour. As Stephen Schwartz notes, “Canadian Islam is more moderate, more diverse and more open to debate than American or even British Islam.”⁸⁴

Yet some Canadians nonetheless accept radical ideologies that legitimize terror. What factors drive that acceptance and how can Canadians use our distinctive national mosaic to deal with radicalization? Are some immigrant communities more prone to radicalization than others, or less so?

The first priority rests on identifying how extremist ideologies spread within society and in prisons and the second on distinguishing what subset of both communities are most at risk. Doing so will require that Canada:

- Identify how radicalization specifically occurs within Canadian borders and compare

Canadian radicalization processes to international trends. That will require establishing a task force on radicalization, consultation with other countries, and culling lessons from their collective experiences in combatting radicalization and home-grown terrorism. We need to understand how radicalization occurs in Canada if we are going to have any success in combatting it.

- Establish an “extremism unit” within the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) whose tasks are the continuous monitoring of trends in radicalization (in all its forms) and informing policy and responses.
- Produce a prison guide for internal use that describes the indicators and processes of radicalization in prisons. France, Germany, and Austria have already done so, co-authoring an official (and secret) manual on behalf of the EU in 2008. Spain, the UK, and the Netherlands have also recently published their own national prison manuals on the indicators of prison radicalization.⁸⁵
- Allow academics and researchers greater access to interview and work with terrorist and radical inmates.

Deny extremists access to other prisoners

Second, extremists must be denied access to Canada’s prison population. The active recruitment of inmates by radical Islamists must be monitored, obstructed, and deterred. Success will require that Canada:

- Develop a strategy that finds the right balance between containing radical prisoners in one facility (concentration), segregating radicals from the general prison population (separation), isolating individual radicals from one another (isolation), and displacing radicals by frequently moving them around within the prison system (displacement).

Each tactic has its merits depending on the situation. For instance, radicals who insist on converting and recruiting others should be isolated and displaced in order to restrict them from building interpersonal relationships with potential recruits. On the other hand, terrorists who reject their violent ideology and turn against their former comrades might have a positive influence on other inmates if they are concentrated with them. Building the proper strategy will require a sophisticated understanding of Canada's terrorist prison population and assessments of each individual prisoner to ensure that "marginally involved foot soldiers are not mixed with hardcore terrorists and charismatic leaders."⁸⁶

The isolation and segregation of prisoners creates pitfalls. First, these tactics can have a deleterious effect on a prisoner's mental health and rehabilitation. Second, the practice creates issues associated with political, legal, and privacy rights. While protecting inmates from radical ideologies may be accomplished by simply restricting the radical's interaction with others, long-term isolation does not facilitate rehabilitation and reform. Since most terrorists are not facing life in prison and will be back on the streets eventually, the long-term goal should remain rehabilitation. Isolation may buy short-term security gains at the cost of long-term losses.⁸⁷ Likewise, more research is needed to evaluate whether "disciplinary segregation" is an effectively punitive disincentive against active recruitment and radicalization.⁸⁸ Preventing radicals from influencing other prisoners will require that we:

- Track incarcerated terrorists as they move within the prison system and throughout their sentences and monitor their social interactions with other inmates.
- Familiarize prison staff with Islamism and radicalization and train them to identify and pinpoint troublesome developments.⁸⁹
- Monitor social circles, clubs, and groups that include known Islamists, and impede attempts by incarcerated terrorists to become leaders or representatives of Muslim prison groups. This can be accomplished by segregating them from other Muslim inmates, if and when required, and frustrating their proselytization and indoctrination efforts with the assistance of prison imams.⁹⁰

Doing so will limit the avenues incarcerated radicals use to disseminate their views easily.

- Ensure prison staff continue to control the prison environment. Keeping prisons safe – an overarching policy objective that is currently being met – decreases the occurrence of radicalization and recruitment. Uncontrolled prisons breed radicalization and violence. As Useem and Clayton explain, "as prisons lose their capacity to govern, inmates are more likely to turn to violence ... and radicalized inmates can blend more easily into the day-to-day disorder of the situation."⁹¹
- Reprimand, lay charges, and prosecute prisoners who advocate and/or facilitate terrorist attacks or incite religious hatred while in prison. As Brandon rightly asserts, "just because individuals are in prison it does not mean that they are somehow immune from laws designed to prevent terrorism."⁹²

Mine convicts for intelligence

Third, incarcerated terrorists can be a source of intelligence on potential security threats developing within and beyond prison walls. As the Toronto 18 case highlights, prisoners like Dirie who continue to facilitate acts of violence and terrorism outside prison can help officials uncover and foil would-be plots and terrorist associations. More specifically, in 2009 Italian police foiled a potential terrorist attack against French and British targets by placing hidden listening devices in a prison cell shared by two Frenchmen arrested for smuggling illegal immigrants into Europe. The two were eventually connected to a pan-European al Qaeda cell active in Belgium and France.⁹³ The trick is to collect intelligence from inmates *and* share it effectively among security officials who may need it. Ensuring intelligence is properly cultivated and appropriately utilized will require that we:

- Systematically survey radical inmates. We can do that both electronically, by placing audio surveillance equipment in strategic locations and employing hidden equipment if and where necessary, and personally, by training line staff to accurately

recognize, identify, and record suspicious behaviour.

- Share intelligence on radical inmates between prisons by strengthening inter-prison liaisons to ensure critical information reaches those who need it.
- Strengthen the CSC's role in cooperative ventures involving other security agencies (like the RCMP, the Department of National Defence, Public Safety, CSIS, and so on). The CSC has already been made a partner of the Integrated Threat Assessment Center (ITAC), a 2004 federal initiative to coordinate Canadian counter-terrorism efforts by facilitating the gathering and analysis of disparate intelligence from a variety of sources. The outcome of this cooperation has been the production of comprehensive counter-terrorism threat assessments. With more intelligence gleaned from prisons, the CSC will have to play a larger role within these partnerships.

Investigate how well various disengagement and de-radicalization programs work

Fourth, a terrorist is no ordinary prisoner. Rehabilitating individuals who are politically and religiously motivated may require the development of prison programming not usually considered relevant in dealing with other criminals. When the punishment of a prison sentence is insufficient to compel a terrorist inmate to turn against radical ideologies and political violence, other forms of structured intervention are needed. Some terrorist convicts, for instance, may require assistance to properly disengage from terrorism and “de-radicalize” while serving their prison terms. A parallel might be drawn with the tailored rehabilitation programming drug offenders and sex offenders receive behind bars. As Public Safety Canada recounts, “sex offenders who receive treatment are less likely to re-offend.”⁹⁴ The same may be true of terrorist inmates, some of whom will require specially-designed rehabilitation treatment to help them reject previously held ideological convictions, re-socialize into mainstream society, and avoid returning to prison in the future.

De-radicalization and disengagement from political violence is a hot topic.⁹⁵ The overarching question – how to compel

terrorists to reject terrorism – is of incredible social and political importance. To date, a variety of states in the Middle East (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Jordan, and Qatar) and Asia (Afghanistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore) have developed individual disengagement programs in their prison systems for Islamist terrorists.

Some Western states have also begun considering the development of similar programs. A major recommendation stemming from James Brandon's study of UK prison radicalization deals specifically with the establishment of a federally-run “specialized de-radicalization center”. The aim of the center and its related prison programs, Brandon explains, is

A terrorist is no ordinary prisoner.

to isolate known extremist prisoners “in order to prevent additional radicalization” in prison and “gradually incentivize extremist prisoners toward abandoning their radical ideologies” in preparation for rejoining the general prison population or reintegrating into the wider society.⁹⁶ De-radicalizing prisoners will require religiously re-educating *jihadists*, delegitimizing violence in the name of Islam, providing inmates with job training and secular education, and devising other inducements.⁹⁷

While the idea of de-radicalizing terrorists in Western prisons is exceptionally appealing, the little available research that analyzes the success (or failure) of de-radicalization programs overseas suggests that doing so will be difficult. John Horgan and Kurt Braddock, both at the International Center for the Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University, have found in their comparative study of various de-radicalization programs that “there are no explicit criteria for success associated with any initiative,” “little data ... that can be reliably corroborated independently,” and “no systematic effort to study any aspect of these programs.”⁹⁸ The ICSR's 2010 report on the subject concludes similarly: foreign-based de-radicalization “programmes are too different and too dependent on local context and conditions to measure success and compare their results across the board ... [T]here is no one ‘template’ or ‘blueprint’ that could be copied and pasted” in the West.

This is not great news; structuring policy on imperfect, incomplete, or uncertain research is never good. But if de-radicalization is critical to rehabilitating radical prisoners, combatting prison radicalization, and ensuring the proper

reintegration of terrorist convicts into society upon release, then much more will have to be done to find appropriate policy responses.

Fortunately, to have a positive influence on our terrorist convicts, Canada does not yet have to rely on an extensive and costly de-radicalization program. It is simply a numbers game. Unlike various European states, many of whom have hundreds of *jihadi* sympathizers behind bars, Canada only has a handful. Whereas the UK, France, Spain, and potentially the United States – following in the footsteps of Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia and elsewhere – will likely require a large-scale, institutionalized response to de-radicalization in prison, Canada can produce the desired effect with much less effort. Compelling terrorist inmates to reject radical ideologies and turn against terrorism while serving their sentences will require that we:

- Survey the field of de-radicalization programs, consult our allies who are currently investigating the issue, identify and consult appropriate Canadian religious leaders, and establish best practices for a Canadian guideline on prison de-radicalization.
- Establish a one-on-one de-radicalization program to administer to inmates who may need assistance rehabilitating, and incentivize participation in the program with a mixture of positive and negative inducements.
- Identify, select, and train appropriate interlocutors to administer and deliver the program. The best options may include qualified religious leaders with added social, psychological, and counselling skills or training and former terrorist leaders or charismatic ideologues who have come to reject terrorism and renounce radical ideologies.⁹⁹
- Examine over the coming years, as other Western countries develop their own programs, wide-scale de-radicalization ventures. Assess their utility against Canada's evolving prison population and, if deemed necessary, develop a Canadian version.

Assist convicts in properly reintegrating into society

Fifth, rehabilitation may be a primary objective of incarceration, yet it is often what happens *after* prison that determines whether or not an ex-convict is likely to be re-imprisoned. Rates of recidivism are influenced by ex-convicts' social environments and their success in reintegrating into society.

The challenges of releasing convicted Western radicals and terrorists in particular are two-fold. First, Islamists and terrorist organizations can approach ex-convicts in hopes of recruiting them back into the extremist fold.¹⁰⁰ Second, many mainstream Muslim communities are uncomfortable with convicted terrorists integrating into their communities. Radicalism carries a social and religious stigma. An Iranian-French professor, Farhad Khosrokhavar, who has conducted interviews with Islamist prisoners in France and the UK, suggests that "many Muslim associations [in France] don't want to get involved. They feel these are bad Muslims. They don't want that post-9/11 stigma, the suspicion."¹⁰¹ When faced with a lack of social and religious support, former inmates may be especially vulnerable to the advances of terrorist recruiters.

Some inmates will require structured assistance if they are to properly reintegrate into society upon their release. In the case of Islamists and former terrorists, assisted reintegration is especially important. The ICSR's 2010 comparative study of prison radicalization cites "after-care" as a crucial factor in preparing terrorist convicts for release. "In the context of disengagement [from terrorism] and de-radicalization," the report suggests, "after-care is designed to help prisoners ease back into society and sustain their newfound commitment to refraining from terrorism."¹⁰² We need to ensure that inmates convicted of terrorism offenses in Canada find a suitable place in society upon their release. Doing so will require that we:

- Allow the National Parole Board of Canada, when reviewing cases, to take into account whether or not convicted terrorists (and other prisoners suspected of having adopted extremist views behind bars) have come to reject violent ideologies.
- Support non-governmental organizations and societal groups that put former convicts in contact with moderate mosques and mainstream religious communities.¹⁰³

Reintegration and resettlement is especially important with inmates who convert to Islam behind bars, many of whom will have no contact with Muslims outside prison.¹⁰⁴

- Bolster de-radicalization programs that exist outside prison, like Toronto's Specialized De-Radicalization Intervention program, and persuade former terrorists to enrol into these institutions upon release.¹⁰⁵ Correctional staff should keep track, supervise, and monitor their progress reintegrating into society – as we do with other ex-convicts (like sex offenders) – and look for signs of relapse.
- Encourage prisoners who renounce terrorism, *jihadism*, and political violence to share their stories and views with other prisoners and members of at-risk communities. Former extremists who turn against terrorism will have the credibility to challenge radicals in a way that will resonate with susceptible audiences.

Religious recommendations

Dealing with Islamism in prison poses a challenge not usually encountered when addressing other forms of prison radicalization and prison gang activity. Incarcerated Islamists and terrorists are usually pious Muslims. Like all Canadians in and out of prison, they have a lawful right to practice their faith, openly and unhindered. In Canada, CSC is bound by the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, the *Corrections and Conditional Release Act* and the *Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations* to offer “religious and spiritual accommodation” to all prisoners, no matter what their criminal offense. That means that CSC must provide “access to an adequate level of resources” including religious leadership, opportunities to worship individually and in groups, holy day observances, educational resources, religious articles (like prayer books or shawls), and dietary requirements (like kosher or halal meals).¹⁰⁶

Finding ways to uphold prisoners' constitutional rights to practice their faith, while ensuring the prison system does not inadvertently facilitate radicalization, is complicated. As Brandon describes the dilemma:

Prisons need to respect religious beliefs in ways that do not exist for other prison groups. This is difficult to do consistently when prison authorities tackle the religion-gang nexus. The [Muslim] Friday prayer service is a good example and continuous flashpoint. To the prison, it may look like gang activity (group members getting together, discussing issues, *etcetera*) when it may have nothing to do with gang activity at all and is rather religiously influenced.¹⁰⁷

Authorities must establish a careful balance between upholding a prisoner's religious rights and freedoms and dealing with legitimate security concerns. Four issues need to be addressed:

Exclude radical religious leaders from prison

First, Muslim inmates have the right to access providers of religious services. Imams are an integral part of Muslim communities. Like other religious leaders, they provide members of their faith with leadership in prayer, offer sermons (usually delivered during the communal Friday service) and educational lectures, and provide religious guidance. At issue is the fact that Islam is a multifaceted religion with a diversity of varying interpretations. Some religious leaders espouse a reading of religious texts that legitimize violence. These leaders must be excluded from prisons. Doing so can be challenging, however, because prison systems are not accustomed to dealing with religious extremism. Schwartz explains:

In the United States, most prisons have only one or only a very few chaplains. Usually these individuals are Catholic. They bring in an Imam when one is needed, and would do the same with other religious leaders. But the actual chaplain system is in the hands of Christians. The problem is that [these Christian religious leaders] are very benevolent individuals and know very little about Islam. They don't get it that some Muslim volunteers who do prison outreach are radicals. Worse, they don't understand what radical means. The result is that we have the wrong people deciding what kind of religious leadership inmates receive.¹⁰⁸

An American example, the case of Warith Deen Umar, former chief Muslim chaplain for the New York State Department of Correctional Services, is enlightening. Until he retired in 2000, Umar spent 20 years working for the state's

prison system; he oversaw the hiring and staffing of Imams. Unfortunately, he held radical and violent views and actively placed like-minded Imams in positions of influence throughout New York state prisons.¹⁰⁹

On the other hand, prison imams can play an integral role in controlling the spread of radicalization. As the ICSR writes, “prison imams can help to minimise, if not deny, the space available to extremists.”¹¹⁰ It is a matter of making sure the right imams and religious leaders are selected, by peer-reviewing religious service providers and weeding out radical religious leaders.¹¹¹ In order to come to terms with the role religious leaders have in countering radicalization in Canadian prisons, we will require a few innovations. We need to:

- Establish a review board that can vet members of the prison chaplaincy, part-time contractors, and volunteers to certify that none retain radical sentiments. A review board can be established by first canvassing how other jurisdictions – particularly the UK and the US – have gone about re-vamping the manner in which they hire Muslim chaplains and then by involving a diversity of leaders from the various Muslim traditions practiced in Canada. The CSC, with help from the Interfaith Committee on Chaplaincy (IFC), has begun doing so. They rely on faith communities outside prison to assist them in providing religious services for inmates.¹¹² The IFC identifies and recruits appropriate religious leaders and volunteers living near CSC facilities. Though spiritual leaders need to obtain an official security clearance, the IFC nonetheless relies on the religious communities themselves to accredit individual leaders.
- Prepare Muslim prison chaplains with specific training in recognizing radicalization and extremism. As Brandon explains, prison services “should not automatically assume that imams understand the nature of extremism, the methods of extremist recruitment, or the best ways to challenge extremist individuals.” This training may also

help identify which Muslim chaplains are not “fully committed” to preventing prison radicalization.¹¹³

- Ensure that enough qualified Imams work for the CSC and that communal Friday services (a religious obligation) are led by prison Imams. Doing so will help eliminate the risk that radical inmates will use a dearth of leadership to self-appoint themselves religious leaders in order to captivate a susceptible audience, spread violent views, and recruit.
- Have prison Imams identify, appoint, and train specific inmates as volunteer religious leaders to take their place in case of their absence. Doing that will keep radicals out of leadership roles.

Provide educational services

Second, inmates should receive other forms of religious and secular education. Hamm offers an interesting account from California’s Folsom State Prison. A charismatic Muslim convert, “Akil” established the “Islamic Studies Program” in jail in order to provide a “viable rehabilitation programme” that contradicted Islamist ideology.¹¹⁴ We could proactively approach and train prisoners like “Akil” to provide an “in-house” alternative for radical inmates. Providing educational alternatives to inmates will require that we:

- Offer lectures and courses by trained religious figures on religious beliefs and practices.
- Offer prisoners secular education, work programs, vocational training, and substance-abuse treatment. Doing so will help inoculate at-risk prisoners against radicalization.
- Train inmates with liberal religious leanings and tolerant understandings of Islam to act as “prison listeners” (or inmate councillors). Have them assist new inmates and Muslim converts and help them steer Muslim attitudes from within prison.¹¹⁵

- Ensure Muslim converts have proper religious guidance and receive a full, rather than selective, reading of their new faith. The CSC has taken steps to do so. In consultation with Muslim groups, it produced an Islamic conversion document to be used by religious leaders in cases of conversions and instructs prison chaplains to inform the Offender Management System (OMS) of all changes in a prisoner's religious status.¹¹⁶

Screen prison libraries for radical literature

Third, just as prisons should exclude radical imams from providing religious services, so too should they remove radical literature from prison libraries. According to the CSC, any material "which advocates or promotes genocide or hatred of any identifiable group that may be distinguished by colour, race, religion, ethnic origin, sex, sexual orientation, or by other specific traits ... [and] material that portrays excessive violence and aggression," should be excluded from prison libraries.¹¹⁷ Ann Curry, Director of the School of Library and Information Studies at the University of Alberta, and her colleagues have found that specific subjects banned from Canadian prisons include materials on bomb- and weapon-making, gang affiliation, martial arts, books on "infamous inmates" and materials that "recount the crimes of extremely violent inmates", any materials "that aggrandize or glorify violence", and literature published by "organized criminal groups."¹¹⁸

If we already restrict a prisoner's access to materials like *The Anarchist Cookbook*, *Mein Kampf*, and *The Protocols of the (Learned) Elders of Zion*, it is not a stretch to suggest that we restrict a prisoner's ability to read Islamist equivalents. A 2008 study of radical literature in US prisons revealed that an inordinate amount of radical and Wahhabi material was available in American institutional facilities.¹¹⁹ We need to find out what kind of literature is available in Canadian prisons. Taking stock of the religious literature in our prison system will require that the CSC, in partnership with community leaders and other government agencies:

- Take an inventory of the type and nature of the literature currently available in the prison system, scrutinize the content, and remove texts that offer support for radical Islam and political violence.

- Control the manner in which new books and texts enter the prison system.¹²⁰
- Supply the prison library with Islamic theological literature written and published by more mainstream and tolerant Muslim scholars and scriptural authorities and ensure that the diversity of opinions that mark Islamic thought is equally represented behind bars.

Combat prison radicalization by fighting radicalization in society

Finally, some theorists suggest that inmates are less likely to adopt radical views in prison if their community in the outside world condemns, denounces, and rejects radicalism. Us-eem and Clayton argue that, when they enter prison, inmates carry with them lessons and attitudes derived from interaction with their broader societal community. New inmates rooted to communities in which radicalization is acceptable are more likely to radicalize behind bars.¹²¹ While this is not surprising, the finding is important: radicalization in prison can be curbed by fighting radicalization in society. Fortunately, a 2006/7 Environics Research Group survey found that Canadian Muslims generally reject Islamism, violence, and terrorism.¹²² We need to build on that trend by:

- Delegitimizing Islamist terrorism in society by endorsing and promoting anti-terrorism norms developed from within the Muslim community and actively disseminating *fatwas*, recantations, and rejections of terrorism within Canada.¹²³
- Promoting ideological competition and dissension within the *jihadist* community by advocating Muslim anti-terrorism voices.

Grievance recommendations

To combat radicalization behind bars, prisons must proactively combat perceptions and actual cases of religious and ethnic discrimination that feed and sustain radical beliefs. Though dedicated Islamists trying to attract recruits will always find ways to twist prison policy to exacerbate perceived anti-Muslim injustices, we can, when possible, take steps to prevent discrimination and, when necessary, remedy it. That

will protect the general prison population and ensure these views have limited appeal. If we present the prison system as tough but fair, and send a message that all prisoners are equal, we avoid sending signals that one group is singled out for rougher (or preferential) treatment.

Deal sensitively with legitimate prisoners' grievances

By most accounts, it appears that the CSC appreciates the value of combatting inequality in Canadian prisons. In its 2005 *Manual on Religious and Spiritual Accommodation*, which describes in detail the practices and belief structures of various religions, the CSC notes that “the tendency toward and the allegations of racial discrimination invariably surface” when members of minority groups and prison staff “deal with issues or conflicts ... on a strictly racial basis.” It is “imperative”, the manual suggests, that “CSC policy and practice remain uniformly applied and implemented.”¹²⁴ This is a good start. The CSC can further combat perceptions of victimization by:

- Formalizing a system-wide approach for dealing with theological questions¹²⁵ and relying on religious service providers to instruct prison staff on how particular religious events should be practiced.
- Judiciously investigating cases of violence

carried out against Muslims by other prisoners and stamping out mistreatment and/or racism against Muslim inmates by prison staff.

- Training staff to recognize and respect minority religious practices and developing a process to address prisoner grievances expeditiously.¹²⁶
- Ensuring observant Muslims are treated in a manner that does not unduly contradict their beliefs (i.e. provide them with halal food, offer them religious washing stations and prayer halls, strip-search them using officers of the same sex, *etcetera*).¹²⁷
- Granting religious rights in a manner that does not unintentionally incentivize and/or favour that particular religion.¹²⁸
- Basing prison decisions that contradict religious obligations (i.e. restricting an inmate from attending communal prayers) on clearly defined security considerations.
- Allowing prison staff, especially “line staff”, to interact more frequently (and personally) with Muslim inmates.¹²⁹

CONCLUSION

Applying these policy prescriptions to Canada's prison system will help to alleviate the threat of Islamist prison radicalization before it gets out of hand. By getting a grip on the situation today – just as the first wave of Canadian terrorists heads to jail – we can pre-empt some of the more dramatic and destructive developments that have afflicted prisons in Europe and the United States. But preventing radicalization in prison is but one goal in a much broader counter-terrorism objective.


Long-term success in combatting al Qaeda and other like-minded terrorist groups will come when their current supporters turn against them. In our struggle both to eradicate al Qaeda and delegitimize its ideology, incarcerated Canadian terrorists may eventually become our strongest allies. If and when these individuals denounce radical Islamism and political violence, they will represent our most potent weapon against Islamist radicalization and terrorist recruitment, both within prison and within society. As Brandon suggests: "We need to find a way to get [Islamist prisoners] back on

track and to get them to turn their energies in a positive direction."¹³⁰ Middle Eastern and Asian states have had some success turning terrorists against radicalism.¹³¹ We need to find a way to do the same here in the West. It is one thing when Canadians denounce terrorism; it is quite another when Canadian terrorists join in.

Important as this long-term goal is, we must focus clearly on an important short-term one. We are fortunate that our prisons are not yet a significant source of home-grown radicalism. But if we do not take active steps, the experience of our allies demonstrates that they will be. Putting terrorists and terrorist plotters in jail is a vital part of the defence of our free society. But we must not think the problem is solved when the police and the courts have done their work and the prison gates close on such dangerous people.

If we do not want to put one terrorist in jail and then release three, we must take active measures to combat radicalization in prison.

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Dr. Alex Wilner is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the ETH Zurich (the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology) in Switzerland. Born in Montreal, Alex has a B.A. from McGill and an M.A. and PhD from Dalhousie; his 2008 dissertation *Detering the Undeterrable: The Theory and Practice of Coercing Terrorists* and doctoral research received scholarships from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council and the Canadian Department of National Defence. Alex is also a research fellow with the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University and the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies in Halifax.

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Endnotes

- 1 Of the 18 individuals arrested in 2006, 11 were eventually charged. All were either convicted in court or admitted their guilt.
- 2 Isabel Teotonio, “Toronto 18 Gun Supplier Gets 7 Years”, *Toronto Star*, October 3, 2009.
- 3 It is important to distinguish between Islam, a religion, and Islamism, a socio-political ideology that adopts a particular interpretation of the political tenets of Islam to advance certain social and political goals. Jihadists are Islamists who advocate the use of violence to achieve these goals. Takfiri Jihadists target those considered infidels and heretics, making “no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim ... between civilian and combatant,” or between political and military leadership. Terrorism, for the purpose of this paper, is the use of indiscriminate violence against non-combatants by non-state actors with the purpose of generating fear in order to signal, communicate, and advance particular socio-political objectives. See Ghaffar Hussain, “A Brief History of Islamism”, Concept Series I, (London: Quilliam, 2010), 11; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia, 2006), p. 40; Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Radicalization and Jihad in the West*, (Intelligence Brief for the Prime Minister), June 7, 2006.
- 4 A *Dawa* (or *Dawah*) is a call or invitation to join and convert to Islam. Stewart Bell, “No Remorse from Terrorist, Court Told”, *National Post*, September 24, 2009; Stewart Bell, “‘Toronto 18’ Defendant Gets 7 years for Terrorist Plot”, *National Post*, October 2, 2009.
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- 10 Frank Cilluffo, “Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?”, Testimony, US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, (September 19, 2006), 3-4. Greg Hannah, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin, *Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the Challenge of Extremist and Radicalized Prisoners*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), 31.
- 11 Mark Hamm, “Prison Islam in the Age of Sacred Terror”, *The British Journal of Criminology* 49:5 (2009), 668. See also, Hannah, *Radicalization or Rehabilitation*, 29-30, 67-68.
- 12 For an overview of jihadi violence in the West, see Peter Nesser, “Chronology of Jihadism in Western Europe 1994-2007: Planned, Prepared, and Executed Terrorist Attacks,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 31 (2008); New York Police Department (Intelligence Division), *Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat, 2007*, 19-66; and Lorenzo Vidino, “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New and Occasional Phenomenon,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32 (2009).
- 13 See Brandon, *Unlocking al-Qaeda*, 14-18.
- 14 NYPD, *Radicalization in the West*, 39; Hannah, *Radicalization or Rehabilitation*, 35.
- 15 Sebastian Rotella, “A War of Words, Waged behind Bars,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 24, 2007.
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- 17 Sara Carter, “Somalis in US Draw FBI Attention,” *Washington Times*, (December 29, 2008); Jeanne Meserve and Mike Ahlers, “Seattle Case Raises questions about War on Terror,” CNN, (December 18, 2006).
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- 19 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Al Qaeda in Yemen and Somalia: A Ticking Time Bomb,” (January 2010), 4-9.
- 20 Edwin Bakker, *Jihadi Terrorists in Europe: Their Characteristics and the Circumstances in which they Joined the Jihad* (Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2006), 36-7, 40-41. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Laura Grossman have found otherwise. In their empirical analysis of 117

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- 59 Brendan O’Duffy, “Radical Atmosphere: Explaining Jihadist Radicalization in the UK,” *PS: Political Science & Politics* 41:1 (2008), 37.
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- 81 Wahhabism is a "fundamentalist ... movement founded in Arabia in the 18th century and now established as the state form of Islam in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia." It is *takfiri* in orientation, declaring "those not following their interpretation to be guilty of *kufir* or disbelief, and ... apostates from Islam." Stephen Schwartz, "Why Canadian Muslims are Different," *National Post*, April 6, 2001; Center for Islamic Pluralism, *A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009* (CIP: Washington DC, 2009), iv-vi.
- 82 See CIP, *Black America, Prisons and Radical Islam*, 16-30.
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- 85 These manuals list the indicators of "deviant conduct" that may be associated to radicalization, including for instance, displaying Islamist logos, reading radical books, refusing to socialize with non-Muslims, defying prison staff, and so on. Elaine Ganley, "Manual Outlines Muslim Radicalization in Prisons," *Associated Press* (October 1, 2008); CIP, *A Guide to Shariah Law*, 109-111; 121-122; ICSR, *Prison and Terrorism Radicalization and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries*, 31-32.
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88 Bottos, "Profile of Offenders in Administrative Segregation."

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90 Given radical Islamist interpretations of *taqiyyah* (the right of Muslims to mislead infidels) the task of selecting and working with suitable prison imams is not to be entrusted to the naïve; see the discussion below. For more on the concept of *taqiyyah* see Raymond Ibrahim "How Taqiyya Alters Islam's Rules of War: Defeating Jihadist Terrorism", *The Middle East Quarterly* 17:1 (2010), 3-13.

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103 For example, Quilliam, a UK-based counter-extremism think tank, was recently approached by an incarcerated member of the Toronto 18 asking for religious and personal assistance in his rehabilitation. Interview with James Brandon, May, 2010.

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108 Personal interview, July, 2010.

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
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- 120 In the United States, radical literature was introduced to the prison system by radical inmates, who were free to order and receive literature at will. They then placed the literature on library shelves for other inmates to use. Personal interview with Schwartz, July, 2010.
- 121 There is debate within prison studies as to the manner in which prison culture is created. Useem and Clayton explain that “deprivation theory” (i.e. the harsh environment of prison shapes an inmate’s “self-protective culture”) is pitted against “importation theory” (i.e. new inmates base their prison behaviour on pre-existing or imported norms, values, and behaviours). They argue that both processes likely take place, suggesting that Muslim inmates who arrive from a community where radicalism is accepted will “be more disposed to radicalize” in prison. Useem and Clayton, “Radicalization of U.S. Prisoners,” 575-578.
- 122 See Michael Adams, “Muslims in Canada: Findings from the 2007 Environics Survey,” *Horizons* 10:2 (2009) 19-26.
- 123 Alex Wilner, “Delegitimizing Terrorism: A Better Way to Counter Radicalization and Recruitment in the West,” Commentary, Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (AIMS), (July 2010), (1-6).
- 124 CSC, *Manual on Religious and Spiritual Accommodation*, 111-112.
- 125 By codifying prison policy on one set of religious beliefs, however, prisons unintentionally champion one interpretation of Islam over others. By deciding what is and is not legitimate practice, prisons make decisions that enforce one interpretation of Islam while rejecting the diversity of opinions that exist.
- 126 The CSC manual assists this process. CSC, *Manual on Religious and Spiritual Accommodation*, 107-133.
- 127 CSC has taken steps to do so, as indicated in the aforementioned religious manual and by publishing the *Religious Diets Guideline*.
- 128 This is especially evident in the case of halal diets that may be interpreted as “special treatment.” As the CSC manual on religious accommodation rightly notes: “delivering religious diets in a completely separate way from regular diets cannot but constitute special treatment. [A]ny perception of special treatment simply invites conflict: either because the Muslim group wants religious accommodation to appear special ... or because the method of providing religious accommodation sets them apart.” A balance must be established. CSC, *Manual*, 111-112, 116.
- 129 It is worth emphasizing that none of these recommendations amount to special treatment; the CSC more or less already does this with all religious groups, as is evident in its various manuals on religious practice and obligations.
- 130 Personal interview with author, May, 2010.
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
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 BY JANET AJZENSTAT



THE MACDONALD-LAURIER INSTITUTE



“True North in Canadian Public Policy”

The Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy exists to make poor quality public policy unacceptable in Ottawa. We will achieve this goal by proposing thoughtful alternatives to Canadians and their political and opinion leaders through non-partisan and independent research and commentary.

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The notion that a new think-tank in Ottawa is unnecessary because it would duplicate existing institutions is completely mistaken. The truth is there is a deep dearth of independent think-tanks in our nation's capital.

*Allan Gotlieb, former Deputy Minister of
External Affairs and Ambassador to Washington*

To surmount the enormous challenges of getting Canada's place in the world right and taking advantage of changing opportunities, we need more ideas, input, discussion and debate in Ottawa-- that is where the crucial decisions about our future are made. That's why MLI is so vital to Canada today.

*Hon. James S. Peterson, former Minister of International Trade and Member of
Parliament for 23 years*

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WHAT PEOPLE ARE SAYING ABOUT *The Canadian Century*, THE MACDONALD-LAURIER INSTITUTE'S FIRST BOOK

It is not often that Canadians talk about moving out of America's shadow—for far too long we have simply assumed that being in that shadow was the natural order of things. Crowley, Clemens and Veldhuis remind us that Sir Wilfrid Laurier thought that all things were possible for us, and they show, with an impressive array of facts to support their argument, that Laurier's plan for Canada can still carry us through to that Canadian century we have all been eagerly awaiting for over a hundred years.

-Allan Gotlieb, from the foreword



"As the U.S. and other nations struggle to defuse some potentially disastrous fiscal time bombs, The Canadian Century makes a compelling argument that the world should be looking to Canada for lessons on how to get reform right." - Robert Kelly, Chairman and CEO, BNY Mellon

"The Canadian Century reminds us that the temptation for governments to solve all our problems with higher spending always ends in grief—a lesson the U.S. will soon learn. It's a reminder that prosperity can be ours if we remember Wilfrid Laurier's legacy of liberty, lower taxes and smaller government." - Patrick Luciani, author, Economic Myths

"Crowley, Clemens and Veldhuis show that if we establish a real advantage vis-à-vis the U.S. on tax and other policies, that will increase both our attraction with emerging pow-

ers and our leverage with the US. The question the authors pose is whether we have the wherewithal to finish the job." - Derek Burney, former Canadian Ambassador in Washington

"The authors strike exactly the right balance with enough detail to keep the most ardent policy wonk captivated while writing in a breezy style that will engage non-economists. And as with a good novel, the authors leave us in suspense. I urge people to read this compelling tale and then, like me, anxiously wait for a sequel to see how the story ends." - Don Drummond, Senior Vice-President and Chief Economist, TD Bank Financial Group

"Entrepreneurship, hard work and self-reliance are deeply ingrained in our psyche. During the Redemptive Decade of the 1990s these virtues were resurrected. In tandem with

concerted actions by the different levels of government, we put right the debt and despair created by a couple of dark decades when we wobbled towards what the Wall Street Journal described as Third-World Status. Limited government, light taxes and fiscal discipline, argue the authors, are the ingredients that bring gold in the Olympiad of nations." - Colin Robertson, first Head of the Advocacy Secretariat at Canada's Washington Embassy

"This timely and provocative book will remind Canadians that the smart fiscal and trade policies pursued by governments of all stripes in the past two decades has made Canada a star at the beginning of this century. But history should not repeat itself. What we have achieved recently is what Wilfrid Laurier understood to be the right path forward for the last century. Instead, wars and economic

depression led to inefficient government spending, high taxes and deficits, and protectionism. Canada should avoid this poisonous policy recipe in the coming years to fulfil Laurier's dream of a truly great nation of the North, which we should rightly be." - Jack Mintz, Palmer Chair in Public Policy, University of Calgary

"This wonderful book is an urgent wake-up call for Canada's current leaders—of all political stripes—and raises crucial economic issues that should be top-of-mind in coming federal elections. Now is the time to reaffirm the power of Laurier's vision, to make some courageous policy decisions, and to thereby ensure that the 21st Century belongs to Canada in the way Sir Wilfred intended a hundred years ago. Will Canada's political leaders pay attention?" - Christopher Ragan, Clifford Clark Visiting Economist, Finance Canada