



TO STAND ON GUARD

A National Security Strategy for Canadians

Paul H. Chapin

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**NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
FOR CANADA SERIES**



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By Paul H. Chapin

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VALUES, THREATS AND STRATEGIES

Canadians cannot take their security for granted, comfortably convinced that trouble in distant time zones matters little to us. We need a national security strategy, one that specifies our core national values and interests, identifies the main dangers to them, and outlines suitable remedies that are strategic in nature, discriminate between what is important and what is less so, and take account of our particular circumstances.

Values

The values that distinguish life in Canada are individual freedom, democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and economic opportunity. Preserving such a way of life is the supreme national interest of Canada.

Threats

Danger can assume many forms. But the three most important kinds are physical attack or coercion, internal subversion, and erosion of the beliefs and practices that give a state its special character.

The end of the Cold War raised hopes that peace would prevail. But 9/11 provided a jolt of reality and launched a new age of security planning. The world is still plagued by disputes between states, civil wars and insurrections, an underground market in arms including weapons of mass destruction, and rogue states. The really bad news is that there is a new world war under way, still mostly low-intensity, pitting radical Islamists against Muslim governments in the Middle East and Asia and against democratic societies everywhere.

The main foreseeable threats are unbridled extremism, uncontrolled immigration, and friction due to resource scarcity. Motives will vary, but the methods will combine traditional and irregular warfare to target people and prosperity. The technology of advanced states will be turned against them, and adversaries will use physical and psychological means to try to convince people to reject the democratic way of life.

Strategies

Canada's national security strategy must combine a home game and an away game. And it must be driven by consider-

ation of the key values our foreign and defence policy must protect, the key threats to those values, and the key measures necessary to defeat those threats. The program should aim to:

- *Reduce Canadian vulnerabilities* by protecting the community at large in conditions between war and peace with anti-terrorist legislation for the long term; protecting immigrant communities susceptible to intimidation or recruitment by militants; better calibrating the flow of new arrivals to Canada; exercising greater control over entry to the country; fixing our dysfunctional refugee determination system; convincing the courts to show greater deference toward the security and intelligence services; and protecting Canada's complex and interconnected critical infrastructure.

- *Create layered defences against threats to national security* through enhancing Canada's capacity to know what is happening on its land mass and in its coastal waters; working toward a common security perimeter with the United States; rationalizing the North American defence architecture; participating in ballistic missile defence; and establishing a Canadian foreign intelligence service.

- *Take action against threats* through diplomatic activity on international issues that jeopardize international peace and security; devoting a much higher portion of our development assistance budget to improving conditions in states on the frontline of the war on terrorism and in failed states that are incubating the security problems of the future; marshalling sufficient resources to frustrate terrorist activities and disrupt the clandestine arms market; and sustaining and enhancing the capacity of the Canadian Forces to deploy and maintain forces virtually anywhere in the world they might be needed.

- *Address the factors that nourish security threats* by working with Muslim communities to undermine support for radicals and with other democratic states to disrupt and defeat terrorist networks; and targeting development assistance to alleviate poverty in countries prone to nurturing terrorism.

- *Modernize the international security architecture* through more effective maintenance of international peace and security; enhancing the role of NATO and regional organizations; and developing new rules of international law to govern the actions of states in the war against terror — in particular, on intervention and the treatment of terrorist prisoners.

VALEURS, MENACES, ET STRATÉGIES

Les Canadiens ne doivent pas se complaire dans un faux sentiment de sécurité. Nous avons besoin d'une stratégie en matière de sécurité nationale qui définit nos valeurs et intérêts nationaux fondamentaux, détermine les principaux dangers qui les menacent et esquisse les solutions stratégiques appropriées, en distinguant ce qui est important de ce qui l'est moins et en tenant compte de notre situation particulière.

Valeurs

Les valeurs qui distinguent la vie au Canada sont la liberté individuelle, la démocratie, la primauté du droit, la justice sociale et l'avancement économique pour tous. Il est dans l'intérêt suprême du Canada de préserver ce mode de vie.

Menaces

Les trois principaux types de danger sont la coercition ou les agressions physiques, la subversion interne et l'effritement des croyances et pratiques qui donnent à un État son caractère particulier.

La fin de la Guerre froide a suscité l'espoir d'une paix durable, mais les événements du 11 septembre ont ramené tout le monde à la réalité et instauré une nouvelle ère de planification de la sécurité. La sombre réalité est qu'une nouvelle guerre mondiale, encore de faible intensité, est en cours. Elle dresse les islamistes radicaux contre les gouvernements musulmans au Moyen-Orient et en Asie et contre les sociétés démocratiques partout dans le monde.

Les principales menaces sont un extrémisme débridé, une immigration incontrôlée et des tensions issues de la rareté des ressources. On retournera contre eux-mêmes la technologie des États avancés et les adversaires de la démocratie utiliseront des moyens physiques et psychologiques pour tenter de convaincre les populations de rejeter le mode de vie démocratique.

Stratégies

La stratégie du Canada en matière de sécurité nationale doit conjuguer les dimensions interne et étrangère. Elle doit également prendre en compte les valeurs fondamentales que nos politiques doivent protéger, ce qui menace ces valeurs et

les mesures qui doivent être prises pour repousser ces menaces. Une telle stratégie doit avoir pour but de :

- Atténuer les points faibles du Canada en protégeant la communauté par des lois antiterroristes ; en protégeant les communautés immigrantes susceptibles d'être visées par des militants ; en calibrant judicieusement le flux des nouveaux arrivants au Canada ; en exerçant un meilleur contrôle sur l'entrée au pays ; en mettant de l'ordre dans notre système de sélection des réfugiés ; en convaincant les tribunaux d'être plus sensibles aux besoins des services de sécurité et de renseignement ; et en protégeant les infrastructures critiques complexes du Canada.

- Créer des niveaux superposés de défense contre les menaces à la sécurité nationale en renforçant notre capacité de savoir ce qui se passe sur notre territoire et dans nos eaux côtières ; en travaillant avec les États-Unis à créer un périmètre de sécurité commun ; en rationalisant l'architecture de défense de l'Amérique du Nord ; en participant au programme de défense antimissile balistique ; et en mettant sur pied un service canadien de renseignement à l'étranger.

- Participer à des activités diplomatiques sur des questions internationales qui mettent en péril la paix et la sécurité internationales ; consacrer une plus grande portion de notre budget d'aide au développement à l'amélioration des conditions de vie dans les pays aux prises avec la guerre au terrorisme ; faire échec aux activités terroristes et perturber le marché clandestin de l'armement ; soutenir et améliorer la capacité des Forces canadiennes de déployer et de maintenir des contingents pratiquement partout où l'on pourrait en avoir besoin dans le monde.

- Travailler de concert avec les communautés musulmanes pour miner l'appui envers les éléments radicaux et perturber et vaincre les réseaux terroristes ; et cibler l'aide au développement de façon à atténuer la pauvreté dans les pays qui sont susceptibles de générer des terroristes.

- Moderniser l'architecture internationale de sécurité ; accroître le rôle de l'OTAN et des organisations régionales ; développer de nouvelles règles de droit international pour encadrer les actions des États dans la guerre au terrorisme – et en particulier en ce qui a trait aux interventions et au traitement des terroristes incarcérés.

THINKING ABOUT NATIONAL SECURITY

The event went largely unnoticed in Canada: At the end of a 10-day visit to Canada in July 2010, Queen Elizabeth II spent a day in New York, her first in 35 years. She addressed the UN General Assembly, visited the site of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and dedicated the British Garden at Hanover Square, which commemorates the 67 UK citizens killed that day. The Queen of Canada had no need to dedicate a memorial to the 24 Canadians who also died that day, for none exists. A small matter perhaps, but an indication that there is something about how Canadians today respond to violence and mayhem, even when directed against themselves, that separates them from their British and American cousins.

More than 20 years have passed since the Berlin Wall came down, close to 10 years since the calamity of 9/11, time enough for Canadian policymakers to have conceived of a national security strategy to guide Canada safely into the new century. So far, they have not done so. A beginning was made by the Paul Martin government in 2004 when it prepared and issued *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*. The document is notable for being the first to articulate what it describes as the country's three core national security interests: protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad, ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to its allies, and contributing to international security. But the document's objective is a modest one: not a strategy, but a "strategic framework and action plan" (Canada 2004, vii). The difference is important.

A strategy describes what you want and how you propose to get it — the choices you make about the alternatives and the means you select to achieve your goals. It then drives those decisions until you achieve those goals or change your mind about them. In the field of national security, a national strategy needs to state what you want to protect; assess how developments abroad and at home might harm you; describe the kind of future you want to have; and explain what you intend to do in the various domains of public policy to secure your future — political, economic, social, cultural, technological, military, and international (Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald 2002, 22). The 2004 policy paper did some of this, but it was mostly a list of the measures the government had taken or intended to take after 9/11 to enhance security in a variety of areas. An update in 2005, *Securing an Open Society: One Year Later* (Canada 2005), provided a scorecard on how the work was proceeding.

And that was it. The Harper government has not since issued its own national security strategy.

Canada is overdue for a national security strategy of the kind its main allies have taken to producing periodically to guide national decisionmaking on security issues. This paper is not it, but one hopes it will help to inform public debate on what such a strategy should be. It explores how to think about "national security," and it suggests why Canadians should be worried about the new and disordered world they inhabit, what the main elements of a Canadian national security strategy should be, and what priorities should drive Canada's policy over the next 10 to 15 years.

At issue is whether today's generation can avoid the worst of the dangers lurking at home and offshore and pass on to their children the "peaceable kingdom" of Canadian history books.

Where to start

A good place to start is with the question: What is there to defend? More specifically, is there something special about life in Canada that deserves to be protected? Learned professors and newspaper columnists have struggled with such questions for years.

In the relativist age in which we live, questions such as these are not even supposed to be asked. No society or culture is intrinsically better than any other, we are told. Better to focus on our common humanity rather than dwell on features that serve only to underscore differences between peoples. But ask Canadians standing in the international arrivals hall at any airport in Canada, and the answers you are likely to get will be entirely complimentary — and guilt free.

Canada is a great country. It works. Public services and utilities deliver. The shops are full. Most people are doing okay, and we try to look after those experiencing hard times. There's no limit to what you can achieve if you work hard. We're respectful of one another and expect everyone to be treated fairly and equally. Minorities aren't persecuted; in fact, they're often treated better than the average citizen. The laws are there to protect you. You have rights. You're innocent until proven guilty, in a court of law not a police station. The police aren't allowed to push you around. Civil servants are honest; you don't have to bribe them to get

what you're entitled to. If you don't like the people running the government, you can vote them out -- and we do it all the time. Canada's just a great place to live and raise kids. There isn't any better.

From time to time, answers will include references to the beauties of the Canadian landscape, Canada's cultured cities, ice hockey, cold beer, and — less frequently these days — cool Mounties. Occasionally, there will be mention of multiculturalism or “diversity” or universal health care. But these are not the elements Canadians miss when abroad. What strikes them is the contrast in the values reflected in everyday life. Absent in the great majority of countries, the values that distinguish life in Canada are individual freedom, democracy, the rule of law, social justice, and economic opportunity.

Preserving such a way of life is the supreme national interest of Canada. Freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of the individual, unlimited horizons: these are what Canadians notice in countries that do not have them, what the world finds so attractive about Canada, why so many people want to come to Canada, and why Canadians have something special to protect.

During long stretches of their history, Canadians have been able to take the security of their country for granted. Political scientists and historians are apt to criticize them for doing so, though being able to take your security for granted is the very condition others dream of achieving. During most of the calamitous

twentieth century, Canadians could live their lives in hamlets in Nova Scotia, in apartments in Ontario, and on farms in Saskatchewan with little

worry they would ever be affected by the international problems they read about in their newspapers. Such problems would have to cross two vast oceans or an arctic wasteland to reach them. Canadians did go to war, more often and more readily than most realize today, but it was to fight far away in defence of friends and common causes. There has not been a battle in Canada in 200 years; Canada's military cemeteries are on other continents.

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As the twentieth century progressed, however, dangers did draw nearer. If German U-boats had prevailed in the North Atlantic, if Britain had fallen to Nazi Germany, if Western Europe had succumbed to Soviet communism, Canadians (and Americans) would have been in deep trouble. By the 1950s, Canada was in the flight path of Soviet bombers intent on destroying the US nuclear arsenal; by the 1960s, it was Soviet missiles. On the Korean peninsula, in South Asia, and in the Middle East, regional conflicts threatened to burst into global war from which neither distance nor detachment would have protected Canadians. Then came 9/11, proof positive that open societies now faced perils that could reach into the everyday lives even of those inhabiting “safe” North America.

The security of states

The Russians, whose lives have been hard and many times convulsed by invading armies, have a word for “security” that captures its essence better than any long-winded political science definition. It is *bezopasnost*, literally “without danger.” Danger, of course, can assume many forms, some foreign and others domestic, all with the potential to disturb, disrupt, diminish, or destroy the way in which individuals, groups, or nations conduct their lives. So a strategy to deal with danger and keep the people safe — that is, a national security strategy — presents a challenge. It must, at minimum, address three kinds of danger.

Attack

One is the danger from physical attack by an adversary, typically a neighbouring state coveting territory or resources. Much of world history has been about states at war with one another, and about the making and unmaking of alliances intended to win a war or deter one. In the prelude to and aftermath of a war, states will employ the threat of attack to try to coerce others into doing their bidding. Intimidation can work. Adolf Hitler was a master at using the threat of military action to secure his objectives without having to go to war. But it can also fail miserably. Prior to the first Gulf War in 1990–91, Saddam Hussein moved 30,000 of his troops to the Iraqi-Kuwait border to try to frighten Kuwait into giving up valuable oil territory. When the intimidation failed, he invaded, whereupon the United States pulled together a coalition of 34 states and despatched several hundred thousand troops to the region to try to convince Saddam to withdraw. When that failed, the coalition had to eject him forcibly.

Subversion

Another danger is the one that arises from internal subversion, a more subtle but no less deadly instrument of warfare.¹ Through clandestine action, an adversary tries to corrupt, undermine, and eventually overthrow from within the people, processes, and institutions that make the state function. Politicians and officials are bribed or bullied into taking certain kinds of action or into looking away when others do, pillars of the community smeared and discredited, investigative journalists bludgeoned into silence, orderly protests hijacked and transformed into violent confrontations, elections disrupted or stolen, and, in due course, the government, the police, and the military captured and turned against the people.

More often than not, the agents of subversion are a “fifth column” of nationals in league with a foreign power. The term originates from the siege of Madrid during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, when a Nationalist general claimed he had four columns of soldiers outside the city and a “fifth column” of supporters inside. Nazi Germany benefited from fifth columns in most of the countries it conquered, some literally opening the gates for the invading forces. The Soviets had the “Lublin Poles” to ensure their con-

tinued hold on Poland at the end of World War II, along with Moscow-controlled politicians in the other Central and East European states that eventually fell into Moscow’s orbit. In the West, communist parties received funding from Moscow and took direction from the Kremlin — including the Communist Party of Canada. In most democratic states today, radical Islamists can count on the support of domestic sympathizers and “home-grown terrorists.”

Erosion

A third danger is erosion of the beliefs and practices that give a state its special character and attract the loyalty of its citizens. These beliefs and practices may be political, economic,

social, cultural, or religious — and no two states have them in the same measure. Every state has a geography and history of its own, the composition of its population is unlike that of any other, and the popular consensus on how affairs should be conducted is subtly different even among states sharing identical democratic ideals.

Unlike subversion, the erosion takes place in plain sight and with the knowledge and consent of influential elements in society. Often, it is quite benign: beliefs and practices tend

to evolve over time as one generation succeeds another and the population changes in composition and character. But in some cases, the erosion results from a deliberate attempt to bend society to the will of particular interests. Radicals push for ideas to be accepted and codified in law before society at large is ready to endorse them, if it ever would be. Groups pressure government and opinion leaders to support compromises to longstanding principles and procedures governing the conduct of public affairs, in the form of special privileges, exemptions from universally applicable rules and regulations, or parallel legal and social structures. Those who object are dismissed as “unprogressive” or bigoted, and removed from the discussion if possible.

Lenin and his Bolsheviks convinced many of the virtues of a “dictatorship of the proletariat,” then established a dictatorship of the Communist Party. Hitler so successfully frightened people that the power brokers of the day actually appointed him chancellor of Germany. More recently, Ayatollah Khomeini exploited Iranians’ resentment over the Shah’s

corruption and vast modernization schemes to overthrow his regime in 1979 and replace it with a priesthood of Shi’ite fundamentalist mullahs with no tradition or training in the exercise of governmental power.

Each of these dangers is potentially mortal. If left unattended, the consequences can include millions killed and cities laid waste, the loss of territory and population to a neighbouring state, the state’s having to assume the role of a “satellite,” living according to the dictates (gravitational pull) of others or becoming a “captive nation” absorbed into another state’s empire. Europe and Asia abound in cases of once-independent countries re-



U.S. National Archives and Records Administration

Hitler’s rise to power, formally “democratic” but based on eroding norms of political decency, was a disaster for Germans... and those around them.

duced to provinces of a great power next door. Some have been lost forever; some have been liberated, as after the two world wars; and some have taken action of their own to wrest back their freedom, as did two dozen countries following the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia. The case of Poland is particularly poignant: since the Middle Ages, Poland has been relocated and carved up numerous times, and three times disappeared altogether from the map of Europe.

The bottom line is that dangers abound, and a state that is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens and their way of life imperils both.

Does this include Canada? Yes, for the days are over when Canadians could take comfort in the belief that trouble in distant time zones mattered little to the peaceful and prosperous life to which they were accustomed. As we shall see, trouble is not just on our doorstep, it is in the house. And the house is not fireproof.

France, Britain, and the United States

Just as every state has a distinctive character of its own, it also has its own particular outlook on the world, which helps to explain why it sees some issues as important and others less so. For some, security may not be much of a priority, for others it may be the consideration that trumps all others.

People with little experience of war or revolution tend to assume the world is basically a peaceful place occasionally disturbed by rogue elements, and they do not think much about their security. In contrast, people who have often found themselves immersed in violent conflicts, in some cases facing annihilation, take planning for their security a little more seriously. Israel is a case of a nation for which security concerns are paramount. Over time, the importance of security may rise or fall as external conditions worsen or improve. For years, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania lived in fear that Russia would try to reassert control after they achieved their independence in 1991. The fear lessened when Russian troops finally withdrew from their territory in 1994 and even more when the three states joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004. But the fear has never completely disappeared.

Until recently, Canadians were very much in the category of people who took their security for granted. In contrast, the French, the British, and the Americans have

thought long and hard about their security. How these others have planned for their security can be instructive for Canadians.

France

France has been a European battlefield since the Middle Ages. One reason was the reckless policy of expansionism pursued by the monarchs and Napoleon, which left France in a perilous strategic position after 1815, amid neighbours with growing economic and military power that France could not match. Between 1870 and 1940, the Germans invaded France three times; and once the Germans were finally expelled in 1945, France lived in fear of Soviet invasion or subversion for another 45 years. So when the government of Nicolas Sarkozy issued its White Paper on defence and national security in 2008, one could expect it to be coldly realistic in appraising the security problems France would have to deal with in future. The purpose of France's national security strategy, the paper noted, was "to provide responses to 'all the risks and threats which could endanger the life of the nation'" (France 2008, 5; emphasis in original).²

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The world had entered a new era, the White Paper declared, driven by institutional, social, cultural, and military forces very different from those that had informed democratic states' post-Cold War outlook. Gone were French fears of attack from the east. The new dangers were jihadism-inspired terrorism aimed directly at France and Europe, ballistic missiles developed by new powers, cyber attacks, and health-related and environmental crises. As a result, the people and territory of France were more vulnerable than they had been in the 1990s. To protect them would take more than just good domestic security and defence programs. Diplomacy and economics would have to play a greater role. Success would require better anticipation of problems, a professional army able to perform a variety of missions at home and abroad, a nation mobilized to shoulder the country's security responsibilities, and resilience. The nation had to be ready to take heavy blows, recover, and stay the course. For France, cooperation with the European Union would be essential, as would a "new strategic partnership" between Europe and the United States.

Britain

Like that of France, much of Britain's history has been about keeping enemies at bay. Its security and prosperity lay in preventing invasion from across the Channel while maintaining its trade with the continent. Fear of invasion was not misplaced: Romans, Angles, Saxons, Jutes, Vikings, and Normans had all done so successfully. Both Napoleon and Hitler gave it serious consideration, but had to settle for trying to force Britain into submission through blockade or blitz.

Unlike France, Britain has a long history of democratic debate over national security, with "Blue Water" Tories arguing that a powerful navy could contain any threat from the continent and ensure Britain's hegemony elsewhere and Whigs fearing that unless Britain intervened in European quarrels one of its continental rivals would grow too powerful to be contained. Also unlike France, Britain emerged undefeated from World War II with aspirations of remaining a great power able to look after its own security. But the war had been so costly that a weakened Britain finally had to admit that its security could be assured only through joining with others. Britain was a leading advocate of a United Nations able to maintain international peace and security, and of NATO when the UN proved incapable of doing its job.

The British government's 2008 national security strategy, which it subtitled *Security in an Interdependent World*, mirrors the French White Paper in stating without qualification that "[p]roviding security for the nation and for its citizens remains the most important responsibility of government." The purpose of the National Security Strategy was "to set out how we will address and manage the diverse though interconnected set of security challenges and underlying drivers, both immediately and in the longer term, to safeguard the nation, its citizens, our prosperity and our way of life." Terrorism and the possible use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons were the top security challenges; the ineffectiveness of international organizations was an important driver of insecurity. British strategy would be to try to tackle security problems early, to develop a more integrated approach to solving them, to retain strong and flexible capabilities, and to "invest, learn and improve to strengthen our security" (United Kingdom 2008, 3–4, 9).

The United States

The national security strategy of the United States is another matter entirely. Since the early years of the republic, US strategy has been torn between two options not available to more than a handful of other countries in the past. One has been to

concentrate on ensuring the United States' own political and territorial integrity and to allow no foreign power to involve itself in the affairs of the hemisphere. The other has been to exercise the country's enormous power to intervene militarily abroad to respond to threats before they can undermine the security of the United States or its allies. Traditionally, Republicans were the firmest advocates of isolation and Democrats of engagement — until 9/11 reversed the roles.

The isolationist impulse has been the stronger of the two over the years. In his farewell address, George Washington warned Congress against an activist foreign policy. "Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice?" America, he said, would soon be so powerful that no foreign power would dare to provoke it, and it would then be able to "choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel." Washington did not counsel isolationism: "Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectably defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies" (Heffner 1952, 58–67). But an overly strict reading of his aversion to "foreign entanglements" has played powerfully over the years in US debates over whether and when to go to war.

It was Washington's counsel that kept the United States out of World War I for three years, until public opinion drove the Wilson administration to declare war on Germany in April 1917. That same counsel kept the United States out of World War II until two years after it started, when the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor made it unavoidable. And it was that counsel that made US decisions to intervene in such far-off places as the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, the Balkans, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq so politically contentious. Leading in wartime is a perilous business for US presidents and has been the political ruin of many.³ People who believe the United States has been too quick to go to war do not know their history.

The events of 9/11 produced a dramatic change in US attitudes about the world. Not since the British army burned the city of Washington in 1814 had foreigners successfully attacked the continental United States. Literally out of a clear blue sky, the lives of close to 3000 people were snuffed out, including those of an estimated 329 non-Americans from 53 countries. Two 110-storey landmark office towers were reduced to 1.5 million tons of rubble. At the Pentagon, the military headquarters of the greatest military power the world has ever known, 125 died, including 55 service personnel.

The 9/11 Commission that looked into how this could have happened said the attacks revealed failures in policy, capabilities, and management. Above all, they revealed a failure of imagination: government leaders and experts simply did not imagine that such devastation could be caused “by a tiny group of people, not enough to man a full platoon,” armed with trivial resources, and “dispatched by an organization based in one of the poorest, most remote, and least industrialized countries on earth” (United States 2004, 339).

Stranded in Europe that fateful day because of the shutdown of commercial air traffic, a group of high-level Pentagon civilian and military personnel travelled back aboard a borrowed US Air Force KC-135 aerial refuelling tanker — and used the time to think through what the US response should be. Their conclusion was that the main objective should not be to bring the perpetrators to justice

or to retaliate but *to prevent another attack*. It was not law enforcement that was required but a strategy for war to deal with a new kind of enemy. It is this strategy that both the Bush and Obama administrations have followed ever since (Feith 2008, 6).

A year after 9/11, Washington released *The National Security Strategy of the United States 2002* (United States 2002), the latest version of a policy document issued periodically over the decades. The strategy declared that the United States would pursue two aims in parallel. One was purely defensive: to head off future attacks against the United States and its allies, prevent enemies from threatening the United States and its allies with weapons of mass destruction, and strengthen their collective ability to defeat global terrorism. The other was interventionist and transformative: to help make the world “not just safer but better” by working with others to defuse regional conflicts and champion aspirations for political and economic freedom.



The Naval History and Heritage Command

USS Arizona capsizing Dec. 7, 1941: The Pearl Harbor attack shocked Americans out of isolationism.

These aims straddled the twin approaches to foreign policy the United States had followed for more than two hundred years, and ought to have been acceptable to advocates of both isolation and intervention. But in the toxic politics of the time, some saw in the language of the *National Security Strategy* evidence of a strong tilt toward intervention. What most worried critics of the Bush administration was the following:

Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.

For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction — and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.... In an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather. (United States 2002, 15.)

The 2006 version of the *National Security Strategy* indicated that the Bush administration was not inclined to change course, much as the United States and its allies were then in the darkest days of the war in Iraq. But the new version went to some lengths to provide context for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, context as controversial as the doctrine of pre-emption:

The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsi-

bility in the international system. This is the best way to provide enduring security for the American people.

Achieving this goal is the work of generations. The United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to what our country faced in the early years of the Cold War. The 20th century witnessed the triumph of freedom over the threats of fascism and communism. Yet a new totalitarian ideology now threatens, an ideology grounded not in secular philosophy but in the perversion of a proud religion. Its content may be different from the ideologies of the last century, but its means are similar: intolerance, murder, terror, enslavement, and repression. (United States 2006, 1.)

The Obama administration came to office on a political platform to reverse the course of US security policy. It has not. In *National Security Strategy 2010*, the administration articulates an approach that differs only rhetorically, not substantively. US priorities are to “strengthen security and resilience at home”; to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qai'da and its violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan and around the world”; and to “reverse the spread of nuclear and biological weapons” (United States 2010, vii).

It was not US policy to withdraw from the world but to “[renew] American leadership so that we can more effectively advance our interests in the 21st century.” The goal is “a world in which individuals enjoy more freedom and opportunity and nations have incentives to act responsibly, while facing consequences when they do not” (1–2).

Common themes

The French, British, and US national security strategies are each clearly the product of their respective histories, circumstances, and aspirations — as would be those of any other country, including Canada. But their common elements are notable. They share much the same appreciation of the problems to be confronted, the solutions they propose are not materially different, and they all promote the importance of a balanced and multidimensional approach. Security has both domestic and foreign dimensions, requires a comprehensive tool kit of political, economic, social, and military instruments, and must engage the whole nation.

THE WORLD ON CANADA'S DOORSTEP

The twentieth century was arguably the most murderous 100 years in human history. Technology had a lot to do with it. The instruments of war had never been so developed, while advances in transportation and communications meant disputes tended to spill more easily across borders and transform regional conflicts into world wars. Some 37 million were killed or wounded in World War I, more than 60 million in World War II. On a single day in 1916 (July 1), in the First Battle of the Somme in France, the British Expeditionary Force suffered 57,000 casualties, most in the first hour. But that was not the worst of it.

Unbelievably, another 130 million people were killed by their own governments during the past century — in social engineering schemes orchestrated by fascist and communist ideologues for whom mass murder was an acceptable method for achieving their supposed higher objectives. The best-known culprits were the Nazis, who were responsible for killing some 17.1 million people, 95 percent of them minority populations, notably Jews. But Russian and Chinese communists murdered an estimated 64.5 million and 35.6 million, respectively. Communist regimes in Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Vietnam, and North Korea between them are estimated to have killed another 5.8 million, while elsewhere in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, governments killed an estimated 7.8 million of their own people. This was murder on an industrial scale (see Scully 1997).

The defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan, people hoped, would be the end of fascism. Similarly, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was supposed to herald the end of communism. China might claim still to be communist, but “capitalism” was clearly on the march there. It was, then, “the end of history,” in the words of Francis Fukuyama (1989): after a century of struggle, liberal democracy had emerged victorious over its two long-time adversaries and was soon to be the norm everywhere.

What better evidence was there for this assessment than the decisions of the captive nations and the satellite states of Central and Eastern Europe, and of a united Germany, to opt for the Western way of life? Within 15 years of the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, most of the freed countries had moved to cement their ties to the liberal democratic world by joining both NATO and the European Union. The first provided for their security — they no longer had anything to

fear from overbearing neighbours; while the second provided for their prosperity — they would abide by rules of commerce and public finance that would free their markets and stimulate economic growth. Today, these states enjoy a sense of security and a standard of living never before achieved in their history. The people had chosen, and chosen well.

As for the victors, many believed it was time to reap the rewards in the form of a “peace dividend.” Within 10 years, the defence budgets of NATO countries dropped from 4.5 percent of gross domestic product to an average of 2.7 percent (CDAI/CDFAI 2010, 45). There was war in this “time of peace” — in the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. But Europeans and North Americans alike fervently believed that the troubles of the 1990s amounted to little more than a difficult phase in the transition to a “new world order.” Security and defence were anachronistic concepts. Aid and development and “multilateralism” were the way of the future.

There were dissenting voices. At Harvard University, Samuel P. Huntington posed the question whether the “clash of civilizations” might not dominate world politics as much in the future as the clash of ideologies had in the past. The main trouble spots, he observed, all seemed to be on the “fault lines” between civilizations, with the boundaries of the Muslim world the most troublesome. Lester Pearson, he pointed out, had thought so, too, 40 years earlier: “The most far-reaching problems arise no longer between nations within a single civilization but between civilizations themselves” (Huntington 1996, 39). Journalist Robert A. Kaplan warned of a “coming anarchy” of ethnic violence, failed states, ecological disasters, and “hybrid” regimes espousing democracy but actually run by military, security, or criminal elements. “Evil wears new masks,” he wrote (Kaplan 2000, xi). Policymakers generally wrote them off as eccentrics or worse.

The terrorist attacks on Tuesday morning, September 11, 2001, provided the jolt of reality that brought governments back to earth and launched a new age of security planning and action that is likely to last a generation.

The New World Disorder

The sudden and unexpected end to the Cold War and the traumatic events of 9/11 were historical events of the first order. They will rank in future with such events as the as-

sassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary, which sparked World War I, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Cuban missile crisis. But it is important to remember that not everything changed as a result. Three things, in particular, did not change.

First, we still live in a world of nation-states. And it is still national governments that make the decisions — not international institutions or nongovernmental organizations. States continue to generate the biggest problems we face and remain our best hope for fixing these problems. States unhappy with their lot in life cause the disputes and take the steps that lead to wars. And it is other states, not the UN or the International Criminal Court or Amnesty International, that bring these wars to an end. When famine and droughts occur, it is typically because states have failed their people. And when relief arrives, it might be delivered by specialized agencies of the UN or private organizations such as the Red Cross — but the bulk of the food aid, medical supplies, tents, and water is provided by national governments and paid for by their taxpayers.

Second, power still settles things, and states that want to play an international leadership role need to have some. The traditional sources of power — military capability, wealth, natural resources, population, geographical location — remain as important as ever. Power derived from these sources is still decisive when the issue is survival or resisting aggression. But such power is less easily transferable to some of the security problems that confront states today, such as arresting the spread of nuclear weapons or cutting off financing to terrorist organizations. For these, “soft power” — the ability to influence outcomes through the power of one’s ideas, persuasiveness, and reputation — can be key. International leaders have both kinds.

Third, leading internationally is possible only if you are confident that your home base is secure and rendered largely invulnerable to attack. The greatest and most common risk a state runs in adopting a robust and forward-leaning position on a matter of international security is that an adversary will take offence and respond in some way. In conflicts between states, escalation can take many forms, ranging from diplomatic warnings to economic sanctions to military responses. In recent years, al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have threatened or taken action to try to coerce states to abandon their support for the war on terrorism — in particular, to withdraw their troops from the coalitions that have been

fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such coercion has rarely succeeded, with one outstanding exception. In March 2004, an al Qaeda-inspired group bombed four Madrid commuter trains and killed 191 people just three days before national elections in Spain. The attacks contributed directly to the defeat of the conservative government of President José Maria Aznar and its replacement by a socialist government, which promptly recalled Spanish troops serving in Iraq.

It is good news that the Soviet Union is gone and no longer poses an existential threat. The bad news is that the world is still plagued by disputes between states that could turn from cold to hot; by several dozen instances of states barely able to qualify as states anymore because chronic civil wars and insurrections have wiped out their ability to govern themselves; by an underground market in arms, including the materials and technology required to build nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; and by rogue states desperate to acquire such weapons to deter and intimidate others.

The really bad news is that there is also a new world war under way, though it is still mostly a low-intensity war for now. When and how it began is a matter of debate, and how it will all end is unclear. Unusually, the enemy is hard to define, his aims murky, and his methods of warfare unlike any ever employed before. But it is most definitely a world war of some kind, pitting radical Islamist organizations against Muslim governments in the Middle East and South Asia and against democratic societies in Europe, North America, and the Pacific. The war has already killed and injured hundreds of thousands, caused the mobilization of large military formations and their despatch to the Gulf and Afghanistan, and compelled dozens of countries to

build up their security apparatus and protect their cities and critical infrastructure. Whether to call this situation a war is a matter of some controversy. Many would prefer to believe the problem is something less than war. But however described, it is not peace.

In approaching the problem, we would do well to remember that the enemy of democratic states in any age is any set of beliefs about how society should be organized that does not provide for individual liberty under the law and for government dependent on the consent of the governed. “In the new conflict as in those against fascism and communism, the challenge is to deal with an anti-democratic ideology being imposed by force. The enemy is not Islam’s 1400-year old

The really bad news is that there is also a new world war under way, though it is still mostly a low-intensity war for now.

doctrine of belief in one God sustained by its five pillars of faith, prayer, charitable giving, fasting, and pilgrimage. The enemy is the Islamist political program to establish a universal state with a totalitarian form of government featuring the supremacy of Islam, rule by an Islamic priesthood, and the application of medieval tenets of Islamic law to both public and private life — and the promotion of that program through evangelism, subversion, intimidation, and violence. In brief, the enemy is not the state of Islam but the “Islamic state” (Fatah 2008, xii), not Muslims but Islamists.

In 2009, the arm of NATO responsible for ensuring its members stay attuned to the security and defence challenges they face reported it was unlikely democratic states would have to deal in future with the kind of large-scale conventional war they had had to plan for during the Cold War. The great powers were not about to attack each other, and regional disputes probably would be containable. More likely was that they would have to confront security problems resulting from “unbridled extremism, uncontrolled and illegal immigration, and friction caused by resource scarcity” (NATO 2009, 6).

In the view of NATO’s Allied Command Transformation, the motives of those wishing to attack could be rooted in “religious extremism, envy of or aversion to our accumu-

lated wealth and resources, or an assertion of power.” But it was their methods that were most worrisome. Because the groups involved would not have the resources of a state, they would have to resort to “hybrid” attacks that combined “traditional warfare with irregular warfare, terrorism and organized crime” and they would attack “our populations, our centres of commerce, and our integrated global economy, including our social networks and the facilitating, but vulnerable, global commons that we use to connect and prosper” (NATO 2009, 7). Reliance on technology had increased the vulnerabilities of advanced societies, and adversaries would use that technology against them — including, if they could, the technology of weapons of mass destruction.



Daniella Zalcman

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran at Columbia University in 2007.

In a sign of the times, the NATO report believed that adversaries would focus “less on attack than on a subversive undermining of what we are in essence, the fundamental principles that bind the Alliance.” Specifically, adversaries would attack “the compact we have with governments, our solidarity, and the values we hold dear — the sanctity of life, individual liberty, and liberal democracy based on the rule of law.” Such a strategy would use both physical and psychological means. Psychologically, adversaries would try to use “our civil norms, legal frameworks and freedom of the media against us” (NATO 2009, 7) to manipulate and convince others to reject the liberal democratic way of life.

CANADA'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

If we define national security as the preservation of a people's way of life against all dangers, it is clearly the first obligation of the state and the most important service a government has to deliver. In the twenty-first century, governments in Canada as elsewhere will find it a challenge to secure people and territory from physical attack or coercion, from internal subversion, and from erosion of the political, economic, social, cultural, and religious values that distinguish life in this country.

Canada and Canadians must be secured not only against traditional military threats but also against new ones emanating from the hybrid attacks of Islamist and other extremist groups armed with advanced technology intending to exploit the vulnerabilities of open societies, possibly armed with the destructive power of weapons of mass destruction previously owned only by states careful to guard their use. Transnational crime syndicates with enormous financial resources at their disposal will also pose a problem in the realms of narcotics, human trafficking, and illegal migration. In remote corners of the world, the failure of states to fulfill their most fundamental responsibilities will continue to generate mass movements of refugees, health pandemics, and ecological disasters of such magnitude that Canadians will feel the effects.

Some of the threats Canadians face today did not exist a generation or two ago. Most now blur traditional distinctions between domestic and international security, at a time when Canada's interests have also become global through trade, travel, and immigration. The result is that Canada's national security interests today require a national security strategy as sophisticated and multidimensional as the threats we face and as flexible as our new security frontiers are porous. Such a strategy has a foundation to build on, but there is work to do.

An effective twenty-first-century Canadian national security strategy should have five main objectives:

- to reduce Canadian vulnerabilities;
- to create layered defences against the various threats Canada faces;
- to take direct action against those threats;
- to address the factors that nourish security threats against Canada; and
- to modernize the international security architecture on which Canada's safety ultimately depends.

These objectives amount to Canada's pursuing both a "home game" to protect its citizens and an "away game" to deal with security problems as far from Canada's shores as possible.

Reducing Canadian vulnerabilities

Within Canada, the principal security threat is to our communities and to the critical infrastructure that links them together and assures the security of our food, water, and energy resources and our access to vital health and emergency services.

Protecting the community at large in time of peace seldom poses more than a routine law enforcement challenge. Protecting the community in wartime tends also to be a relatively straightforward matter. War measures decreed by government and sanctioned by Parliament establish the rules people are expected to abide by, and they generally prove broadly acceptable as a reasonable temporary compromise of civil liberties in the greater interest of protecting citizens and winning the war. But protecting the community in conditions between peace and war is fraught with problems. Some will argue normal law enforcement is fully adequate; others will insist special measures are necessary. And government, with the ultimate responsibility of getting it right, will struggle to find common ground between two positions both arguing that a middle course would be ruinous. Substance aside, it is also important that antiterrorism legislation not assume that conditions will revert to "normal" any time soon.

Canada's immigrant communities pose a different kind of problem. Immigrants have been a source of great wealth for Canada over the years and an unmatched asset in the international trade that sustains Canadians' high standard of living. But immigration also provides a conduit for importing problems such as chronic disputes between nationalities or ethnic groups, transnational crime enterprises, and ideas and behaviours alien to the Canadian way

of life. Over the years, few have doubted that the balance of advantage favoured Canada. Not anymore, for the evidence has been building that the volume and composition of immigration is outstripping society's capacity to absorb and acclimatize the new arrivals. Schools, hospitals, and service agencies are being overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of the new arrivals they have to deal with, leaving every individual who does not receive the necessary attention — particularly the young and impressionable — vulnerable to the predators within their community. Immigration without assimilation and the radicalization of youth can be catastrophic for both social harmony and security.

New Canadians from countries with repressive regimes are more vulnerable than the average immigrant to intimidation and to recruitment to a terrorist or criminal enterprise, because of an ingrained distrust of government and the police. Effective national security will require a diligent and sustained effort by public services at every level to protect immigrant communities, particularly Muslim communities vulnerable to exploitation by jihadist elements, and to demonstrate through their actions that the state is in fact there to protect them.

In the meantime, Canada will remain an attractive haven for terrorist and criminal organizations until government better calibrates the flow of new arrivals, exercises greater control over entry to the country, fixes Canada's dysfunctional refugee determination system, and convinces the courts to show greater deference toward the country's security and intelligence agencies.

Protection of the country's complex and interconnected critical infrastructure — power plants, transmission lines, water purification facilities, financial centres, industry, science and technology centres, agriculture, food distribution, hospitals, police and public services, computer networks, databases, and telecommunications — represents a management problem of the first order in a country as geographically vast as Canada.

Physical plant tends to be relatively simple to secure, complicated though the issue can be by the fact that the majority of Canada's infrastructure is owned by the private sector. Rather more difficult is the protection of widely distributed and exposed transmission lines, whose vulnerability Canadians have learned all about in recent years.

An even greater challenge is to secure the country's information and communications systems, both governmental and private. To date, considerable success appears to have been achieved in this area. Where the country may be most vulnerable in the short term is in the field of disease surveillance and control and in the community's capacity to control health pandemics.

Layered defences

Securing Canada requires full awareness of what is happening within Canada; active defence of Canada's air and sea approaches, borders, and ports of entry; cooperative arrangements with the United States and Mexico for the common defence of North America; and eyes and ears on the world. This is a tall order for a country with limited resources and what seems like unlimited geography, and historically Canadians have been stoic about what they could do alone. They accepted risks against the belief that

Canada was unlikely to be the direct target of aggression, and ultimately they vested their security in cooperative arrangements with the United States and membership in the North Atlantic alliance.

Clearly this will no longer do. Canada faces security threats at home and abroad that only Canada itself can deal with. "Smart borders" with the United States require significant resources on

the Canadian side. National defence takes military capability that only Canada can provide, unless the country is prepared to cede sovereign functions to the United States.

Five priorities loom large for the future.

Domain Awareness

One is to enhance our capacity to know what is happening on Canada's land mass and in its coastal waters. Not long ago, a Senate study (Canada 2003) reported that Canada's coastlines were vast, vulnerable, and largely unattended, posing a risk not only for Canada but also for the United States, which counts on its northern neighbour not to become a route into the United States for those wishing to strike at it. The Senate study recommended more naval patrols, better aerial reconnaissance, enhanced connectivity between the Navy and the Coast Guard, and more comprehensive RCMP surveillance of ports. Some of this is happening, but there is still a long way to go.

Canada will remain an attractive haven for terrorist and criminal organizations until government exercises greater control over entry to the country.

A Common Security Perimeter


Another priority is to build a common security perimeter around North America, initially encompassing Canada and the United States but eventually including Mexico. The events of 9/11 demonstrated both that North America was vulnerable to attack and that the United States was worried about Canada. Since that fateful day, the two countries have put enormous effort into securing the border between them — that is, *in defending each country from the other*. This is not something that makes sense for either side, considering the enormous challenge involved in trying to restrict the movement across the border of terrorists or the clandestine passage of materials and equipment for weapons of mass destruction while also maintaining the free flow of people and goods across that same border. Better for both, one would think, to put their effort into defending the continent as a whole through establishing a common security perimeter in the Arctic and up and down the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, and jointly working on identifying and dealing with security problems before they ever arrive in North America.

Both sides would have to make adjustments, and no doubt some Canadians would worry that cooperating with the United States in such a venture would lead to oblivion for Canada. But in light of how successful previous joint ventures have been — the International Joint Commission, the St. Lawrence Seaway, the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD), the North American Free Trade Agreement — the existential angst of a few ought not to be allowed to stand in the way of the security of all.

Continental Defence Architecture

A third priority is to rationalize the North American defence architecture — that is, to improve the working linkages between the various security and defence institutions that the United States and Canada have created. For half a century, the management of Canada-United States defence relations rested with two institutions: the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, created in 1940 to coordinate planning against a possible German attack, and NORAD, created in 1958 to warn of Soviet bomber or missile attack against the continent. The events of 9/11 transformed the North American threat environment and brought into existence four additional institutions with missions related to the security and defence of the two countries: in the

security field, the Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety Canada, and in the defence field, US Northern Command and Canada Command. The mandates of the two sets of institutions are sufficiently similar to suggest comparisons between them, but there are also sufficient differences between them that cooperation has not always come easily. If they could be made to work together more smoothly, the security and defence of the two countries would be powerfully strengthened.



U.S. Navy photo

Japanese destroyer JS Kirishima launches an SM-3 that successfully intercepted a ballistic missile in a joint exercise with U.S. ships off Hawaii.

Canada's Participation in Missile Defence

A fourth priority is to consider again the merits of Canadian participation in ballistic missile defence. Beneath the overblown rhetoric that has characterized public debate in Canada over this issue lies a simple truth: missiles represent a growing problem for all Western countries, and all are actively building defences against them — except Canada.

The threat is real. A study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace lists 31 countries with ballistic missile programs (Cirincione, Wolfsthal, and Rajkumar 2005). Two of these, Iran and North Korea, are rogue nuclear states whose plans include expanding the range of their existing missiles so that they can reach North America. The proliferation of missile technology also introduces the possibility of a well-financed terrorist organization such as al Qaeda's firing a nuclear-armed missile off an ocean-going container ship or tanker in the maritime approaches to North America.

Canada must be diplomatically active on issues arising anywhere in the world that could pose a threat to international peace and security, lead to war, or produce effects that could impact negatively on Canada itself.

The defensive measures that states are taking are also real. In addition to the national programs of the United States and Japan — both targets of North Korea — the NATO alliance has been working on a program to defend alliance territory, forces, and population centres from missile attack. Canada, of course, is a member of NATO; for some reason, it seems able to support missile defence for others, just not for itself.

A Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service

The time has also arrived to end another long debate, this one over the establishment of a Canadian foreign intelligence service. A foreign intelligence capacity — the ability to use clandestine as well as overt means to collect information about the capabilities and intentions of foreign states and groups — is a fundamental asset of statecraft. All of Canada's major allies and adversaries have such a capacity to ensure that their leaders are in possession of the fullest information possible when reaching important decisions. Canada is the anomaly in not having a foreign intelligence service.

Over the years, opponents have argued that Canada either does not need the information or can get it from its allies (arguments that contradict each other). What is sure is that Canada has interests of its own to protect and should not have to rely on others for any of the information it needs.

What is also sure is that, today, Canada cannot do what its closest allies can, namely:

- confirm independently information provided by others when Canada has a great deal at stake;
- secure full and timely intelligence on the positions of foreign states on matters of special interest to Canada;
- target foreign states or groups engaged in activities detrimental to specifically Canadian interests or intended to harm Canadian government leaders, officials, diplomats, military missions, commercial enterprises, banks, and so on; and
- uncover undisclosed but hostile policies intended to harm Canada or Canadians.

Governments have recognized the logic of these arguments and existing legislation (section 16 of the CSIS Act) already permits a limited degree of foreign intelligence collection. But governments have not acted on these arguments for reasons that have little to do with the security of Canadians, including cost and potential controversy. In light of what lies ahead in the 21st century, it might be better to wonder whether Canada can afford any longer not to have its own foreign intelligence service.

Taking action against threats

Canada's security begins at home, but the threats mostly emanate from abroad, and it is there they are best dealt with. The conclusion this leads to is that Canada must be able to act on several fronts.

First, Canada must be diplomatically active on issues arising anywhere in the world that could pose a threat to international peace and security, lead to war, or produce effects that could impact negatively on Canada itself. On some issues, the Prime Minister must lead, though routinely it is the business of ministers and officials to engage in the discussions on strategy and to help negotiate agreements to resolve issues. They require the support of diplomatic missions with the staff and resources to exercise influence and broker solutions as necessary — at the UN, at NATO, in the regional organizations where issues are discussed, and in the national capitals of the states most involved in any particular issue.

Diplomatic engagement traditionally has been a Canadian strength, but in recent years Canada has seldom taken the lead on a major political or security issue. The Mulroney

Canada must have the capability to deploy and sustain military forces virtually anywhere in the world where international intervention might be required to maintain international peace and security.

government was active in security questions; its successors have not been. In the 1990s, the Chrétien government studiously avoided Canadian participation in the “contact groups” that assumed special responsibilities to try to resolve particularly knotty problems in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Asia. Under Stephen Harper, Canada today remains

largely an outsider looking in while others try to negotiate peaceful solutions to problems in Palestine, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea — all of which affect Canadian security.

Second, the resources Canada devotes to its international operations must be spent carefully and purposefully. Public money directed at protecting and promoting Canadian interests abroad is around \$25 billion a year. Much of that money supports largely “nondiscretionary” activities such as operating diplomatic and consular missions, financing the headquarters of departments and agencies, paying Canada’s membership dues at the UN, NATO, and dozens of other international organizations, and developing and sustaining the Canadian Forces. But a significant portion of the total is invested at the government’s discretion in good works abroad such as humanitarian relief, poverty alleviation, health, basic education, environmental sustainability, private sector development, governance, and the promotion of gender equity. In fiscal year 2010/11, the Canadian International Development Agency budgeted some \$3.25 billion for such programs. At issue is how much of this money is devoted to improving conditions either in states that are on the “frontline” of the war of terrorism, whose success bears directly on Canada’s security, or in failed states that are incubating the security problems of the future. The short answer is relatively little.

Third, Canada must be able to marshal sufficient resources to take action to frustrate terrorist activities abroad, above all those that may be directed at Canada, and to disrupt the

clandestine arms markets that sustain them. It is hard work to adapt the processes and institutions of the arms-control and counter-proliferation regimes of earlier times to the security realities of today, in some cases requiring the jettisoning of old attitudes and habits. But the danger posed by an al Qaeda team armed with a “dirty bomb” or biological agent is at least as great as that stemming from a rogue state in possession of a weapon of mass destruction and the means to deliver it.

Fourth, Canada must have the capability to deploy and sustain military forces virtually anywhere in the world where international intervention might be required to maintain international peace and security. This includes the capacity to intervene to protect populations suffering serious harm as a result of internal wars or repression and their government’s failure to take corrective action. The “responsibility to protect” means little without the capacity to intervene. It is not a capacity to be employed for frivolous purposes, but it is one Canada has taken pains to acquire, employed at considerable sacrifice in the Balkans and Afghanistan and not one to be squandered in future by denying the Canadian Forces the personnel, equipment, and training they need. The capacity to intervene is an essential instrument of Canadian security policy.

Addressing factors that nourish threats

As the NATO Multiple Futures Project advises, security threats may arise from a variety of motivations: religious extremism, aversion to the accumulated wealth and resources of others, or the impulse to assert power. Each requires its own strategy.

Religious extremism undoubtedly will be the most difficult to address. For the foreseeable future, the threat is likely to emanate almost entirely from extremism rooted in either Sunni or Shia Islam. Radical offshoots of other major religions, while no less prone to violence in the past, are not expected to constitute a comparable security threat, at least in the next decade. Public Safety Canada currently lists over 40 terrorist organizations worldwide, more than half of which are Islamist in orientation.

In the case of Islamist extremists, the main difficulty is that their ideology prevents them from accepting any outcome other than the total submission of their adversaries, whether Muslim or not. Since their adversaries — other Muslims, apostates, or infidels — are not likely to succumb, the prospect that this zero-sum game will produce

a satisfactory outcome for them is remote. The struggle can be expected to play out largely in the Muslim world, where it has been most intense and the casualties have been greatest. But it will be mirrored in other countries with significant Muslim minorities, as factions compete for the loyalty of community members and seek soft-target outlets for acts of violence perpetrated for political effect. Canada has little option other than to work with Muslim communities to try to undermine support for the radicals and to work with other democratic states to disrupt and defeat the terrorist networks.

Poverty is overrated as a driver of politically motivated violence, but it is not to be dismissed entirely. The process of globalization has lifted millions out of poverty, but it has also left millions more to eke out an existence — sometimes just across the road — in desperate and often hopeless conditions. The plight of certain Canadian First Nation communities is a case in point. Circumstances such as these fuel a sense of exclusion that can lead to outbreaks of violence, initially against local authorities and in due course against others, and eventually may induce better-off members of the community to take up the cause. In the final analysis, it is almost always educated and somewhat privileged individuals who form the terrorist cells. So development assistance can play a role in making the world not just a better but a safer place, provided it is well aimed and administered.

Modernizing the security architecture

Today's international security institutions are mostly mid-twentieth-century constructs struggling to find solutions to problems largely unknown at the time they were created. Efforts have been made to modernize their mandates and procedures, but with limited success. It should be a priority to ensure that the new century has the institutions it needs for the problems of its time.

The United Nations has never lived up to its security responsibilities, and the time has come to consider putting more effective arrangements in place for the maintenance of international peace and security. To date, the UN has defied serious reform in just about every area of security. Security Council decisions no longer carry the weight they used to, too often reflect wish rather than determination, and are routinely defied with impunity. The General Assembly retains little of the moral authority it once had as the voice of the "international community," more than half of its members are despotic regimes of the left

or right, and its resolutions are often an affront to decency and common sense. After the disasters of Rwanda and Srebrenica, some progress was made in how the UN manages peace operations, but they continue to be compromised by mandates that are not resourced for success and by command structures no professional military organization would ever accept. In some cases, reform has been a subterfuge, as when the UN terminated its bigoted Human Rights Commission and replaced it with the equally bigoted Human Rights Council.

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The war between democracy and despotism at the UN is not new. In the mid-1970s, the renowned Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then serving as US ambassador to the United Nations, alerted the world to the assault on democratic ideals being conducted by the then new majority of despotic states.⁴ The UN was a dangerous place, he wrote afterwards, and it is no less so today. The organization's institutional susceptibility to the views of blocs opposed to individual liberty is driving customary international law in directions no democratic state would choose — but might in due course be compelled to accept.⁵

In contrast, NATO has adapted rather better to the changed environment both in protecting its members and in supplying the UN with the professional resources needed to address difficult security issues. Regional organizations in Asia, Africa, and the Americas have been slower to adjust, but they should not be ruled out as potentially decisive players in resolving peace and security issues in their own neighbourhoods.

International law has also failed to keep up with changes in the global strategic context. The most urgent need is for legal parameters to govern the actions of states in the war against terror. At present, democratic states often face an impossible choice: Follow the law as it was written long ago for other purposes and put an important war aim at risk, such as the protection of civilians; or dispense with the law and put the legitimacy of the entire war effort at

risk. Philip Bobbitt, the author of two outstanding books on international security affairs, states the case succinctly:

We must develop new rules of international law that incorporate [the new] parameters. These rules would be used to determine when it is permissible for one state to intervene in another's affairs in order to protect itself or its allies from terrorism or to protect civilians from catastrophic events or preclude the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] (*jus ad bellum*). Similarly, they would govern the ways states may lawfully treat prisoners during warfare and the actions of the defense forces (*jus in bello*). Obviously the Geneva Conventions apply in some fashion to all

prisoners....[But] what treatment is to be accorded terrorist prisoners of the Wars against Terror? They are not combatants in uniform, with a publicly acknowledged chain of command, to whom the status of [prisoner of war] is accorded. But they are not spies or partisans either. (Bobbitt 2008, 531; see also Bobbitt 2002.)

The time has come to create an international law reform commission to tackle some of the more egregious disconnects between current international law and practice — and to finish the UN's work on an international convention outlawing terrorism, begun in 1998 when India first tabled a draft.⁶

ABOUT THE AUTHOR



PAUL CHAPIN is a veteran of Canada's foreign service and a specialist in international security affairs. During more than 25 years with the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, he served in Tel Aviv, Moscow, at NATO headquarters in Brussels, and in Washington as minister-counsellor in charge of the political section of the Canadian Embassy. He was also DFAIT's director for political and strategic analysis, and director-general for security policy and operations in the Office of the Solicitor General of Canada.

Following 10 years as an independent management consultant, in 2003 Mr. Chapin was appointed director general for international security at DFAIT, responsible for managing the operations of Canada's missions to NATO, the UN in Geneva, and the IAEA and OSCE in Vienna. In that capacity, he co-chaired meetings of the Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence, negotiated renewal of the NORAD agreement, explored terms for Canada's participation in BMD, and worked closely with colleagues in other departments on the deployment of Canadian Forces to Afghanistan, Haiti and Sudan.

In 2006, Mr. Chapin joined the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre as Vice President (Programs) where he was responsible for business development and management of PPC's worldwide training programs. He now teaches at the School of

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CONCLUSION

Reflecting on the circumstances that led to the outbreak of World War II, Winston Churchill imparted some wisdom for those charged with responsibility for the safety and security of their people:

The Sermon on the Mount is the last word in Christian ethics. Everyone respects the Quakers. Still, it is not on these terms that Ministers assume their responsibilities of guiding states. Their duty is first so to deal with other nations as to avoid strife and war and to eschew aggression in all its forms, whether for nationalistic or ideological objects. But the safety of the State, the lives and freedom of their own fellow countrymen, to whom they owe their position, make it right and imperative in the last resort, or when a final and definitive conviction has been reached, that the use of force should not be excluded. If the circumstances are such as to warrant it, force may be used. And if this be so, it should be used under the conditions which are most favourable. There

is no merit in putting off a war for a year if, when it comes, it is a far worse war and one much harder to win. These are the tormenting dilemmas upon which mankind has throughout its history been so frequently impaled. (Churchill 1948, 320.)

The world remains a dangerous place and if Canadian governments are to discharge their primary duty to protect the citizenry, they must think more systematically about what really matters to Canadians (key interests), what the greatest dangers are to their interests (key threats) and how to organize the protection of those interests (key assets). A national security strategy is no substitute for effective action in specific cases, but without such a strategy governments are likely to react too late, too feebly, or in the wrong way to the security problems they will have to deal with. We might prefer to think the world holds few perils for us. But it just ain't so, and we need to be both intelligent and vigilant about our security.



Endnotes

1 In 1984, the act establishing the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) listed subversion as one of four threats to the security of Canada. It defined subversion as “Activities directed towards undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada.” The other listed threats were espionage/sabotage, foreign-influenced activities, and terrorism.

2 The page reference is to the English-language version of the White paper.

3 Harry Truman’s decision not to seek re-election in 1952 was heavily influenced by the political damage he was sustaining over Korea. The presidencies of both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were heavily tarnished by Vietnam. Jimmy Carter was a one-term president in large part because he was seen as weak in matters of war and peace (the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Iran hostage crisis that stretched for 444 days until the morning his successor was inaugurated). Throughout his two terms, Ronald Reagan was attacked relentlessly for being a “war-monger.” George H.W. Bush was defeated for a second term because Democrats painted him as too concerned about foreign affairs and not enough about domestic issues. George W. Bush, compelled into war by 9/11, won re-election despite the early failures of the US campaign in Iraq, and left office an unpopular president despite the later successes of that campaign.

4 Moynihan also worried that democratic states were not ready to fight the ideological battles they needed to, warning of “the pattern of avoidance to be expected from an elite losing its nerve” (Moynihan 1978, 226). He wondered why Western countries did not understand the leverage they enjoyed. “Let the Tanzanians get their aid,” he suggested, “from the same capitals from which they get their politics” (259).

5 Take, for example, the initiative of the 56-member Organization of the Islamic Conference for a global ban on “blasphemy.” Once a large enough number of countries support such an initiative, it arguably becomes part of customary international law — and Canadians would be expected to interpret their Charter of Rights and Freedoms accordingly.

6 Available online at www.un.org/law/terrorism.

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
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